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Abstract 
In the literature, a need was identified to consider the provision of drinking water to be 
a ‘high reliability’ societal service. This thesis reports on an investigation into the 
technical and organisational reliability of a defined section in the water utility sector 
and a Regional Water Utility. Here, the organisational reliability in operations and 
incident management, and, secondly, the management of technical reliability of water 
supply systems arising from risk-based asset management were the emphasis of this 
project.  
In order to substantiate this investigation, three main research components were 
designed and conducted: firstly, a characterisation of the nature of incidents and their 
impact on customers; secondly, an investigation into organisational capabilities to 
manage incidents and its role in maintaining a resilient water supply system that 
minimises the impact of incidents on customers, and thirdly, an investigation into risk-
based asset management strategies that provide and maintain the technical reliability of 
the water supply system. In the latter perspective, the opportunity to learn from previous 
incidents to enhance asset risk assessments was investigated.  
In this study, it was found that many HRO principles are readily observable in the water 
utilities that participated in this research. Following the characterisation of incidents, it 
is demonstrated that the observation of HRO principles during incident management has 
a positive effect on the overall reduction of incident impacts on customers. Beyond the 
immediate effect of HRO principles in incident management, it could be demonstrated 
that ‘learning from failure’ provides a mechanism to understand and manage future 
risks. The concept of incident meta-analysis is introduced that compares series of past 
incidents with documented perceived, future risks. The statistical analysis of incident 
time series facilitated the monitoring of incident trends, the validation of the risk model 
used in the Regional Water Utility and the verification of risk data, in particular for the 
risk components ‘probability, cause, effect and impact’. 
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Glossary 
Asset Plant, maschinery, property, buildings, vehicles and other items and 
related systems that have a distinct and quantifiable business function 
or service (British Standard Institution, 2003) 
Asset 
management 
Systematic and coordinated activities and practices through which and 
organisation optimally manages its assets, and their associated 
performance, risks and expenditures over their lifecycle for the purpose 
of achieving its statutory and/or regulatory obligations and economic 
levels of service (British Standard Institution, 2003) 
Asset 
inventory 
A standardised dataset covering the asset base of a water company. It 
divides assets into classifications and records physical attributes for 
each (Office of Water Services, 2007) 
Asset register A record of asset information including historical, financial, condition, 
construction, technical and financial information (NAMS Group, 
2006).  
Business 
objectives 
A goal that a company has set itself or is set by a regulator.  
Capital 
expenditure 
Expenditure used to create new assets or to increase the capability of 
existing assets beyond their original design capacity, capability or 
service potential (NAMS Group, 2006) 
Capital 
maintenance 
Planned work to replace, repair or refurbish waterassets to provide 
continuing services to customers (Office of Water Services, 2007).  
Cause An effect or event producing entity. 
Consequence The direct or indirect impact that [an event] has on the provision by the 
overall system of service to customers and the environment, and/or on 
[company] cost. (UK Water Industry Research Limited, 2002) 
Control 
measures 
Activities and processes applied to prevent or lessen risk events or risk 
consequences that might occur.  
Discounting A technique for converting cashflows that occur over time to an 
equivalent amount at a common point in time (NAMS Group, 2006). 
Frequency The number of occurrences within a specified period.  
Hazard An entity that has potential to cause harm.  
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Impact The measurable result of an incident (or risk event) and its effects.  
Incident An adverse impact on customers, the environment or normal operation 
of a water utility. 
Infrastructure Assets such as water mains, water treatment works, pumping stations 
and service reservoirs 
Life cycle 
(Asset) 
Time interval of an assets that commences with the identification of 
the need for an asset and terminates with the decommissioning of the 
asset or any liabilities thereafter (British Standard Institution, 2003) 
Net Present 
Value 
The present value of an asset derived from its future use in return for 
future cash flows 
Operating 
expenditures 
Expenditure for the daily running of assets and services.  
Probability or 
likelihood 
The chance of a defined outcome to eventuate which is based on 
sufficient information and knowledge. 
Risk The probability or frequency of adverse effects and impacts measured 
as a consequence. 
Risk 
assessment 
Qualitative or quantitative evaluation of risk.  
Risk 
management 
The process of risk assessment and decision making that considers 
measures to reduce, contain or accept identified risks.  
Risk 
mitigation  
Options to control or reduce risk. They may be applied to any 
identified risk causes or to control or reduce the impact.  
Root cause The underlying reasons that triggers an event or incident.  
Service Services to customers (e.g. the safe and reliable provision of drinking 
water), the environment (e.g. pollution control) and employees (e.g. 
health and safety at work) (UK Water Industry Research Limited, 
2002) 
Serviceability The capability of an asset to provide service (UK Water Industry 
Research Limited, 2002). 
Uncertainty Insufficient information and knowledge to confidently determine 
probabilities or frequencies.  
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Notation 
 
AWWARF  American Water Works Association Research Foundation 
Av   Average 
CBA   Cost Benefit Analysis 
CI 95%  Confidence interval at 95% 
CAPEX  Capital Expenditure 
D   Duration 
DOMS   Distribution Operations & Maintenance Strategy 
DMA   Distribution Management Area 
DWI   Drinking Water Inspectorate 
ETA   Event tree analysis 
F   Frequency of incidents 
FTA   Failure tree analysis 
H   Hazard 
H0   Null hypothesis 
HACCP  Hazard Analysis, Critical Control Points 
HAZOP  Hazards and Operability study 
HRO   High Reliability Organisation 
HRT   High Reliability Theory 
IT   Information Technology 
MTBF   Mean time between failures 
NAT   Normal Accident Theory 
NPV   Net Present Value 
OFWAT  Office of Water Services 
OPEX   Operational Expenditure 
P   Population 
RCM   Reliability Centred Maintenance 
RWU   Regional Water Utility 
SCADA  Supervisory control and Data acquisition 
SD   Standard Deviation 
SE   Standard error 
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SL   Significance level 
SRE   Service reservoir for drinking water 
SN   National standard 
WACC  Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
WHO    World Health Organisation 
WPS   Water pumping station 
WSP   Water Safety Plan 
WT   Water tower 
WTW   Water treatment works 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis reports on the investigation into the technical and organisational reliability 
of a defined section of the water utility sector and a Regional Water Utility in particular.  
Chapter 1 introduces the background, literature review, aims, objectives, and outline 
methodology for this research project. Recent academic publications have focussed on 
major failures in water supply organisations to provide safe drinking water to customers 
(Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004) and risk management systems are increasingly promoted as 
a means to control failure (World Health Organisation, 2004). Others have argued that 
the provision of drinking water should be a ‘high reliability’ societal service, subject to 
the sectoral rigours inherent to the nuclear, offshore and aerospace industries (Pollard et 
al., 2005).  
Based on the literature review, it was decided to investigate high reliability theory in the 
water utility context. Firstly, a need was identified to investigate how water utilities 
cope under trying conditions. Secondly, a need was identified to understand how water 
utilities learn from trying conditions, in particular to enhance assessments of perceived, 
future risks. This thesis places a particular emphasis on learning from failure to enhance 
risk assessments that are used in asset investment and maintenance decision making. 
The relationship of these themes is conceptualised in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 A high reliability organisations' perspective on technical reliability and organisational 
resilience 
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Chapter 2 investigates the causes, effects and impacts on customers of incidents in 
England and Wales and a Regional Water Utility. With a view to subsequent chapter, a 
methodology was adopted that enables a comparative assessment of incident impacts on 
customers. This methodology is used throughout this thesis to compare incidents but 
also to evaluate the consequential impact of perceived, future risks. The findings of this 
chapter are subsequently used to validate the risk model and verify the risk data used in 
the Regional Water Utility.  
Based on the findings in the previous chapter, chapter 3 investigates the familiarity of 
the water sector with the principles identified in the HRO literature. A HRO framework 
was developed as an organisational assessment tool that was used to survey a number of 
water utilities but also to structure observations, interviews and document reviews. This 
chapter emphasises the organisational ability to remain resilient under trying conditions, 
i.e. during incident management. The previously introduced assessment of incident 
impacts is used as a metric to correlate observations and assessments of HRO in the 
Regional Water Utility. 
Chapter 4 investigates the organisational ability to learn from incidents with a particular 
emphasis on enhancing risk assessments for subsequent risk-based asset management 
decision making. The use of risk data in the asset investment and maintenance decision-
making process is further illustrated and findings from the second chapter are used to 
validate the risk model and verify the risk data acquired in the Regional Water Utility.  
Chapter 5 investigates the financial and customer evaluation of risk in the water sector. 
In addition to prior art of risk-based decision making in the literature, the previous 
chapter further established and verified a distinct relationship between the price of risk 
and the cost of risk reduction. In this chapter, the influence of the price of risk or the 
benefit of risk reduction in asset management decision making is investigated and it is 
sought to explain why incidents occur despite the availability of risk assessments that 
predicted failure.  
The subsequent chapters discuss the research findings, present the conclusions and 
suggest further work.  
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1.1 Background 
A water utility’s prime objective is to provide “good safe drinking water that has the 
trust of consumers.” Water must be safe, reliable, of good aesthetic quality and 
maintain the trust and confidence of customers (International Water Association, 2004).  
The probability of an event or incident with an adverse impact on this objective is a 
public health risk and their management is the primary function of the water utility 
sector (Ministry of Health, 2005b). 
Dramatic incidents in recent years, such as the E. coli and Campylobacter jejuni related 
outbreak in Walkerton in 2000 (O'Connor, 2002), the outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in 
north Battleford (Laing, 2002), various Cryptosporidium outbreaks in the UK 
(Badenoch, 1995; Bouchier, 1998) and in Milwaukee (MacKenzie et al., 1994), led to 
an increased emphasis in the water sector to explicitly assess and mange risks. E.g., the 
Water Supply (Water Quality) (Amendment) Regulation 1999 (Department of 
Environment, 1999) introduced the legal and regulatory framework to assess and 
manage Cryptosporidium risk in drinking water supplies (Colbourne, 2004; Drinking 
Water Inspectorate, 1999). Increasing use of explicit assessment and management of 
public health risk is also the subject in the Bonn Charter (International Water 
Association, 2004) and the World Health Organisation’s Guidelines for Drinking Water 
Quality (World Health Organisation, 2004; Deere et al., 2001) which introduce the 
concept of Drinking Water Safety Plans that are strongly supported by regulatory 
authorities (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2005a), implemented by water utilities (Lake, 
2004) and operationalised in IT-based models (Breach, 2004) for catchment to tap risk 
assessments.  
According to MacGillivray et al. (2006), the water sector has sufficient risk 
management tools and techniques at hand to assess and manage public health, technical 
and business risks. Descriptions and examples of risk strategies to provide safe and 
reliable drinking water are found in (Pollard et al., 2007; MacGillivray et al., 2007; 
Pollard et al., 2004; Pollard et al., 2005; Ministry of Health, 2005a; International Water 
Association, 2004; World Health Organisation, 2004; Deere et al., 2001). 
According to Pollard et al. (2005), the water sector has embarked on explicit risk 
management strategies and is making good progress in formulating risk management 
strategies to face practical implementation issues (Pollard et al., 2005). As part of an 
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Awwa Research Foundation (AWWARF) project, a capability maturity model has been 
developed for water companies to assess their risk management capabilities (Pollard et 
al., 2007; MacGillivray et al., 2007; Pollard et al., 2004). However, since the collapse 
of Enron, risk management systems, too, came under critical scrutiny. In 2000, Deloach 
(2000) praised Enron for its “leading edge in enterprise wide risk management”. Rather 
astonishingly, this enterprise wide risk management system failed to forecast Enron’s 
rapid escalation into catastrophic, economic failure which casts some doubts on the 
effectiveness of risk management systems in isolation of the organisational culture 
(Gebler, 2005). Cultural issues have also been identified in Hrudey et al. (2002) who 
investigated a series of incidents to conclude that “complacency” is “an endemic 
problem underlying water borne disease outbreaks”.  
The role of organisational culture in the management of incidents and risks was further 
researched in a recent project for the Awwa Research Foundation (Pollard et al., 2008). 
Culture in this context denotes “the way we do things here” (Johnson, 1992; Content, 
2005) and various case studies were compiled to illuminate processes, organisational 
and control structures, power structures, rituals and routines but also stories that 
circulate in the organisation and the symbols that identify how the organisation manages 
incidents and risks. This project had two emphases: firstly, on how water utilities 
manage incidents and, secondly, how water utilities manage risk, i.e. the probability of 
incidents. As a means to describe the context of management culture, a Regional Water 
Utility was benchmarked against the principles of high reliability organisations (Pollard 
et al., 2008) that were previously identified in the literature and communicated in 
Bradshaw et al. (2006). 
This thesis further focuses on the investigation of HRO principles in the water utility 
sector, in particular their effective contribution to incident impact reduction on 
customers and ‘learning from failure’ to enhance risk assessments. The latter aspect 
aims to identify a novel approach to learning from failure by using historical incident 
data to validate the structure of risk models and to verify risk data. It further seeks to 
find evidence for the influence of cultural settings as well as psychological and 
sociological factors that shape the understanding and perception of risk.  
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1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1 Literature review methodology 
The literature review comprised of a systematic review based on a rigorous, transparent 
and replicable methodology for locating, selecting and appraising relevant existing 
research studies (Bradshaw et al., 2006). Tranfield and Denyer et al. (2003) state that in 
order to ensure that reviews in the management field are rigorous, scientific 
investigations that limit bias and random error, they need to include: 
• the development of clear and precise aims and objectives; 
• pre-planned methods; 
• a comprehensive search of all potentially relevant articles; 
• the use of explicit reproducible criteria in the selection of articles for the review; 
• an appraisal of the quality of the research and the strength of the findings; 
• a synthesis of individual studies using an explicit analytical framework; and 
• a balanced, impartial and comprehensible presentation of the results. 
 
In this thesis, it was aimed to adhere to all these principles in undertaking the literature 
review on the principles of HROs, risk-based asset management and incident 
management and analysis.  
 
1.2.2 Water safety and reliability objectives 
In the UK, the water utility’s prime objective to provide “good safe drinking water that 
has the trust of consumers” (International Water Association, 2004) is reflected in the 
“level of service” and serviceability criteria (Office of Water Services, 1998; Drinking 
Water Inspectorate and Office of Water Services, 2001) that are used to regulate 
privatised water utilities. Serviceability is the ability of assets to maintain a standard of 
service that customers directly receive from a water utility and is a measure of 
exceedance or non-compliance against standards. This relates to asset performance and 
operational performance in four principal areas (Drinking Water Inspectorate and Office 
of Water Services, 2001; WRc and BHR, 2001): 
• Water quality from the assets. 
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• Capacity of assets and networks available to meet demand (Availability). 
• Reliability of assets and networks to supply services. 
• Customer satisfaction.  
 
In the regulated UK water industry, the regulatory objective of strategic maintenance 
planning is to maintain and enhance serviceability benefits to customers (UK Water 
Industry Research Limited, 2002). Water companies in England and Wales are required 
to appraise their capital maintenance planning in light of past and future maintenance to 
provide a view on long term trends on investment and financial requirements, whilst 
considering “the trade off between cost and risk” (Office of Water Services, 2000; 
Drinking Water Inspectorate and Office of Water Services, 2001; Day, 2006; Parsons, 
2005). The key elements of maintenance planning is the identification of failure modes 
with impact on customer service, the environment or cost to the water company if no 
proactive capital maintenance is undertaken and the development of an estimation 
method for probability of failure, consequence of failure and cost of failure (UK Water 
Industry Research Limited, 2002). This approach emphasises the importance of 
assessing risks in relation to serviceability criteria (Drinking Water Inspectorate and 
Office of Water Services, 2001) and emphasises explicit cost benefit (risk reduction) 
analysis as previously introduced by Haimes (1980a; 1980b) for water resource 
economics.  
 
1.2.3 Risk and decision making theory 
In his investigation into the North Battleford outbreak, Justice Laing (2002) found 
“…the end result was that the quality drinking water program was sacrificed as a 
matter of choice, not necessity. The choice was made knowing the result would be a 
reduction in the overall quality of drinking water in the province.” In Justice Laing’s 
view, the decision making processes that led to the outbreak implicitly assumed that the 
decision maker used judgment and choice in full awareness of the risks and 
consequences of pursued action to derive desirable (or undesirable) outcomes (Hogarth, 
1980). According to Hogarth (1980), choice between alternatives is a process of conflict 
resolution based on numerous paths or options that could be followed. The “accuracy of 
judgement depends on the extent to which the mind mirrors the environment it attempts 
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to predict” (Hogarth, 1980). Predictions and evaluations are based on a combination of 
information from different sources. Information is weighted and combined to form 
judgement. Yet, according to Hogarth (1980), the literature on judgement present two 
findings: firstly, people are generally overconfident in judgements made and the degree 
of confidence is not matched by subjective reality; secondly, the problem of “illusory 
correlations” phenomena in seeing a relationship between variables that do not exist. 
According to Hogarth (1980), this is a disturbing fact if we are to believe that people 
learn from experience. Hogarth (1980) offers two explanations for the above two 
findings: firstly, they are motivational using selective memory for making judgements 
and secondly, the assumption of illusory correlation – a persistence in instances of poor 
feedback and where others share illusions (Hogarth, 1980). 
From an economic perspective, utility theory assumes rationality and describes all 
decision outcomes in terms of utility. Here, decisions are to be understood by the level 
of utility attached to different outcomes. The decision making process to derive greatest 
utility defines the problem, identifies the decision criteria, weights those criteria, 
generates weighted alternatives and computes the optimal decision (Bazerman, 1998). 
Similarly, micro-economic theory uses the economic-rational approach to derive a 
customer demand function and a firm’s product supply function for production of goods 
and services. Here, the overwhelming driver for decision making is the market price to 
achieve effective and efficient allocation of products and resources (Bonart and Peters, 
1997). From an environmental economics viewpoint, the market price also contains 
‘social cost’ for adverse effects (Endres, 1994). More sophisticated versions of the 
decision making process use the calculation of probabilities for different possible 
outcomes that are associated to each alternative (Wisniewski, 2000). 
De Bondt (1998), however, found evidence that individuals do not form rational 
decisions: “for at least forty years psychologists have amassed evidence that economic 
man is very unlike a real man and that reason – for now, defined by the principles that 
underlie utility theory, Bayesian learning and rational expectations – is not an adequate 
basis for a descriptive theory of decision making.” Decisions are bounded in their 
rationality by limitations of intelligence and perception of decision makers (Bazerman, 
1998).  
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  8 
According to Kahneman and Tversky, decision makers use a number of simplifying 
strategies, or rules of thumb, to make decisions that they called ‘heuristics’ (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1972; Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Gigerenzer et al. (1999) explained heuristics as a 
range of simplifying and confidence-sustaining mental short-cuts that enable quick 
decisions in circumstances when pausing to undertake a full analysis would be unwise. 
From birth, people start to learn to filter information to cope with the excess 
information that the human brain cannot process. Filtering information comes at a cost 
and introduces significant biases. These filters enable (over-)confidence in decision 
making because sources of uncertainty are filtered out. Availability heuristic describes 
that people pay more attention to information that is easily available; retrieveability 
heuristics overweight memories that are more easily retrievable either because they are 
emotionally vivid or have personal relevance. A further heuristic relates to 
representativeness and denotes an assessment of “likelihoods of an event’s occurrence 
by the similarity of that occurrence to their stereotypes of similar occurrences” 
(Bazerman, 1998).  
As soon as new information becomes available, decisions need revisiting and updating. 
According to Rutledge (1993), insufficient anchoring adjustment, i.e. failing to update 
one’s targets as the knowledge of the environment changes, describes how initial 
decisions or judgments provide a mental anchor which acts as a source of resistance to 
reach significantly different conclusions once new information becomes available 
(Rutledge, 1993). 
From a sociological perspective, the pursuit of legitimacy shapes the cognitive schema 
in decision-making; social pressures like coercive, mimetic and normative pressures 
influence the decision maker. Coercive pressures arise from social sanctions that are 
applied if action is pursued in socially illegitimate ways. Mimetic pressures drive 
people and organisations to copy strategies of others despite different circumstances and 
little regard for the different contexts and challenges. Normative pressures are 
concerned with what we think we should do (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Abrahamson, 1996; Ashworth et al., 2005).  
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The perception, definition and assessment of risk, too, relates to the economic-rational, 
psychological and sociological perspectives introduced above. From a rational-
economic perspective in utility theory, risk represents a combination of the expected 
magnitude of a loss and is combined with probability distributions of anticipated 
outcomes (Bazerman, 1998). In Appendix 1, the general mathematical model to derive 
optimal supply functions for production of goods and services of a firm (Bonart and 
Peters, 1997) was adapted to internalise risk in asset decision making. From a 
theoretical perspective, it was found that the rate of technical substitution between 
assets and risk equates to the negative ratio of the production input factor prices (Bonart 
and Peters, 1997), i.e. the price of risk and the price of assets. It theoretically 
demonstrates that the optimal rate of substitution for production input factors, i.e. assets 
and risks, are directly dependant on their factor prices (Bonart and Peters, 1997). Such 
rational-economic asset risk trade-off models are increasingly used in the water sector 
to internalise risks in decision making (Abell, 2005; Lifton and Smeaton, 2003; Lifton, 
2005; Bradshaw, 2005), yet, the assessment of risk has to consider the psychological 
and sociological perspectives that risk assessors use in their heuristic models of 
perceiving and expressing risks e.g. in explicit risk assessments.  
From a psychological perspective, the literature introduces the concept of risk 
neutrality, risk adversity and risk seeking that is governed by the fear factor, i.e., the 
dread of potential outcomes, and the control factor, i.e. the extent to which we are in 
control of adverse events. Prospect theory describes the combination of risk and loss 
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Rowe, 1980). “An individual who has a 
certainty equivalent (e.g. £1,000) for an uncertain event that is equal to the expected 
value of the uncertain pay-off (e.g. £10,000 at a probability of 10%) is risk neutral”. 
“An individual with a certainty equivalent (e.g. <£1,000) for an uncertain event that is 
less than the expected value of that uncertain pay-off (e.g. £10,000 at a probability of 
10%) is risk averse” An exceeding certainty equivalent over the expected value of that 
uncertain pay-off denotes risk seeking (Bazerman, 1998). From a psychological 
perspective, it was also found that decision maker discount risks on the basis that they 
felt they could control them: illusory control beliefs lead to under-estimation of risk 
(Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2003). 
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From a sociological perspective, a shared cognitive schema defines risk, the dread or 
fear factors that people attribute to them and the perceived likelihood of their 
occurrence. Risk perceptions dictate behaviour and some sociologists have suggested 
that our approach to risk depends on fundamental assumptions about the way the world 
operates. Schwartz, Thompson, and Adams characterised these assumptions as the four 
myths of nature; they are the myth of nature as capricious, i.e. the world is entirely 
unpredictable and small actions can have unpredictable consequences of unknown 
scale, the myth of nature as benign that denotes an everlasting equilibrium. A strong 
disturbance to the world is subsequently is restored to the status quo. The 
perverse/tolerant myth believes that the world in predictable and tolerant to shocks 
within defined boundaries. The ephemeral myth regards even small disturbances to have 
profound and potentially catastrophic changes (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990; Adams, 
1995).  
One aspect of this thesis is to investigate whether the psychological and sociological 
perspectives on risk influence the quality and consistency of risk data used for decision-
making. The rational-economic, psychological and sociological perspectives on risk 
may also explain why the term ‘risk’ is very widely used without an accurate and 
precise definition of its real meaning (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). It is often used 
interchangeably with hazard, probability and danger (Jones et al., 2001). The Society of 
Risk Analysis aimed to provide a holistic and clear definition of risk and recommended 
that each author and researcher define their own meaning of risk (Kaplan, 1997). What 
seems simplistic turned out to be a contentious debate leading up to the definition of 
risk (Dombrowsky, 1995). Eventually, a definition was derived stating that “risk is the 
potential for realisation of unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, health, 
property, or the environment; estimation of risk is usually based on the expected value 
of the conditional probability of the event occurring times the consequence of the event 
given that it has occurred” (Society for Risk Analysis, 2004). 
Risk as a likelihood and potential effect of impact are both measurable characteristics 
(Jones et al., 2001), however ‘probability’ can have three distinct meanings: firstly, 
what can be called ‘frequency’ referring to repeated action forming a rate of 
reoccurrence for an event (Rowntree, 1991); secondly, the degree of confidence (in 
evidentiary-based probability) about a given circumstance as a subjective concept for 
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individual assessors (Bernardo and Adrian, 1994); and, thirdly, the mathematicians’ 
meaning of probability as a curve of data points without any regard for real-world 
interpretation (Rice, 1995). Risk as a mathematical function is an absolute figure that 
can be measured and compared to other risks (Moore, 1983). Others contend that risk 
exists primarily as a social phenomenon (Douglas, 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1982) that is evaluated as an elusive volume of space between a population and a hazard 
(Hayes, 1992). From a social perspective, risk is “a social process of examination; the 
discovery of the relationship between hazards and a population“ (Adams, 1995) and 
risk management is the method of controlling that relationship by preventing or 
lessening the impact of a hazard on a population. Risk as a social phenomenon also 
enables the definition of safety as the “immediate and individual level of potential risk” 
(Reider, 1974). Unfortunately, Reider (1974), again, introduces confusion when 
speaking of potential risk, i.e. the potential probability of adverse consequences.  
The Australian and New Zealand risk management standard (AZ/NZ 4360) 
(Australian/New Zealand Standard, 1999) is regarded as an authoritative source for 
principles and guidelines for risk and risk management (Business Continuity Institute 
(BCI), 2002) as a preventionist approach whilst regarding risk as a social construct and 
seeking to develop responses to hazards in order to reduce or control their effect 
(Australian/New Zealand Standard, 1999). Here, the phases of risk management are to 
‘establish the context’, ‘identify the risk’, ‘analyse the risk’, ‘evaluate the risk’, ‘treat 
the risk’ and ‘monitor’ and ‘review risks’.  
In practice, a number of different uses of the term ‘risk’ can be found: Kaplin and 
Garrick (1981) define risk by a multi-dimensional entity comprising the answer to three 
questions (Hrudey, 2005): ‘What can go wrong?’, ‘How likely is it?’ and ‘What are the 
consequences?’. Hrudey (2000) also offers the risk definition as ‘a hazard’, the 
‘uncertainty of occurrence and outcomes (expressed by the probability or chance of 
occurrence)’ and the ‘adverse consequences’(Hrudey, 2005). It is interesting to note the 
change in language: In the first example, the author referred to ‘likelihood’ whereas in 
the second example the term ‘uncertainty’ is used. There is a marked difference 
between the two: The former is based an accurate knowledge, whereas the latter is best 
described as a degree of knowledge about probability (Vose, 2000). 
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The WHO defines risk as the likelihood of identified hazards causing harm in exposed 
populations including the assessment of the severity of the consequences in a specified 
time frame (World Health Organisation, 2004). Risk can be defined as a threat to 
strategic and business objectives (Fraser, 2005) or as likelihood (% chance per year) 
times business impact (supply interruption + reputational + financial) expressed in 
monetary terms (Lifton, 2005). Risk can be defined as the probability times impact on 
regulatory objectives (Abell, 2005) or as a probability of an adverse consequence 
measured for hazard type, affected population and duration of hazard exposure (Deere 
et al., 2001). Risk can be evaluated as a probability to incur consequential costs 
(including moral, economic and social costs) (Hughes and Ferrett, 2003) or the 
probability of an incident with incident defined as impact on regulatory objectives. In 
analogy to  Deere et al. (2001), risk can also be defined as the probability of an incident 
with incident defined as a combination of hazard types, affected population and 
duration of hazard exposure. Considering the cause effect relationships during an 
incident, risk can be defined as ‘probability of an event (e.g. chlorine equipment failure) 
that has a probability to have an adverse impact’. Another perspective is offered by 
assessing the risk per affected person, risk per population and risk per asset.  
In this thesis, the definition of public health risk advanced by Deere et al. (2001) is used 
that proposes a probability assessment and evaluation of impact in terms of the hazard 
type, the size of the affected population and the duration of hazard exposure. The 
severity of a hazard is defined by the dose-response of biological and chemical hazards 
to human health. Here, a number of concepts can be used to compare different hazard 
types and Havelaar et al. (2003) introduce the concepts of ‘disability-adjusted life 
years’, ‘quality adjusted life years’ and ‘willingness to pay’ as common denominators 
for comparative hazard assessments. The two former concepts are further discussed in 
Fewtell and Bartram (2001). In engineered systems risk can be assessed as a failure 
event that leads to a deviation from the normal operational function, changes to the 
physical, chemical and biological status, a transmission pathway and the effect of 
exposure to the receiving population, object or environment (Crossland et al., 1992).  
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1.2.4 Managing public health risk with assets  
The provision of safe and reliable drinking water requires competencies to design, 
operate and maintain assets in line with the strategic objectives. Asset management is 
defined as “systematic and co-ordinated activities and practices through which an 
organisation optimally manages its physical assets, and their associated performance, 
risks and expenditures over their lifecycle for the purpose of achieving its 
organizational strategic plan” (British Standard Institution, 2003). The aim of asset 
management is to optimise returns on investments (Woodhouse, 2000) and, in the 
public utility context, to improve the accountability and performance of public works 
(Lee and Fisher, 2004).   
Asset management aligns the organisational strategy and the level of service with 
capital investment planning for asset creation, maintenance and financial planning 
(United States General Accounting Office, 2004). It requires the optimisation of total 
cost of ownership and operation with the objective of delivering service levels to 
customer expectation at defined levels of risk. Managing risk in the face of limited 
resources has long been an implicit component of asset management in the water sector. 
Increasing pressures from financial self-sufficiency and price control have created a 
climate in which utilities have to negotiate spending on capital investment and 
maintenance schemes in light of acceptable levels of public health risk. Over- or under-
engineering facilities with the presumption of screening out all risk or tolerating 
excessive levels of risk is no longer acceptable for stakeholders. Instead, asset 
management is becoming an increasingly explicit trade off between cost and risk (Booth 
and Rogers, 2001; Abell, 2005; Lifton and Smeaton, 2003; Muto, 2002) and water 
sector specific models were developed for asset decision making (Barnes et al., 2008; 
Oakes and Skipworth, 2006; Hall, 2006).  
Risk management is pursued, in part, through investments in physical, human, 
information and intangible assets so as to eliminate, reduce, isolate or control risk 
(Bradshaw et al., 2006).  When optimally designed and operated, these assets are active 
barriers against chronic exposure to hazards and sufficiently reduce the probability of 
hazard exposure during incidents (Bradshaw, 2006; Bradshaw, 2007; Bradshaw, 2008).   
The management of assets requires evidence-based decisions on the correct course of 
action to take in time and by reference to cost and risk and builds on strategic planning 
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and organisational development (Brueck et al., 2004). Monitoring, evaluation and 
optimisation in asset management activities are supported by formal systematic 
processes. Tools and processes at strategic, policy and tactical level form an integrated 
framework (Organ et al., 1997a) to proactively and consistently identify risk, assess 
risks and select appropriate controls (Faber and Stewart, 2003). Here, risk-based asset 
management considers the probability of events and the consequences from physical 
failure, operational risks, human factor and activities which affect performance, 
condition and safety (British Standard Institution, 2003). This places risk identification, 
assessment and control (together, risk management) at the centre of asset management 
(Bradshaw et al., 2006) and the availability and quality of risk data at the centre of asset 
decision making. 
 
1.2.5 Asset risk data 
Risk-based asset management requires systematic collection of data. Managing risk at a 
programme level, i.e. the entire asset base consisting of all assets from catchment to tap 
across a region (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2005a; UK Water Industry Research 
Limited, 2003; UK Water Industry Research Limited, 2005), requires consistent and 
comparable risk data to facilitate the risk-ranking procedures that evaluate and prioritise 
risks to achieve best value in the context of performance, service provision, cost and 
risk (Pollard et al., 2004). Unfortunately, data management strategies that are supposed 
to identify and assess risks are very often initiated from a need for regulatory 
compliance (Burns, 2002). Adding purpose transforms data into asset information; asset 
information in conjunction with professional judgement creates asset knowledge; asset 
wisdom is supposed to align additional information which considers community, social 
and environmental aspects. Very often data do not progress to ‘asset wisdom’ and Burns 
(2002) suggests to define asset wisdom before identifying knowledge, information and 
data requirements. Asset wisdom is then derived from the strategic objective that, in 
turn, provides a definition for risks.  
Processes are required to facilitate effective and consistent risk data acquisition that is 
of sufficient quality to provide for effective risk-based decision making for asset 
investments and asset maintenance. A risk-orientated systems approach from catchment 
to tap (Bannister et al., 2000; Hrudey, 2001) is increasingly used for hazard 
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identification, reliability and failure analysis and estimation of consequences (Crossland 
et al., 1992). Here, reliability is the probability of a system to perform within the 
boundaries of specified functionality (Crossland et al., 1992).  
The World Health Organisation (2004) promotes Water Safety Plans to facilitate 
‘Hazard Analysis’ and the evaluation of  ‘Critical Control Points’ (HACCP) (Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 1997) as a principle model to consistently assess public 
health risk. HACCP, introduced to the water sector by Havelaar (1994), identifies 
hazards at the point of source and facilitates the assessment of risk (Deere and 
Davidson, 1998; Deere and Davidson, 1999a; Deere and Davidson, 1999b; Aertgeerts, 
2006). The Critical Control Points are the barriers that significantly contribute to risk 
elimination, reduction or control. Their critical limits to act as an effective barrier 
determine the performance requirements under event condition and Deere at al. (2001) 
identify the critical concept of the multiple barrier approach to reduce public health 
risks to a tolerable level. Multiple barriers are promoted for practical reasons: firstly, 
barriers reduce rather than eliminate risk. Secondly, failure or poor performance of one 
barrier is safeguarded by other simultaneously operating barriers to maintain reduced 
levels of risk preventing worst-case consequences. Individual barriers require 
independence from the overall system to reduce the probability of simultaneous barrier 
failure during an event or incident.  
Risk management tools can apply quantitative and qualitative techniques (Hood et al., 
1992). Techniques to assess hazards and risks in engineered systems and ‘Critical 
Control Points’ require the definition of a system, failure and hazards identification with 
HACCP, HAZOP or FMECA and reliability modelling with FTA (Tung, 2004), ETA 
and reliability block diagrams (Strutt, 2004; Mays, 2004). Failure modes, effects and 
criticality analysis (FMECA) identify failure modes of equipment and their effects and 
criticality on the system.  The failure mode is a functional failure of the system, e.g. an 
open valve when expected to be closed. The effect of the failure mode and the criticality 
determines the consequence of failure on the system (American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers, 1992). Practical applications in the water sector are found in Demotier et al. 
(2002) who use FTA / FMEA to determine the risk of non-compliance in drinking water 
production. Their study considers a range of water quality parameters, removal 
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efficiencies and reliability of the treatment processes. Similar studies are found in 
Eisenberg et al. (2001) and Haas and Trussell (1998).  
Scottish Water also use catchment-to-tap FMECA studies to identify and prioritise 
risks. Scottish Water employs an asset risk and criticality scoring system that is 
designed to assess the ‘total business impact’ of asset failures. For this comparison, a 
‘common currency of risk’ in which one point equates to £1000 of business impact is 
introduced. The scoring system informs the asset management strategy that guides 
prioritisation of reliability studies and scenario modelling. Critical risk assets are further 
subjected to maintenance optimisation based on cost, risk and performance (Lifton and 
Smeaton, 2003). Using the monetary evaluation of public health risk as a common 
denominator is also found in Hall (2006).  
Examples for quantitative risk assessment are found in (Kent et al., 2003) and (Sadiq et 
al., 2004). Kent at al. (2003) describe a strategy to identify the probability of water 
trunk main failures using historical data. The consequences of failure are assessed with 
a network analysis computer package. However, they conclude that vast, complex 
factors have to be considered for which relevant data is limited. Sadiq et al. (2004) used 
probabilistic risk analysis to corrosion associated failures in grey cast iron water mains 
using Monte Carlo simulations to compute the reduction in the factor of safety over 
time. Further risk assessment techniques for large-diameter transmission mains using 
fuzzy logic are introduced by Kleiner et al. (2005). Regression analysis of failure 
frequency with material age of distribution mains is introduced by Herz (2005) and the 
technical and cost optimisation of distribution networks is introduced by Richter (2006) 
and Grimshaw (2006) for leakage-driven water mains renewal. 
 
Systematic capture of data requires the organisation to build suitable information 
systems (e.g. asset register) (Office of Water Services, 2000; Marlow et al., 2005; 
Marlow and Kowalski, 2005; Hoffman and Lambert, 1990). Houlihan (1995) describes 
early initiatives of improving the decision making process in infrastructure maintenance 
with a computer-based system. This system integrated data analyses on asset condition, 
risk of failure, economic consequences of failure and renewal cost. The system linked 
into a feasibility study with other construction and rehabilitation projects whilst 
minimising cost and disruption.  
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According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (2004), key challenges to 
implementation of an asset management approach remain the lacking availability, 
completeness and accuracy of existing data to support the asset management process 
(United States General Accounting Office, 2004). Chadwick and Rees (2003) recognise 
the importance of data requirements. They conclude that data weaknesses have to be 
mitigated in planning future data requirements to reduce uncertainty in medium term 
programmes and Skipworth (2006) proposes a bottom-up and top-down approach to 
asset data acquisition.  
 
One top down strategy to understand future risks is to learn from past failures and 
incidents (Health and Safety Executive, 2000). This may enable the enhancement of risk 
assessments and, hence, improves the quality of risk data.  
 
1.2.6 Learning from incidents and emergencies 
Learning from incidents and emergencies requires suitable learning strategies. The 
literature suggest the most suitable strategies to be “reflection” and “asking questions” 
(Morgan and Saxton, 1991; Van Ments, 1990; Moon, 1999). Reflection is the re-
examination and re-interpretation of experience that could be defined “in two senses, 
first as a process by which experience is brought into consideration and secondly, 
deriving from the first, the creation of meaning and conceptualisation from experience 
and the capacity to look at things as potentially other than they appear, the latter part 
embodying the ideas of critical reflection”. When experience is brought into 
consideration it will include thought, feeling and action” (Brockbank and McGill, 
1998). 
Asking questions facilitates the process of reflection and Smyth (1987) offers a set of 
learning questions to facilitate critical reflection. They are: 
 Where do the ideas I embody in my practice come from historically? 
 Why did I appropriate them and continue to endorse them in my work? 
 Whose interests do they serve and what power relationships are involved? 
 How do these ideas influence my interaction and relationships with others? 
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Good questions can be subjective and often contain tacit assumptions and intuition to be 
aware of when commencing an inquiry (Carr, 1985). Often questions can summarise 
what the researcher already knows as well as what they wish to discover (Carr, 1985).  
 
For the purpose of learning from failure, Johnson (2003) developed a thorough 
methodology to investigate accidents and incident reporting that considers the sources 
of failure and causal analysis, detection and notification of incidents, primary responses, 
incident investigation and the anatomy of incident reporting. These are commonly used 
in the nuclear sector that has a series of tools and techniques to investigate safety 
incidents at nuclear power plants (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002). They 
emphasise the identification and analysis of root causes and encompass people factors, 
technology, organisational factors and the environment in which the incident unfolded. 
In analogy, the following section reviews learning models and learning outcomes from 
water contamination incidents in recent years.  
Hrudey et al. (2002) investigated failed water supply systems using a five barriers 
model (Figure 2) (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004) to identify the causes of incidents and, 
subsequently, to understand risks. Hrudey et al. (2002) proposed a framework with the 
‘barriers’ to incidents consisting of “catchment, treatment, distribution, monitoring and 
response”. In all 16 outbreak cases reviewed, Hrudey et al. (2002) identified a failure of 
at least one barrier which ought to have operated simultaneously and subsequently led 
to microbiological outbreaks. Later on, Hrudey and Hrudey (2004) and Hrudey and 
Rizak (2006) aimed to learn lessons from a significantly larger review of incidents 
using the above model to explain incidents.  
 
 
Figure 2 Catchment to tap model for drinking water safety 
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Learning valuable lessons from incidents can be challenging: it assumes that the future 
risks are a reflection of past incidents. However, the adoption of new technologies is 
increasingly concerning decision makers in the water industry, because of the inherent 
and unknown risks (Clark et al., 2000). Decision-making processes in systems design 
are usually based on a deterministic approach, because they incorporate the judgements 
on the acceptable standard of practice and therefore risk. The deterministic approach 
does not apply to evolving technologies since previous experience does not exist 
(Crossland et al., 1992). Technology problems arise from new processes, materials or 
subsystems with limited experience on parameters controlling cost and failure modes as 
well as extending technology applications beyond previously experienced design 
envelopes from unexpected interactions between subsystems (Hartmann and Lakatos, 
1998).  
A further challenge to learn from previously experienced failure relates to complexity 
theory. According to Perrow (1999), complexity and tight coupling of systems increases 
the probability of failure. System accidents constitute a sequence of unanticipated, in 
hindsight obvious, interaction of multiple failures from system components. These 
complex interactions occur in unfamiliar, unplanned and unexpected sequences 
(Perrow, 1999). Complex systems are characteristic for common mode connections with 
interconnected subsystems and integrated, multiple and interacting controls (Perrow, 
1999). Pool (1997) identified an ever increasing trend of designed complexity of our 
technologically built environment and Woo and Kim (2003) observed this trends with 
respect to continuous improvement in performance and quality. It might be difficult to 
argue that water supply systems technologies are complex technologies, yet, water 
supply system assets have substantial interfaces with the environment that affect their 
processes, performance and asset condition. Asset design decisions that extend 
technologies beyond experience, increasing interconnectivity between supply systems, 
operational interfaces and challenging maintenance decision-making processes also 
contribute to an increasingly complex management and operation of assets.  
It is believed that lessons can be learnt from experience in the water sector. Fine (1998) 
introduces the concept of industry ‘clock speeds’ to characterise the speed in which 
industries change over time. Here, the water industry would be considered to have a 
slow clock speed when considering the long-term investment in physical water supply 
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assets that are used to provide service over a few decades; hence, previous experience 
may provide valuable learning opportunities to enhance risk assessments since the 
fabric of the physical assets will not have dramatically changed. One example was 
previously introduced by Kent et al. (2003) who use historical water mains failure data 
to derive probabilities for future asset failures.  
Learning from failure does not only relate to technical learning, despite the physical 
asset centric nature of the water sector. Learning can also relate to the cultural settings 
of a water utility, its concern for water safety and staff attitudes. For example, in May 
2000, Walkerton, Ontario experienced its worst failure in public health obligation when 
the water distribution system became contaminated with predominantly E.coli O157:H7 
and Campylobacter jejuni bacteria. In the town of 4800 residents seven inhabitants died 
and ca. 2300 contracted illness related to the bacteria (O'Connor, 2002). According to 
O’Connor (2002), the most significant failure arose from lack of professional 
knowledge, training and competence from operators, managers, regulators and public 
health authorities. A few months later North Battleford saw an outbreak of 
cryptosporidiosis infecting 5800 to 7100 persons (Laing, 2002). Budget cuts had been 
imposed at a time where public health objectives already were not achieved. The 
question remains why these budget cuts had been executed which had such a 
significant, adverse impact on technical and organisational reliability to provide safe 
drinking water and what specific learning outcomes have been gained from this 
outbreak. Prudham (2004) investigated the Walkerton outbreak in order to identify the 
reason for this accident: According to his analysis, this outbreak came as a result of 
irresponsible environmental regulatory reforms that resulted in poor governance. The 
regulatory reform of the water sector increased the risk to the public to a point where an 
incident inevitably had to occur. The analysis of Prudham (2004) captures a systemic 
view of the socio-technical interaction of a utility with its environment. Despite the 
‘regularity of complacent behaviour’ (Hrudey et al., 2002) across different involved 
organisations, the majority of criticism was directed at the Manager of the Walkerton 
Public Utility Commission who played a key role in the failings before and during the 
outbreak. However, as Howard and Richardson (Howard and Richardson, 2002) put it: 
“Stan Koebel likely could have prevented Walkerton, but the Ontario government could 
have prevented Stan Koebel”. The government had a public health duty of “enacting 
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and enforcing strong regulations, supported by fiscal and staffing resources” (Howard 
and Richardson, 2002).  
Considering the public policy changes in the Ontario water sector, Woo and Vicente 
(2003) applied the Rasmussen framework for complex socio-technical systems to 
compare the Walkerton and Battleford outbreaks based on the investigations by 
O’Connor (2002) and Laing (2002). The Walkerton incident has previously been 
investigated using this methodology (Vicente and Christoffersen, 2002) that has been 
developed to identify possible causes of safety incidents (Rasmussen, 1997). It is a 
structural hierarchy of individuals and organizations within a complex socio-technical 
system. The framework aims to uncover contributing factors that are causes to accidents 
and threats to public safety. In this model, threats to public safety result from a loss of 
control over organisational reliability caused by a lack of integration, i.e. lack of 
transparency, communication, and feedback and system response, at the different levels 
of a complex socio-technical system, rather than shortcomings or misconduct at one 
level in the hierarchy (Woo and Vicente, 2003).  Dynamic forces modified the structure 
and behaviour of complex socio-technical system over time. Financial, functional, 
social and psychological pressures required the socio-technical system to work in a 
more fiscally responsible and mentally/physically in a more efficient manner that 
changed work practices over time. The uncoordinated adaptation to financial, 
psychological and environmental pressures gradually eroded a safe system and the 
catastrophe resulted in combination with a key critical event at which the degradation in 
safety was revealed (Woo and Vicente, 2003).  
Figure 3 is an adaptation of the socio-technical model from Woo and Vicente (2003). 
The model shows different levels of interdependencies and pressures on a water utility 
that can have an adverse impact on the organisational and technical reliability of service 
provision to the customer. Stakeholder pressures and key influences on organisational 
reliability and the decision-making processes of a water utility are represented as 
arrows.  
 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  22 
 
Figure 3 A socio-technical framework for a water utility 
 
It could be argued that the model from Hrudey et al. (2002) (Figure 2) and the socio-
technical framework in Figure 3 are complementary learning models for the assessment 
of system risk. The design of an ‘operational and socio-technical integrated’ framework 
system should be robust to safeguard public health objectives and introduces a 
theoretical framework for risk management. Identifying root causes with such a 
framework shapes risk management into a multi-faceted phenomenon (Woo and 
Vicente, 2003).  
Leveson (2004) introduced a further adaptation of the Rasmussen framework. The 
‘System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP)’ (Leveson et al., 2003) 
demonstrated how systems theory provides important information about accident 
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causation in the Walkerton outbreak. The STAMP model considers four factors as core 
principles of system theory: 
 Emergence as a characterisation of a system property,  
 Hierarchy of levels of organisation,  
 control and communication. 
 
Leveson et al. summarised the circumstances leading to the outbreak as “inadequate 
control or enforcement of safety-related constraints on the design, development, and 
operation of the system” (Leveson et al., 2004). Furthermore, Leveson et al. 
recommend, “when designing safer systems is the goal rather than identifying who to 
punish, the emphasis needs to shift from cause (in terms of events or errors), which has 
a limiting, blame orientation, to understanding accidents in terms of reasons, i.e., why 
the events and errors occurred” (Leveson et al., 2004).  
In hindsight, many disasters can be interpreted as ‘waiting to happen’ where minor 
errors, omissions and slips accumulate and trigger a major accident. Risk management 
should identify the chains of causation, shortcomings and conflicting requirements and 
improve the system accordingly. Vulnerability of a system can stem from the complex 
interaction of organisations and their environment (Hood et al., 1992) and Walkerton 
and North Battleford have highlighted some gross organisational failures that suggest a 
systemic failure in the organisations involved. The application of a socio-technical 
framework maps out all structural pressures on organisational reliability that can 
ultimately impact on public health objectives.  
Learning from failure may not only consider physical asset failures but also the 
information assets, personnel, decision making processes and the prevailing 
organisational culture that contributed to an incident. Reason (1997) explained the root 
causes of many organisational accidents with latent flaws in the fabric of an 
organisation that act as precursors for failures. These latent precursors eventually align 
under “favourable” circumstances leading to the unfolding of accidents. Aiming to 
identify latent precursors to failure is a scientific challenge. Often neither their existence 
nor their role in a performance failure is known in advance, regardless how very obvious 
the contributing factors are in hindsight (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004).  
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In this section, an important finding was identified: Various approaches and models have 
been identified in the literature to explain why incidents happen. The application of these 
models to specific incidents, such as the Walkerton outbreak, demonstrate that different 
models provide different results. The models used for incident and accident investigation 
represent heuristic frames used for reducing the complex circumstances of incidents into 
simplistic means of understanding (Bazerman, 1998). The use of heuristic models with a 
background of complex environments and bounded rationality are useful strategies to 
explain accidents but can sometimes lead to systematic biases and possibly severe errors. In 
analogy to a diamond, each simplifying model represents a true facet to understand one 
aspect of incidents; yet, all the facets provide a more ‘objective’, valid as well as 
trustworthy and authentic representation of the causes and reasons for failure.  
Learning from incidents requires asking the right questions and the use of appropriate 
models. The water sector is fast adopting the paradigm of risk-based asset  and operations 
management to consider public health risk in the context of costs (UK Water Industry 
Research Limited, 2002). Proponents argue that risk based approaches to public health are 
designed to reduce risk to acceptable levels as the only approach to provide safe systems. 
Others are more critical. Nichols (2004) inquired whether outbreaks of waterborne diseases 
are actually the consequences of implementing risk-based approaches to water safety rather 
than the cure. Similarly, the German Association for Gas and Water does not endorse the 
risk-based water safety plan approach for its members. It praises the technical superiority of 
the German water sector and, instead, recommends a non-risk-based approach to technical 
and organisational water systems reliability that builds on a precautionary principle-driven 
best practice guide and technical specifications for the design, operation and maintenance of 
water supply systems (Castell-Exner, 2005; Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches e.V.  2003).  
Others argued that the provision of drinking water should be a ‘high reliability’ societal 
service, subject to the sectoral rigours inherent to the nuclear, offshore and aerospace 
industries (Pollard et al., 2005), echoing Roberts (1990b) who identified the need for 
high reliability characteristics to manage risks in metropolitan water supplies. 
Considering the multi-faceted dimension of incident propagation, the principles of 
HROs may enhance the technical and organisational reliability of water supply 
provision for customers.  
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In the following section, the principles of HROs are reviewed.  
 
1.2.7 High Reliability Organisations 
High reliability organisations (HROs) operate under trying conditions and yet have 
outstanding safety records (Weick, 1987).  They have been described for nuclear power 
plants, aircraft carrier flight decks and air traffic control operations (LaPorte and 
Consolini, 1991; LaPorte and Consolini, 1998; Weick et al., 1999), for offshore oil 
platforms (Rosness et al., 2005), nuclear powered aircraft carriers (Roberts, 1990a) and 
certain parts of the energy sector (Schulman et al., 2004) but not for the water sector.  
So far, the organisational attributes of an HRO are partially tested in that they have not 
been challenged under conditions of major failure to evidence that their absence 
contributed to failure.  
Based on the literature research, HROs possess (Bradshaw et al., 2006):  
• a strong organisational culture of reliability; 
• continuous learning and intensive training; 
• effective and varied patterns of communication; 
• adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible organisational structures; 
• system and human redundancy (retained margins of safety); 
• precise procedures for managing technology; and 
• human resource management practices that support reliability. 
 
Each component is characterised in turn.  
1.2.7.1 Organisational culture of reliability 
A strong organisational culture of reliability is required as a bulwark against failure 
resulting in catastrophic consequences.  Staff need to have a strong sense of the primary 
mission of the organisation and share a common system of beliefs and perceptions 
(Grabowski and Roberts, 1996). With the development of such a ‘mindful (vigilant) 
culture’ the formal system can be monitored, understood and failure events foreseen 
(Roberts et al., 1994a).  Members of staff require a highly developed understanding of 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  26 
their contribution and role in the system, acting in a collaborative and collegiate manner 
to deliver ‘collective intelligent’ interaction (Weick and Roberts, 1993). 
Constant vigilance and concern for reliability dictate behaviour (Roberts and Bea, 
2001), and alertness, attentiveness and care (Weick and Roberts, 1993) can prevent 
cascading errors and their escalation into system failure. Employees are encouraged to 
take responsibility, in particular, where problems are identified and immediate 
corrective action programmes are required (Bierly and Spender, 1995). Errors are 
regarded as system faults and employees are encouraged to report their mistakes 
without fear of punishment. On the other hand, individual behaviours that deliberately 
jeopardise the primary mission of reliability are labelled as disgrace. 
The commitment of senior management to the reliability of the organisation is 
communicated to all levels in the organisation and demonstrated with investments in 
technology, processes and personnel (Laporte, 1996). There is a strong sense of 
collective needs and goals. Individuals “monitor, advise, criticize and support” another, 
in particular in situations where mistakes are more likely to occur (Bierly and Spender, 
1995). 
1.2.7.2 Continuous learning and intensive training 
In order to facilitate continuous learning and intensive training, HROs constantly review 
their processes and standard operating procedures (SOPs).  Staff  training is extensive 
and focuses on the requirements for maintaining a safe system which is embedded in 
formal rules, generalised guidelines and standardised frameworks (Rochlin et al., 1987). 
The emphasis is not only on adherence to SOPs but also on identifying potential sources 
of failure and actions to stop faults from escalating. Staff maintains a commitment to 
continuous learning and seeks the acquisition and improvement of skills. 
HROs also learn by studying the failures, near misses and mistakes by others. They use 
these as a means to study the failure susceptibility of their own organisation (Weick et 
al., 1999). Even minor errors and incidents provide a source for learning (Weick et al., 
1999), which might be  assessed using root cause analysis (Bierly and Spender, 1995). 
This way, the organisation develops a collective memory for failures, incidents and their 
root causes that help the organisation anticipate future problems (Bierly and Spender, 
1995). Much research on HROs has been undertaken in ‘high hazard’ environments 
where, because of the high consequence of failure, trial and error is not a realistic 
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learning method. Offline methods of learning are required, consisting of realistic drills, 
simulations and exercises to replicate potential scenarios (Weick, 1987).  
1.2.7.3 Effective and varied patterns of communication 
Effective communication facilitates a complex system to become more understandable, 
predictable and controllable (Grabowski and Roberts, 1996).  HROs create information 
rich environments. Processes are measured and understood, with data made transparent 
and available to all.   
Communication not only considers inter-personnel communication but also human-
machine interfaces and data flow between machines. Here, technical system 
performance and control are often not observable directly and intervention is based on 
systematic reasoning and process assumptions (Perrow, 1999). Control logics are the 
operational interfaces with linear and complex systems. They are based on control 
parameters and process specifications and accommodate known, anticipated and 
foreseeable linear system failures. The design of control logics does not integrate every 
eventuality of system failure which usually becomes apparent after an incident 
occurred. The uncertainty of failure probability is further increased with the level of 
indirect parameters for process control (Perrow, 1999).  
Within an HRO information is a public good and staff are encouraged to share their 
experiences relating to the reliability of the system. Communication is designed as both 
bottom up and top down to ensure rapid flow of information through the hierarchy of 
the system. Rapid dissemination of information helps the organisation respond to 
mistakes, with corrective action aiming to prevent the escalation of error into failure 
(Bierly and Spender, 1995). 
Communicating information allows staff to shape and share the ‘big picture’ of the 
HROs vision, mission and responsibility of individuals towards reliability (Roberts and 
Bea, 2001). HROs use multiple channels to transmit different types of information – 
direct and complementary. Indirect information enhances information reliability and 
provides a form of redundancy (Roberts, 1990a). Multiple signals from a variety of 
sources provide information density that allows individual signals to be scrutinised for 
fitting into the whole information pattern. Abnormal signals are treated as an indication 
of latent errors about to unfold into failures (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 
1990a). Where possible, communications are formalised in a brief, precise, 
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unambiguous, impersonal and efficient manner. This does not allow individuals to 
complicate or distort the message and ensures clarity of information (Bierly and 
Spender, 1995).  
The enabling environment for open and honest communication is also central to the 
learning organisation. Reason (2000a) describes the culture of communication and 
learning with an emphasis on  
 a reporting culture, where people are prepared to report incidents and near 
misses;  
 a just culture, which encourages the reporting of safety-related information 
without jeopardising clear understanding of acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour; 
 a flexible culture where, in particular under trying conditions, control passes 
from the formal hierarchical structure to the task expert; and 
 a learning culture, which is characteristic for “the willingness and the 
competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety information system and 
the will to implement major reforms when their need is indicated”. 
1.2.7.4 Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible organisational 
structures 
Perrow (1999) argues that complex and tightly coupled systems can only prevent 
accidents with a high level of centralisation because low level decision makers have 
insufficient understanding of the inter-relationship between their actions and 
consequences on other elements of the system (Rochlin et al., 1987). HRO research has 
demonstrated that decentralisation is required to respond rapidly to unfolding failures. 
Yet, centralisation is essential in tightly coupled technical systems where 
interdependency is high.  Where systems can be de-coupled, decentralisation provides 
for action at the point of need (Bierly and Spender, 1995; Roberts, 1990b; Rochlin et 
al., 1987; Weick et al., 1999).  
HROs therefore can be described as ‘holistic’ or ‘decomposable’. In emergency 
conditions, a holistic HRO needs to be centrally managed in order to maintain an 
overview of the entire system.  In a decomposable organisation, emergencies can be 
confined to one sub-unit which is then isolated from the entire system. Control over 
such an emergency is decentralised to this sub-unit until the problem is cleared. 
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Holistic HROs enforce stringent adherence to SOPs aiming for a repeatability of actions 
and routines. Such formal rules and procedures identify and mitigate risk (Roberts and 
Libuser, 1993). Activities based on decisions that are not defined in SOPs are  taken at 
the most senior levels, for these individuals should have the best overall knowledge of 
the system (Bigley and Roberts, 2001). 
Effective HROs build slack into the decision making process  (Schulman, 1993; Weick, 
1987) in order to assess and challenge decisions so as to avoid faulty decisions to 
escalate into failure.  
1.2.7.5 System and human redundancy 
HROs maintain reserve capacity in their system that includes back-up functions, 
overlapping tasks and responsibilities (Rochlin et al., 1987; Roberts, 1990b). It is 
important to recognise that designing redundancy for a system can be 
counterproductive, as back-up functions can increase technical complexity, conceal 
errors and  lead individuals into not performing their required tasks under the 
assumptions that someone else takes care of it (Sagan, 1994). This ‘diffusion of 
responsibility’ (Latane and Darley, 1970) can be a significant cause of system error. 
1.2.7.6 Precise procedures in managing technology 
An HRO does not necessarily require ‘state of the art’ equipment, since such technology 
can add unnecessary complexity (Bierly and Spender, 1995). HROs usually aim to 
simplify complex technical systems and avoid unnecessary automation (Bierly and 
Spender, 1995). New technology acquisition is only justified if existing equipment does 
not perform to required specification (Rochlin et al., 1987).  On the other hand, existing 
technology is maintained to exceptionally high standards and there is zero tolerance of 
defective, substandard or malfunctioning equipment (Roberts, 1990b). Maintenance 
activity and protocols as well as performance data are used to monitor the healthy 
operation of the system (Laporte, 1996). 
1.2.7.7 Human resource management practices that support reliability 
According to Weick (1987), “humans who operate and manage complex systems are 
themselves not sufficiently complex to sense and anticipate the problems generated by 
those systems”.  In recruitment and selection, HROs try to recruit and select suitable and 
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skilled candidates aiming to match as closely as possible the complexity of the 
environment with appropriate people skills and competences. Having recruited, it is 
vital to align reward and control systems, remunerating reliability with incentives, 
recognition and career opportunities. Job rotation can increase networking between 
teams and help the organisation to transfer and diffuse knowledge and lessons learnt 
(Rochlin et al., 1987).   
In order to nurture a culture promoting the absence of failure, a human resource strategy 
has to consider four components of total reward (Zingheim and Schuster, 2000). These 
are individual growth opportunities, total pay, a compelling future in the organisation 
and a positive workplace (Zingheim and Schuster, 2000). Employee participation and 
autonomy, as well as more formalised work activities are regarded to increase staff 
retention and being appreciated as a valued team member underpins commitment 
(Cappelli, 2000). Operator training (Truss, 2000) and certification (DeNileon, 2000) 
also play a pivotal role in achieving high reliability.  
 
Practical steps to implement HRO strategies have been described by Burke et al. 
(2005). They describe how to unfreeze the existing organisation, create resilience, 
develop a pre-occupation with failure and creating a learning organisation before re-
freezing the organisation. These implemented skills are adaptability to new information 
on the environment, close loop communication, competencies in decision making based 
on information and building of inter-personal relations, leadership and team 
management, performance monitoring and feedback and heightened awareness for 
situations in the environment (Figure 4). In a water sector context, this was presented in 
Bradshaw et al. (2006). 
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Figure 4 Evolving towards a High Reliability Organisation 
 
Taken together, all of these HRO dimensions can be seen as contributing to a design 
template for HROs. Individually, each dimension is important, but it is when acting 
together as a coherent configuration that failure susceptibility might be expected to be 
reduced. 
High reliability theory and ‘normal accident theory (NAT)’ (Perrow, 1999) are 
inherently conflicting theories. Whereas the former claims the ability to control major 
accidents by emphasising organisational competencies, the latter discounts such efforts 
due to the unpredictability of (technical) accident precursors that seem obvious in 
hindsight. Furthermore, HRT emphasises the detection and management of abnormal 
operating conditions which, according to NAT, may cascade into unpreventable system 
meltdown.  
During the literature review, a number of issues were identified that have an impact on 
the findings relating to HRT. A number of HRO studies were conducted for systems 
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- motivate teams 
- positive atmosphere 
Performance monitoring 
- constructive feedback 
Shared situational awareness 
- common mental models of the 
environment 
Shared mental models 
- roles in the team 
- collective requirements for team 
interaction 
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that were nowhere near a “trying condition” (Weick, 1987). An aircraft carrier and a 
nuclear submarine were studied that was not performing in its primary function of 
warfare but rather in a state of cold war preparedness. Hence, a clear definition of 
‘trying conditions’ is required that relate to the primary objective of an organisation. In 
the water sector this is the provision of safe and reliable drinking water and ‘trying 
conditions’ are the exposure of customers to public health hazards e.g. during incidents.  
HRT does not explicitly consider risk, i.e. the probability and impact of ‘trying 
conditions’, or risk reductions from implementing HRO principles. A significant 
proportion of journal articles primarily focus on reducing the impact during ‘trying 
conditions’, e.g. by using systems redundancy, but neglect the management of incident 
probabilities. The latter is only implicitly stated for the management of technology that 
is - in the author’s interpretation - regarded as a means to manage the probability of 
failure. 
It was found that HRO studies hardly considered the absence of individual HRO 
principles that led to catastrophic failure of an HRO. Similarly, there is limited evidence 
that the cause effect relationships that inadvertently avoided catastrophic failure of 
systems can be attributed to HRO principles. As a result, past studies do not attribute a 
value to individual HRO parameters that may be critical to safety whereas other may 
seem beneficial but not critical. The value of HRO principles arises in their ability to 
reduce risk, i.e. their contribution to reduce the probability and impact of adversity. The 
value of their risk reduction capability also needs to be considered in the context of the 
cost of implementing those HRO principles in order to provide maximum utility as 
stipulated by Bazerman (1998).  
Finally, the term ‘high reliability’ denotes absence or minimal failure rates. The theory 
states that “minor errors and incidents provide a source for learning” (Weick et al., 
1999), “which might be  assessed using root cause analysis” (Bierly and Spender, 
1995). With increasing ‘high reliability’, i.e. minimal failure rates, an organisation does 
not have the opportunity to learn from failures. This is a paradox that underlies the 
academic concept of HROs and again suggests that previous studies were a) not based 
on truly High Reliability Organisations or b) assumed a causal relationship between 
HRO principles and system safety. Furthermore, limited evidence was found on the 
nature and methodologies that underpin the ‘learning from failure’.  
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1.2.8 Application of HRO in the water sector 
In (Bradshaw et al., 2006), Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ model (Reason, 1997) for incident 
propagation was adapted and instead presented as a series of organisational 
requirements for delivering water safety (Figure 5).  Here, continuous changes in the 
natural and built environment, in labour markets, in competition for financial resources 
and in the evolution of data available to underpin management decisions must be 
actively managed to deliver water safety. 
 
 
Figure 5 Organisational requirements for the delivery of safe drinking water 
 
This can only be delivered if there is the optimal design, construction, operation and 
maintenance of a physical water supply infrastructure. Operators, asset managers, 
public health specialists and engineers make decisions using relevant information to 
design, operate and maintain physical assets so that water safety is ensured. The HRO 
principles described above are thought to contribute to this aim. Hence, asset and 
operations management are a clear candidate for an exploration of high reliability 
organisational principles within the water utility sector and, in tandem, offers the 
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opportunity to explore risk management practice since risk analysis and the use of risk 
assessments is paradigmatically seen as an essential aspect for managing the water 
supply asset base (Pollard et al., 2008). 
1.2.8.1 Organisational asset management process 
For water supply assets, the asset management decision process involves a periodic 
(public health) risk assessment to determine operational and maintenance requirements 
and the design of new physical assets (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches e.V.  2003; Ministry of Health, 2005b; Ministry of Health, 2005a; World 
Health Organisation, 2004; British Standard Institution, 2003; Haimes, 1998). This 
decision process includes: 
• setting operational objectives for assets (British Standard Institution, 2003); 
• managing data from asset performance and statistical reliability data (British 
Standard Institution, 2003); 
• deriving acceptability criteria for risk and reliability that define ‘system safety’ 
(World Health Organisation, 2004; British Standard Institution, 2003; Ministry 
of Health, 2005b; Ministry of Health, 2005a; Hughes et al., 2000); 
• risk assessment and prioritisation (Ministry of Health, 2005b; Ministry of 
Health, 2005a) for assets from catchment to tap (Ministry of Health, 2002c; 
Ministry of Health, 2002b; Ministry of Health, 2001f; Ministry of Health, 2001l; 
Ministry of Health, 2001m; Ministry of Health, 2001n; Ministry of Health, 
2001o; Ministry of Health, 2001h; Ministry of Health, 2001p; Ministry of 
Health , 2001q; Ministry of Health, 2002d; Ministry of Health, 2001j; Ministry 
of Health, 2001r; Ministry of Health, 2001s; Ministry of Health, 2001t; Ministry 
of Health, 2002a; Ministry of Health, 2001w; Ministry of Health, 2001k; 
Ministry of Health, 2001x; Ministry of Health, 2002e; Ministry of Health, 
2001g; Ministry of Health, 2001u; Ministry of Health, 2001v; Ministry of 
Health, 2001i; Ministry of Health, 2001c; Hughes et al., 2000) 
• specification of water safety criteria based on public health risk assessment 
(World Health Organisation, 2004); 
• engineering specification, e.g. technical reliability, materials (British Standard 
Institution, 2003); 
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• the design specification for data flow, monitoring and control for human-
machine interfaces and machine-machine interfaces (World Health 
Organisation, 2004); 
• the design of operational processes and procedures; 
• the design of incident detection and response procedures (World Health 
Organisation, 2004; Taylor, 1995; Sander, 1991; Ministry of Health, 2001b; 
Ministry of Health, 2001e; International Standards Organisation, 2007); and 
• the definition of normal and abnormal operating procedures (World Health 
Organisation, 2004; Ministry of Health, 2001b; Ministry of Health, 2001e; 
Ministry of Health, 2001a; Ministry of Health, 2001d; Ministry of Health, 
2001e; Hughes et al., 2000);. 
 
The assessment concludes with a recommendation how and when to: 
• operate the existing physical asset better to control risk; 
• design new assets to eliminate, reduce or isolate the risk; and  
• maintain the existing assets to upkeep the ability to eliminate reduce and/or 
isolate public health risks. 
 
Periodic assessment of assets provides a basis for prioritising the risks of non-
compliance and allows a ranking of investment requirements. This, in turn, allows 
recommendations to be formulated on how to alter the operating regime, maintenance 
requirements and propositions for new asset designs. This holistic asset management 
model was further developed in Appendix 2. 
Below then, the asset life cycle is considered and aspects of organisational reliability, 
i.e. the reliability of the corporate body, discussed as they impact on the management of 
the asset base.  In turn, the design, systems integration, operation and maintenance 
phases of the asset life cycle are introduced and considered.  How the principles of 
HROs might apply to these phases of asset and operations management are here further 
introduced.  The discussion sets the scene for the research scope within this project – 
generating an evidence base for large utilities on whether these HRO principles see 
application in practice and, where they do, understanding their value in the provision of 
safe and reliable drinking water. 
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1.2.8.2 Organisational reliability in asset design 
The design process of physical assets is concerned with the definition of the: 
• scope of works; 
• responsibilities during design, construction, commissioning and operation; 
• design parameters; 
• operating and maintenance philosophy; 
• testing, commissioning and completion requirements; 
• operational, design, construction and commissioning constraints; 
• engineering and operational specifications; and  
• contractual arrangements (Kawamura, 2000; Smith, 2002).  
 
These amalgamate into contract specifications and design drawings for construction and 
commissioning. These documents reflect the designed degree of physical asset 
reliability anticipated for asset operation. Designing physical assets requires a detailed 
knowledge of the future operational and maintenance regime. This information should 
directly reflect the objective of safe and reliable operation and defines the role human 
resources (operators) occupy within operations. 
The process of designing physical assets brings together project managers, operators, 
operations management, public health specialists, civil, geotechnical, mechanical and 
electrical engineers, contractors, consultants and commissioning staff, etc. (Smith, 
2002). The involvement of operators in the design team reduces designer-user mismatch 
(Reason, 1990). The skills set of the individuals should match his/her task in the team 
(Reason, 1990) and the design programme should allow sufficient time for completing 
the design (Reason, 1990). 
The workings of the team are critical. Although most likely line managed within a 
hierarchical system, decentralised decision making (Weick, 1987) for such a complex 
task is important. The project team and the peer reviewers (O’Hara, 2005) need to 
provide adequate checking which represents deliberate slack in the decision making 
process and offers the opportunity to cross-examine complex project interactions 
(Schulman, 1993).  Human relations and communication are also known to be vital in 
the design phase. HROs have distinct characteristics for employee relations. Roberts 
(1993) summarised these as situations where: 
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• people are helpful and supportive to another; 
• people are trustful to another; 
• people nurture friendly and open relationships that emphasise credibility and 
attentiveness; 
• the working environment allows creativity and goal achievement; and 
• informal networks can be accessed in unexpected situations (Roberts et al., 
1994b). 
 
In HROs, communication channels convey information to project sub-units in order to 
enhance the understanding of roles and responsibilities of employees and sub-units 
(Tranfield et al., 2002). Communication design is structured in closed loops (Weick, 
1987) and needs to avoid the loss of information during transmission. An enabling 
environment for open and honest communication is central to HROs.   
The setting of operational objectives for assets should reflect the aim to zero accidents 
and incidents (O’Hara, 2005) and the creation of resilience for the physical asset 
(Pidgeon, 1997). These objectives are clearly communicated to the design team (Weick, 
1987).   
The definition of a physical asset design project requires the definition of risks, in 
particular public health risk, health and safety for operatives, commercial risks, as well 
as a process of risk identification. As a principal HRO philosophy, the whole 
organisation should participate in problem identification and devising corrective action 
programmes (O’Hara, 2005). The emphasis rests on learning from previous failures and 
incidents/accidents (Burke et al., 2005) and aims to combat human error and catch out 
system error (Burke et al., 2005). The whole organisation contributes to these aims by 
having behavioural monitoring systems for risks in place that feed back into the project 
team (Burke et al., 2005). 
In the risk assessment process, the project team should embrace the complexity of risks 
rather than simplifying them (Burke et al., 2005) in order to establish acceptability 
criteria, e.g. for design parameters and performance specifications.  
The project team can use dedicated risk assessment tools and reliability techniques. 
These have been described in the literature elsewhere (MacGillivray et al., 2006; 
Puglionesi and McGee, 1998; Strutt, 2004; Mays, 2004; Tung, 2004).  
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Throughout the design phase, the current state of the design should be regularly 
challenged in dedicated value analysis, HAZOP workshops and in design review 
meetings to identify failure susceptibility of plant and equipment, maintainability as 
well as access and lifting arrangements. These workshops also involve other 
stakeholders, e.g. electrical field service engineers, who are not directly involved in the 
design, but have a peripheral role in asset operations. 
The engineering and performance specifications (as well as the design parameters) 
should formulate the level of acceptable risk from physical assets in relation to 
operational performance and other identified risks, e.g. Health and Safety. In a HRO, 
specifications reflect the aim for zero incidents and accidents (O’Hara, 2005) and relate 
to (Kawamura, 2000): 
• the technical reliability of the physical asset; 
• the operator interface with the physical asset, in particular avoiding human error 
in operations; 
• process monitoring and control; 
• the design of standard operating procedures; 
• emergency detection and response plans; 
• health, safety and welfare; 
• maintainability, accessibility and lifting arrangements; and 
• skills and training requirements. 
 
The specifications for the physical asset could include: 
• reliability, including equipment and component redundancy (Rijpma, 1997; 
Rochlin et al., 1987); 
• operational availability; 
• detection and indication of abnormal operating conditions (Reason, 1990); 
• design of clear indication for component and equipment failure, even if standby 
(redundancy) operates in healthy state (Turner, 1978); 
• warning systems to signal the presence and nature of hazards to all those likely 
to be exposed (Reason, 1990); 
• containment of hazard to spread (Reason, 1990); 
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• multiple channels to transmit warnings for abnormal operating conditions 
(Reason, 1990); 
• provisions for contingencies in case of failure (American Water Works 
Association, 2001; Taylor, 1995; Hughes et al., 2000; O’Hara, 2005); and 
• minimisation of data loss (Rochlin et al., 1987). 
 
The specifications to avoid human error in operations could aim for: 
• avoiding irreversibility of errors (Reason, 1990); 
• designing out information load (Reason, 1990); and 
• designing good instructions and procedures (Reason, 1990). 
 
When considering new technologies, the aim is to avoid blind spots in the application of 
technology and production processes so to minimise the potential for accidents (Rijpma, 
1997). The impact assessment for new technologies considers the risks of unnecessary 
complexity (Perrow, 1999). These blind spots directly affect the operator interface: 
scope for hasty actions in the operator interface should be reduced and the organisation 
has to learn to comprehend the complexity of the technology applied (Rijpma, 1997).  
The design of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for bureaucratic, high tempo and 
emergency conditions requires both instructions and procedures (Reason, 1990). 
Overall, asset design is a vital concern as it defines the boundary conditions for 
operational reliability for physical assets. In the next section asset construction and 
integration into the existing water supply system are further considered. 
1.2.8.3 Organisational reliability during the integration of new assets 
During construction activities (e.g. of new assets or maintenance of existing assets) 
management needs to understand the impact on the reliability of existing asset 
operations.  The construction industry is a high risk industry in terms of health and 
safety (Hughes and Ferrett, 2003) presenting a risk not only to staff and the 
environment but also to existing assets. During the construction phase, the emphasis for 
a water utility operation rests on the continuation of its services provided to the 
customer. 
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The project team manages the construction progress, the assignment of responsibilities, 
control over construction areas and construction hazards but also contractual issues such 
as construction cost, the work programme and quality. In addition, all construction 
interfaces must be managed within existing operations. In particular, this is relevant for 
construction in close proximity to existing water supply assets.  
The construction process should have procedures in place to negotiate work activities to 
be carried out on existing assets, e.g. work permits and safe systems of work (Hughes 
and Ferrett, 2003). From a water supply operations perspective, the control over 
existing assets and responsibilities should be clearly communicated to all stakeholders 
in the construction process and the transfer of existing assets to the construction 
organisation has to be negotiated in advance of any construction activities. Emphasis on 
the control of foreign material and activities, good housekeeping practices and the 
development of staff ownership for work areas (O’Hara, 2005) can be vital. 
The construction activities undergo a risk assessment process that informs a detailed 
method statement for construction (Lawson et al., 1999; Hughes and Ferrett, 2003). The 
project team identifies hazards in construction and commissioning with a view to 
isolate, reduce or control any risk to the existing water supply operation and health and 
safety (Hughes and Ferrett, 2003).  
The risk assessment and method statement should be communicated to all stakeholders, 
in particular to water supply operations.  The risk assessment and method statement can 
also envisage contingency planning based on failure modes in construction and their 
critical effects on operations (Hughes and Ferrett, 2003).  
The method statement provides a detailed description of the construction activity and 
forms the basis for information, training, instruction and supervision of construction 
activities (Hughes and Ferrett, 2003).  The emphasis is to provide good instructions and 
procedures (Reason, 1990).  The workforce is committed to continual training and 
organisational development (O’Hara, 2005) and the organisation provides systematic, 
multi level training evaluation (Burke et al., 2005). The construction management 
ensures the familiarity of its operators with the task, avoids operators inexperience and 
the misperception of risks and provides adequate checking and supervision (Reason, 
1990).   
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The quality of the construction work should be monitored against the contractual 
description in the scope of works, design parameters and engineering specifications.  
With the philosophy of ‘concurrent design’ commonly adopted in the construction 
industry, the design and construction processes are no longer ‘clear cut’.  The design 
process carries forward into the construction process and all stakeholders in design and 
construction should be involved in change management (O’Hara, 2005). 
The quality assurance system provides an auditable “trail” of compliance with the 
design, construction and commissioning procedures (International Standards 
Organisation, 2000).  
Failure in construction and integration of physical assets is a concern to the continuation 
of services from existing assets. These concerns could be managed with the array of 
HRO principles described earlier.  
Cost control in construction and the compliance with asset reliability criteria ensure the 
safe and economic operation of the new assets. In the next section, the organisational 
reliability in the operation of water supply systems and more importantly during 
incident management is further considered. 
1.2.8.4 Organisational reliability in operations and incident management 
The human element plays a significant role in preventing accidents (Reason, 2000a).  In 
the process industry, it is recognised that 70-90% of industrial accidents have been 
attributed to human error (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1994a). 
Work process definitions, or Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), aim to codify 
routine tasks in business processes and operations in order to control risk.  Park et al. 
(2005) suggest that good standard operational procedures reduce the opportunity for 
human errors based on the provision of instructions to operators.  This also appears 
useful for infrequent tasks and complicated or stressful situations. In adhering to 
standard operating procedures, the water supply operator controls public health risks at 
grass root level in the organisation.  
However, procedures may also contribute to human error. Errors can arise from using 
inaccurate procedures that contain false instructions, incomplete procedure or obsolete 
instructions. Even procedures with accurate and complete instructions may have the 
potential for human error depending on the level of complexity that hinders the operator 
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to understand instructions themselves or the technical system. The level of complexity 
in procedures becomes a critical factor in the design of instructions (Park et al., 2005).   
Although the organisation aims for accurate and complete operating procedures 
(Reason, 1990), operators should be encouraged to question the procedures when in 
doubt about their appropriateness (Rijpma, 1997). This requires staff to engage with the 
organisational reliability and safety culture of a water utility. 
Organisations should establish a safety culture that builds “on an understanding of the 
cause of unsafe acts” (Ruchlin et al., 2004). Reliability is a dynamic, ongoing condition 
of a system where the reliable outcomes are an invisible, constant achievement (Weick, 
1987). Reason describes this as a paradoxon: safety is defined and measured by the 
absence of “failures” rather than its presence (Reason, 2000b). 
Viewing reliability from a dynamic perspective requires the mindset of a chronic 
suspicion that minor deviations can unfold into a bigger incident (Weick, 1987). A good 
safety culture requires (Pidgeon, 1997; Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000): 
• senior management commitment to safety; 
• a shared concern for risk and their impact on people; 
• realistic and flexible norms and procedure to manage risk; and 
• continuous learning through monitoring, analysis and 
information/communication systems to provide feedback  
 
Hence, the safety culture of an organisation is a contingent and dynamic process built 
on argument and rhetoric (Turner, 1995). 
A HRO would decentralise decision making whilst centralising the design of decision 
premises (Weick, 1987).  Although its operations are hierarchically structured 
(Yorkshire Water Services Limited, 1994), decision making, in particular during trying 
conditions is allocated to the most appropriate person to take effective action (Roberts, 
1993) - in a water utility - the operator or operations duty manager.  Different layers in 
the organisation act as checks and balances in the decision making process (Ruchlin et 
al., 2004; Roberts, 1993).  
HROs use redundancy and slack (Weick, 1987) to provide back-up in decision making, 
personnel, equipment and components to cope with unexpected circumstances and to 
promote the safe operation of systems (American Water Works Association, 2001). 
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Slack allows a decision-making unit to consider options and their outcomes that is 
driven by a culture of collective responsibility and accountability. Reserve capacity can 
consist of technical back-up functions and overlap in employee duties.  Technical and 
human redundancy is commonly adopted in water supply systems design, where 
technical equipment is designed with ‘duty/standby’ and more than one operator is 
trained and licensed to operate systems.  
In operational decision-making, e.g. the production planning or outage planning for 
maintenance, the organisation should understand and measures its processes.  
The organisation promotes a continuous learning approach (Roberts, 1993) where trial 
and error may not be available as a learning vehicle “because errors cannot be 
contained” (Weick, 1987) without the risk of incurring excessive, consequential cost. 
“Trial without error” uses symbolic representation of technologies and their effects, 
simulations (Weick, 1987), critical incident examinations and scenario planning 
methods. 
Employee relations are characteristic for mutual support and helpfulness in trusting, 
friendly and open relationships that emphasise credibility and attentiveness. The 
working environment is characteristic for creativity and goal achievement (Roberts, 
1993). 
Communication plays a central role in operations. Communication channels convey 
information to sub-units in order to enhance the understanding of roles and 
responsibilities of employees and sub-units (Tranfield et al., 2002).  
Communication design is structured in closed loops, similar to an aircraft captain who is 
required to repeat an instruction received from an air traffic controller (Weick, 1987). 
Closed loop communication or three-point communication avoids the loss of 
information during ‘transmission’.  
The enabling environment for open and honest communication is central to the learning 
organisation. Reason (2000a) describes the culture of communication and learning with 
an emphasis on: 
• a reporting culture, where people are prepared to report incidents and near 
misses;  
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• a just culture, which encourages the reporting of safety-related information 
without jeopardising clear understanding of acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour; 
• a flexible culture where, in particular under trying conditions, control passes 
from the formal hierarchical structure to the task expert; and 
• a learning culture, which is characteristic for “the willingness and the 
competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety information system and 
the will to implement major reforms when their need is indicated”. 
 
Political barriers can cause problems insofar as they can inhibit learning as a result of 
conflicting interests (Macgillivray, 2008). The reporting of incidents, the normalisation 
of errors in light of external accountability and a revisionist interpretation of failures as 
a success (Pidgeon, 1997; Sagan, 1993; Rijpma, 1997) inhibit open and honest 
communication. ‘Blame cultures’ inhibit learning from incidents but arguably may also 
enforce individual accountabilities (Pidgeon, 1997). 
 
The American Water Works Association (2001) describe how water utilities can plan 
for, respond to and recover from incidents and emergencies. Building on vulnerability 
assessments, emergency preparedness plans are developed and staff trained to use 
system redundancy to re-instate normal operations. Further planning for disasters can be 
found in Grigg (2002).  
Riordan (1995) describes how an incident command system has been created to oversee 
command, operations, planning/intelligence, logistics, finance and administration 
during emergencies that are increasingly supported by IT solutions for incident 
reporting and communication (Roeschke, 2005). A centralised incident command also 
facilitates communication with third parties and the public (Koschare et al., 2007).  
 In unforeseen situations, e.g. water quality incidents and emergencies (American Water 
Works Association, 2001), operators should do not follow rules blindly (Schulman, 
1993), but negotiate the course of action in a collegial manner with experienced 
operators and supervisors (Roberts et al., 1994b). The operators should form an 
informal network in decision making when confronted with unexpected situations 
(Roberts et al., 1994b) which is kept at an optimal size to avoid increasing ambiguity on 
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the due course of action (Rijpma, 1997). More experienced staff have a veto power in 
negotiating due course of action (Schulman, 1993). The response team to an unforeseen 
situation is aware of the timing when negotiating due course of action aiming to balance 
the period of hazard exposure with the time to build confidence in the correct due 
course of action (Schulman, 1993). If an accurate and complete operating procedure is 
not available, the operator creates awareness in a situational assessment (Burke et al., 
2005).   
Operations management aims to learn from failures and incidents (Burke et al., 2005) 
and incorporates lessons learnt and operational experience (Roberts, 1993) into 
common practice and SOP. Learning organisations promote the importance of 
information gathering (Burke et al., 2005). Information systems collect, analyse and 
disseminate information from near misses and incidents (Reason, 2000a) to support 
operations with contextual rich knowledge. The accident/incident investigation focuses 
on processes, not people (O’Hara, 2005).  
The HRO is aware of ambiguity and diverging opinions on the many contributing root 
causes (Weick, 1987; Sagan, 1993; Bovens and ‘t Hart, 1996) when incorporating 
lessons learnt. Learning from past experience requires a strategy for data collection and 
root cause analysis (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1994b). The data 
collection strategy also incorporates near miss reporting (American Institute of 
Chemical Engineers, 1994b).  
The learning process identifies critical tasks, audits critical factors which influence 
performance and predicts specific errors and their consequences (American Institute of 
Chemical Engineers, 1994b). Based on this analysis, the organisation selects and 
implements corrective actions and introduces an error reducing strategy (American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1994b), e.g. in operations, design or maintenance of 
assets.  
 
In summary, asset operation is a primary organisational function to control public health 
risks and the HRO principles described earlier may have a positive impact on the 
organisational reliability in operations. In the next section, maintenance planning in the 
water sector and its ability to maintain the ability of physical assets to control of public 
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health risks are further considered. This will close the loop to the asset management 
decision process described earlier. 
1.2.8.5 Maintaining physical assets to safeguard operational reliability 
In maintenance planning the organisation should understand the reliability requirements 
in operations and maintains the ability of physical and information assets to eliminate, 
reduce, isolate and control risks. Maintenance planning requires asset condition data 
(Heywood and Lumbers, 2001) and, for this purpose, uses tools and techniques to assess 
the probability and impact of failure, e.g. FMEA, HAZOP for the consequence of 
failure, and specific considerations for assessing the probability of failure and reliability 
(Lifton and Smeaton, 2003; Lifton, 2005; Hughes et al., 2000; Strutt, 2004; 
MacGillivray et al., 2006). 
A HRO would maintain their physical assets to exceptionally high standards as HROs 
do not tolerate defective, substandard or malfunctioning equipment (Roberts, 1990b). 
More realistically, a water supply organisation maintains its assets to maintain its ability 
of providing services at acceptable risk and cost. In the regulated UK water industry, the 
regulatory objective in maintenance planning is to maintain and enhance serviceability 
benefits to customers (UK Water Industry Research Limited, 2002). Water companies 
in England and Wales are required to appraise their capital maintenance planning in 
light of past and future maintenance to provide a view on long term trends on 
investment and financial requirements, whilst considering “the trade off between cost 
and risk” (Office of Water Services, 2000; Drinking Water Inspectorate and Office of 
Water Services, 2001). 
The key elements of maintenance planning is the identification of failure modes with 
impact on customer service, the environment or cost to the water company if no 
proactive capital maintenance is undertaken and the development of an estimation 
method for probability of failure, consequence of failure and cost of failure (UK Water 
Industry Research Limited, 2002). This approach emphasises the importance of 
assessing risks in relation to serviceability criteria (Drinking Water Inspectorate and 
Office of Water Services, 2001).  
The assessment of maintenance needs can be challenging: Many water engineering 
assets have low probabilities but high consequence of asset failure. Furthermore, 
reactive maintenance planning has, traditionally, aimed to avoid system failure 
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(Chapman, 2002) and the impact of asset failures on the level of service is difficult to 
predict because of large redundancies inbuilt to the supply system. Redundancies and 
low failure history, although a high reliability trait, complicate the assessment of 
maintenance needs and  inevitably limits reliability assessment methodologies and 
techniques (e.g. RCM and Weibull analysis) (Dunn, 2004).   
The risk of failure throughout the life-time of an engineering system can be optimised in 
a regime of inspection and maintenance (Crossland et al., 1992) Many systems 
deteriorate over time and condition assessment based on inspection supports the 
assessment of deterioration to estimate the residual life of an asset. The planning of the 
inspection process has to consider the re-produceability and practicability of the regime, 
but also the integration into a management and auditing system (Crossland et al., 1992).  
Dunn (2004) proposes an asset integrity process which is the meta process of risk 
management, environmental management, maintenance management and safety 
management processes. Dunn (2004) defines three root causes for system failures: 
physical root cause failure of equipment, human root cause failure from human 
intervention and latent root cause, which finds its origin in the organisational decision 
making processes described earlier. The latter is a function of organisational processes, 
leadership, culture and reward systems which interact with organisational ability to 
manage risks (Dunn, 2004). 
The asset integrity assessment is a review of the designed system against current 
standards and specification using a risk matrix with defined probabilities and categories 
for consequences for production, environment and safety. The designed operating 
parameter envelope is reviewed against actual operating parameters to assess the 
probability and consequence of exceedence. A review of the routine maintenance 
program is assessed and compared to the asset risk profile from a design and operations 
perspective down to individual needs for maintaining components (Dunn, 2004).  
The outcome of risk assessment methodologies determines the maintenance activity 
which range of fixed interval tasks, condition based tasks, periodic inspections, 
continuous monitoring and planned maintenance (Woodhouse, 2001) such as 
refurbishment and replacement. Reliability centred maintenance (RCM) was developed 
to direct maintenance towards components critical to reliable operation. RCM considers 
maintenance cost and loss of production (as a consequence) due to failure when 
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identifying the optimal maintenance intervention for reliability sensitive components 
(Anderton and Neri, 1990). RCM considers the criticality of components in process 
equipment and the appropriate maintenance regime which could be (Organ et al., 
1997b): 
• preventative intervention based on past experience; 
• planned maintenance integrated to the business planning system; 
• breakdown response maintenance where excess capacity is available or 
preventative maintenance difficult to forecast or expensive; and 
• condition monitoring uses and benefits of vibration analysis, thermography and 
microscopy but also visual inspection. 
 
Application of RCM for the water industry in the context of cost and benefit was 
investigated by Fynn et al. (2006). They found that “water utilities will typically derive 
extensive benefit from utilizing RCM to develop optimised maintenance programs for 
their asset base”.  Vatn et al. (1996) aimed to integrate RCM into the wider context of 
business operations to demonstrate the relationship between maintenance, safety and 
economic returns. Safety, health and environmental objectives are assessed in 
conjunction with maintenance and loss of production costs. Since this model is based on 
an economic assessment, it requires valuing safety and risk in monetary terms.  
Asset maintenance planning also has to consider human error during maintenance 
activities and ‘learning from past failures’ is a strategy to identify risks associated to 
maintenance planning (Health and Safety Executive, 2000). 
 
In this section, the loop of the asset life cycle (with the exception of decommissioning 
assets) is closed whilst aiming to portrait a reliability-focussed approach to asset and 
operations management. Reliability of a water supply system goes beyond technical 
reliability and has to consider the organisational processes in asset management 
planning but also design, construction, commissioning, operation, incident management 
and maintenance of physical assets. These processes consider primarily the physical 
assets but also human ‘assets’, information and intangible assets which constitute the 
basis for an organisational culture and public health risk management. 
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1.2.9 Knowledge gap 
The World Health Organisation (2004) characterises trying conditions in the water 
sector as  “short periods of ‘stress’” after “long periods of steady state performance” 
(World Health Organisation, 2004) that affect customers. These periods of stress need 
to be identified and characterised to subsequently investigate organisational resilience 
via incident management based on HRO principles. 
High reliability theory in the context of drinking water supply operations has not been 
investigated in formal case studies and recent academic work suggests that the 
principles of HRO should be further investigated in context of the water sector. A rich 
academic literature exists on HROs in other industry sectors and operations, e.g. 
management systems in nuclear power stations and submarines, oil platforms and other 
high hazard industries. In this thesis, high reliability theory is investigated in the context 
of water utilities.  
The challenge in investigating a high reliability for water utilities is to provide evidence 
of the successful contribution in terms of ‘value for money’ of HRO principles towards 
enhancing the provision of safe and reliable drinking water.  
The recent 3rd Edition of the WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality places a 
greater emphasis on proactive risk-based management for drinking water supplies. 
Risk-based decision-making requires sufficient quality and quantity of risk assessment 
data to effectively and consistently allocate resources for risk management (e.g. via cost 
benefit analysis). In the literature review it was stipulated that the three perspectives on 
risk, i.e. the economic-rational, the psychological and sociological construction of risk 
can have a significant impact on the quality of risk data by inducing psychological and 
sociological biases in the risk models and data. In this thesis, evidence for these biases 
is sought in the risk data used for asset management decision making. Furthermore, it 
was stipulated that ‘learning from failure’ can act as a means to adjust mental anchors 
(Rutledge, 1993). In this thesis, evidence is sought to enhance the prediction of future 
risks by statistical comparison between risk data with historical incident data.  
The forthcoming study investigates the principles of HRO in the context of incident 
management. In particular, it aims to identify the presence and effectiveness of high 
reliability principles to maintain a resilient water supply system “under trying 
conditions” (Weick, 1987). Beyond the immediate management of incidents, 
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opportunities to ‘learn from failures and incidents’ are sought to enhance risk 
assessment data that challenge the perception of risk by individual risk assessors who, 
according to the literature, can be biased by psychological and sociological constructs 
of risk. The latter study is aimed to enhance the (economic-) ‘rationality’ of decision 
making by providing a methodology to remove biases in the mental modes of risk 
assessors. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
1.3.1 Research question and hypothesis 
In the literature review, the main characteristics describing High Reliability 
Organisations were introduced. High Reliability Theory has two main themes. Firstly, a 
technical perspective on reliability, and secondly, an operational perspective that 
describes organisational reliability. The former is concerned with managing technology 
and system redundancy to manage the failure proneness of technical assets and systems. 
Its measure is failure frequency, e.g. mean time between failures (MTBF), and the 
impact of failure on organisational objectives. The latter describes organisational 
strategies for learning from failure, decision making processes as well as 
communication and training to operate assets and resources in the organisation with a 
view to avoid failures or contain their impact. In the water utility context, failure relates 
to incidents that affect the safe and reliable supply of drinking water to customers.  
For this project, a hypothesis was developed that builds on the statement that “most 
drinking water supply systems are characterised by long periods of steady state 
performance, and short periods of ‘stress’” (World Health Organisation, 2004). It is 
hypothesised that the 
 
“principles of HRO facilitate a) organisational resilience under trying conditions and 
b) learning from failure to enhance the safety and reliability of drinking water 
supply”. 
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1.3.2 Research aim 
The research aim of this project is to investigate the benefit of high reliability 
organisations principles in enhancing the safety and reliability of drinking water 
supplies.  
Three main aspects are investigated: firstly, the nature of incidents and their impact on 
customers; secondly, building on the review of incidents, the effectiveness and benefit 
of HRO principles to enhance the organisational capability to manage incidents and 
contain their impact. Thirdly, learning from incidents to enhance risk assessments that 
are subsequently used for risk-based asset management strategies that provide and 
maintain the technical reliability of the water supply system. The relationship of these 
three themes is conceptualised in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6 A high reliability organisations' perspective on technical reliability and organisational 
resilience 
 
From a utility operations perspective, the three themes are further detailed in Figure 7. 
 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  52 
 
Figure 7 The interaction of operation, incident and asset management via learning from failure 
 
1.3.3 Research objectives 
From the above literature review, the hypothesis and the research aim, a number of 
research objectives have been devised. The specific objectives of this study were 
identified as: 
 
1. To characterise “the short periods of stress” (World Health Organisation, 2004) 
in an assessment of incident frequencies, cause and effect relationships and 
impact on customers. 
Physical 
asset 
Information 
assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human assets 
Input Operation Output 
Systems Design &  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintenance 
Product & service 
 
 
Drinking water 
supply service at 
residual risk with 
respect to safety 
and reliability  
Operations 
Management 
 
 
Systems operation 
aiming at continuous 
& consistent 
provision of drinking 
water 
Incidents  
 
 
Cause & effect 
relationships 
 
Incident impact on 
public health 
Incident 
Management 
 
 
Reduce the impact 
of incidents on 
customers & re-
instate normal 
operation 
 
 
Asset management 
 
Risk based asset 
management 
decision making 
process for 
prioritising design & 
maintenance scope 
for water supply 
systems 
 
Risk assessments based on previously experienced and perceived, future incidents anticipating 
incident impact (severity), cause & effect relationships and incident frequencies or probabilities 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  53 
2. To investigate the benefit of HRO principles in incident management, and to 
correlate incident impacts on customers and impact reductions with observation 
of high reliability principles under trying conditions. 
3. To identify learning opportunities from incident analyses to enhance risk 
assessments that are subsequently used for asset investment and maintenance 
decision making in asset management.  
4. To investigate the prevalence of incidents from a financial and customer 
perspective on the “price” of risk and the benefit arising for customers to reduce 
the frequency or probability of incidents.   
 
1.4 Outline Methodology 
1.4.1 Research strategy 
The literature differentiates between deductive and inductive approaches to research 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Deductive research uses a theory, e.g. HRT, to develop a 
hypothesis that is then used to structure observations. Based on the findings, the 
hypothesis is accepted or rejected. Inductive research commences with observations to 
identify patterns that amalgamate into building hypotheses and theories.  In practice, the 
combination of deductive and inductive research methodologies provide a more 
practical means of addressing a research question and deriving the necessary data to 
support or reject a hypothesis. This is depicted in Figure 8 which is adapted from 
Blaikie (1993). 
The methodology in this thesis uses the combined approach to research, although 
individual studies are dominated by deductive or inductive inquiry. These are further 
detailed below.   
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Figure 8 Combined inductive and deductive research strategies 
 
A range of research strategies were considered and used in the design of this project. 
Ethnography is concerned with specific people or cultural groups to describe a way of 
life (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994), or in this project’s context, the “the way we do things 
here” (Johnson, 1992). As part of the sample group, the researcher interacts with the 
group. This poses a serious disadvantage since the researcher influences the information 
obtained in the studies.  
Phenomenology studies events and how individuals experience them (Trochim, 2000) 
and is a method of trying to understand how an individual perceives and constructs their 
reality (Robson, 2002). This form of research can provide highly detailed data for a 
specific research question. However, facts and information become highly personalised 
and subjective experiences (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). In combination with studies of 
the external reality (beyond individual accounts) it can provide a definite advantage 
(Trochim, 2000). 
Historical research focuses on the history of reality. It refers to documentation such as 
company reports and all forms of records that were pre-existing to the research project 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Documentation can be highly biased due to the views of 
the authors and it was even suggested as a form of propaganda (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994). Yet, it holds some weight when combined with other forms of research 
(Trochim, 2000). 
Action research has been promoted by practitioners as a moral responsibility to work 
socially meaningful in changing a situation for the better by the researchers involvement 
Hypothesis 
Observation 
Theory 
Generalisation Testing 
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(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Greenwood and Levin, 1998). It is “research becoming 
praxis – practical, reflective, pragmatic action – directed towards solving the problems 
in the world” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994) and has a deliberate interaction with the 
subject areas of study.  
Grounded theory identifies an area of study and allows findings to emerge from 
systematically collected data (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). It is data driven with 
developed methods of collection and analysis that can stand up to rigour, reliability and 
validity. It is not theory driven and is approached by broad and exploratory search 
before focussing on emerging findings. According to Robson (2002), grounded theory 
allows the researcher to cover more territory whilst remaining relevant within the real 
world. It is a constant comparative approach building on a continual review of new data 
against previously collected data that help to refine the development of theory (Bogdan 
and Taylor, 1984) and represents an almost inductive approach to data analysis (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1997). Theory must fit the real world across a range of contexts, it must be 
relevant to the people concerned and its theory must be readily modifiable beyond a 
single project (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Lee (1999) identifies the eight steps for 
grounded theory research as 
 the generation of ideas, questions and concepts; 
 suggestions of potential hypotheses; 
 preliminary data acquisition to test potential hypothesis; 
 continuous comparison of hypotheses with the wider population; 
 theory refinement with integration and simplification of the hypotheses; 
 production of theory development and theory refinement; 
 detailed data collection and analysis; and 
 communicating the research findings. 
 
A number of methodological challenges had to be considered in the design of this 
project: HRT has not been previously investigated in the water sector context. Although 
this research builds on existing academic prior art in the military-industrial 
environment, the transfers of knowledge requires an in-depth analysis of HRT in a 
water utility setting to avoid false assumptions and conclusions biased from the 
literature. A detailed analysis was required to capture the complex processes and 
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organisational cultures that may prevail in an organisation. It was previously found that 
HRT interlinks a number of disciplines and functions in an organisation, e.g. operations 
management, asset management, human resource management, etc. Ultimately, this is 
reflected in the extensive scope of a HRO research project. In addition, the analysis of 
management theory application requires particular attention to sufficient detail in order 
to ascertain authentic and trustworthy conclusions (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). It was 
decided that an in-depth study of one water utility was required to provide a sufficiently 
detailed case study. According to Trochim (2000), case studies are widely used and an 
accepted tool for gathering a broad range of data about a specific, contextual topic.  
The selection process of one water utility had to consider a number of criteria. In 
considering Reason (2000b) who wrote that “unlike pure sciences, in which theories are 
assessed by how much empirical activity they provoke, the insights of safety scientists 
and safety practitioners are ultimately judged by the extend to which their practical 
application leads to safer systems”. This research project, too, has been initiated from a 
practical perspective to provide safer water supply systems and  it was thought that an 
investigation of HRO principles in an exceptionally well performing water utility would 
enhance their capabilities so that the “practical application [of HRO principles] leads to 
safer systems”. In a wider perspective of HRO application in the water sector, it could 
be argued that such a study investigates the ultimate potential or benefit for water 
utilities arising from HRO principles. Whilst different utilities have different technical 
systems and organisational cultures, the findings of this research seem eminently 
transferable across the sector. Subsequent studies would require an investigation how 
average and poor performing companies could enhance their performance by 
implementing HRO principles (Bradshaw and Pollard, 2006; Burke et al., 2005).  
The economic regulator in England and Wales has systems and procedures in place to 
monitor the performance of regulated water utilities in accordance with the level of 
service requirements (Office of Water Services, 1998; Office of Water Services, 2003). 
Since these level of services reflect the water sector objective of providing safe and 
reliable drinking water, it was thought that level of service performance assessments are 
a valid mechanism to select a water utility for this case study.  
The water sector in England and Wales has seen a considerable concentration in the 
number of water utilities with increasingly large utilities serving increasing numbers of 
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customers (Office of Water Services, 1993). From the literature, it was understood that 
risk assessment tools and techniques were readily available to water utilities to assess 
their risks. The literature, however, has not sufficiently emphasised the needs and 
challenges of risk assessment programmes, i.e. the risk data requirements for 
significantly large asset systems, and it was thought that the competence of conducting 
risk assessments requires a further dimension of consistency in risk data acquisition. 
Therefore, it was decided to study a significantly large water utility in terms of its asset 
base and the customers supplied by their water supply system.  
In the selection process it was further stipulated that the water utility needs to be willing 
to learn, i.e. a level of curiosity of stakeholders to ascertain interest and engagement 
with this project, and willing to share information as a data source to underpin this case 
study. The dimension of learning was thought to be important because it is critical for 
this project to have access to data that may portray the organisation in an unfavourable 
light (e.g. incident data). Since this project aims to learn from failure, an attitude to 
‘discard’ previous experience, e.g. from previous incidents, would have rendered this 
investigation impossible to conduct.  
The methodology of selecting a water utility that complies with all those criteria 
represents a non-random selection of an “extreme samples” (Schnell et al., 1995).  
 
The Regional Water Utility that was chosen for this case study was identified to be 
within the top three water utilities in the overall performance assessment ranking that 
compares all water utilities in England and Wales (Office of Water Services, 2003). It 
has “continued to improve levels of operational and customer service in Ofwat’s 
Overall Performance Assessment (OPA), with an increase in score for the 9th 
consecutive year. The report confirmed that the company achieved the highest grades 
available in all categories of service indicators”(Regional Water Utility Limited, 2007). 
“Ofwat again confirmed [that the Regional Water Utility] has the most efficient water 
and sewerage company in the UK. The company was awarded four ‘A’ ratings for the 
efficient way it runs its water and waste water operations” in 2007 (Regional Water 
Utility Limited, 2007). It achieved ‘A’ band ratings for operational and capital 
efficiency since 2005. The Regional Water Utility “achieved platinum status in the 
Sunday Times ‘Top 100 Companies that Count 2007’ report, based on Business in the 
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Community’s corporate responsibility index. The report benchmarks companies’ 
performance against a range of social, ethical and environmental issues. The company, 
which achieved its highest ever score of 97%, achieved outstanding performance in the 
areas of community, environmental, workplace and customer management” (Regional 
Water Utility Limited, 2007). In addition, the Regional Water Utility has won the 
‘Utility Company of the Year Award’ in three consecutive years between 2004 and 
2006. The Regional Water Utility has an active research interest in risk management 
and its approach to risk-based asset management is considered to operate an advanced 
risk management and asset investment decision making model (Oakes and Skipworth, 
2006). Regarding the large asset base, the Regional Water Utility represents ca. 10 % of 
customers in England and Wales and operates a vast asset base that will be further 
described in chapter 4.  
 
Extrapolating from one in-depth case study to draw wider conclusions for the water 
sector in highly developed countries was deemed unacceptable and in addition to an in-
depth study in one water utility, which provides authentic and trustworthy conclusions, 
less detailed studies in a sample of water utilities were conducted to provide more 
objectivity and validity in the results. Robson (2002) and Blaikie (1993) argue that with 
increasing number of consistent dataset the fallibility of a single conclusion drawn from 
that data reduces dramatically but never to zero, hence, always leaving scope for further 
research to derive new or conflicting conclusions (Robson, 2002). As a result, it was 
decided to conduct eight sub-studies: Four projects were designed to address the 
research question with in-depth studies in the setting of one Regional Water Utility; the 
remainder focussed on addressing the research question in less detailed studies with 
contributions from a national and international perspective. This is reflected in the 
overall methodology of the research design but also in the methodologies of the 
forthcoming, individual chapters. Four themes were investigated so that each theme had 
a national or international context and a water utility specific context in the Regional 
Water Utility. As outlined in the research objectives, the four themes are 
 characterising incidents, 
 incident management with a particular emphasis on HRO principles, 
 asset management with a particular emphasis on ‘learning from incidents’, and 
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 valuing the ‘price’ of risk for risk-based asset management decision making. 
 
These four themes were used to structure this investigation but also this thesis. It can be 
seen that the study of incidents and incident management is transactional as well as the 
study of incidents and the derivation of risk data.  
 
Before outlining the eight sub-studies, data acquisition strategies have to be considered. 
According to Wisker (2001), “collections of statistics and number crunching are not 
the answers to understanding meanings, beliefs and experience, which is better 
understood through qualitative data.”  In the research design of the eight sub-studies a 
number of data collection methods were considered. Trochim (2000) and Robson 
(2002) argue that a single research project should focus on ideally one data collection 
method. Others argue that diverse data collection methods as a form of triangulation 
reduce skewedness of data sets (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). The latter view has been 
endorsed in this thesis.  
Qualitative data collection uses language, description and expression (Trochim, 2000) 
and emphasises the human element in a ‘real’ perspective (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
Yet, its analysis is inherently complex (Robson, 2002) and provides highly animated, 
rich and deep information (Trochim, 2000).  
One form of qualitative data collection are observational methods to view what groups 
or individuals do (Robson, 2002). Recording their actions and describing their activities 
in ‘real-world research’ (Robson, 2002) offers good advantages, however, there is 
danger of the researcher influencing the results. Interviews provide a source of data 
from interacting in a conversation. The spectrum of interviews ranges from unstructured 
via semi-structured to structured interviews (Robson, 2002). Whereas the former can 
provide very rich and detailed data with expressive and enlightening information 
(Wengraf, 2001), it lacks standardisation in its results (Robson, 2002) which is a 
definitive advantage in structured interviews. Yet, structured interviews lack in the 
inability to react to emergent topics raised by the interviewee (Robson, 2002).  
Surveys and questionnaires are an extension to interviews (Trochim, 2000) and can be 
designed for quantitative analysis and even for self-administration (Robson, 2002). 
They offer a time-effective means of data acquisition but questions arise over the 
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quality of data obtained (Robson, 2002), e.g. unanswered questions and 
misinterpretation.  
Quantitative research methods use numerical techniques to acquire and process data 
from surveys and questionnaires but also from ‘hard science’ experiments that provide 
numeric data outputs. Another form of quantitative analysis can arise in the coding of 
language. Means of coding language can be ‘open coding’, ‘axial coding’ and ‘selective 
coding’ (Lee, 1999). With open codes, the researcher develops new codes for every new 
concept found in the use of language and can result in significant amounts of coded 
categories. Axial codes are pre-determined coding categories that are predominantly 
prescriptive. In selective coding, the researcher selects the most important category and 
judges all data with the potential to fit that category. If a predetermined model exists, 
the model can be used to generate initial codes (Trochim, 2000) whilst still allowing for 
new codes to be generated without changing the strict adherence of one concept to one 
code (Lee, 1999).  
Data analysis has to provide research results that are reversible and repeatable (Lee, 
1999). Dozens of diverse methods exist for quantitative data analysis to be used 
according to different circumstances and distinctive types of results (Rowntree, 1991). 
They can be found in (Dey, 1993), (Hays, 1993), (Wright, 1996) and (Rice, 1995). 
 
It was decided that the research scope of this project was best studied with qualitative 
research methods such as participant observation, interviews, surveys, document 
reviews but also keeping personal learning logs. Quantitative research techniques such 
as quantitative data analyses based on surveys and coded language were used to 
underpin the qualitative research findings.  
Qualitative research is prone to bias and ambiguity and a methodology was sought to 
reduce their effect on the research results. It was decided that the design of the overall 
project should build on triangulation. This is reflected in the design of the sub-studies. 
As a result, the eight studies were: 
 A statistical analysis of incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2006 in 
England and Wales to explore the causes and effects of incidents and their 
impact on drinking water customers. 
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 A statistical analysis of incidents that occurred between 1997 and 2006 in a 
Regional Water Utility to explore the causes and effects of the incidents and the 
impacts on drinking water customers. The statistical analysis was enhanced by 
interviews and further explored with observing unfolding incidents during a 
research placement in the Regional Water Utility. 
 A survey and interviews on ‘HRO’ with particular emphasis on the value of 
HRO for incident management with participants from water utilities in the UK, 
the USA and Canada. 
 A survey and interviews on ‘HRO’ with particular emphasis on incident 
management with participants from the Regional Water Utility. This study was 
further enhanced by the research placement in the Regional Water Utility to 
observe HRO principles. 
 A survey and interviews on risk-based asset management with participants from 
water utilities in the UK, the USA and Canada. 
 A study of risk-based asset management with particular emphasis on ‘learning 
from incidents’ to enhance risk assessments and risk data quality that is used for 
decision making. This study was facilitated by a research placement in the 
Regional Water Utility and enhanced by document reviews, expert interviews 
and observations 
 A statistical analysis of financial data to evaluate the monetary value of asset 
risk in stock market listed water utilities in England. 
 An analysis of the monetary evaluation of public health risks from customers in 
the Regional Water Utility. 
 
Triangulation does not remove personal and group bias from research participants. The 
author of this thesis was educated and trained as an engineer to operate within the socio-
technical system of water utilities. In this working environment many years of 
awareness, experience, knowledge and expertise were accumulated that shaped the 
author’s “heuristic models” to perceive the world (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Bazerman, 
1998). These heuristic models influence the idiosyncratic understanding of the functions 
and processes in the water sector. In a further attempt to reduce bias and ambiguity, it 
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was considered to be aware of the research paradigms that are commonly used to 
interpret research results. They are the  
 Positivistic research paradigm where “things, events and people interact and 
link logically”. Its focus is on “internal validity, external validity, reliability and 
objectivity”. In this paradigm, the inquiry does not interact with the truth, facts 
can only be read in one way and are value free (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). 
 Relativistic research paradigm in which our beliefs of the world affect the 
studying and interpretation of interaction between things, events and people. 
Their focus is not validity but trustworthiness and authenticity. This research 
aims for the production of reconstructed understanding (Wisker, 2001).  
 Constructivism and critical theory that “use a relativistic ontology, 
transactional  epistemology [i.e. knowledge of the world based on one set of 
action that causes an interaction and responses], and hermeneutic, dialectical 
methodology” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998).  
 
The author’s awareness of different paradigms help to challenge own beliefs and 
understandings of the world. As a result, the research results presented in this thesis are 
not entirely value-free but also value laden and reflect how the author’s and 
participants’ beliefs and perceptions affect the interpretation of research data as an 
interaction between people, things and relationships (Wisker, 2001). Hence, the focus is 
not only internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity but also on authenticity 
and trustworthiness.  
 
In the following section the rationale of the forthcoming studies, the methodologies 
used and the interpretation of results are summarised. The detailed methodologies of the 
individual studies are further introduced and presented in greater depth in the 
subsequent chapters.   
 
1.4.2 Individual study methodologies 
The statistical analysis of incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2006 in England 
and Wales aimed to inductively explore the root causes, effects and the impacts of 
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incidents on drinking water customers. The methodological approach in this study is 
similar to a study carried out by the Health and Safety Executive (2000) with a view to 
learn from failure. It considers human and organisational factors, technology as factors 
in incident propagation (Johnson, 2003). The structured analysis was facilitated by 
incident data provided by the Drinking Water Inspectorate (Drinking Water 
Inspectorate, 2005b; Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2006; Drinking Water Inspectorate, 
2007) and represents a form of historical research. The study used a number of models 
to conceptualize and code the unfolding of the individual incidents. The models include   
 a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) study from catchment 
to tap (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004), 
 the study of failure modes and an analysis of their effects (FMEA) (Strutt, 
2004)’, 
 an asset systems model that investigates the asset types (e.g. physical, 
information and human assets) (British Standard Institution, 2003) involved 
during an incident, and 
 a model to assess the incident impact on customers.  
 
The latter model uses a methodology described in Deere et al. (2001) and was used to 
derive a comparative measure for incident impacts. The impact on customers was 
measured as an incident impact score consisting of individual scores for  
 the hazard type,  
 the affected population, and 
 the duration of hazard exposure. 
 
This is conceptualised in Figure 9. 
 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  64 
 
Figure 9 The risk assessment matrix (adapted from (Deere et al., 2001)) 
 
Beyond the derivation of individual incident scores, the frequency of incidents with 
identical hazard types was derived and the average incident impact for those hazard 
types calculated.  
Quantitative analysis is used to compare incident impacts for subsequent years but also 
to investigate the frequency and impact of incidents relating to specific hazard types. 
The methodology adapted from Deere et al. (2001) is further used in subsequent 
studies.  
 
The statistical analysis of incidents that occurred between 1997 and 2006 in the 
Regional Water Utility explores the causes and effects of incidents and their impact on 
Hazard & Consequence  
Frequency 
X in 1 yrs 
1 in X yrs 
Aesthetics, Chemical & Biological Hazards (Dose-Response) 
No. of customers affected by hazard 
Duration of hazard exposure 
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drinking water customers. This historical research was facilitated by an analysis and 
coding of detailed documentations of incidents. They consisted of incident reports, 
incident logbooks and personal accounts of staff involved during the incident as well as 
 narrative summaries of incidents, 
 narrative descriptions of cause for the incidents, 
 description of the effect on customers, 
 review of the timeline log of events, 
 issues arising and further data/investigation required, 
 an analysis of what went well and what could be improved during the 
management of incidents, 
 narrative descriptions of lessons learnt and recommendations to senior 
management, and 
 immediate actions arising after the incident. 
 
The level of detail in the incident documentation enabled a thorough analysis of 
incidents that are subsequently coded using the conceptual models and methodologies 
previously introduced. The use of primary data significantly improved the quality and 
robustness of research results. The results of the incident analyses were subsequently 
used in studies relating to the management of incidents but also in the studies relating to 
‘learning from failure’ with a view to enhance risk assessments.  
The statistical analysis was further enhanced by semi-structured interviews with staff 
who were recently involved in the management of incidents and specialists for specific 
asset types. The interviews were primarily conducted to understand “meanings, beliefs 
and experience” (Wisker, 2001) but were not used for subsequent coding or 
quantitative analysis. These interviews were conducted during a 6-month research 
placement in the Regional Water Utility. 
 
The next two studies investigated ‘organisational reliability’ in the context of water 
utilities. For this purpose, an HRO framework specific for water utilities was 
conceptualised. The framework was developed by deductively setting HRO principles 
into the context of water utility management with a particular emphasis on contributing 
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to the provision of safe and reliable drinking water. The HRO framework was 
previously introduced in the literature review and presented in (Bradshaw et al., 2006). 
A survey tool (Appendix 4.3.1) was planned and a survey executed that explored HRO 
principles amongst a selected group of participants - all senior managers - from water 
utilities in the UK, the USA and Canada. The survey was sent to the participants to 
identify HRO principles within their own water utilities. In addition, the survey required 
the participants to evaluate their benefit and the cost of implementing and maintaining 
those principles. The survey was designed to enable a quantitative analysis using a 
numerical code or metric (HRO metric) that enabled subsequent statistical analysis. The 
emphasis of the statistical analysis concentrated on those HRO principles that were 
regarded to be cost beneficial for the provision of safe and reliable drinking water. 
Furthermore, it calculated an HRO score for the participating water utilities. This survey 
was repeated with participants from the Regional Water Utility and a significance test 
compared both samples. 
In the literature it was argued that HROs operate effectively “under trying conditions” 
(Weick, 1987) and a need was identified to identify and validate the presence and 
effectiveness of high reliability principles to maintain a resilient water supply system 
during the management of incidents. For this purpose, the HRO framework was 
specifically adapted to incident management situations (Appendix 4.3.2) and used for a 
series of structured observational studies in the operational control centre and in the 
field during the unfolding of incidents. For this study, the author also had access to 
standard operating procedures, policies, planning and implementation documents for 
incident, operations and asset management. 
The adapted HRO framework (Appendix 4.3.2) was also used in a review of detailed 
incident documentations described above. The review sought to find evidence of HRO 
principles in the documentation of incidents. For each investigated incident an HRO 
score was calculated using the above scoring system. To establish the significance of 
HRO principles in incident management, two extreme datasets were required, i.e. 
incidents with a significantly low impact on customers and incidents with a significantly 
large impact. The HRO scores were subsequently correlated with the incident impact 
score derived in a previous study. The review of past incidents also attributed HRO 
principles to effective incident impact reduction. Here, it was necessary to estimate the 
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potential incident impact had the incident management team failed to reduce the 
incident impact. Again, the documented adherence to HRO principles was correlated to 
incident impact reduction attributable to HRO principles.  
In a series of interviews with staff who were recently involved in the management of 
incidents, the specific aspects relating to ‘learning from failure’ with a particular view 
to enhance risk assessment processes were explored. Again, these interviews were 
primarily conducted to understand “meanings, beliefs and experience” (Wisker, 2001) 
but were not used for subsequent coding or quantitative analysis. 
 
The next two studies investigated the management of technical reliability via risk-based 
asset management in the context of water utilities. In a theoretical development, it was 
identified that the trade-off between assets and risk, i.e. the substitution of public health 
risk with assets that reduce risk, are optimally derived in cost benefit analyses. Here, 
benefit arises through risk reduction whilst cost denotes the capital and operational 
expenditures to design, operate and maintain assets. The theoretical/mathematical 
derivation of this equilibrium was previously introduced in Appendix 1.  
In the first study that consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews the 
understanding, practice and experience in using risk assessments for asset management 
decision making were explored. A number of participants from a range of water utilities 
in the UK, the USA and Canada were invited to partake. The interview schedule was 
designed with a view to understand risk-based asset management and the need for 
learning strategies from incidents to enhance risk assessments (Appendix 4.3.3).  
In the following study, opportunities in the Regional Water Utility to enhance risk 
assessments by ‘learning from failure’ were investigated. It was previously argued that 
a water utility is a low clock speed organisation (Fine, 1998) in which learning 
opportunities from incidents arise to predict or validate risk assessments for future risks. 
In a series of data analyses, the accuracy and consistency of risk assessments was 
investigated. Previously analysed incident data were used as a baseline to evaluate risk 
assessments that are currently filed in the Asset Risk Database and used for risk-based 
decision-making. In this study, it was aimed to compare the perceived and explicitly 
assessed risks with the occurrence of incidents as a proxy for actual risk. The 
discrepancy between perceived and actual risk is sought to demonstrate that risk 
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perceptions by risk assessors can significantly vary. This was previously introduced and 
explained with the psychological and sociological construction of risk as opposed to 
economic-rationality of risk.  
In further action research studies, opportunities to enhance the risk assessment process 
were sought. The study used document reviews, observation of the asset decision-
making processes, case studies, interviews and experiments.  
 
Finally, in the theoretical development of trade-off’s between assets and risk it was 
identified that optimal investments in assets are a function of the ‘price’ of risk. In the 
following two studies, the ‘price’ of risk was investigated a) from a financial 
perspective and b) from a customer ‘willingness to pay’ perspective.  
The first study investigated the financial evaluation of risk for stock market-listed water 
utilities in England and Wales. It used publicly available financial data to calculate the 
asset beta for water utilities. Asset beta is a measure for the volatility in cash flows, 
which represents business risk. The asset beta or business risk is compared to the 
incidents that affect drinking water customers.  
In the second study, the monetary benefit of risk reduction is investigated from a 
customer perspective. In a series of surveys, the Regional Water Utility investigated the 
‘willingness to pay’ of customers to reduce the occurrence of future incidents, i.e. risks. 
In a series of case studies, the monetary benefit of risk reduction to customers is 
compared with the capital and operational expenditures required to reduce particular 
risk.  
 
1.4.3 Study validation and verification 
The project execution for this thesis used a number of strategies to validate and verify 
the research scope, methodologies and results.  
This project commenced in October 2004 with a literature review to scope out the 
research question and hypothesis. In parallel to studying mandatory taught modules at 
Cranfield University’s School of Management between January 2005 and January 2006, 
a preliminary research scope was prepared and presented as a poster at a conference on 
‘Risk analysis strategies for better and more credible decision making’ (AWWARF 
RFP 2939) in Banff, Canada, April 2005. This poster presented early ideas of risk – 
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asset trade-off’s in the context of managing public health risks and water safety 
(Bradshaw, 2005). At this conference, the research scope was further defined in 
discussions and formal meetings with water utility professionals, academics and the 
Project Advisory Committee of the American Water Works Association Research 
Foundation.  
In mid 2005, the first pilot studies commenced, in particular relating to the analysis of 
incidents.  
In April 2006, the author’s research scope was presented at a project initiation 
workshop (‘Developing a risk management culture – ‘mindfulness’ in the international 
water utility sector’ (AWWARF Project 3184)) in London. A number of academics, 
water utility professionals and the AWWARF Project Advisory Committee were 
present to peer review the project scope and execution plan. Feedback from the peer 
review group was evaluated and endorsed in the project execution plan.  
In December 2006, the author presented a literature review and the revised project 
scope in a formal conference paper (Bradshaw et al., 2006) to an audience of water 
utility professionals and academics at a conference on ‘Risk management culture’. The 
subsequent discussion provided valuable feedback that was incorporated in the research 
execution plan. In a subsequent project meeting with the AWWARF Project Advisory 
Committee, the project execution plan was again presented and research progress 
discussed with the committee. 
In December 2007, a formal review meeting was organised with the AWWARF Project 
Advisory Committee to present the author’s preliminary findings.  
In January 2008, the author commenced writing his contribution to the final AWWARF 
Project Report (Pollard et al., 2008), which was subsequently peer reviewed by 
academics, water utility professionals and the AWWARF Project Advisory Committee. 
At this time, the author was also invited to present his research findings at an EPSRC 
sponsored workshop under the title “IDEAS Factory: Scientific uncertainty and decision 
making; Project title: Rethinking Human Reliability Analysis Methodologies 
(EP/E017800/1)”. The presentation was followed by a discussion and critical analysis 
by six independent academics from various disciplines and an invited water utility 
professional.  
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In April 2008, the author was invited to present his research findings at an international 
conference on ‘Water Contamination Emergencies: collective responsibilities’ at The 
Royal Society of Medicine, London. Here, the author presented his research findings 
and obtained valuable peer review critique for further consideration in this thesis 
(Bradshaw et al., 2008).  
Throughout the 4-year research programme, regular meetings with academic 
supervisors provided a peer review mechanism and critical challenges to the proposed 
scope, methodology and research data analysis.  
Furthermore, the research results were presented to staff in the Regional Water Utility. 
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2 Characterising incidents in the water sector 
2.1 Introduction 
The WHO states that “most drinking water supply systems are characterised by long 
periods of steady state performance, and short periods of ‘stress’” (World Health 
Organisation, 2004). They are the incidents that affect customers relating to the safety 
of their drinking water and supply reliability. 
For this study historical incident data from the Regional Water Utility between 1997 
and 2006 as well as publicly available incident data reported to the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2005b; Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2006; 
Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2007) for England and Wales between 2004 and 2006 
were coded and analysed. The objective of this study is to characterise “the short 
periods of stress” (World Health Organisation, 2004) with a view to identify 
 the incident occurrence in a catchment to tap model; 
 the incident occurrence in the asset life cycle model;  
 cause and effect relationships for incidents; and  
 frequencies and impact of failure. 
 
This detailed analysis of incidents constitutes the foundation to investigate incident 
management capabilities in water utilities and to argue for a competent approach to 
incident management that is capable to manage unforeseen and complex incident 
scenarios with a view to minimise the impact on customers. It also aims to demonstrate 
the learning opportunities from previously experienced incidents to enhance the process 
of identifying and assessing risks.  
 
2.2 Theoretical development 
Regulated water companies in England and Wales have procedures in place to report 
water quality and supply reliability related incidents to the Drinking Water Inspectorate 
(DWI). The procedure of investigating incidents and their reporting to the DWI is 
outlined in the Water Undertakers (Information) Direction 2004 (Department for 
Environment, 2004) and Guidance on the Notification of events (Drinking Water 
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Inspectorate, 2004). In practice, water utilities are required to document, analyse and 
report incidents. Since 2004, the reported incident narratives are publicly available 
(Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2005b; Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2006; Drinking 
Water Inspectorate, 2007).  
The rich body of incident data available in the Regional Water Utility and the incident 
data published by the DWI were analysed to identify the frequency, cause and effect 
relationships and their impacts on customers.  
Incidents were investigated according to the asset type that failed using a catchment to 
tap model during the incident and its life cycle. The catchment to tap model consisted of  
 catchments including boreholes and river abstraction points; 
 water treatment works; 
 service reservoir; 
 distribution system; and  
 customer installations. 
 
In that context, the asset life cycle phases were identified during which the incident 
occurred. The typical asset life cycle for a physical asset usually commences with its 
conceptualisation followed by design, construction, commissioning, operation, 
maintenance and finally de-commissioning. For this analysis, the following categories 
were used: 
 asset design; 
 asset construction; 
 asset operation; and 
 asset maintenance. 
 
Incidents in the category ‘design’ denote a failure to design or upgrade sections of an 
existing supply system to be fit for purpose. A failure in design suggests that the supply 
system was not built fit for purpose or the design was outdated to provide safe and 
reliable drinking water. Incidents in the category ‘operation’ denote a failure to operate 
sections of a fit for purpose water supply system. A failure in operations suggests that a 
human intervention based on inadequate information (monitoring and control), training, 
instruction (e.g. work procedures) or supervision through management was the root 
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cause to an incident and, e.g., may relate to the erroneous opening or closing of valves 
on a distribution water main. Incidents in the category ‘maintenance’ denote a failure to 
maintain the fitness for purpose of sections of the water supply system. A failure to 
maintain water supply assets suggests inadequate re-investment into technically 
depreciating water supply system. This section also accounts for all physical asset 
failures which are designed to ‘run to failure’ and incidents caused by maintenance 
activity on assets.  
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis was used as a methodology to characterise the 
multiple, contributing causes for individual incidents and the multiple effects an 
incident can have. 
 
Based on the methodology advanced by Deere et al. (2001), a comparative measure of 
failure impacts was derived that takes into account the hazard type, the affected 
population and the duration of hazard exposure. It used these key parameters to 
construct a comparative metric for public health impacts from incidents. This impact 
assessment model provided a methodology to calculate a comparative incident score. In 
Table 1, the scores for each parameter ‘hazard type’, the ‘duration of hazard exposure’ 
and the ‘size of affected population’ are defined. Definitions for the hazard categories 
are found in Table 2.  
The hazard scores adopted for this project are predominantly based on weighting factors 
proposed in the literature (Deere et al., 2001) but a number of modifications had to be 
considered. The hazard scores for ‘aesthetics’ and ‘discolouration’ of drinking water 
were reviewed and amended with a view to re-evaluate their potential health impact. 
According to Tam et al. (2005) “there is some evidence that increases in turbidity of 
final water are associated with subsequent increases in the incidence of acute 
gastrointestinal illness”, in particular due to resuspended deposits in drinking water 
mains (Korth et al., 2008). A hazard category for ‘loss of supply’ was introduced. 
Although ‘loss of supply’ does not constitute a health hazard but rather a supply 
reliability issue, it was reasoned that ‘loss of supply’ coincides with the de-
pressurisation of distribution networks and potential for contaminant ingress from 
groundwater, surface water and leaking sewers (Emde et al., 2006; Korth et al., 2008). 
A further adaptation was introduced for the potential presence of hazards: In the review 
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of the incident records it was found that a significant number of incidents were 
presumed hazard exposures but the actual presence of hazards was not confirmed or 
reported. Consequently, the hazard scores were adapted to represent 75% of an actual 
hazard presence reflecting the uncertainty of hazard exposure.  
 
Estimate 
frequency 
of hazard 
Estimate 
magnitude of 
hazard 
 Estimate 
duration of 
hazard 
 Estimate no. of 
customers 
affected by 
hazard 
 
Score 
(F) 1 
Hazard type 
 
Score 
(H) 
Duration in 
days 
Score 
(D) 
Customers Score 
(P) 
1 in X yrs Aesthetics above 
guidelines 
32 < 0.5 2 0 – 7,500 2 
 Unwholesome, 
potential health 
effects 
48 0.5 – 1 4 7,500 – 15,000 4 
 Chemicals present 
above guidelines 
8 1 – 2 8 15,000 – 
30,000 
8 
 Chemicals present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
envisaged 
32 2 – 4 16 30,000 – 
60,000 
16 
 Potential biological 
pathogens present 
6 4 – 8 32 60,000– 
120,000 
32 
 Potential biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 
envisaged 
48 8 – 16 64 120,000– 
250,000 
64 
 Biological 
pathogens present 
8 16 – 32 125 250,000 – 
500,000 
125 
 Biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 
envisaged 
64 32 – 64 250 500,000 – 
1,000,000 
250 
 Loss of supply, 
potential 
contaminant ingress 
16 64 – 128 500 > 1,000,000 500 
X in 1 yr   > 128 1000   
1 X represents a variable > 1; e.g. X = 50: 1 in 50 years and 50 in 1 year 
Table 1 Coding the impact of incident, after (Deere et al., 2001) 
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Primary incident effect Definition 
Interruption to supply Temporary loss of water supply to customers (including low pressure for 
surrounding areas) 
Discolouration Aesthetic problems with the drinking water to due high colour, turbidity 
Potential biological 
pathogens present 
Potential for biological pathogens present in the drinking water for 
customers on which procedures were instigated to avoid customers from 
drinking supplied water (Precautionary principle). The presence of 
pathogens, in hindsight, was neither confirmed or rejected 
Chemicals present above 
guidelines 
Exceedance of water quality parameters specified in drinking water 
quality regulations 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
envisaged 
Confirmed presence of pathogens in drinking water supply. Health effects 
were envisaged and a “do not drink notice” or “boil notice” was issued to 
affected customers 
Potential biological 
pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
Potential for biological pathogens present in the drinking water for 
customers on which procedures were instigated to avoid customers from 
drinking supplied water (Precautionary principle). Health effects were 
envisaged and a “do not drink notice” or “boil notice” was issued to 
affected customers 
Biological pathogens 
present 
Confirmed presence of pathogens in drinking water supply. No health 
effects were envisaged and no  “do not drink notice” or “boil notice” was 
issued to affected customers 
Aesthetics above 
guidelines 
Aesthetic problems with the drinking water to due taste and/or odour 
Chemicals present above 
guidelines, health effects 
envisaged 
Exceedance of water quality parameters specified in drinking water 
quality regulations with anticipated short, medium or long-term effects for 
customer health 
low pressure Low pressure in the distribution network 
Table 2 Hazard definitions 
 
The representation of public health impact for individual incidents used the following 
equation to provide an impact score 
HDPI ++=  
 with 
 I = Incident impact score 
 P = Population impact score 
 D = Duration impact score 
 H = Hazard impact score 
Equation 1 Public health impact 
 
The annual score for public health impacts was calculated with 
∑ ++= )( HDPI yr  
Equation 2 Annual public health impact 
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Equation 2 can be used to compare the annual impact of incidents on a year-to-year 
basis.  
Based on the definition of a hazard type, incidents can be grouped together to calculate 
the annual frequency of a particular hazard type to result in an incident. This is shown 
in Equation 3. Since every incident has its own characteristic impact profile in terms of 
duration and affected population, an average impact for groups of incidents with 
identical hazard types was calculated. For each hazard type, the frequency of occurrence 
and the average impact on customers are expressed with  
yrn
HDP
FR HyrH /
)(
*
,
∑ ++
=  
with 
RH,yr = Frequency*Impact of incidents for specific hazard types per year 
yrnFH /=  
FH = Frequency of occurrence for specific hazard type 
n = number of incidents 
yr = year 
 
Equation 3 Annual public health impact for specific hazard types 
 
The incident profile at national or regional level for all incidents per time period is a 
function of  
)
/
)(
*(
, yrn
HDP
FR HyrTotal
∑
∑
++
=  
Equation 4 Annual public health impact profile for all incidents grouped according to hazard types 
 
This theoretical development enables a comparative study of individual incidents but 
also groups of incidents in specific hazard categories. It also enabled a comparative 
analysis of incidents in one water utility with incidents at national level. For this 
purpose, the scale of a water utility operation had to be taken into account with a 
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common denominator or baseline. Therefore, the national public health impact profile 
from incidents can be calculated per capita.  
 
TP
yrn
HDP
F
R
H
yrTPTotal
∑
∑ ++
=
)
/
)(
*(
,/  
with 
TP = total population 
Equation 5 Standardised incident impact profile per capita 
 
or 
yrn
HDP
TP
F
R HyrTPTotal /
)(
*
,/
∑∑
++
=  
Equation 6 Standardised incident impact profile per capita 
 
From a water utility perspective, the average impact of incidents at national level can be 
expressed as a water company specific public health impact by scaling national incident 
impacts to regional level.  
yrn
HDP
WCP
TP
F
R HyrWCPTPTotal /
)(
**
,*/
∑∑
++
=  
with  
WCP = population served by the water company 
Equation 7 Public health impact profile adjusted to size of a water utility operation 
 
Equation 7 enables a comparative assessment of reported incident impacts at regional 
level, i.e. water utility level, with the national average incident impact per hazard 
category. Furthermore, it enables the assessment of actual (reported and unreported) 
incident impacts with the national average incident impacts. The methodology for this 
analysis is further described in the section below. At first, the methodology outlines the 
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analysis of incidents that were reported to the DWI between 2004 and 2006. The second 
section describes the methodological approach to investigating incidents in the Regional 
Water Utility.  
 
2.3 Methodology 
For this chapter it was decided to conduct a form of historical research to inductively 
observe patterns in historical data that allows further generalisation and theory building.  
The qualitative data contained in historic documents uses language, description and 
expression and provides highly animated, rich and deep information (Trochim, 2000).  
The coding of language provides the facility to identify patterns in the data and it was 
decided to use selective coding of language based on pre-conceived models and 
concepts introduced in Chapter 1.4 ‘Outline methodology’. The methodological 
approach for these studies were considered to be superior to any other form of research 
methodology and data analysis: firstly, the use of historical data is perceived to reflect 
the truth of what was known at the time and removes any attempt to revise knowledge 
with hindsight ideas or concepts. Secondly, the selective coding of language found in 
the incident documentations avoided unnecessary open coding of language and enabled 
the use of well established ideas and concepts to be used to categorise data. Considering 
the volume of data records used in this research element, selective coding provided the 
highest benefit in the context of time required to code incidents.  
In addition to the historical research, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
staff who were recently involved in incidents. This represents a form of triangulation to 
the historical research and presents a form of phenomenology as a method of trying to 
understand how an individual perceives and constructs their reality (Robson, 2002). 
Although this form of research provides highly detailed data based on highly 
personalised and subjective experiences it was thought that the content analysis based 
on semi-structured interviews provides rich and detailed data with expressive and 
enlightening information (Wengraf, 2001) on how staff experience and make sense of 
incidents despite the lack of standardisation in its results. A further advantage over 
structured interviews is the ability to react to emergent topics that are raised by the 
interviewee (Robson, 2002). The results of the content analysis arising from the semi-
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structured interviews were grouped in themes and used in the presentation of the results 
to construct a coherent argument in this chapter.  
 
2.3.1 Incidents in England and Wales between 2004 and 2006 
In this section, two methodologies for analyses are presented. Firstly, an analysis of the 
asset types that failed and caused an incident and, secondly, the impact these asset 
failures had on customers. 
The first analysis was limited to a dataset of incidents that occurred in England and 
Wales for the year 2005. At the time of commencing this study, data for the year 2006 
was not yet available, since the incident reports are made public ca. 7 months after the 
end of the year. Furthermore, the 2004 data provided little reliable information on 
specific assets types that failed and caused an incident. As a result, the asset types and 
the asset life cycle phase were identified for incidents that occurred and were reported 
in 2005 for England and Wales. In total, 92 reported incidents were studied and 
analysed. Following a thorough examination of the incident narratives, each incident 
was coded and classified in a matrix as the most probable asset type and asset life cycle 
phase that caused the incident. For this purpose, a methodology of subsequently 
eliminating matrix fields that were unlikely to pinpoint the incident in the matrix was 
employed. The process is based on eliminating those matrix fields with the lowest 
probability of being related to the incident until only one matrix field is identified to be 
the most probable. Where the elimination process was inconclusive and different matrix 
fields had equal probability to constitute the most probable source of the incident, two 
or more asset types – asset life cycle phases were listed in the matrix. From the analysis 
of all incidents in 2005, a matrix distribution was obtained that provides and overview 
for the types of assets that fail and their asset life cycle phase. In an application of Chi 
Square testing the matrix is tested for randomness of the data distribution. A 
comparison between observed incident data and expected data identifies asset types and 
asset life cycle phases that follow non-random patterns.  
 
The incident impact on customers for incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2006 in 
England and Wales was further investigated in the following analysis. In this analysis, 
incident data that were reported to the DWI for the three consecutive years 2004, 2005 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  80 
and 2006 were analysed. In principle, qualitative, narrative data were converted into 
semi-quantitative data to enable statistical analyses of hazard types, the size of the 
affected population and the duration of hazard exposure. For each incident, an incident 
impact factor was calculated using the theoretical development described above. In 
total, 279 narrative incident reports were coded and statistically analysed to identify 
trends in the frequency and impact of these incidents but also trends for the duration of 
hazard exposures and the population sizes exposed to hazards.  
2.3.1.1 Data quality 
The data used in this study is limited to the data provided to the public by the Drinking 
Water Inspectorate (2005b; 2006; 2007) and represents tertiary data. In narrative form, 
the incidents were described by the DWI to reflect the severity of incidents and the 
impact the incident had on drinking water customers.  
The interpretation of the data analyses requires some caution: After an incident, the 
water utility will have commissioned an incident investigation. An incident investigator 
would evaluate the causes, effects and impacts of the incident using his/her expertise 
and heuristic models to interpret the incident. This process is guided by the Water 
Undertakers (Information) Direction (2004) and Guidance on the Notification of events 
(Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2004). An incident report, that summarises the findings, 
will be sent to the regulator who further evaluates the findings and publishes a short 
description of the incidents in the annual reports on drinking water quality (Drinking 
Water Inspectorate, 2005b; Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2006; Drinking Water 
Inspectorate, 2007). The summary of these incident reports, too, reflect an interpretation 
of the Drinking Water Inspectorate who use their expertise and heuristic models to 
communicate the incident to the public. The author, in turn, used the incident 
summaries to assess incident causes, effects and impacts based on pre-filtered data.  
The merit of this study was primarily designed as a trial of the above theoretical 
developments, methodologies and models for the subsequent detailed incident analysis 
in the Regional Water Utility. 
 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  81 
2.3.2 Incidents in the Regional Water Utility between 1997 and 2006 
The Regional Water Utility maintains a database of all its incidents and significant 
incident data recorded between 1997 and 2006. These detailed, narrative descriptions of 
cause and effect relationships, failed asset type, population affected, the duration of the 
incident and the procedures adopted to manage the incident enabled a thorough, 
structured incident analysis.  
In the first study, all of the 419 documented incidents were coded to identify the 
primary cause and the primary effect of the incident. In the assessment of primary 
incident causes and primary incident effects a number of categories have been 
inductively identified which best characterise and code the circumstances on an 
incident. These categories are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Although most of these 
categories are self-explanatory, the tables provide definitions for the cause and effect 
categories.  
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Primary 
incident cause 
Description 
Burst main Failure of a water main or trunk main 
Information 
Technology 
failure 
Failure of information technology or systems required to operate assets or business 
processes (e.g. computer networks, software programs)  
Maintenance 
work 
Maintenance work at or near a water supply systems asset which subsequently 
caused the asset to fail in providing safe and reliable drinking water supply 
Asset failure Asset failure denotes any asset, equipment or component failure for asset which are 
not elsewhere specified (e.g. as burst main or chlorination asset failure) 
Power failure Power failure denotes failure in the power supply from external suppliers or 
generates on site of the water utility (e.g. uninterruptable power supply) 
Operational 
intervention 
Planned or unplanned intervention in the water supply system causing an incident 
(e.g. a valving operation in the distribution network resulting in a discolouration 
incident) 
3rd party 3rd party impact on water utility assets (e.g. accidental damage or unauthorised use 
of hydrants) 
Chlorination 
failure 
Failure to maintain uninterrupted chlorination of drinking water due to asset failure 
specific to chlorination assets, equipment or components 
Asset 
contamination 
Ingress of contaminants into water supply system asset e.g. ingress of groundwater 
or sewage in depressurised water mains 
Treatment 
failure 
Treatment process failure due to inadequate treatment process design, raw water 
quality parameters outside the designed boundaries for treatment processes or 
treatment process asset failures  
Raw water 
quality 
Raw water quality outside the specified boundaries for designed assets 
Asset damage Damage to assets due to any circumstances other than 3rd party 
Monitoring and 
Control failure 
Failure of monitoring and control assets, equipment or component specific to 
monitoring and control of water supply assets (instruments, PLC, SCADA) 
Severe weather Unprecedented and unforeseen, extreme weather conditions such as 1 in 50 year 
flood events 
High Demand Exceptionally high demand for drinking water e.g. due to high temperatures 
Security Security breaches and intrusion on utility sites for the purpose of theft or sabotage 
Adverse 
weather 
Poor but not extreme weather conditions  
Chemical 
spillage 
Chemical spillage due to accidental release or unauthorised discharge of chemicals 
into or near the water supply system (e.g. in the catchment or service reservoir)  
Chemical supply 
contamination 
Contamination of chemicals used in treatment processes 
Design failure Conceptual error or failure of an asset which originated in the design phase of the 
asset  
Illegal 
connection 
Illegal connection onto the distribution network 
Telemetry failure Failure of a telemetry system which is used to transfer signals for monitoring and 
control of water supply assets to a control centre 
Water quality Water quality failure due to unknown circumstances not related to the treatment 
process or raw water quality 
Table 3 Primary incident causes 
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Primary incident effect  
Interruption to supply Temporary loss of water supply to customers (including low pressure for 
surrounding areas) 
Discolouration Aesthetic problems with the drinking water to due high colour 
loss of Monitoring and 
Control 
Loss of the ability to monitor and/or control assets without immediate or 
direct effect on customers 
Potential biological 
pathogens present 
Potential for biological pathogens present in the drinking water for 
customers on which procedures were instigated to avoid customers from 
drinking supplied water (Precautionary principle). The presence of 
pathogens, in hindsight, was neither confirmed or rejected 
Chemicals present above 
guidelines 
Exceedance of water quality parameters specified in drinking water 
quality regulations 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
envisaged 
Confirmed presence of pathogens in drinking water supply. Health effects 
were envisaged and a “do not drink notice” or “boil notice” was issued to 
affected customers 
Potential biological 
pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
Potential for biological pathogens present in the drinking water for 
customers on which procedures were instigated to avoid customers from 
drinking supplied water (Precautionary principle). Health effects were 
envisaged and a “do not drink notice” or “boil notice” was issued to 
affected customers 
Biological pathogens 
present 
Confirmed presence of pathogens in drinking water supply. No health 
effects were envisaged and no  “do not drink notice” or “boil notice” was 
issued to affected customers 
Empty Service Reservoir Operational failure resulting in empty reservoir with having no immediate 
impact on customers 
Loss of asset Long-term outage of asset due to failure. Asset write-off.  
Damage to asset Damage to assets owned by water utility as a result of an type of incident 
cause  
3rd party impact (Gas) Ingress of drinking water into gas distribution assets owned by the gas 
company. Incident due to burst main or leakage 
Aesthetics above 
guidelines 
Aesthetic problems with the drinking water to due taste and/or odour 
Environmental  Environmental pollution 
Chemicals present above 
guidelines, health effects 
envisaged 
Exceedance of water quality parameters specified in drinking water 
quality regulations with anticipated short, medium or long-term effects for 
customer health 
low pressure Low pressure in the distribution network 
3rd part damage Damage to assets owned by 3rd parties  
Disruption To Normal 
Processing Of Work 
Disruption of business processes not treatment processes 
Risk of cross 
contamination 
Risk of cross contamination from other assets e.g. wastewater cross 
connection to distribution network 
3rd party accident Accident of a member of the public or other 3rd party  
Human safety Safety of operator, 3rd party is jeopardised 
Statutory monitoring failure Failure in the requirement to provide a statutory sample  
Supply of unchlorinated 
water 
Confirmed supply of unchlorinated water to customers 
Treatment failure Treatment process failure without immediate impact on public health 
objectives for customers 
Table 4 Primary incident effects 
 
In a subsequent study, a comprehensive assessment of incidents not only considered the 
primary causes and effects of incidents but also multiple causes and contributing factors 
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as well as the multiple effects of individual incidents. This analysis focused on incidents 
between 2004 and 2006. The incident analysis was facilitated by an inductively 
developed, comprehensive incident assessment tool that enabled the structured coding 
of incidents. It identified  
 asset type; 
 asset phase;  
 asset and process failures; 
 cause and effect relationships during the incident;  
 duty standby arrangements for the failed assets; 
 intermediate asset between the failed asset and customers; 
 the way the incident was notified; and  
 human factors that may have contributed as a cause to the incident.  
 
With a view to the subsequent thesis chapter on incident management, the 
comprehensive incident analysis tool was also used to investigate the prevailing 
organisational ‘culture’ in the organisation during the management of the incident. In 
particular, it investigated  
 the effectiveness of communication;  
 the organisational ability to adapt its structure to the incident management 
needs;  
 the adaptability and flexibility in decision making; and  
 the use of redundancy during the incident. 
 
Furthermore, it investigated whether a risk assessment had been previously devised to 
forecast such an incident. Here, the experienced incidents were compared to risk 
assessment data stored on the corporate risk database. The template for structured 
incident analysis is presented in Appendix 3.3.1.  
Following the analysis of incident causes and effects, the impacts of incidents on 
customers were investigated. In this analysis, the incident data for the years 1997 to 
2006 were analysed. Based on the previously introduced theoretical development and 
methodology, the 419 incident were considered for coding. Of these, 95 incidents had 
no customer impact and were excluded from the study. As a result, 324 incidents were 
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coded and statistically analysed. In a significance test, the frequency and impact of 
incidents in the Regional Water Utility were compared to the previously analysed 
incidents in England and Wales. Furthermore, all incidents experienced by the Regional 
Water Utility are compared to the incidents they reported to the DWI.  
In a series of semi-structured interviews with staff who were recently involved in the 
management of incidents, a number of questions related to the causes, effects and 
impacts of incidents. The interviews were primarily conducted to understand 
“meanings, beliefs and experience” (Wisker, 2001) but were not used for subsequent 
coding or quantitative analysis. Where appropriate, extracts of interviews are presented 
in the body of text. The interview questionnaire is presented in Appendix 4.3.4. 
2.3.2.1 Data quality  
The main source of data in this study originates from the Regional Water Utility who 
provided access to a vast repository of documented incidents. The predominant source 
of data used in this study is historical data and personal accounts of staff involved in 
recent incidents. In most cases, incident files describing individual incidents contained 
lengthy logbook entries, detailed incident review minutes, personal communications of 
staff involved during the incidents, maps and raw data from monitoring and control 
equipment (e.g. SCADA printouts). From a practical perspective, the structured analysis 
of data consisted of building a number of databases to code, analyse and statistically 
process the data.  
The quality of the incident data analysis depends on the reference models used to 
acquire and process data. In the literature review and the theoretical development of this 
chapter a number of models were introduced that facilitated the assessment of incidents. 
The information and knowledge derived from the analyses were presented to the peer 
review group for review. The verification and validation process aimed to ensure that 
the models used to code the data were relevant and applicable to the set research 
question and to verify the results.  
One important aspect in evaluating research results was the awareness that the outcomes 
of this data analysis also depended on the reference models used by the incident 
investigator to derive primary incident data. A risk was identified that the data 
acquisition and collection process within the water utility is subject to cultural bias 
(Macgillivray, 2008). The models used to analyse incidents may represent heuristic 
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simplifications of complex circumstances that represent a simplified or limited version 
of a complex reality. Furthermore, according to Denzin and Lincoln (1994), 
documentation can be highly biased due to the views the authors may had at the time 
recording data. This is particularly relevant in light of the regulatory requirements to 
report incidents and it is important to understand the motivation of the authors. On the 
one hand, a systematic bias may motivate authors to ‘misrepresent factual data’; on the 
other hand, a strong desire may exist to learn from failure driven by a code of 
professional conduct. At this stage, the quality of data cannot be fully evaluated before 
understanding the organisational culture and attitudes towards learning from failures 
and incidents. So far, the organisation provided unrestricted access to historical incident 
data with a motivation to further learn from documented failures. The subsequent 
chapters return to evaluate the quality of incident data.  
 
2.4 Results and Discussion of Results 
2.4.1 Incidents in England and Wales between 2004 and 2006 
The primary purpose of the following analysis was to understand where (asset type) and 
when (asset life cycle phase) incidents occur. On analysis of the incident narrative, the 
main cause for the incident was pinned to an (asset) failure in the broad categories 
‘catchment’, ‘water treatment works’, ‘service reservoir’ and ‘distribution system’. 
Furthermore, the appropriate asset management phase from ‘design’, ‘operation’ and 
‘maintenance’ was identified to which the individual incident causes was attributed. 
Both models can be presented in a matrix form to record the asset type and life cycle of 
the asset at which the incident occurred.  
In Table 5 the catchment to tap – asset life cycle matrix for the analysed incidents is 
presented. A total of 159 incident causes were recorded for the 92 incident narratives. 
The deviation in numbers arises mainly from multiple factors contributing during an 
incident but also ambiguity in the short incident reports to precisely pinpoint the 
incident to a specific matrix field.  
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Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum 
Design 6 18 8 3 35 
Operations 6 19 11 22 58 
Maintenance  0 10 6 50 66 
Sum 12 47 25 75 159 
Table 5 Incident classification in catchment to tap - asset life cycle matrix for incident in England 
and Wales in year 2005 
 
In Table 5 a number of significant observations can be made. First, the results in a 
catchment to tap perspective are considered: Here, 47% of incidents arose in the 
distribution networks of the water utilities. This is followed by ca. 30% of incidents 
occurring at the water treatment capabilities in the water utilities, ca. 16% of incidents 
originating in service reservoirs and ca. 7% in the catchment.  
From an asset life cycle perspective, the majority of incidents were attributed to asset 
maintenance. As per definition, the category ‘maintenance’ denotes a failure to maintain 
the fitness for purpose of sections of the water supply system but also accounts for all 
physical asset failures which are designed to “run to failure” and incidents caused by 
maintenance work. A total of 41% of incidents were attributed to this category. This is 
followed by ca. 36% of incidents as a result from failing to operate a water supply 
system that is otherwise fit for purpose. As per definition, a failure in operations may 
suggest that a human intervention based on inadequate information (monitoring and 
control), training, instruction (e.g. work procedures) or supervision through 
management was the root cause to a particular incident. Only 22% of incidents were 
attributed to the category ‘design’ which denotes a failure to design or upgrade sections 
of an existing supply system to be fit for purpose. A failure in design suggests that the 
supply system was not fit for purpose or the design outdated to provide safe and reliable 
drinking water.  
Within the matrix, the largest number of recorded incident causes can be identified for 
distribution systems maintenance. Here, ca. 31% of incident causes were recorded. This 
originates primarily from water mains bursts that result in discolouration of the 
remaining water supply. Ca. 14% of incident causes were recorded as distribution 
systems operation. The majority of these incidents were caused by valving operations 
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which re-suspended solids in the water mains but also impact from third parties e.g. 
during construction work. Ca. 23% of incidents were recorded for the design and 
operation of water treatment works. The majority of these relate to design and operation 
of chemical dosing equipment that was inadequate, e.g. non-fail safe, and loss of power 
supply causing water treatment problems.  
Overall, it could be demonstrated that a high level of diversity in the occurrence of 
incidents prevails. Incidents occurred across the categories from catchment to tap as 
well as in all asset management life cycle phases and from this observation it can be 
concluded that water utilities require an incident management system that is capable to 
manage this diversity of incidents.  
In the following analysis, it was aimed to identify common patterns in the distribution 
of incidents in the catchment to tap – asset life cycle matrix. It was hypothesised that 
incidents are randomly distributed across the matrix. For this purpose, the Chi square 
testing methodology was employed to calculate an expected distribution of incident 
occurrences in the matrix. A random distribution of incidents in the matrix based on the 
sums for the individual categories is presented in Table 6. The formal calculation and 
hypothesis testing is presented in Appendix 3.2.1.  
 
  
Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum 
Design 2.64 10.35 5.50 16.51 35 
Operations 4.38 17.14 9.12 27.36 58 
Maintenance  4.98 19.51 10.38 31.13 66 
Sum 12 47 25 75 159 
Table 6 Calculated, random distribution of incident occurrences in the asset type - asset life cycle 
matrix 
 
The Chi square statistic is calculated from the sum of squared differences in each matrix 
field as (Observed-Expected)2/Expected. For each matrix field the Chi Square statistic is 
presented in Table 7. 
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Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum X2 
Design 4.27 5.66 1.13 11.05   
Operations 0.60 0.20 0.39 1.05   
Maintenance  4.98 4.64 1.85 11.44   
Sum 9.85 10.50 3.37 23.54 47.26 
Table 7 Chi square statistic for incident occurrences in the asset type - asset life cycle matrix 
 
The sum of the Chi square statistic is 47.26. The critical value for 6 degrees of freedom 
at a significance level SL = 0.05 is X2 = 12.59. Since 47.26 > 12.59, the H0 hypothesis 
of a random distribution in the catchment to tap – asset life cycle matrix is rejected.  
Similarly, the critical value for 6 degrees of freedom at a significance level SL = 0.001 
is X2 = 22.46. Since 47.26 > 22.46, the H0 hypothesis of a random distribution in the 
catchment to tap – asset life cycle matrix is rejected. In scrutinising the Table 7 it can be 
identified that the largest deviation between observed and expected distribution arises 
for the distribution network. A significantly larger proportion of distribution 
maintenance issues can be observed than it would be expected assuming a random 
distribution of incident occurrences in the matrix. Similarly, a significantly smaller 
proportion of distribution design issues are observed than would be expected.  
In the above analyses, valuable insights into the distribution of incidents occurrences for 
different asset types and their asset life cycle were gained. This analysis was aimed to 
understand the criticality and priorities for incident management efforts but also to 
direct risk assessments towards assets and asset management interventions (design, 
operation and maintenance) that are more likely to cause incidents. 
 
In the following analysis, the impact of incidents on customers is presented by 
calculating incident impact factors based on hazard type, the size of the affected 
population and the duration of hazard exposure. Table 8 is a summary of the statistical 
analysis performed on the incident data that affected customers in England and Wales 
between 2004 and 2006. The detailed analysis is presented in Appendix 3.2.1. 
In Table 8 the following trends can be identified for the years between 2004 and 2006: 
 The number of incidents increased by 10% from 89 to 98. 
 The average incident impact score increased by 59% from 21.59 to 34.40. 
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 The average duration of an incident increased from 80.15 hours to 579.82 hours. 
 The average population affected during an incident increased by 17% from 
38,372 to 44,871, although the number reduced to 36,072 in 2005. 
 
 
 
Duration 
in hrs Population 
P 
Score 
H 
Score 
D 
Score 
I Score 
Incident 
impact on 
customers  
Drinking Water Incidents 2004       
Number of incidents: 89       
Average 80.2 38372.1 15.3 30.2 20.6 21.6 
SD 101.8 101868.4 39.0 17.3 23.4 15.5 
SE 10.8 10798.0 4.1 1.8 2.5 1.6 
CI 95 lower 59.0 17207.9 7.2 26.6 15.8 18.4 
CI 95 upper 101.3 59536.2 23.4 33.8 25.5 24.8 
       
Drinking Water Incidents 2005       
Number of incidents: 92       
Average 191.3 36072.0 14.2 30.0 51.0 31.5 
SD 472.4 103239.8 32.8 16.9 131.7 47.6 
SE 49.0 10705.5 3.4 1.8 13.7 4.9 
CI 95 lower 95.3 15089.3 7.5 26.5 24.2 21.9 
CI 95 upper 287.4 57054.7 20.9 33.4 77.7 41.2 
       
Drinking Water incidents 2006       
Number of incidents: 98       
Average 579.8 44871.4 17.8 25.9 59.6 34.4 
SD 3475.1 149689.4 55.1 17.0 183.2 63.3 
SE 352.8 15198.7 5.6 1.7 18.6 6.4 
CI 95 lower -111.8 15082.1 6.8 22.5 23.2 21.8 
CI 95 upper 1271.4 74660.8 28.8 29.3 96.1 47.0 
Table 8 Statistics for drinking water incidents between 2004 and 2006 in England and Wales 
 
Statistically, the mean time in days between an incident for England and Wales reduced 
from 4.6 days to 4.0 and 3.7 for the years 2004 to 2006, respectively. Considering the 
average duration of each incident of 3.3, 8.0 and 24.2 days for the respective years, it 
could be argued that every day parts of the population in England and Wales were 
affected by an incident impact from their water supply. Multiplying the number of 
incidents for the respective years with the average population affected concludes that, 
statistically, 3.41 million, 3.32 million and 4.39 million customers experienced the 
impact of incidents in those years. With an estimated population of 53.47 million 
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drinking water customers in England and Wales, this represents ca. 8 % of customers 
for the year 2006.  
Further statistical analysis is required to establish whether these trends are significant in 
comparison to previous years. In Table 9 the significance tests are presented that 
compare the incident statistics for incident duration, size of population and incident 
impact score for 2004, 2005 and 2006. According to this analysis, the trends do not 
represent a significant increase for the duration of the average incidents, the average 
affected population and the average incident impact score. The only significant 
difference arises in the duration score that suggests that the average incident in 2004 has 
a significantly shorter duration than in 2005. Similarly, the duration score for the 
average incident in 2004 is significantly lower than in 2006.  
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Significance testing 
     
 H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1: 2004 SL: 5%  
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2: 2005   
 
Duration 
in hrs Population P Score H Score D Score Sum  
       
X1-X2 -111.2 2300.1 1.2 0.3 -30.4 -9.9 
       
Var 2516.4 231204278.7 28.7 6.4 192.6 27.1 
SE 50.2 15205.4 5.4 2.5 13.9 5.2 
CI 95%  
(+/-) 98.3 29802.6 10.5 5.0 27.2 10.2 
Result at 
significance 
level of 5% 
Reject H0, 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
Reject H0, 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
 
 
      
Significance testing 
     
 H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1: 2005 SL: 5%  
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2: 2006   
 
Duration 
in hrs Population P Score H Score D Score Sum  
X1-X2 -388.5 -8799.4 -3.6 4.1 -8.6 -2.9 
       
Var 126895.5 345606155.1 42.9 6.1 532.3 65.7 
SE 356.2 18590.5 6.6 2.5 23.1 8.1 
CI 95% 
 (+/-) 698.2 36437.4 12.8 4.8 45.2 15.9 
Result at 
significance 
level of 5% 
Accept 
H0, not 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant 
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
 
 
      
Significance testing 
     
 H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1: 2006 SL: 5%  
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2: 2004   
 
Duration 
in hrs Population P Score H Score D Score Sum  
X1-X2 499.7 6499.4 2.4 -4.3 39.0 12.8 
       
Var 124611.9 347596544.4 48.4 6.3 352.1 44.0 
SE 353.0 18643.9 7.0 2.5 18.8 6.6 
CI 95%  
(+/-) 691.9 36542.1 13.6 4.9 36.8 13.0 
Result at 
significance 
level of 5% 
Accept 
H0, not 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
Reject H0, 
significant  
Accept H0, 
not 
significant  
Table 9 Significance test comparing incident impact in England and Wales between 2004 and 2006 
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So far, the incident impacts for individual incidents were determined and the annual 
average incident impacts were calculated. This was used to compare the annual, average 
incident impact with the impact from incidents in subsequent years. This analysis was 
performed to assess the trend of annual incident impacts; however, it does not explain 
the nature of these incidents. In the following section, these incidents with a specific 
focus on the different hazard types or hazard categories as identified in Table 1 are 
investigated. This thesis employed the definitions ‘Aesthetics’, ‘Biological pathogens 
present’, ‘Biological pathogen present health effects’, ‘Chemical present above 
guideline’, ‘Chemicals present, health effects’, ‘Unwholesome’ and ‘Loss of supply’ to 
record incidents according to the respective hazard categories. Incidents in these 
categories were grouped into a table that was used to identify the annual re-occurrence 
of incidents in these impact categories. This enabled the calculation of the frequency 
and average incident impact score for the respective hazard category. For each table 
containing one incident category, e.g. ‘Aesthetics’, the  annual frequency of incidents 
was calculated as well as average, standard deviation, standard error and confidence 
interval at 95 percentile for the size of population affected, the duration of hazard 
exposure and the overall incident impact factor. A summary of the frequency and 
average impact for these hazard categories is presented in Table 10. The detailed 
analysis is presented in Appendix 3.2.1. 
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Hazard category  
Frequency 
of 
occurrence 
in 2004 (F) 
Average incident 
impact in this 
hazard category (I) SE 
CI 95% 
lower  
CI 95% 
upper 
Aesthetics 46 21.6 2.2 17.2 26.0 
Biological pathogens 
present 16 16.4 5.1 6.5 26.3 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 15 29.9 2.5 25.0 34.8 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 6 19.6 6.3 7.3 32.0 
Potential unwholesome 
medium health effect 2 24.8 2.3 20.2 29.3 
Potential Unwholesome, 
low health effect 2 16.8 0.3 16.2 17.5 
Loss of supply 1 11.9 0.0 11.9 11.9 
 
      
Hazard category  
Frequency 
of 
occurrence 
in 2005 (F) 
Average incident 
impact in this 
hazard category (I) SE 
CI 95% 
lower  
CI 95% 
upper 
Aesthetics 48 29.1 7.1 15.1 43.0 
Biological pathogens 
present 18 20.3 9.1 2.5 38.5 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 15 46.4 12.2 22.4 70.4 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 4 39.0 17.9 3.9 74.0 
Chemical present, health 
effects 3 85.8 52.1 -16.3 187.9 
Unwholesome 2 10.3 5.7 -0.8 21.4 
Loss of supply 2 19.3 8.0 3.7 35.0 
 
      
Hazard category  
Frequency 
of 
occurrence 
in 2006 (F) 
Average incident 
impact in this 
hazard category (I) SE 
CI 95% 
lower  
CI 95% 
upper 
Aesthetics 43 43.7 11.5 21.2 66.3 
Biological pathogens 
present 22 20.5 7.6 5.6 35.3 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 11 33.7 7.3 19.4 47.9 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 11 18.2 3.5 11.3 25.0 
Chemical present, health 
effects 4 96.1 82.8 -66.1 258.3 
Loss of supply 6 8.7 1.0 6.7 10.6 
Table 10 Frequency and average incident impact by hazard categories for the years 2004 to 2006 
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Table 10 enables a direct statistical comparison of frequency and impact for specific 
incident categories in subsequent years. This analysis was performed to identify 
significant differences in customer impact from the frequency and average hazard 
exposure for the respective hazard categories. The findings are summarised in Table 11, 
Table 12 and Table 13. The detailed analysis is presented in Appendix 3.2.1.  
In the analysis it was found that customer impacts for ‘Aesthetics’, ‘Biological 
pathogens present’ and ‘Chemicals present above guideline’ have significantly 
increased over the three years. The ‘Biological pathogens present with anticipated 
health effects’ has significantly increased from 2004 to 2005 and significantly reduced 
from 2005 to 2006.  
One interesting finding is the low number of ‘Loss of supply’ incidents presented in the 
data. Primarily, the DWI reports on water quality incidents but not incidents relating to 
supply reliability. This will be further investigated in the Regional Water Utility.  
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Significance 
testing 
H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1: (F*H) for year  Legend  
  H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2: (F*H) for year  F Frequency of 
occurrence 
          H Average incident 
impact per 
hazard category 
X1    X2        
2004    2005        
 F I   F I  H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 46 21.6  Aesthetics 48 29.1  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2005 
Biological 
pathogens 
present 
16 16.4  Biological 
pathogens 
present 
18 20.3  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2005 
Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
15 29.9  Biological 
pathogens 
present, 
health effects 
15 46.4  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2005 
Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 
6 19.6  Chemical 
present 
above 
guidelines 
4 39.0  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2005 
Chemical 
present, health 
effects 
   Chemical 
present, 
health effects 
3 85.8  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2005 
Potential 
unwholesome 
medium health 
effect 
2 24.8  Unwholesome 2 10.3  Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2005 
Potential 
Unwholesome, 
low health 
effect 
2 16.8   0 0.0  Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2005 
Loss of supply 1 11.9  Loss of 
supply 
2 19.3  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2005 
           
 
Table 11 Significance testing comparing frequency and impact of incidents in 2004 and 2005 
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Significance 
testing 
H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1: (F*H) for year  Legends  
  H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2: (F*H) for year  F Frequency of 
occurrence 
          H Average incident 
impact per 
hazard category 
X1    X2        
2005    2006        
 F I   F I  H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 48 29.1  Aesthetics 43 43.7  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2006 
Biological 
pathogens 
present 
18 20.3  Biological 
pathogens 
present 
22 20.5  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2006 
Biological 
pathogens 
present, 
health effects 
15 46.4  Biological 
pathogens 
present, 
health 
effects 
11 33.7  Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2006 
Chemical 
present 
above 
guidelines 
4 39.0  Chemical 
present 
above 
guidelines 
11 18.2  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2006 
Chemical 
present, 
health effects 
3 85.8  Chemical 
present, 
health 
effects 
4 96.1  Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Unwholesome 2 10.3   0   Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2006 
Loss of 
supply 
2 19.3  Loss of 
supply 
6 8.7  Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
            
Table 12 Significance testing comparing frequency and impact of incidents in 2005 and 2006 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  98 
 
Significance 
testing 
H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1: (F*H) for year  Legends  
  H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2: (F*H) for year  F Frequency of 
occurrence 
          H Average incident 
impact per 
hazard category 
X1    X2        
2004    2006        
 F I   F I  H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 46 21.6  Aesthetics 43 43.7  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2006 
Biological 
pathogens 
present 
16 16.4  Biological 
pathogens 
present 
22 20.5  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2006 
Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
15 29.9  Biological 
pathogens 
present, 
health 
effects 
11 33.7  Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2006 
Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 
6 19.6  Chemical 
present 
above 
guidelines 
11 18.2  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2006 
Chemical 
present, health 
effects 
0   Chemical 
present, 
health 
effects 
4 96.1  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2006 
Potential 
unwholesome 
medium health 
effect 
2 24.8   0   Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2006 
Potential 
Unwholesome, 
low health 
effect 
2 16.8   0   Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2006 
Loss of supply 1 11.9  Loss of 
supply 
6 8.7  Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact in 
2006 
            
Table 13 Significance testing comparing frequency and impact of incidents in 2004 and 2006 
 
In the above analysis it is demonstrated how different hazard categories can be 
compared for subsequent years. In the following analysis incidents that occurred at 
regional level, i.e. incidents in individual water utilities are compared to incidents at 
national level in England and Wales. In this analysis, it was aimed to identify how 
regional water utilities perform relative to national average with respect to incidents. In 
this analysis, the national incident frequencies and average incident impacts for hazard 
categories represented a baseline against which the performance of the regional water 
utilities was evaluated. Since the 89, 92 and 98 incidents for the years 2004, 2005 and 
2006 respectively, represent the national frequency of incidents, the baseline frequency 
needs to be adjusted to reflect the regional scale of water utilities. It was thought that an 
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effective means to adjust the national baseline was to scale down the frequency of 
national incidents according to size of population served by the assets of a regional 
water utility. A water utility serving 10% of the customers in England and Wales would 
have a baseline of 9.8 incidents in 2006.  
Here, the Regional Water Utility is used as an example: According to the DWI, it 
supplied 9.09% of all customers in England and Wales in 2004 and 8.74% of all 
customers in 2005 and 2006 (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2005b; Drinking Water 
Inspectorate, 2006; Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2007).  
Based on the national incident frequencies presented in Table 10 the scaled down 
frequencies were calculated as a baseline to reflect the regional size of supplied 
population in the Regional Water Utility. In order to facilitate the significance testing of 
regional incidents at water utility level with the baseline data, the water utility specific 
incidents were identified in (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2005b; Drinking Water 
Inspectorate, 2006) (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2007)and statistically analysed.  
Table 14 to Table 16 summarise the comparison of incidents in the Regional Water 
Utility with incidents in England and Wales for the years 2004 to 2006. It was found 
that on five counts between 2004 and 2006, the Regional Water Utility generated 
significantly higher impacts on its customers compared to national average. Similarly, 
on five counts it generated significantly lower customer impacts on its customers in 
comparison. The detailed analyses and significance tests are presented in the Appendix 
3.2.1. 
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 X1  X2    H0: RWU H*RWU F = SN H*SN F 
2004 
Baseline 
(National 
standard (SN) 
for RWU  
Regional  
Water Utility 
(RWU) 
Incident 
Impact 
   H1: RWU H*RWU F<>SN H*SN F 
Hazard 
category SN F SN I  
RWU  
F 
RWU 
I  
Mean 
(X2-X1) SE  CI 95%  H0 Result 
Aesthetics 4.2 21.6  12 19.0  137.3 2.7 5.2 Reject 
RWU do 
worse than 
SN 
Biological 
pathogens 
present 1.5 16.4  2 8.6  -6.7 7.3 14.3 Accept  
Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 1.4 29.9  3 30.6  51.0 3.1 6.0 Reject 
RWU do 
worse than 
SN 
Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 0.6 19.6  1 9.2  -1.5 6.3 12.3 Accept  
Potential 
unwholesome 
medium health 
effect 0.2 24.8  0   -4.5 2.3 4.5 Accept  
Potential 
Unwholesome, 
low health effect 0.2 16.8  0   -3.1 0.3 0.7 Reject 
RWU do 
better than SN 
Loss of supply 0.1 11.9  0   -1.1 0.0 0.00 Accept  
       
 
 
   
Note  
SN F is the national frequency for this category incident scaled down with the percentage of customers served by this 
utility.  
Legend  
SN National standard 
RWU Regional Water Utility 
F Frequency of occurrence 
I Incident impact for respective category 
SE Standard Error 
CI 95% Confidence interval at 95% 
Table 14 Significance test comparing incidents in the Regional Water Utility with incidents in 
England and Wales in 2004 
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 X1  X2    H0: RWU H*RWU F = SN H*SN F 
2005 
Baseline 
(National 
standard (SN) 
for RWU  
Regional 
Water Utility 
(RWU) 
Incident 
Impact 
   H1: RWUH*RWU F<>SN H*SN F 
Hazard 
category SN F SN I  
RWU 
F 
RWU 
I  
Mean 
(X2-X1) SE  CI 95%  H0 Result 
Aesthetics 4.2 29.1  5 17.9  -32.7 8.3 16.2 Reject 
RWU do 
better than SN 
Biological 
pathogens 
present 1.6 20.3     -32.0 9.1 17.8 Reject 
RWU do 
better than SN 
Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 1.3 46.4  3 41.2  62.7 16.7 32.7 Reject 
RWU do 
worse than 
SN 
Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 0.4 39.0  0 0.0  -13.6 17.9 35.0 Accept  
Chemical 
present, health 
effects 0.3 85.8  0 0.0  -22.5 52.1 102.1 Accept  
Unwholesome 0.2 10.3  1 4.7  2.9 5.7 11.1 Accept  
Loss of supply 0.2 19.3  0   -3.4 8.0 15.7 Accept  
Table 15 Significance test comparing incidents in the Regional Water Utility with incidents in 
England and Wales in 2005 
 
 X1  X2    H0: RWU H*RWU F = SN H*SN F 
 
Baseline 
(National 
standard (SN) 
for RWU  
Regional 
Water Utility 
(RWU) 
Incident 
Impact    H1: RWUH*RWU F<>SN H*SN F 
            
Hazard 
category SN F SN I  
RWU 
F 
RWU 
I  
Mean 
(X2-X1) SE  CI 95%  H0 Result 
Aesthetics 3.8 43.7  5 81.1  241.3 66.8 131.0 Reject 
RWU do 
worse than 
SN 
Biological 
pathogens 
present 1.9 20.5  3 23.9  32.3 12.7 24.9 Reject 
RWU do 
worse than 
SN 
Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 1.0 33.7  0   -32.4 7.3 14.3 Reject 
RWU do 
better than SN 
Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 1.0 18.2  2 12.0  6.5 4.4 8.6 Accept  
Chemical 
present, health 
effects 0.4 96.1     -33.6 82.8 162.2 Accept  
Loss of supply 0.5 8.7  0   -4.5 1.0 1.9 Reject 
RWU do 
better than SN 
Table 16 Significance test comparing incidents in the Regional Water Utility with incidents in 
England and Wales in 2006 
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This type of analysis was conducted for all significantly large water utilities in England 
and Wales. The significantly large water utilities were selected by the size of population 
they serve. In analogy to the incident analysis for the Regional Water Utility, their 
incidents were analysed and compared to a specific baseline of national incidents that 
reflects their population size. In a significance test, it was determined whether they 
generated incidents in the specific hazard categories that exceeded national average.  
Figure 10 shows the number of hazard categories for which the frequency and impact 
assessment of individual water utilities generated significantly better or worse incident 
impacts in comparison to the national average in England and Wales. If the significance 
test resulted in accepting H0 at a significance level of 5%, the water utility performance 
was recorded as ‘same performance’. Similar to the analysis for the Regional Water 
Utility, the results for the years 2004 to 2006 were aggregated. From this analysis, it can 
be identified that there is a trend suggesting that water utilities with significantly large 
customer bases outperform the average and small water utilities with significantly lower 
incident impacts. This can be calculated by the number of significantly lower customer 
impacts in comparison to the number of significantly higher customer impacts 
generated by significantly large water utilities.  
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Figure 10 Summary of significance tests comparing water utility performance during incidents to 
the national average performance for the years 2004 to 2006 
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In summary of this section, publicly available incident data were used to identify - in a 
high level assessment - the types of assets that failed and caused an incident. The asset 
life cycle phase during which the incident occurred was identified and presented in a 
matrix. It was found that incidents do not occur randomly but significantly affect 
distribution assets. They commonly occurred due to a lack of maintenance or as a 
deliberate policy to “run to failure”.  
In a more detailed analysis, the incident impacts on customers were evaluated. An 
increasing trend was found in the annual number of incidents but also in the average 
duration and size of population affected by incidents. The comparative analysis of 
incidents enables a direct comparison of incidents at regional level with incident data 
for national level.  
 
In the following section, the incidents between 1997 and 2006 in the Regional Water 
Utility are presented.  
 
2.4.2 Incidents in the Regional Water Utility between 1997 and 2006 
In this following analysis the 419 incidents that occurred between 1997 and 2006 were 
investigated to understand their cause and effect relationships and to quantify their 
impact on customers using the previously introduced theoretical developments, 
methodologies and models. For each analyzed incident, the most significant or primary 
cause and effect was extracted from the incident narratives discarding any contributing 
factors or secondary effects of the incident. (These will be accounted for in a 
subsequent study.) 
In Table 17, a histogram of the primary incident causes and primary incident effects is 
presented for all 419 incidents. The causes and effects are presented in descending 
order.  
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Primary 
incident cause 
10 year 
histogram in %  Primary incident effect 
10 year 
histogram in %  
Burst main 133 31.7%  Interruption to supply 120 28.6% 
IT failure 47 11.2%  Discolouration 115 27.4% 
Maintenance 
work 45 10.7%  loss of M and C 42 10.0% 
Asset failure 41 9.8%  
Potential biological pathogens 
present 24 5.7% 
Power failure 25 6.0%  
Chemicals present above 
guidelines 23 5.5% 
Operational 
intervention 23 5.5%  
Biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged 18 4.3% 
3rd party 19 4.5%  
Potential biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
envisaged 13 3.1% 
Chlorination 
failure 18 4.3%  Biological pathogens present 12 2.9% 
Asset 
contamination 15 3.6%  Empty Service Reservoir 11 2.6% 
Unknown 13 3.1%  Loss of asset 8 1.9% 
Treatment 
failure 12 2.9%  Damage to asset 5 1.2% 
Raw water 
quality 8 1.9%  3rd party impact (Gas) 4 1.0 % 
Asset damage 4 1.0%  Aesthetics above guidelines 4 1.0% 
M and C failure 3 0.7%  Environmental  4 1.0 % 
Severe weather 3 0.7%  
Chemicals present above 
guidelines, health effects 
envisaged 3 0.7% 
High Demand 2 0.5%  low pressure 3 0.7% 
Security 2 0.5%  3rd part damage 2 0.5% 
Adverse 
weather 1 0.2%  
Disruption To Normal 
Processing Of Work 2 0.5% 
Chemical 
spillage 1 0.2%  Risk of cross contamination 2 0.5% 
Chemical supply 
contamination 1 0.2%  3rd party accident 1 0.2% 
Design failure 1 0.2%  Human safety 1 0.2% 
Illegal 
connection 1 0.2%  Statutory monitoring failure 1 0.2% 
Telemetry failure 1 0.2%  Supply of unchlorinated water 1 0.2% 
Water quality 1 0.2%  Treatment failure 1 0.2% 
Total 419 100.00%  Total 419 100.00% 
Table 17 Primary incident causes in the Regional Water Utility between 1997 and 2006 
 
The top 50% of primary incident causes were identified as ‘failed water mains 
(31.7%)’, ‘IT failures (11.2%)’ and ‘maintenance work (10.7%)’. The remainder is 
distributed over 21 further categories reflecting the prevailing diversity of primary 
incident causes resulting in an incident. Similarly, the top 50% of primary incident 
effects were identified as ‘interruption to drinking water supply (28.6%)’ and 
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‘discolouration/aesthetics (27.4%)’. The remainder is distributed over 22 further 
categories reflecting the prevailing diversity of primary incident effects.  
345 out of the 419 incidents had a direct impact on customers. Their cause-effect 
relationships are presented in a three-dimensional chart in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11 Percentage of incident occurrence for primary cause and effect relationships for 
incidents between 1997 and 2006 in the Regional Water Utility 
 
In 22.9% of all incidents, a burst main resulted in the loss of supply to customers. In 
10.1% of all incidents, a burst main has primarily resulted in aesthetical problems 
related to the drinking water supplied to customers. 7.5% of incidents were attributed to 
maintenance work that subsequently led to aesthetical problems with the drinking water. 
5.2% of incidents were attributed to chlorination systems failure that led to potential 
biological pathogens present in the supplied drinking water. All other interrelationships 
between causes and effects constitute less than 5% of incidents.  
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In comparison to the data recorded for incidents in England and Wales in 2005, a 
significantly higher percentage of incidents are attributed to loss or interruption of 
supply reflecting the DWI strategy of reporting water quality incidents only. Yet, this 
analysis already confirms that the majority of incidents are associated to distribution 
network assets.  
 
In the following analysis, it was aimed to understand where and when incidents occur in 
the asset type – asset life cycle matrix. 324 incidents were considered that had an impact 
on the safety and reliability of drinking water supply for customers in the Regional 
Water Utility between 1997 and 2006. Based on the analysis of the incident narratives, 
the primary incident cause of every incident was classified in the broad categories 
‘catchment’, ‘water treatment works’, ‘service reservoir’ and ‘distribution system’. 
Furthermore, the appropriate asset management phase from ‘design’, ‘operation’ and 
‘maintenance’ was identified to which the individual incident causes could be 
attributed.  
In Table 18 a catchment-to-tap – asset life cycle matrix is presented. A total of 369 
incident causes were recorded for the 324 incident description. The deviation in 
numbers arises mainly from multiple factors contributing during an incident but also 
ambiguity in the incident reports to precisely pinpoint the incident to a specific matrix 
field. Problems of classification also arose when an incident symptom occurred in a 
downstream asset but originated further upstream in the catchment to tap model. 
Discoloured water can arise through the deposition of solids in the distribution network. 
At self-cleaning velocities in the distribution network, these deposits are constantly 
washed out to customer tap at low concentration and low impact on customers. The 
deposition of solids could be classed as a treatment problem (design) because the 
process does not adequately remove the precursors for discolouring precipitates (Iron 
and Manganese). It could also be classed as treatment (operations) if the process was 
not optimally operated to remove precipitates. It could be classed as distribution 
network design problem because deposits were allowed to accumulate in the network 
until water demand increased the flow velocities to self-cleansing velocity. It could be 
classed as a distribution operations and maintenance issue because regular flushing and 
swabbing could have avoided the accumulation of deposits.  
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Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum 
Design 2 38 4 24 68 
Construction 0 1 2 54 57 
Operations 2 14 8 33 57 
Maintenance  0 18 4 165 187 
Sum 4 71 18 276 369 
Table 18 Incident classification in catchment to tap and asset life cycle matrix for incidents in the 
Regional Water Utility between 1997 and 2006 
 
In Table 18 a number of significant observations can be made: The results are first 
considered in a catchment to tap perspective: Here, 74.8% of incidents arose in the 
distribution networks of the water utilities. This is followed by 20.2% of incidents 
occurred at the water treatment capabilities in the water utilities. 4.8% of incidents 
originated in service reservoirs and 1% in the catchment.  
From an asset life cycle perspective, the majority of incidents were attributed to asset 
maintenance. A total of 50.6% of incidents were attributed to this category. This is 
followed by 18.4% of incidents attributed to the category ‘design’ (which denotes a 
failure to design or upgrade sections of an existing supply system to be fit for purpose). 
15.4% of incidents were attributed as a result from failing to operate a water supply 
system that is otherwise fit for purpose. Another 15.4% of incidents were attributed to 
construction work at or near the asset that subsequently failed or resulted in an impact 
on customers.  
Within the matrix, the largest number of recorded incident causes can be identified for 
distribution systems maintenance. Here, 44.7% of incident causes were recorded. This 
originates primarily from water mains bursts that result in ‘loss of supply’, ‘low 
pressure’ and ‘discolouration’. 14.6% of incidents causes were recorded as an impact of 
construction work on distribution assets. Overall, it could be demonstrated that a high 
level of diversity in the occurrence of incidents prevails. Incidents occur across all 
categories from catchment to tap as well as in all asset management life cycle phases.  
In the following analysis, it was aimed to identify patterns in the distribution of 
incidents in the catchment to tap – asset life cycle matrix. It was hypothesised that 
incidents in the matrix are randomly distributed and the Chi square testing methodology 
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was employed to calculate an expected distribution of incident occurrences in the 
matrix. The formal calculation and hypothesis testing is presented in Appendix 3.2.2. A 
random distribution of incidents in the matrix based on the sums for the individual 
categories is presented in Table 19.  
 
  
Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum 
Design 0.7 13.1 3.3 50.9 68 
Construction 0.6 11.0 2.8 42.6 57 
Operations 0.6 11.0 2.8 42.6 57 
Maintenance  2.0 36.0 9.1 139.9 187 
Sum 4 71 18 276 369 
Table 19 Calculated, random distribution of incident occurrences in the asset type - asset life cycle 
matrix 
 
The Chi square statistic is calculated from the sum of squared differences in each matrix 
field as (Observed-Expected)2/Expected. For each matrix field the Chi Square statistic is 
presented in Table 20.  
 
  
Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum X2 
Design 2.2 47.5 0.1 14.2   
Construction 0.6 9.1 0.2 3.0   
Operations 3.1 0.8 9.8 2.2   
Maintenance  2.0 9.0 2.9 4.5   
Sum 7.9 66.3 13.0 23.9 111.17 
Table 20 Chi square statistic for incident occurrences in the asset type - asset life cycle matrix 
 
The sum of the Chi square statistic is 111.17. The critical value for 9 degrees of 
freedom at a significance level SL = 0.05 is X2 = 16.92. Since 111.17 > 16.92, the H0 
hypothesis of a random distribution in the catchment to tap – asset life cycle matrix is 
rejected. Similarly, the critical value for 9 degrees of freedom at a significance level SL 
= 0.001 is X2 = 27.88. Since 111.17 > 27.88, the H0 hypothesis of a random distribution 
in the catchment to tap – asset life cycle matrix is rejected. It is concluded that the 
matrix distribution is not random but dependencies exist between the catchment to tap 
axis and the asset life cycle axis. In scrutinising Table 20 it can be identified that the 
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largest deviation between observed and expected distribution arises for design issues in 
Water Treatment Works. Here, the observed incident causes are larger than expected in 
a random distribution.  The observed incident causes related to design of distribution 
assets are lower than expected in a random distribution.  
 
In a further, detailed analysis, the 145 incidents between 2004 and 2006 were coded 
with the structured incident assessment template previously introduced. In this analysis, 
the detailed description of the incident enabled a precise identification of the failed 
equipment and component. In Figure 12, the asset, equipment and component types at 
which the incidents occurred are shown in percentage of the total number of incidents 
for the years 2004 to 2006. As seen before, the majority of incidents occur in the 
distribution network; 33% of the incidents occurred due to the failure of water mains. 
13.6% of the incidents occurred as a result of trunk main failures. The second largest 
asset type causing an incident is equipment for chemical treatment in water treatment 
works (14.3%). This is followed by incidents due to power failures (10.2%).  
 
Water mains - 
Distribution, 33.3%
WTW - Chemical 
treatment equipment, 
14.3%
SRE  - Structure, 2.7%
SRE - 
Pump/motor/valve, 
1.4%
WPS - 
Pump/motor/valve, 
1.4%
Trunk mains - 
SRE/WPS/WT, 4.8%
Trunk mains - 
Distribution, 8.8%
Power - 
Supply/generation, 
10.2%
Power - UPS failure, 
4.8%
IT - 
Monitoring/control/tele
metry, 6.1%
WTW - 
Pump/motor/valve, 
1.4%
Catchment/IRE, 2.7%
BH - 
Pump/motor/valve, 
0.7%
WTW - Process, 7.5%
 
Figure 12 Asset type causing an incident between 2004 and 2006 
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In Figure 13, the number of attributed asset-related incident causes is shown. In total 
316 asset-related causes were identified for the 145 incident. The categories of incident 
causes presented in this figure are not necessarily mutually exclusive as the analysis 
allowed multiple categories for the assessment of individual incidents. E.g., a burst 
water main could be attributed to water mains failure due to material fatigue and 
corrosion, if this was so identified in the incident documentation for a particular 
incident. ‘Corrosion’, ‘material fatigue’, ‘wear and tear’, ‘age’ and ‘poor condition’ are 
often the underlying factors for the different types of asset-related failures. ‘Asset 
failure’ denotes any failure of an asset which has not been explicitly recorded as 
‘mechanical failure’, ‘electrical failure’, ‘civil failure’ or ‘water mains failure’. Within 
the 145 incidents, the largest number of incident causes was recorded as ‘water main 
failures’; this is followed by ‘material fatigue’, ‘3rd party impact on assets’ and 
‘corrosion’.  
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Figure 13 Asset related causes for incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
A further perspective is provided by investigating the time series of asset failures. 
In Figure 14 asset-related incident causes are shown in a time series which relate to 
asset failures. The incident causes classed as ‘asset failures’ denote failures of assets, 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  111 
equipment and components other than burst mains and failure of chlorination asset, 
equipment and components. Due to the high rate of occurrence, ‘burst mains’ form a 
distinct group. Similarly, the ‘failures of chlorination’ (equipment) were recorded 
separably. The remaining category ‘asset damage’ denotes a severe impact on an asset 
that limited its ability to provide a service. In Figure 14, the number of primary incident 
causes for asset failures, burst mains, chlorination asset failure and asset damage is 
plotted for the years between 1997 and 2006. For the purpose of illustration, the data 
points are connected with a line.  
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Figure 14 Asset damage, asset failure, burst mains and chlorination equipment failure between 
1997 and 2006 
 
A notable trend can be identified of increasing numbers of burst mains to cause an 
incident. This trend peaked in 2004 at 24 incidents and, since, the number of burst main 
incidents reduced to 14 in 2006. According to one reporter (participant no.34), the 
reduction of burst main incidents coincides with targeted mains refurbishment and 
replacement programmes.  
A trend of increasing asset failures can also be identified. Throughout the 10 years, on 
average four asset failures per year led to an incident. Since 2004, the number of asset 
failures increased to 6 and 11 for the years 2005 and 2006, respectively.  
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Failure of chlorination assets, equipment and components resulting in an incident 
averages at 1.8 failures per year. In 2004, the frequency of chlorination asset and 
equipment failure peaked at 6 incidents per year. Since then, the number has reduced to 
zero and one incident in the years 2004 and 2005, respectively.  
 
In Figure 15, the number of primary incident causes for ‘IT failures’, ‘power failures’ 
and ‘monitoring, control and telemetry failures’ that caused an incident is plotted in a 
time series for the years between 1997 and 2006.  
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Figure 15 IT, power, monitoring, control and telemetry failures between 1997 and 2006 
 
With respect to IT failure, a significant trend can be observed of increasing numbers of 
incidents between 1999 and 2005. This can be attributed to an increasing use of IT to 
manage business processes in the organisation. Since 2004, the number of IT related 
incidents reduces from 14 to 4 in 2006. According to one IT Manager (participant no. 
30), the “teething problems of introducing new technologies were initially having a 
huge impact on the business but have now been ‘ironed out’”. Similarly, the number of 
power failures with the effect of an incident has significantly increased since 2001 to 
2005. On enquiry, a number of factors were reported to explain this trend: Firstly, the 
supply of electricity by the electricity company is seen as less reliable nowadays than it 
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was a few years ago. One reporter (participant no.4) suggested that severe weather 
events have contributed to the overall reduction in the reliability of electrical supply. 
Secondly, according to one asset manager (participant no.13), the water utility has 
increased its use of water pumping stations in favour over water towers and reduced its 
capacity of gravity-fed water supply systems. In his view, increasing numbers of power-
supply dependent water pumping stations correlates with the increasing number of 
incidents due to power supply failures. This trend is, however, overshadowed by 
investments in un-interruptible power supply systems. The organisation has increased 
its investments in un-interruptible power supply based on risk assessments and 
reliability studies on the power supply company.  
In 2006, three incidents were specifically attributed to failures of monitoring and 
control equipment. This represents a significant increase compared to previous years. 
Similarly, to the use of IT, a trend can be observed in the organisation for increased use 
of monitoring and control equipment. This is related to an operational philosophy that 
requires all water treatment works to be operated from a regional operations and control 
centre without an operator on-site. This operational philosophy can also be observed for 
other assets owned by the water utility.  
 
Incidents do not only occur due to asset-related failures. Figure 16 shows the number of 
attributed process-related incident causes. In total, 110 process-related causes were 
identified for the 145 incident between 2004 and 2006. Again, the categories are not 
mutually exclusive and the analysis allowed multiple categories for the assessment of 
individual incidents, if this was so identified in the incident documentation. Process-
related incidents may relate to process issues, impact from the environment but also 
process-operational issues in utilitizing assets. The three largest process-related incident 
causes were recorded as ‘water main scouring’, ‘treatment process failure’ and ‘ingress 
of contaminants’. Water main scouring denotes changes in flow patterns, velocities and 
pressures in distribution systems that re-suspended deposited solids to cause 
discolouration incidents. Hydraulic effects, too, are changes in flow patterns, velocities 
and pressures in a distribution system that may disrupt the continued water supply to 
customers or dissolves air in the drinking water. ‘Operating environment’ denotes an 
adverse operating environment for assets.  
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Figure 16 Process-related incident causes for incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
So far, 426 asset- and process- related incident causes were identified for the 145 
incident. On average, 2.9 asset- and process-related incident causes were attributed per 
incident. This figure indicates that incidents have multiple causes and contributing 
factors leading to failures and an inability to pinpoint one ‘root cause’.  
Beyond asset- and process-related failures, human factor can be taken into account as a 
contributing element to cause an incident. In 127 instances, a causal relationship 
between human factors/errors and an incident could be attributed. This represents an 
average of 0.88 human factors per incident. Although this was not necessarily the main 
root cause to the incident, the human factor was seen as a contributing factor in the 
incident. As in previous studies, this analysis allowed more than one contributing factor 
to be attributed to any one incident. In Figure 17, the numbers of occurrences in the 
respective categories of human factors are presented. A number of these human factor 
categories are arguable: ‘Unanticipated effect’ and ‘acted in good faith’ do not 
necessarily describe an insufficiency in the decision making of an operator but rather 
denote a ‘lesson learnt’ in hindsight: Had the person involved in the incident known 
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about the potential effect, s/he would probably not have pursued a chosen course of 
action. Other categories are self-explanatory.  
The largest attributed human factor was identified as ‘poor design’ and ‘unanticipated 
effect’. ‘Lack of information’ on the potential consequences of action and ‘poor outage 
planning’ represent the third and fourth largest group in human factors contributing to 
incidents.  
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Figure 17 Human factor-related incident causes for incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
In total, 553 asset-, process- and human factor- related incident causes were identified 
for the 145 incident. This represents an average of 3.8 incident causes attributed for 
each incident and demonstrates that incidents are attributable to multiple incident causes 
and contributing factors as opposed to one ‘root cause’.  
In Figure 18 incident causes are shown which relate to operational activities on assets in 
the years 1997 to 2006 and represent human factors in incident propagation. The 
incident causes are classed as incidents that occurred during maintenance work on 
assets and due to an operational intervention by utility staff.  Again, the data points care 
connected by a line to illustrate any trends. 
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Figure 18 Incidents relating to operational activities on assets between 1997 and 2006 
 
On average 4.5 incidents per year occur during maintenance work on assets. Although a 
trend can be identified of reducing numbers of incident causes in this category, the main 
observation suggests some form of periodical increase and decline. 1999 and 2005 
represent peaks in the number of incidents occurring. It appears that this periodical 
trend coincides with capital investment and maintenance spending during the 
subsequent asset management programmes (AMP). According to one asset manager 
(participant no.31), 1999 and 2004 are the final years of asset management programmes 
in which, historically, a considerable amount of investment and maintenance projects 
are implemented. These implementation phases are “busy” periods with many 
scheduled construction activities being carried out on or near water utility assets.  
It appears that operational interventions resulting in an incident has a similar periodic 
pattern, which almost corresponds with incidents due to maintenance work on assets. 
There may be a correlation to increased construction activity. However, there was no 
further data available to test this hypothesis. Providing evidence for this hypothesis 
would require an assessment of overall operational activity, in particular interventions 
into the water supply system, as a baseline to compare operational interventions causing 
an incident. The assessment would further require a measure for construction related 
activity on or near water supply system assets.  
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In a series of interviews it was aimed to further illuminate the causes of incidents. A 
number of operations and asset engineers were asked how specific incidents came 
about: Quite often interviewees would state “it was like a bit of a freak occurrence 
which caused [the asset] to fail”, “it was sort of a strange incident”, “what happened 
was there was several things linked in.” and “that fault was just specific to that site and 
that issue, it was just a one off type thing and it wasn’t a generic fault which could 
occur at any site.” One process engineer (participant no.1) commented: Regarding “the 
initial fault, you realise that there’s still going to be that unknown, that something can 
occur which can throw a spanner in the works which it did on this occasion which 
there’s nothing that you could have really done about it, it was like a freak 
occurrence.” 
Commenting on one incident that involved a failure of chlorination equipment, an asset 
engineer (participant no.2) reported: “The chlorine problems that happened on site 
because the site wasn’t a fail safe site as such.” 
Another process engineer (participant no.32) commented on an incident that involved 
contaminated chemicals: “It was down to unforeseen circumstances really that caused 
[the incident]. Because basically it all stemmed from the supply of the chemical being 
substandard and causing blockages in our line and we actually ran out of hypo because 
of it.   I mean, hindsight is a great thing.  Up until this happening I don’t think anybody 
had considered us getting a chemical that was going to crystallise and block our dosing 
lines – up until now you think that might happen in the future. I mean, all chemicals 
should be to an ISO standard, you know, they do come ISO stamped so whether they 
failed on ISO standards could be questionable.  We’ve had hypo for a lot of years and 
we’ve only had it happen the once so something has gone wrong” 
One expert for distribution systems (participant no. 4) further explained the reason for 
discolouration incidents: “Well, I suppose it all begins … from the water treatment 
works output and we don’t provide distilled water from treatment works, there’s always 
a level of say materials like iron and manganese that have been distributed into the 
distribution network.  Now, they eventually sort of end up somewhere, I’ve heard some 
figures from water treatment works over a year kicking out so many kilograms of iron, 
for instance, and it’s true, if the water is coming out of the treatment works at the level 
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of even twenty milligrams per litre of iron then eventually that ends up somewhere.  A 
lot of the iron and manganese ends up as sedimentation.  Research now shows that it 
sticks to the pipe more at the inner surface and then it can just build up and up and, as 
long as the typical daily flows and velocities are happening in that main then it’s quite 
happily stuck to the pipe and then eventually on some disturbance happening, call it like 
a hydraulic event, typically a burst, then the sudden increase in the velocity increases 
what we’re calling the sheer stresses on that pipe or sedimentation material and strips 
those off and, of course, it then gets delivered to customers. When we get a burst, we get 
big discolouration problems sometimes because of … material has stripped off and 
some of the figures have shown that it doesn’t take much of this to cause massive 
discolouration problems.”  Further research into discolouration incidents and strategies 
to manage discolouration risk were developed by (Brandt et al., 2004). 
 
In Figure 17, a number of incidents were attributed to human factors. After one incident 
involving the failure of an acid system, one senior operations manager (participant no.5) 
commented: “I think there was a lot of thing about the monitoring of the chemical 
dosing of the acid systems at the time, I think there was a clear gap in the process and 
procedures.  I think basically [the operators] did a really excellent, top quality job 
during the day in normal hours and … out of hours and on a weekend they went back to 
basically a skeleton monitoring exercise and I think that’s when the process started to 
go astray. “ Another operations manager (participant no.6) was more specific about 
human error: “I would say that responding to incidents is something that we excel at 
but, you know, as far as incidents happening there’s usually some gap in an operating 
procedure or it’s human error, someone’s made an incorrect judgement.” 
Incident may also arise from standard operating procedures. The organisation requires 
stringent adherence to procedures and guidelines aiming for a repeatability of actions 
and routines. Activities based on decisions that are not defined in procedures are to be 
taken at a more senior level, for these individuals should have the best overall 
knowledge of the system. Many incidents that were investigated had unique and novel 
aspects to consider for which detailed procedures were not available. These arise out of 
the specific circumstances, e.g. the environment in which the incident occurs. The 
performances of tasks are embedded in formal rules, generalised guidelines and 
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standardised frameworks and are expressed in SOPs, risk assessments and method 
statements. One process engineer (participant no.1) commented on the adherence to 
SOP: “You’re relying more and more on your team members to pull their weight to 
actually do the job correctly and not to drop you in it basically and there is an 
understanding within teams that you’ve got to do your job and you’ve got to follow, if 
there is a procedure there, you don’t follow it and it’s proved you don’t follow it then 
that’s it, it’s your fault for not following the procedure.  So it is understood that 
procedures are there for a reason, they’re there to ensure things are done correctly and 
people are aware that you’ve got to understand and evaluate all the risks that you’re 
going to come into contact with when you do certain jobs.  
There are jobs on site which you know that you can do with your eyes closed, it’s not 
going to create a problem, but then there’s also – especially with being on standby and 
having site shutdowns and you’re there and you've got to start a site up and you’ve 
resolved a fault and you know that there’s a higher risk involved because the site has 
been shut down.  People are aware that, yeah, you have to ensure you follow 
procedures and you do everything to the letter and you do see through things 
thoroughly before carrying out any actions to ensure that you’ve mitigated all the risks 
that you can within reason.” 
One incident manager (participant no.7) criticised the amount of procedures currently in 
use: “I think one of the problems we’ve got is there would be so many procedures 
people don’t read them.  I think what we need to do is they need to highlight the critical 
’ thou shall not ever’ sort of thing, they really do need to understand those ones but 
they’re just being hit with that many now.  I think that’s the problem, they just all merge 
into each other.” 
Care must also be taken when procedures are not updated or fail to reflect actual 
circumstances on a site. One operations manager (participant no. 8) reported: “Also, I 
think some learning [from an incident] that we had [for] the organisation [was], that 
when certain controls are changed on assets that we need to consider what the whole 
effect of that is.” A senior operations manager (participant no.5) commented on 
enhancing SOP following an incident caused by inadequate procedures: “I think they 
would have certainly amended the site protocols in terms of the monitoring and control 
of the acid system.” 
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Another operations manager (participant no.6) commented: “We had some actions that 
rolled out from that [incident] - a modification to a procedure so, for instance, on start 
ups, sample transfers, things like that before you actually move water forward into the 
contact tank, … and I believe there was also some amendments into … alarms as well.” 
Adherence to SOP also features in the incident review meeting. One operation engineer 
(participant no.1) commented: In the incident review meeting “everybody was asked: 
what was your involvement, what happened at this time, what did you do at this time, 
did you follow the relevant QMS procedure?  So if there’s a procedure in place you 
were asked if you followed it, what did you do with it, it was checked and then, if there 
are procedures missing do any need writing.” 
More interesting are incidents with multiple incident causes that include human factors: 
One asset engineer (participant no.9) commented on physical asset failure in 
combination with human error: “You’ve had … [a] communication breakdown, 
somebody hasn’t fully understood the procedure and you’ve had something that’s failed 
technically.” 
Another interviewee (participant no.6) expanded on the multicausality of incidents: 
“Usually, it’s like I said before with this incident, it’s usually when you get two things 
that align.  This, for instance, the incident that we had at [Name of site], the flow switch 
failing and being modified with PLC codes on its own would have been fine, you 
wouldn’t have had a problem with that if the Process Engineer had checked the sump 
before he put the water forward. 
It’s usually when two or three errors align that you get an incident, one error alone and 
there’s usually thing in place that ensure that, if you do have a failed asset, you have an 
alarm that picks it up and, if you have a failed alarm, there’s usually someone on site.   
I would say that we have very robust procedures and our assets are extremely well 
automated and extremely well alarmed that it usually captures everything and it’s 
usually when there’s a gap in something and a couple of those gaps align that  you end 
up with a failure.” 
One operations manager (participant no.10) commented on the lack of inspection and 
maintenance that led to a specific incident: “It would be the lack of inspection and 
maintenance of the mechanical seals that are used in a particular tank and the fact that 
we don’t do that, therefore, they corroded and it wasn’t a proactive replacement 
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schedule and, therefore, we ended up with an acid leak.” An asset engineer (participant 
no.11) also commented on the organisational maintenance philosophy: “I’ve found that 
a lot of the issues have come because we don’t maintain the assets like we used to, it’s 
as simple as that.  We don’t have the manpower to do that any more and we’ve also 
reduced the practice policies and how many times we maintain things etc”.  There are, 
however, strategies in place to identify investment and maintenance needs. Another 
asset engineer (participant no.12) reports on ways of investigating problems on site 
before an incident may happen: “Well, in my role a lot of identifying the needs has been 
when we have problems on the site so the Process Engineers will call me….  Some of 
it’s from looking around or looking at trends on SCADA or from breakdowns or, you 
know, things like pump failures or generator failures or diesel generator failures. “  
The multicausality and often very complex circumstances under which incidents arise 
were further investigated in a series of case studies based on documented incidents 
(Appendix 3.1). It was found that minor technical issues can cause cascading errors 
technical and human errors that amalgamate into major incidents. A number of cases 
were studied that relate to power failures and subsequently failure of chlorination assets 
or pumping stations despite being designed with fail safe mechanisms or stand-by 
power generation. One incident describes an operations controller being over-whelmed 
by alarms ‘flooding’ into the operations control centre and disguising the most critical 
alarm; another case study describes how an alarm from a failed asset is badly 
communicated to field staff resulting in a prolonged incident duration. One case study 
reports on the adverse effect of a telemetry failure that led to a site being ‘non-visible’ 
for monitoring and control purposes without controllers realising the problem. The 
detailed case studies are presented in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Before considering the effect of incidents, the use of redundancy has to be considered 
that has potential to reduce the impact on customers. The entire water supply system 
builds on duty standby systems or excess capacity to isolate a failed asset and 
compensate for its loss. The organisation maintains reserve capacity in its technical and 
organisational system that includes back-up functions, overlapping tasks and 
responsibilities.   
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In Figure 19, the immediate availability of redundancy for failed assets that caused an 
incident is identified. The majority of incidents between 2004 and 2006 that occurred on 
assets had no immediate redundancy or stand-by available. These duty-only assets were 
predominantly water and trunk mains. The lack of standby or redundancy is one reason 
why the incident had an impact on customers and, it could be argued, that the incident 
impact could have been avoided, if immediate redundancy had been available (unless a 
common cause failure occurred). This, of course, would have significant cost 
implications, as it would require the duplication of the entire distribution system. It can 
also be identified that 29.6% of incidents had immediate standby assets or redundancy 
that failed in the course of the incident unfolding. This was attributed to duty-standby 
failures e.g. due to a common failure cause.  
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Figure 19 Immediate redundancy of assets that failed during incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
In Figure 20, the catchment to tap model was used to identify any assets between the 
asset that caused the incident and the customer. In this analysis, all intermediate assets 
were identified even if they had no reducing effect on the impact on customers.  
It can be seen that in 68% of the incidents an asset failure had an immediate impact on 
customers without any asset between the incident origin and the customer. These 68% 
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contain the majority of “burst water and trunk main” incidents. In 8% of the incidents, 
the rezoning capability of the distribution network significantly reduced the impact on 
customers. In 15.3% of the incidents, a service reservoir mitigated against the full 
impact of an incident. As in the example above, the impact of a failure at a water 
treatment works was largely reduced due to the availability of drinking water in the 
service reservoir for supply to customers.  
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Figure 20 Alternative redundancy in the water supply system between the failed assets and the 
customer for incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
Figure 21 identifies the beneficial use of the intermediate assets to reduce the impact of 
an incident on customers. As shown before, the majority of incidents had no immediate 
asset between the failed asset and the customer that could have reduced the impact 
(67.6%). In 9.7% of the incidents an intermediate asset was available, however, it was 
not designed to or failed to reduce the impact of the incident on customers. In 4% of the 
incidents, the intermediate asset had a very high effect in reducing the incident impact 
so that the residual incident impact was minimal. The remainder of incidents had 
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intermediate assets between the failed asset and the customer. Their effectiveness to 
reduce the impact ranged from very low to high.  
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Figure 21 Beneficial use of systems redundancy during incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
The use of system (as opposed to asset) redundancy was investigated as part of the 
incident management response. In the previous study, the immediate asset redundancy 
and downstream redundancy of failed assets in a catchment to tap perspective were 
investigated. In this study, the emphasis is on alternative supplies that were used to 
reduce or avoid the impact of incidents on customers. Systems redundancy is defined as 
any means of water supply capability that could be diverted to compensate for a failed 
asset or installation. This can arise from using explicitly designed standby systems such 
as standby boreholes, pumps but also emergency connections between distribution 
management areas (DMA). This definition considers systems redundancy to originate 
from fixed installations but excludes bottled water and water tankering. The latter are 
commonly used to provide customers with an emergency supply of drinking water if no 
alternative supply can be established.  
With reference to Figure 22 it was found that in 55.2% of the incidents no systems 
redundancy was used or could be used to reduce the impact or avoid customer impact. 
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In the majority of these incidents, the water utility resorted to the supply of bottled 
water. In 22.1% of the incidents, the use of systems could not avoid customer impact 
although it had a reducing effect. In 15.9% of the incidents, the use of systems 
redundancy significantly reduced the impact of incidents on customers and avoided the 
impact for a much larger customer base. In 6.2% of the incidents, systems redundancy 
was available and used but had a low effect on reducing the incident impact.  
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Figure 22 Usage of redundancy during incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
Sagan (1994) noted that it is important to recognise the counter-productivity of 
designing redundancy for a system, as back-up functions can increase technical 
complexity, conceal errors and lead individuals into not performing their required tasks 
under the assumptions that someone else takes care of his task. 
One incident manager (participant no.7) commented on the availability of redundancy 
for managing incidents: “I think we’re getting a bit close now sometimes, be it …in 
terms of the capacity of a system in dealing with failure or in terms of the people, it can 
be a little bit tight but that’s indicative of the way we are now. In terms of the systems, 
we’re obviously trying to run an optimum system, people are trying to be careful with 
the budgets and sometimes there’s one pump not working at this site and one pump not 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  126 
working at this site and one pump not working and they all come together to – and just 
one more little thing and, you know, we’ve got a major problem here.  That is part of 
risk management; you’re going to get it wrong, aren’t you?  And I don’t say it was any 
different to what it was in the past because in the past you would have three standby 
pumps but if you ever tried to switch them on it didn’t work”. 
In that context, one asset manager (participant no.13) commented on the rationalisation 
of redundancy: “We’ve spent a lot of time trying to understand what we actually mean 
by rationalisation, what exactly is it, and the crux of it is can we deliver the same or 
better service with less assets. Before you can take the assets out you have to 
understand how the assets perform and how they contribute to a resilient network.  If 
you have a resilient network, in theory, an asset failure doesn’t impact on the customer 
…and … we can build up an understanding [of] asset failure versus network resilience 
and customer impact. 
One of the things that we are targeting is reservoirs as a whole…  Why do we need 
them, why do we have them, do we really need them, can we avoid spending money on 
certain service reservoirs and invest it on building a new reservoir in a better area.” 
The aforequoted incident manager (participant no.7) also commented on concealed 
errors in technical back-up systems: “One of the things we have is –say, that water 
treatment works is at a hundred percent of its capacity and at the minute we’re only 
calling in fifty percent.  One of the places we really slip upon, something happens and 
you say right, I want seventy percent, yeah, you’ve got an emergency and you want 
seventy percent.  It tends to be then when you find out that at that moment you can 
actually only do sixty percent.  That’s what the works is capable of doing but obviously 
there can be filters out on different things or there can be a problem, there can be a 
dosing pump that’s maybe for repair which means at the moment can only do sixty 
percent but, because we’re only asking as a routine for fifty percent of its capacity, you 
don’t get to know that.  If something else fails and we say let’s have some more water, 
that’s the point where you find out and that lets us down big style in this organisation of 
water.” 
Technical redundancy has to be available instantaneously during an incident. As 
suggested by the above incident manager, technical redundancy is also required for 
technical maintenance. The availability of redundancy to enable maintenance work 
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requires planning. One asset engineer (participant no.14) reports on the planning of 
maintenance work: “Any operation which our field team do on the distribution system, 
they have to do a risk assessment ….  Basically… it’s like a risk assessment and a 
method statement so it’s basically just saying how they will isolate an asset, whether it 
be a water main, service reservoir or pumping station….” The risk assessment for 
planned maintenance has to consider the availability of redundancy to manage eventual 
incidents. 
Beyond technical redundancy, there is also an element of operator redundancy to 
prevent incidents from happening. One operations engineer (participant no.15) reported: 
“I think people are beginning to realise that, where before they might have been a little 
bit more lax about things because there were more people around to ensure things were 
covered.  Not that I’m saying that things were done haphazardly, I’m just saying that 
now teams have become smaller people are aware that, yes, if there’s less people to 
ensure if you ‘can’t something out’ that someone else will do that for me.  It’s down to 
‘yeah, I’ve got to do that because the team is relying on me to do my job properly 
otherwise I’m going to impact on them further down the line’.  There’s that possibility 
and if I do that they’re going to have to deal with more risks because I haven’t done 
something the way I should have done it.” 
 
Having considered the causes of incidents and the beneficial use of redundancy, the 
impact on customers was assessed. In the following analysis, the effects of these 
incidents are considered taking into account the explicitly stated, multiple effects an 
incident can have. In Figure 23, the effects of the 145 incidents between 2004 and 2006 
are shown. It total 170 incident effects were recorded which equates to 1.17 incident 
effects per incident. The percentages shown in Figure 23 are based on 145 incidents. 
For example, 59 out of the 145 incidents were identified that resulted in ‘loss of supply’ 
to customers. This equates to 40.7% of incidents.  
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Figure 23 Effects of incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
Out of the 145 incidents, 107 were recorded to have no impact or only one impact 
category affecting customers. 37 were recorded explicitly stating two distinct incident 
effects affecting customers. One incident was recorded explicitly stating three different 
impact categories affecting customers. In Figure 24 the percentage of incidents are 
shown with no impact on customers, a single impact on customers and the percentage of 
incidents with double and triple impact on customers. 26.2% of the incidents were 
recorded to have a two or more distinct effects on customers. 23.5% of the incidents 
were recorded for ‘loss of supply’ to customers. 14.5% of the incidents constituted a 
potential presence of pathogens in the drinking water. 13% of the incidents related to 
aesthetic issues affecting the drinking water mainly due to discolouration. 9.7% of the 
incidents had no immediate customer impact. In these incidents, the incident 
management response was able to avoid any impact on customers.  
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Figure 24 Percentage of single, double and triple effect incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
In the following analysis, the incidents with two or more incident impacts on customers 
are further examined. In Figure 25, the percentage of incidents with double or triple 
impact on customers is shown. 10.3% of the 145 incidents caused a ‘loss of supply’ to 
customers followed by aesthetical problems – mainly due to discolouration – on 
resuming normal operations. 6.2% of the incidents involved potential pathogens present 
in the drinking water in combination with exceeding chemical parameters above 
guidelines. 4.8% of the incidents were recorded as ‘loss of supply’ for customers and 
subsequently or simultaneously ‘low pressures’.  
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Figure 25 Percentage of incidents between 2004 and 2006 with a multiple incident effect 
 
In the following section, the impact of incidents on customers is further considered. In 
the Regional Water Utility, a trend of increasing frequency for incidents can be 
identified between 1997 and 2006. Whereas the number of incidents has gradually 
increased by an average of 2.3 incidents per year, the average incident impact has 
marginally reduced. This is presented in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26 Frequency and impact of incidents between 1997 and 2006 
 
The increase in incidents may have threefold reason: firstly, the threshold for defining 
an incident may have changed during that time period. Collecting incident data 
corresponds with a need to report incidents to the Drinking Water Inspectorate. Since 
2004, the current definition of an incident is governed by the Water Undertakers 
(Information) Direction 2004 (Department for Environment, 2004) and the Guidance on 
the Notification of events (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2004). If the threshold in the 
definition of an incident had been reduced, it would reflect in the number of incidents in 
the incident database. Secondly, the water utility may commit more resources to 
document incidents. This, in turn, may contribute to an increased availability of incident 
documents that would, otherwise, not be available. Thirdly, incidents may actually 
occur more frequently due to increased vulnerability of the water supply system, lack of 
maintenance, increased 3rd party impacts, etc.  
Over that 10 year time period, the annual average impact of incidents reduced 
marginally. Per definition, the annual average incident impact is derived from three 
components, namely, the average factor for the hazard type, the average size of the 
population affected during an incident and the average duration of an incident. Hence, 
the average size of the population affected by an incident not only indicates the size of a 
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population supplied by individual supply system arrangements but also indicates the 
ability of the organisation to reduce the affected population during an incident. The 
average duration of an incident indicates the speed of the incident management team to 
identify the hazard source and the speed of re-instating normal operations.  
In the following Figure 27, the annual, average size of populations affected during 
incidents is presented. For the purpose of illustration, the data points are connected by a 
line. It can be seen that the annual average fluctuated between 1,000 and 10,000 
customers affected by incidents. In the year 2005, the annual, average peaked at above 
100,000 customers due to one extreme event that caused an impact on customers in the 
entire water supply region. In 2006, the average number of customers has again fallen 
below the 10,000-customer threshold.  
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Figure 27 Annual, average population size affected by incidents between 1997 and 2006 
 
Figure 28 shows the average duration of incidents in hours of exposure to hazards. Over 
the shown years, the incident duration has reduced by more than 50%.  
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Figure 28 Annual, average duration of incidents between 1997 and 2006 
 
Overall, the comparison of data for subsequent years does not suggest a statistically 
significant increase or reduction for the duration of the average incidents, the average 
affected population and the average incident impact score. The only exceptions arose in 
the analysis of the datasets for 2000 with 2001, 2005 with 2006 and 1997 with 2006. In 
2000, the average size of population affected during incidents was significantly larger 
than in 2001. In 2005, the average hazard score was significantly larger than in 2006. 
The comparison of the year 1997 with 2006 suggests that the average duration of 
incidents, the duration score, the hazard score and the calculated incident impact for the 
year 1997 was significantly higher than in 2006. The detailed statistical analysis and 
significance tests are presented in Appendix 3.2.2.  
In Table 21 further statistical analysis provides evidence of the statistical percentage of 
customers who experience incidents but also the statistical number of hours the water 
utility operated under trying condition.  
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Year Average 
population 
/ incident 
Average 
duration 
in hrs / 
incident 
Number 
of 
incidents 
Mean 
Time 
Between 
Incident 
in days 
Number of 
incidents * 
Population 
Statistical 
percentage 
of 
population 
experiencing 
incidents 
Total 
incident 
hours  
(Number of 
incidents * 
Average 
duration of 
incidents) 
Total 
incident 
hours / 
Total 
operating 
hours 
1997 23867.5 41.1 23 15.9 548953 11.8% 945 10.8% 
1998 2323.5 26.7 15 24.3 34852 0.8% 400 4.6% 
1999 7694.9 14.0 40 9.1 307794 6.6% 560 6.4% 
2000 5231.1 18.4 34 10.7 177856 3.8% 627 7.2% 
2001 1898.2 21.9 29 12.6 55047 1.2% 634 7.2% 
2002 8381.3 17.0 31 11.8 259819 5.6% 528 6.0% 
2003 3575.9 13.4 32 11.4 114429 2.5% 429 4.9% 
2004 3061.0 15.3 54 6.8 165296 3.5% 828 9.5% 
2005 110879.0 12.0 43 8.5 4767798 102.0% 514.5 5.9% 
2006 6608.2 10.8 36 10.1 237895 5.1% 390 4.5% 
Table 21 Statistical percentage of customers experiencing incidents and the percentage of hours 
operating under incident condition between 1997 and 2006 
 
So far, the incident impact for individual incidents were analysed and determined and 
the annual average incident impact calculated. This was used to compare the annual, 
average incident impact with the impact from incidents in subsequent years. This 
analysis was used to monitor the trend of annual incident impacts; however, it does not 
explain the nature of these incident impacts on customers. In the following figures, the 
incidents are investigated with a specific focus on the different hazard types affecting 
customers. 
The overall annual customer impact from incidents in their respective hazard categories 
is presented in Figure 29. The annual incident impact on customers is calculated as 
(frequency of incident for hazard category)*(average incident impact for hazard 
category).  
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Figure 29 Annual incident impact in specific hazard categories between 1997 and 2006 
 
The incident impact in the specified hazard categories were compared with another and 
it was found that the highest customer impacts between 1998 and 2004 related to 
‘aesthetical’ unpleasing drinking water quality. Since 2004, this has significantly 
reduced. Since 1998, a trend can be identified of increasing customer impact from 
incidents relating to ‘loss of supply’. This trend peaked in 2005 and has, since, reduced. 
The third largest hazard category that affects customers during incidents relate to 
‘biological pathogens present with anticipated health effects’. Since 1997, a downward 
trend suggested an improvement in this incident category. Since 2002, the impact on 
customer in this category increased to a peak in 2005. Since then, it reduced to below a 
10-year average.  
The frequencies of incidents for the different hazard categories are presented in Figure 
30.  
As suggested before, it can be identified that the two highest incident frequencies are 
associated to ‘aesthetics’ and ‘loss of supply’. Since 2004, the frequency of incidents 
associated to ‘aesthetical’ unpleasing drinking water quality has reduced significantly 
whereas the frequency of ‘loss of supply’ incidents has been steadily increasing since 
1998.  
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Figure 30 Annual incident frequencies for hazard categories between 1997 and 2006 
 
The average, annual incident impact per incident for the respective hazard categories is 
presented in Figure 31. It can be identified that the annual average impact of incidents 
in the respective hazard categories remained largely unchanged. The only exception is 
identified for the average, annual incident impact related to the hazard category 
‘biological pathogens present with envisaged health effects’. In this category, a 
declining trend can be identified that suggests an improving organisational performance  
 to reduce the size of the population affected during an incident, and/or 
 to reduce the duration of such incident for this particular category.  
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Figure 31 Average, annual incident impact for different hazard categories between 1997 and 2006 
 
The analysis for hazard categories enables a direct statistical comparison and 
significance testing of frequency and impact for specific hazard categories in 
subsequent years. In Table 22, the findings for the years 2004 to 2006 are summarised. 
In this analysis, the hazard categories are compared for subsequent years. 
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Significance testing 
  H0: X1 - X2  = 0       
   H1: X1 - X2 <>0       
   SL: 5%       
      
 
  
 
X1: Year 
  
X2: Year 
  
 
  
 
2004 X1 2005 X2     
 F I  F I H0 SL  Analysis 
Aesthetics 20 13.4 Aesthetics 11 12.8 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Biological pathogens 
present 
3 3.3 Biological pathogens 
present 
3 5.3 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
5 24.4 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
8 19.9 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 
3 4.0 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
5 4.0 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0 0 Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0 0 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Loss of supply 23 7.6 Loss of supply 16 17.7 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous 
year 
      
 
  
 
X1: Year   X2: Year       
2005 X1 2006 X2     
 F I  F I H0 SL  Analysis 
Aesthetics 11 12.8 Aesthetics 7 12.5 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Biological pathogens 
present 
3 5.3 Biological pathogens 
present 
3 4.7 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
8 19.9 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
1 17.3 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 
5 4.0 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
6 7.6 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0 0 Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0 0 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Loss of supply 16 17.7 Loss of supply 19 7.4 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Table 22 Significance testing for hazard categories between 2004 and 2006 
 
As an example, it was identified that incident impacts relating to ‘aesthetical’ 
unpleasing drinking water quality significantly reduced from 2004 to 2006. With 
respect to discolouration and incidents relating to aesthetically unpleasing drinking 
water quality, the technical expert for distribution systems (participant no. 4) 
commented on the regulatory response to those types of incidents: “It was a DWI … 
initiative and information letter that first instigated what all Water companies are doing 
in DOMS [Distribution Operation and Maintenance Strategy]. So they’re really 
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concerned with water quality issues of which discolouration is probably the biggest one 
in terms of customer contact, customer complaints coming in.  So all the Water 
companies are quite focussed on discolouration being the biggest problem but DOMS 
does actually encompass other aspects like taste and odour and contacts around that 
and problems associated with it and pH and, you know various other issues as well.  So 
it’s quite all encompassing in terms of water quality but they’re all naturally a bit 
biased towards discolouration because it’s often such a big problem.”  DOMS was 
developed in a collaborative research project in response to discolouration incidents 
(Brandt et al., 2004). 
Returning to Table 22, incident impacts relating to ‘biological pathogens present with 
envisaged health effects significantly increased from 2004 to 2005 and significantly 
reduced in the following year.  
 
In the following analysis, incidents in the Regional Water Utility are compared to 
incidents reported at national level in England and Wales. As in previous analyses, the 
national incident occurrences and impacts represent a baseline against which the 
performance of the Regional Water Utility is compared. Table 23, Table 24 and Table 
25 summarise the comparison of incidents in the Regional Water Utility with incidents 
in England and Wales for the years 2004 to 2006. 
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RWU Incident database 
  
 
National Standard (SN) (DWI) 
customised to RWU (Frequency 
adjusted over Population) 
Significance testing 
 
 
      H0: X1 - X2  = 0  
Year      H1: X1 - X2 <>0  
2004      SL: 5%    
      X1 RW
U 
  
      X2 DWI   
         
 
  F I   F  I H0 SL  Analysis 
Aesthetics 20 13.4 Aesthetics 4.9 21.6 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 RWU do 
worse 
than SN 
Biological pathogens 
present 
3 3.3 Biological 
pathogens 
present 
1.5 16.4 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 RWU do 
better 
than SN 
Biological pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
5 24.4 Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
1.4 29.9 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 RWU do 
worse 
than SN 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 
3 4.0 Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 
0.6 19.6 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2   
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0 0.0     Accept 0.05 X1 = X2   
Loss of supply 23 7.6 Loss of supply 0.1 11.9 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 RWU do 
worse 
than SN 
    Potential 
unwholesome 
medium health 
effect 
0.2 24.8 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2   
    Potential 
Unwholesome, 
low health effect 
0.2 16.8 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 RWU do 
better 
than SN 
Legend  
SN National standard 
RWU Regional Water Utility 
F Frequency of occurrence 
I Incident impact for respective category 
Table 23 Comparison between regional incidents against national baseline for 2004 
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RWU Incident database 
  
 
National Standard (SN) (DWI) 
customised to RWU (Frequency 
adjusted over Population) 
Significance testing 
 
 
      H0: X1 - X2  = 0  
Year      H1: X1 - X2 <>0  
2005      SL: 5%    
      X1 RW
U 
  
      X2 DWI   
          
  
  F I   F  I H0 SL  Analysi
s 
Aesthetics 11 12.8 Aesthetics 4.2 29.1 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 RWU do 
worse 
than SN 
Biological pathogens 
present 
3 5.3 Biological 
pathogens present 
1.6 20.3 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2   
Biological pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
8 19.9 Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
1.3 46.4 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 RWU do 
worse 
than SN 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 
5 4.0 Chemical present 
above guidelines 
0.4 39.0 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2   
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0 0.0 Chemical present, 
health effects 
0.3 85.8 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2   
Loss of supply 16 17.7 Loss of supply 0.2 19.3 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 RWU do 
worse 
than SN 
    Unwholesome 0.2 10.3 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2   
Table 24 Comparison between regional incidents against national baseline for 2005 
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RWU Incident database 
  
 
National Standard (SN) (DWI) 
customised to RWU (Frequency 
adjusted over Population) 
Significance testing 
 
 
      H0: X1 - X2  = 0  
Year      H1: X1 - X2 <>0  
2006      SL: 5%    
      X1 RW
U 
  
      X2 DWI   
          
  
  F I   F I H0 SL  Analysis 
Aesthetics 7 12.5 Aesthetics 3.8 43.7 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 RWU do 
better than 
SN 
Biological pathogens 
present 
3 4.7 Biological 
pathogens 
present 
1.9 20.5 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 RWU do 
better than 
SN 
Biological pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
1 17.3 Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
1.0 33.7 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 RWU do 
better than 
SN 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 
6 7.6 Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 
1.0 18.2 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 RWU do 
worse than 
SN 
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0 0 Chemical 
present, health 
effects 
0.4 96.1 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2   
Loss of supply 19 7.4 Loss of supply 0.5 8.7 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 RWU do 
worse than 
SN 
Table 25 Comparison between regional incidents and national baseline for 2006 
 
For the years 2004 to 2006, it was found in the comparison that on eight counts the 
Regional Water Utility had significantly worse incident impacts on customers than the 
national average. On 8 counts it was performing not significantly different to national 
average. In 5 counts customer impact was significantly better than national average.  
 
In this final analysis, the actual incident data in the Regional Water Utility is compared 
with the data they reported to the DWI. This analysis is an indication for the willingness 
to report incidents to the regulator. The significance tests that compare actual incidents 
with incidents reported to the regulator DWI are presented in Table 26. 
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RWU Incident database RWU reported to DWI Significance testing 
 
      H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5% 
      H1: X1 - X2 <>0  
Year 
     X1 RWU   
2004 
     X2 DWI   
 F I  F I H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 20 13.4 Aesthetics 12 19.0 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Biological 
pathogens present 
3 3.3 Biological 
pathogens present 
2 8.6 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2  
Biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 
5 24.4 Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
3 30.6 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 
3 4.0 Chemical present 
above guidelines 
1 9.2 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0 0.0 Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0 0 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2  
Loss of supply 23 7.6 Loss of supply   Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
          
Year 
         
2005          
 F I  F I H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 11 12.8 Aesthetics 5 17.9 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Biological 
pathogens present 
3 5.3    Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 
8 19.9 Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
3 41.2 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 
5 4.0    Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Loss of supply 16 17.7    Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
   Unwholesome 1 4.7 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 The actual incident impact 
is lower than reported 
          
Year 
         
2006          
 F I  F I H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 7 12.5 Aesthetics 5 81.1 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 The actual incident impact 
is lower than reported 
Biological 
pathogens present 
3 4.7 Biological 
pathogens present 
3 23.9 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 The actual incident impact 
is lower than reported 
Biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 
1 17.3    Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 
6 7.6 Chemicals present 
above guidelines 
2 12.0 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Loss of supply 19 7.4    Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Table 26 Comparison of actual incidents and reported incidents for the years 2004 to 2006 
 
In this analysis, it was found that on 13 counts the actual incident impacts for the hazard 
categories are significantly higher than the incidents reported to the regulator DWI. On 
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4 counts the incident impacts in the hazard categories are not significantly different. On 
3 counts the actual incidents in the hazard categories are significantly lower than 
reported to the DWI.  
 
2.5 Summary 
In the outset of this thesis, the need to characterise the causes, effect, frequencies and 
impacts of incidents that affect customers was identified. In this chapter, the “short 
periods of stress” (World Health Organisation, 2004) were characterised in an 
assessment of incidents frequencies, cause and effect relationships and impact on 
customers. 
Drinking water quality incidents were investigated which occurred in England and 
Wales in the years 2004 to 2006 and incidents in the Regional Water Utility that 
occurred between 1997 and 2006. A series of data analyses were performed to identify 
the cause and effect relationships that govern the outcome of incidents, their impact on 
customers and the frequency or re-occurrence of incidents for distinct hazard categories.  
It was found that incident in the Regional Water Utility occur frequently rather than 
exceptionally. A trend was identified of increasing numbers of annual incidents between 
1997 and 2006. Considering the mean time between incidents of 8.7 days, it was 
suggested that incidents and their management are a normal operating routine.  
The analysed incidents do not always constitute ‘linear’ cause - effect relationships with 
a single incident root cause and a single incident effect. More appropriately, incidents, 
in many occasions, can be characterised for their diversity of cause and effect 
relationships, multiple incident causes and interdependencies in the effects of an 
incident. In the case studies it was shown that they are often a reflection of the complex 
interaction between physical and information asset and their interface with human 
‘assets’. From the study of the 419 incidents and the case studies, supporting evidence 
was found that incidents affecting the safety and reliability of drinking water mirror the 
complexities of the asset fabric that constitute this large water supply system. This asset 
fabric consists of the predominantly physical assets and information asset and their 
interaction with human ‘assets’ and cultural, intangible assets including organisational 
policies for systems design, operation and maintenance but also communication, 
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decision making and organisation structures and hierarchies for asset operation and 
management. It was also found that precursors for incidents can be introduced as early 
as in the design phase; furthermore, operational intervention and maintenance issues 
play a major role in contributing or causing an incident.  
For each incident the hazard type, the size of the population affected by the incident and 
its duration was investigated. In a structured analysis based on a methodology 
introduced by Deere et al. (2001) an incident impact factor was calculated to enable a 
direct comparison between individual incidents but also between groups of incidents 
which have been aggregated according to hazard categories. This was used to compare 
incidents in their respective hazard categories but also to compare incidents at water 
utility level to the national average.  
In comparing the causes, effects, frequency and impact of water utility incidents to a 
national standard, valuable learning opportunities for water utilities to monitor incident 
frequencies and impact of incidents on customers were demonstrated. Per definition, the 
impact of incidents is composed from three components: hazard category, duration of 
the incident and the size of the population. Evaluating the impact of incidents with this 
methodology enables the monitoring of trends for the above components. During an 
incident, the incident management function of an organisation could monitor the 
components ‘incident duration’ and ‘size of exposed population’ as the main 
management emphasis of incident management. The exposure of a population to 
hazards during the circumstances of an incident requires a water utility to design and 
maintain effective incident monitoring and response systems and procedures. 
Monitoring the frequency of incidents for specific hazard types could be the main 
emphasis of the asset management function in a water utility. This form of analysis can 
guide a water utility to prioritise management efforts to improve performance in certain 
hazard categories. For example, a water utility can specifically target asset maintenance 
to reduce aesthetical problems in a water supply or the frequency of water main bursts. 
This would be a typical example for risk-based asset management.  
 
In this chapter, the nature of “trying conditions” (Weick, 1987) in the water sector were 
identified. In the following chapter, the organisational capacity to respond to incidents 
and the ability to manage risk is investigated in the context of the previously introduced 
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High Reliability Organisations Framework that has been conceptualised to describe the 
means of creating organisational resilience. So far, it is understood that every incident 
that occurred required organisational capacities to identify the incident, reduce its 
impact on customers and processes and procedures to re-instate normal operations. This 
is primarily a capacity within operations management that assumes the role of managing 
incidents. 
In the following chapter, the organisational preparedness for these short periods of 
stress is further investigated. Here, the objective is to investigate the benefit of HRO 
principles in incident management and to correlate incident impacts on customers and 
impact reductions with observation of high reliability principles under trying conditions. 
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3 High reliability in incident management 
3.1 Introduction 
In the literature review, it was identified that high reliability theory has not been 
researched in the context of providing safe and reliable drinking water to customers. 
Without an existing knowledge base in this area, it was decided to conduct a series of 
studies that investigate the familiarity of the water sector with the principles of high 
reliability organisations. In this chapter, the prevalence of HRO principles in the water 
sector and their perceived organisational benefit in the provision of safe and reliable 
drinking water to customers is investigated. The perceived benefit of HRO principles 
was also investigated in the context of the cost required to implement and maintain the 
described HRO principles.  
High Reliability Organisations (HRO) have been characterised for providing resilience 
during “trying conditions” (Weick, 1987) – in the water sector context this relates to 
normal operating conditions deteriorating into abnormal events, incidents and 
significant incidents. At the extreme end, the organisation has to be capable to contain 
emergencies whilst minimising the impact of public health hazards on the affected 
population. For the investigation of a water utility under “trying conditions” (Weick, 
1987), recently experienced incidents were identified for further analysis and research. 
In a series of incident analyses, it was aimed to identify whether HRO characteristics 
were observable during the management of incidents. For this purpose, the author had 
access to the incident control room and staff involved during incidents but also a vast 
body of documented incident records.  
Twofold questions are investigated in this chapter. Firstly, how familiar is the water 
sector with the principles of high reliability organisations (HRO)? Here, it was aimed to 
identify the benefit of HRO principles in providing safe and reliable drinking water to 
customers in the context of the cost to implement, operate and maintain these principles. 
This represents a form of cost benefit analysis or economic cost benefit trade-off.  
Secondly, it is investigated if HRO principles in incident management significantly 
reduce the public health impact on a population during an incident. 
Three main sub-studies were carried out: Firstly, a series of surveys with water utility 
staff to identify the familiarity of water utilities with HRO principles were conducted. 
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Secondly, the author acted as an observer in the operations and incident control centre. 
During unfolding incidents, it was aimed to observe the HRO characteristics during the 
handling of incidents. These studies were enhanced by staff interviews (Appendix 4.3.4) 
and document reviews, e.g. standard operating procedures, policies, communiqués, etc., 
to underpin the observations. Thirdly, based on a large number of highly detailed 
incident analysis documentations, the documented incidents were cross-reviewed 
against an HRO framework and the impact of incident management correlated against 
evidence of documented HRO principles.  
In this chapter two chapter-hypothesises are used to structure the study. Firstly, it is 
hypothesised that the water sector is familiar with the principles of HRO in the context 
of providing safe and reliable drinking water to customers. Secondly, a water utility 
makes provisions for the “short periods of ‘stress’” (World Health Organisation, 2004) 
with the design of incident management procedures that are based on HRO principles.  
A number of sub-hypotheses were also used with specific relevance for subsequent 
chapters in this thesis. In particular, it is hypothesised that 
  ‘water utilities maintain existing technology to an exceptionally high level’; 
  ‘water utilities use root cause analysis of minor errors and incidents as a source 
for learning’; and 
 ‘water utilities develop a collective memory for failures, incidents and root 
causes of failure to help anticipating future problems’. 
 
3.2 Theoretical development 
High reliability theory (HRT) claims to having discovered principles that reduce the 
accident susceptibility of complex and tightly coupled systems and creates 
organisational resilience under trying conditions (Weick, 1987). HRT has two distinct 
pillars: firstly an approach to technical reliability and, secondly, an approach to 
organisational reliability and resilience. The technical reliability is concerned with the 
design and maintenance of asset systems including their system redundancy to produce 
and deliver reliable product and services. Organisational reliability, on the other hand, 
has been described as an approach for effective decision-making, organisational 
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learning, communication, organisational structures and human resource practices. They 
are reflected in the culture of an organisation. 
The previous chapter that analysed incidents in England and Wales between 2004 and 
2006 and in the Regional Water Utility between 1997 and 2006 demonstrated that 
incidents can present trying conditions to a water utility. These trying conditions require 
an incident management response to reduce the impact of incidents on customers and to 
re-instate normal operating conditions. Therefore, water utilities are a suitable candidate 
to investigate the resilience of an organisation under trying conditions based on HRO 
principles.  
For this purpose, an HRO framework was developed to investigate the prevalence of 
HRO principles in water utilities. This HRO framework was deductively derived in the 
literature review and is presented in Table 27 to Table 31. This HRO framework was 
used to observe and evaluate HRO principles in the water utility context under trying 
conditions. It was also used to structure surveys, observations, document reviews and 
interviews.  
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Table 27 High reliability organisations framework 
 
 
Organisational culture of reliability 
Ref. Description 
A1 In my organisation, staff in operations has a strong sense for the primary mission of 
the organisation and share a common system of beliefs and perceptions. 
A2 In my organisation, the water supply system is continuously monitoring so that 
failure events are foreseen and understood.  
A3 In my organisation, our staff in operations has a highly developed understanding of 
their contribution to water safety and their role in the system.  
A4 In a water quality incident, our staff in operations acts in a collaborative and 
collegiate manner and the group interaction can be described as collective 
intelligent interaction. 
A5 Our staff in operations is sensitive towards all events where water supply reliability 
is concerned. Staff knows that a very small initial moment of inattention or 
misperception can lead to an escalation of failure which can result in a water quality 
incident.  
A6 All our employees take responsibility where problems are identified and immediate 
corrective action programmes are required. 
A7 Our staff in operations is obliged to report their mistakes without fear of 
punishment. 
A8 In our organisation, individual behaviours which jeopardise the primary mission of 
reliability are labelled as disgrace.  
A8a Our senior management is committed to the reliability of the organisation. This is 
communicated to all levels in the organisation and demonstrated with investments 
in technology, processes and personnel. 
A9 In our organisation, individuals “monitor, advise, criticize and support” each other, 
in particular in situations where mistakes are more likely to occur. 
A10 In general, our staff is attentive, alert and act with care. 
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Table 28 High reliability organisations framework (continued) 
Continuous learning and intensive training 
Ref. Description 
B1 In order to facilitate continuous learning and intensive training, our organisation 
constantly reviews their processes and ways of operating.  
B2 In preparation for a job, our staff in operations and maintenance staff receive training 
on the requirements of maintaining a safe system. These are embedded in formal 
rules, general guidelines and standardised frameworks. 
B3 Our staff in operations must adhere to standard operating procedures but also pro-
actively identify potential sources of failure and actions to stop faults from escalating.  
X1 Our staff question procedures when in doubt about their appropriateness. 
X2 In unforeseen situations, staff in operations doesn’t follow rules blindly, but negotiate 
the course of action in a collegial manner with more experienced staff and 
supervisors.  
X3 During a water quality incident, staff in operations establish an emergency response 
team for joint decision making in order to avoid overlooking complex circumstances.  
B4 All our staff maintains a commitment to continuous learning and seeks the acquisition 
and improvement of skills.  
B5 In our organisation we learn from failures, near misses and mistakes by other utilities 
and use these as a means to study the failure susceptibility of the own organisation. 
B6 In our organisation, even minor errors and incidents provide a source for learning 
which are assessed through root cause analysis. 
B7 Our organisation develops a collective memory for failures, incidents and root causes 
for failure which helps the organisation to anticipate future problems. 
B8 In our organisation, we share a sense that learning from trial and error is not feasible 
to understand our water supply system. For staff training, we use offline methods of 
learning which consist of realistic drills, simulations and exercises to replicate 
potential failure scenarios. 
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Table 29 High reliability organisations framework (continued) 
Effective and varied patterns of communication 
Ref.  Description 
C1 Our communication system makes our water supply system better understandable, 
predictable and controllable.  
C2 Our organisation operates in an information rich environment. All processes are 
measured and understood. Data are transparent and made available to all.   
C3 Our staff in operations is encouraged to share their experiences relating to the 
reliability of the system. Communication is designed as bottom up and top down to 
ensure rapid flow of information through the hierarchy of the system. Rapid 
dissemination of information helps the organisation to respond to water quality 
incidents with corrective action aiming to prevent the escalation of failure. 
X1 During a water quality incident, the response team maintains “closed loop” 
communication with all stakeholders within the organisation 
X2 During a water quality incident, the organisation maintains “closed loop” 
communication with the public, regulators and government authorities 
C4 In our organisation, communicating information shapes the ‘big picture’ of our 
organisational vision, mission and responsibility of individuals towards reliability. 
C5 Our organisation uses various channels to transmit different types of data and 
information relating to monitoring and control of our assets (and ultimately water 
safety).  
Direct and complementary information enhance information reliability and provides a 
form of redundancy. 
C6 Multiple monitoring and control data from a variety of sources provide information 
density which allows individual signals to be scrutinised for fitting into the whole 
information pattern. Abnormal signals are treated as an indication for latent errors to 
unfold into failures. 
C7 In our organisation, interpersonal communications are formalised in a precise, 
unambiguous, impersonal and efficient structure, which denies individuals to 
communicate in their idiosyncratic communication style. 
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Table 30 High reliability organisations framework (continued) 
Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible organisational structures 
Ref. Description 
D1 Our organisation can only prevent outbreaks with a high level of centralisation, 
because low-level decision makers have insufficient understanding of the inter-
relationship between their action and consequences on other elements of the water 
supply system.  During an emergency, control has to be maintained highly centralised 
in order to maintain overview of the entire system response to action on all sub-units. 
D2 In our organisation, decentralisation is required to respond rapidly to unfolding 
failures.  An emergency can be confined to one sub-unit which is subsequently 
isolated from the entire system. The control over an emergency is decentralised to 
this subunit until the emergency is cleared. 
D1/2a In our organisation, centralisation at collective level coexists with decentralisation at 
individual level. The organisation exhibits an adaptive, flexible or organic nature. 
D3 Our organisation enforces the stringent adherence to standard operating procedures 
aiming for repeatability of action and routines. 
D4 Our standard operating procedures are constantly updated and incorporate lessons 
learnt. Formal rules and procedures are effective elements to identify and control risk. 
D5 In our organisation, activities which are not defined in standard operating procedures 
are based on decisions a most senior individual makes as they should have the best 
knowledge of the system. 
D6 Our organisation has a hierarchical structure for decision making which reflects 
expertise, know-how and seniority. Each level has controls and regulating 
mechanisms.  
D7 Our organisation requires staff to conform to organisational norms and avoids 
innovative, autonomous or creative behaviours. 
D8 Our decision-making processes have slack in-built in order to assess and challenge 
decisions to avoid faulty decisions to escalate into failure.  
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Table 31 High reliability organisations framework (continued) 
 
In the literature review, it was identified that water utilities increasingly use an explicit, 
risk-based approach to decision-making that uses cost benefit analysis or cost-risk 
trade-off models to evaluate the merits of investments to reduce or maintain risks. 
Similar to physical assets, changing the culture in an organisation requires investment 
and maintenance in training, communication and competence building. For this 
research, the need to evaluate the perceived benefit of HRO principles in providing safe 
and reliable drinking water to customers in the context of the cost to operate and 
maintain these principles was identified. This enables an analysis of the perceived cost 
benefit or an economic cost benefit trade-off analysis.  
The first analysis in this chapter was designed to investigate the familiarity of the water 
sector with the principles of high reliability organisations. Water utility managers and 
System and human redundancy 
Ref.  Description 
E1 Our organisation maintains reserve capacity in the system. This includes back-up 
functions, overlapping tasks and responsibilities. 
E2 In our organisation, we are aware that redundancy can be counterproductive. Back-up 
functions can increase technical complexity, conceal errors and can lead individuals 
into not performing their required tasks under the assumptions that someone else takes 
care of his task. 
Precise procedures in managing technology 
F1 Our organisation does not use state of the art equipment to ensure that our technology 
does not add unnecessary complexity to the organisation. 
F2 In water supply systems design, our organisation aims to simplify complex technical 
systems and avoid unnecessary automation. 
F3 New technology acquisition is only justified if existing equipment does not perform to 
required specification. 
F4 In our organisation, existing technology is maintained to exceptionally high standards, 
as we do not tolerate defective, substandard or malfunctioning equipment. 
F5 In our organisation, maintenance activity and protocols as well as performance data 
are used to monitor the healthy operation of the system. 
Human resource management practices that support reliability 
G1 In recruitment and selection, our organisation acquires suitable and skilled candidates 
for the jobs aiming to match the complexity of the environment with an equally 
complex set of people to understand the system. Diverging backgrounds for staff offer 
different ways of looking at systems.  
G2 Since most people do what is rewarded, our organisation remunerates reliability with 
incentives, recognition and career opportunities.  
G3 In our organisation, job rotation increases networking between teams and helps the 
organisation to transfer and diffuse knowledge and lessons learnt. 
G4 Our organisation has systems in place to monitor the behaviour of staff. 
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staff were invited to participate in a survey on HROs. The survey required the 
participants to observe HRO principles in their organisation and to evaluate the merit of 
implementing and/or maintaining those HRO principles. The first survey series was 
conducted with water utility managers from various international water utilities 
followed by an in-depth survey of managers and staff in the Regional Water Utility. 
This survey aimed to capture the ‘world view’ of the organisation as a general 
perception of staff members on ‘how we do things here’ with respect to HRO 
principles.  
 
In the next analysis, the author acted as an observer during a six-month placement in the 
Regional Water Utility. During this placement, the processes and culture in the 
operations and incident management department as well as the asset management 
department were studied. During that period, interviews with staff were conducted and 
documents and processes studied. This placement also facilitated a review of past 
incidents for an analysis specific to HRO principles. A series of well-documented 
incidents were identified and the observance of HRO principles during incident 
management investigated. These were used to correlate the observed HRO principles 
with a) the impact of these incidents on customers using the methodology based on 
Deere et al. (2001) and b) with an assessment of an effective incident impact reduction 
and re-instatement of normal operations.  
Finally, a series of case studies were identified to demonstrate how observable HRO 
principles operated under “trying conditions” (Weick, 1987).  
 
3.3 Methodology 
In this chapter four different methodologies were used to structure this research aspect. 
The use of multiple methodologies were thought to provide a form of triangulation for 
investigating the subject matter of this chapter. The four methodologies adopted were 
surveys, observations, analysis of historical records and interviews.  
The first research element discussed here are the surveys that were conducted to explore 
the prevalence of HRO principles in the water sector and their cost benefit to provide 
safe and reliable drinking water for customers.  
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The HRO survey is a phenomenological methodology aiming to capture qualitative data 
from a number of participants. Considering the aim to reach out to a significant number 
of participants the conduct of interviews had to be ruled out and a strategy of self-
administrated, structured surveys as a research tool was adopted. The survey 
questionnaire was deductively derived from high reliability theory and logically applied 
to the water sector. Surveys offer a time-effective means of data acquisition although 
problems may arise regarding the quality of data obtained. These problems may arise 
when questions remain unanswered or are misinterpreted. The form of survey adopted 
in this research enabled the use of numerical techniques to process the data by coding 
the results with numerical values for subsequent analysis. The research design 
envisaged to obtain two sets of data samples that were subsequently compared.  
The second methodology adopted in this chapter were observations in the regional 
water utility. This form of research is best categorised as phenomenology and studies 
how the researching individual experiences events (Trochim, 2000). It may also be used 
as a method of trying to understand how an individual perceives and constructs their 
reality (Robson, 2002). Observational methods can be used to investigate what groups 
or individuals do and recording their actions and describing their activities offers data 
rich accounts of real-world research (Robson, 2002). However, there is a danger of the 
researcher to influence the results, in particular when considering mental frameworks 
that are shaped by heuristics or expectations.  
In addition to surveys and observations, it was decided to extend the form of historical 
research described in Chapter 2 towards identifying evidence of HRO principles in the 
records of documented incidents. It was thought that further evidence was required to 
substantiate the claims made by the participants of the survey and the evidence recorded 
in the observational study. The content as well as context analysis of recorded incidents 
sought to identify how these HRO principles are used to reduce the impact of incidents. 
As described earlier, the qualitative data contained in historic documents uses language, 
description and expression and provides highly animated, rich and deep information 
(Trochim, 2000). The coding of language provides the facility to identify patterns in the 
data and it was decided to use selective coding of language based on pre-conceived 
concepts introduced in the literature on high reliability theory. The methodological 
approach for these studies were considered to supplement the other forms of research 
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methodologies and data analyses: firstly, the use of historical data is perceived to reflect 
the truth of what was known at the time and removes any attempt to revise knowledge 
with hindsight ideas or concepts. Secondly, the selective coding of language found in 
the incident documentations avoided unnecessary open coding of language and enabled 
the use of well established ideas and concepts to be used to categorise data. Considering 
the volume of data records used in this research element, selective coding provided the 
highest benefit in the context of time required to code incidents.  
In addition to the historical research, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
staff who were recently involved during incidents. This represents a further form of 
triangulation to the historical research and presents another form of phenomenology as a 
method of trying to understand how an individual perceives and constructs their reality 
(Robson, 2002). Although this form of research provides highly detailed data based on 
highly personalised and subjective experiences it was thought that the content analysis 
based on semi-structured interviews provides rich and detailed data with expressive and 
enlightening information (Wengraf, 2001) on how staff experience and make sense of 
incidents despite the lack of standardisation in its results. A further advantage over 
structured interviews is the ability to react to emergent topics that are raised by the 
interviewee (Robson, 2002).  
 
3.3.1 The concept of HRO in an international water sector context 
Based on the previously deducted HRO framework a survey questionnaire was 
developed to investigate HRO principles in a range of water utilities. 14 water utility 
professionals from a range of international water utilities in highly developed countries 
were invited to participate in this self-administrated questionnaire (Appendix 4.3.1). 
The selection criteria for inviting participants focussed on risk-, operations- and asset 
managers who were invited to attend a workshop on risk management culture in 
December 2006 in Banff, Canada.  
The invitees represented a range of water utility sizes and various water utility 
ownership models. The participants represented  
 medium to large-sized, privately owned water utilities from England and Wales;  
 a large-sized, corporatized, publicly-owned water utility in Scotland; 
 a medium-sized, corporatized, publicly-owned water utility in Canada; 
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 small to medium - sized, publicly owned and operated water utilities in Canada; 
and 
 a small - sized, publicly owned and operated water utility in the USA. 
 
For the purpose of subsequent analysis, the organisational types differentiated between 
private and public ownership but also considered its corporate structure. ‘Public’ 
denotes public ownership and operated within government administration, ‘public 
corporate’ denotes public ownership operated within financially accountable corporate 
structures and ‘private’ denotes private/shareholder ownership with a corporate 
structure. The utility size indicates the number of customers supplied by the water 
utilities. ‘Small’ denotes less than 100,000 customers, ‘Medium’ represents a customer 
base between 100,000 and 1,000,000 and ‘Large’ denotes a water utility with more than 
1,000,000 customers.  
In the first part of the survey, the participants were required to identify and observe the 
prevalence of the individual HRO principles in their organisation. The questionnaire 
was designed as an organisational self–assessment and required the participant to record 
their observation using the legend in Table 32. For further statistical analysis, a scoring 
system was used that reflects the criteria detailed in the choice of answers. These scores 
were not visible to the participant. 
 
Choice of 
answer 
Criteria Score 
Strongly 
Agree 
“This attribute is observable throughout my 
organisation without any exception!” 
100 
Agree “This attribute is observable throughout my 
organisation with some exceptions!” 
80 
Disagree “This attribute is not observable throughout my 
organisation. There are, however, some exceptions!” 
20 
Strongly 
Disagree 
“This attribute is not observable throughout my 
organisation.  
0 
Table 32 Assessment criteria for HRO survey 
 
In the second part, the participants were requested to evaluate the benefit of each HRO 
principle in a cost benefit assessment. Here, the participant was prompted to evaluate 
the merit of the HRO principle in contributing to the provision of safe and reliable 
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drinking water in the context to the cost of implementing and maintaining the HRO 
principle. A framework was provided to consider the cost implications of implementing 
and maintaining HRO principles. The framework in Table 33 prompted the participants 
to consider the capital and operational expenditures for physical assets, human resource 
management and information assets required to implement and maintain HRO 
principles in the organisation.  
 
Change management model Criteria  
Policy Consider the policy required to implement and 
maintain the described HRO principle. 
Organisation Consider the cost for providing an organisation 
structure required to plan, implement, monitor, audit 
and review a policy which facilitates the described 
HRO principle. 
Planning and Implementation Consider the cost for planning and implementing a 
policy which facilitates the described HRO principle. 
Monitoring Consider the cost for a monitoring programme 
required to measure the success of the HRO principle. 
Auditing Consider the cost for auditing requirements to verify 
the successful operation of the HRO principle. 
Review Consider the cost for review procedures to ascertain 
the effectiveness of the HRO principle 
Table 33 Implementation and maintenance framework for HRO principles in an organisation 
 
The participants were prompted to use the legend presented in Table 34 to answer the 
cost benefit analysis questionnaire. For further statistical analysis, a scoring system was 
used that reflects the criteria detailed in the choice of answers. These scores were not 
visible to the participants.  
 
Choice of answer Criteria Score 
Highly cost 
beneficial  
The benefits significantly outweigh 
the costs incurred 
10 
Balanced cost 
benefit 
Approximate parity between cost 
and benefits 
0 
Negative cost 
benefit 
The costs significantly outweigh 
the benefits  
-10 
Table 34 Assessment criteria for the cost benefit of HRO principles 
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The range of answers is reflected the following equations.  
Positive cost benefit = 0>∆−∆ CostBenefit  
Balanced cost benefit = 0=∆−∆ CostBenefit  
Negative cost benefit = 0<∆−∆ CostBenefit  
It should be noted that ‘benefit’ denotes ‘risk reduction’ and relates to reducing public 
health impact during incidents or public health risks. 
The acquired data enabled a number of statistical analyses: Firstly, it enabled the 
calculation of scores for the individual questionnaire sections and a total score of 
observed HRO principles for each participant. The results represent a numerical 
analysis of identified HRO principles for the individual water utilities.  
Secondly, it enabled the calculation of average scores for the individual questionnaire 
sections and a total average score for all participants. This analysis calculated the 
average score, standard deviation, standard error and a 95% confidence interval for each 
HRO principle. The results from this survey were subsequently used for a comparison 
with an identical survey in the Regional Water Utility.  
Thirdly, it enabled the calculation of scores for the individual questionnaire sections and 
a total score for the cost benefit analysis for all participants. This analysis calculated the 
average score, standard deviation, standard error and a 95% confidence interval for each 
HRO principle.  These results represent the evaluated cost benefit for each HRO 
principles in a cross section view for the participating water utilities.  
Previous to launch, the survey was tested by fellow students and peer-reviewed by 
academic supervisors and the AWWARF Project Advisory Group. 
 
Alongside the survey, six international water utility professionals from the above 
sample were invited to participate in an interview series to enquire aspects relating to 
the management of water safety, reliability and incidents. The interview series was 
designed as a pilot study to inform the detailed study in the Regional Water Utility. The 
questionnaire (Appendix 4.3.3) was previously peer-reviewed. 
3.3.1.1 Data quality 
The analysis and evaluation of the data aquired in the survey and interview has to 
consider that participants responded according to individual perceptions and 
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observations. These individuals have their own heuristic frameworks for observations 
but also motivations to participate in this survey and interviews. Each survey return is a 
subjective assessment of HRO principles within the boundaries of their, idiosyncratic 
water utilities. The subjectivity of the survey is illustrated by the following observation: 
In the survey, two participants were selected to carry out an assessment in one water 
utility. It was found that their assessment of HRO principles marginally deviated from 
another.  
Although this study provides valuable, initial insights into the culture and philosophies 
of water utilities, the results of this survey cannot be extrapolated to represent the entire, 
international water sector of highly developed countries. These participants represent 
only a little number of water utility segments in terms of their size, country of origin 
and ownership models. Furthermore, the selection of these individuals was pre-screened 
by their involvement in an international workshop on “risk management cultures” in 
Banff in 2005 which also explains the high return rate of completed surveys.  
 
3.3.2 HRO principles in the Regional Water Utility 
Based on the HRO framework survey used in the previous study an in-depth survey was 
prepared and launched in the Regional Water Utility. In total  27 operations managers 
and operators in the water supply department were invited to partake in this survey. The 
participants reflect a range of professional experience, office or site locations within the 
region and different degrees of responsibilities in the provision of safe and reliable 
drinking water. The invited staff were selected for their recent involvement in the 
management of an incident dating back no further than 6 months. The statistical 
analysis of the survey returns enabled a direct comparison with the survey results from 
the international participants and enabled a significance test between both samples.  
Following the survey, structured observations in the organisation were conducted, in 
particular in operations and incident management. The above HRO framework was used 
as a guiding document to observe work processes and activities in the operations 
management department in particular during the management of incidents. As a silent 
and passive observer, the author monitored and recorded organisational processes and 
activities during the management of incidents.  
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Building on the observations of incident management, it was further aimed to correlate 
the actual impact of incidents on customers with a structured assessment of evidently 
documented HRO principles observed or adhered to during their management. Based on 
detailed, narrative accounts of incidents in the incident documentation, individual, well-
documented incidents were selected and evaluated against an adapted version of the 
HRO framework (Appendix 4.3.2). In a statistical analysis, the individual incident 
impacts on customers were correlated with the documented adherence to HRO 
principles during the management of incidents. The selection of incidents employed a 
methodological approach of non-random selection of extreme incident cases (Schnell et 
al., 1995) that reflect operating “under trying conditions” (Weick, 1987): All incidents 
for the years 2004 to 2006 were identified and a confidence interval at 95% for the 
incident impacts was constructed. With the confidence interval, those incidents with a 
significantly lower and higher incident impact as well as incidents with average impact 
were identified for the individual years. Out of these, 12 incidents per year were 
selected aiming to reflect four incidents with a significantly high incident impact, four 
incidents with a significantly low incident impact and four incidents with an incident 
impact within the range of the minimum and maximum confidence interval. In the 
selection process of incidents, it was ensured that these incidents were well documented 
to enable a thorough document analysis. The selection process of incident case studies 
is further discussed in Appendix 4.2.3.  
Individual incident impacts were plotted against the numeric score for HRO principles 
that were, according to the incident documentation, observed or adhered to during 
incident management. This analysis was performed for the overall HRO score per 
incident as well as for the individual groups of HRO principles.  
For each of these analyses a coefficient of determination was derived to explain the 
range of incident impacts as a function of HRO principles. Furthermore, a significance 
test was performed to compare the average HRO scores for incidents with significantly 
low incident impacts on customers to the average HRO scores for incidents with 
significantly high incident impacts. Using significance testing, the results of this 
analysis were also compared to the results of the previously conducted survey on HRO.  
Finally, a series of case studies were identified  to demonstrate how HRO principles can 
operate under “trying conditions” (Weick, 1987). In a narrative format, the potential 
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incident impact is compared to the actual incident impact whilst considering the 
influence of HRO principles as a beneficial contributor to reduce the impact on 
customers. The assessed impact reduction was correlated with the obtained HRO scores.  
Alongside the above studies, a series of interviews was launched to explore how the 
Regional Water Utility prepares for and performs under “trying conditions” (Weick, 
1987) but also to understand the process of incident investigation.  
3.3.2.1 Data quality  
The main sources of data in this study originated from the Regional Water Utility who 
provided access to staff for interviews and surveys but also a vast repository of 
documented incidents. The predominant source of data used in this study is historical 
data and personal accounts of staff involved in recent incidents. In most cases, incident 
files describing individual incidents contained lengthy logbook entries, detailed incident 
review minutes and personal communications of staff involved during the incidents.  
The survey, structured observations, interviews and the study of documented interviews 
were used as a triangulating technique to reduce personal bias and ambiguity. However, 
the analysis and evaluation of the survey data and the interviews reflect individual 
perceptions and observations of the participants. These individuals have their own 
heuristic frameworks for observations but also motivations for participating in the 
survey and interviews. 
The data quality used for the analysis of documented incidents was previously discussed 
in the context of characterising incidents. In this chapter, it was aimed to understand the 
motivation behind the analysis of incidents that are subsequently reflected in the 
incident documentation. It was previously argued that documentation can be highly 
biased due to the views the authors may have had at the time of recording data (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1994).  
 
3.4 Results and Discussion of Results 
3.4.1 The concept of HRO in an international water sector context 
In total, the author received 14 completed questionnaires from the participants in the 
survey. They were returned by email or handed over at the ‘Risk management culture’ 
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conference in December 2006  in Banff. Two returned questionnaire were only half-
completed and, hence, represented exceptionally low data quality.  
In Table 35 and Table 36, the observation of the participants in their water utilities is 
summarised in percentage of all observations. The alpha-numeric reference number 
refers to the HRO principles in Table 27 and Table 31. It can be identified that HRO 
principles are not observed homogeneously across the participating water utilities. The 
majority of observations confirm that a particular HRO principle may be observable by 
a number of participants, whereas others have not observed them in their organisation. 
In 40 out of 51 HRO principles, the majority of participants ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ 
to having observed those principles in their organisations. In total, 61% of the overall 
responses ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with having observed the stated HRO principles 
in the organisations. Thereof, 12.7% of the overall responses ‘strongly agreed’ and 
48.3% of the responses ‘agreed’ with having observed the stated HRO principles. 
34.7% of the overall responses ‘disagreed’ and 4.2% ‘strongly disagreed’ with having 
observed the stated HRO principles in the organisations. Further detailed analyses of the 
survey data is presented in Appendix 4.2.1. 
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  Percentage of participants observing HRO principles 
Reference to 
HRO principle 
Combined 
‘Strongly agree’ & 
‘Agree’ 
Strongly 
agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
A1 84.6% 38.5% 46.2% 15.4% 0.0% 
A2 91.7% 16.7% 75.0% 8.3% 0.0% 
A3 91.7% 25.0% 66.7% 8.3% 0.0% 
A4 91.7% 50.0% 41.7% 8.3% 0.0% 
A5 91.7% 41.7% 50.0% 8.3% 0.0% 
A6 66.7% 8.3% 58.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
A7 83.3% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7% 0.0% 
A8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 83.3% 16.7% 
A8a 100.0% 16.7% 83.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
A9 50.0% 8.3% 41.7% 50.0% 0.0% 
A10 100.0% 41.7% 58.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
B1 91.7% 25.0% 66.7% 8.3% 0.0% 
B2 66.7% 13.3% 53.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
B3 71.4% 14.3% 57.1% 28.6% 0.0% 
X1 66.7% 8.3% 58.3% 25.0% 8.3% 
X2 66.7% 8.3% 58.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
X3 91.7% 58.3% 33.3% 8.33% 0.0% 
B4 58.3% 0.0% 58.3% 33.3% 8.3% 
B5 66.7% 25.0% 41.7% 25.0% 8.3% 
B6 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 50.0% 16.7% 
B7 42.9% 0.0% 42.9% 50.0% 7.1% 
B8 58.3% 0.0% 58.3% 33.3% 8.3% 
C1 66.7% 8.3% 58.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
C2 61.5% 7.7% 53.9% 38.5% 0.0% 
C3 76.9% 7.7% 69.2% 23.1% 0.0% 
X1 57.1% 7.1% 50.0% 42.9% 0.0% 
X2 72.7% 9.1% 63.6% 27.3% 0.0% 
C4 58.3% 8.3% 50.0% 41.7% 0.0% 
C5 91.7% 0.0% 91.7% 8.3% 0.0% 
C6 57.1% 0.0% 57.1% 35.7% 7.1% 
C7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 83.3% 16.7% 
   Continued overleaf 
Table 35 Summary of observed HRO principles in percentages of all observations from 14 
participants in the HRO survey 
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  Percentage of participants observing HRO principles 
Reference to 
HRO principle 
Combined 
‘Strongly agree’ & 
‘Agree’ 
Strongly 
agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
D1 23.1% 0.0% 23.1% 76.9% 0.0% 
D2 38.5% 0.0% 38.5% 61.5% 0.0% 
D1/2/a 76.9% 30.8% 46.2% 23.1% 0.0% 
D3 57.1% 0.0% 57.1% 42.9% 0.0% 
D4 58.3% 16.7% 41.7% 25.0% 16.7% 
D5 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 
D6 71.4% 0.0% 71.4% 28.6% 0.0% 
D7 8.3% 0.0% 8.3% 58.3% 33.3% 
D8 54.6% 9.1% 45.5% 36.4% 9.1% 
E1 50.0% 25.0% 25.0% 33.3% 16.7% 
E2 41.7% 8.3% 33.3% 50.0% 8.3% 
F1 30.8% 0.0% 30.8% 61.5% 7.7% 
F2 58.3% 8.3% 50.0% 41.7% 0.0% 
F3 41.7% 25.0% 16.7% 58.3% 0.0% 
F4 33.3% 8.3% 25.0% 66.7% 0.0% 
F5 84.6% 15.4% 69.2% 15.4% 0.0% 
G1 78.6% 21.4% 57.1% 21.4% 0.0% 
G2 53.9% 15.4% 38.5% 38.5% 7.7% 
G3 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 41.7% 8.3% 
G4 58.3% 8.3% 50.0% 25.0% 16.7% 
Sum 61.0% 12.7% 48.3% 34.8% 4.3% 
Table 36 Summary of observed HRO principles in percentages of all observations from 14 
participants in the HRO survey (continued) 
 
Based on the scoring system introduced in the methodology, a numerical analysis of the 
data was conducted and the average, SD, SE and CI 95% for all survey responses 
calculated. The averages for the observed HRO principles and the cost benefit analysis 
were derived by multiplying each observation and cost-benefit analysis with the scoring 
factors previously introduced in Table 32 and Table 34. The total sum was then divided 
by the number of observations. Based on the statistical analysis for the cost benefit 
analysis, those HRO principles were identified that were evaluated by the participants 
with an average positive cost benefit. In other words, the participants in the survey 
evaluated these particular HRO indicators to have an average positive cost benefit for 
effectively contributing to the safety and reliability of drinking water supply. These 
HRO principles are presented in Table 37 to Table 42. The Tables also record the 
combined observation of HRO principles in the participating water utilities. The 
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aggregated observation of these HRO principles reflects whether the participants 
observed these principles being implemented or maintained in their organisations.  
 
Table 37 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit 
 
Ref Description  1) Observable in my 
organisation 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA): Av>=0 
St
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n
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ee
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ee
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y 
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Organisational culture of reliability     
A1 In my organisation, staff in operations has a strong sense for the 
primary mission of the organisation and share a common system of 
beliefs and perceptions. 
5 6 2 0 
A2 In my organisation, the water supply system is continuously monitoring 
so that failure events are foreseen and understood.  
2 9 1 0 
A3 In my organisation, our staff in operations has a highly developed 
understanding of their contribution to water safety and their role in the 
system.  
3 8 1 0 
A4 In a water quality incident, our staff in operations acts in a collaborative 
and collegiate manner and the group interaction can be described as 
collective intelligent interaction. 
6 5 1 0 
A5 Our staff in operations is sensitive towards all events where water 
supply reliability is concerned. Staff knows that a very small initial 
moment of inattention or misperception can lead to an escalation of 
failure which can result in a water quality incident.  
5 6 1 0 
A6 All our employees take responsibility where problems are identified 
and immediate corrective action programmes are required. 
1 7 4 0 
A7 Our staff in operations is obliged to report their mistakes without fear 
of punishment. 
2 8 2 0 
A8a Our senior management is committed to the reliability of the 
organisation. This is communicated to all levels in the organisation and 
demonstrated with investments in technology, processes and personnel. 
2 10 0 0 
A9 In our organisation, individuals “monitor, advise, criticize and support” 
each other, in particular in situations where mistakes are more likely to 
occur. 
1 5 6 0 
A10 In general, our staff is attentive, alert and act with care. 5 7 0 0 
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Table 38 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit (continued) 
 
Ref. Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA): Av>=0 
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Continuous learning and intensive training     
B1 In order to facilitate continuous learning and intensive training, our 
organisation constantly reviews their processes and ways of operating.  
3 8 1 0 
B2 In preparation for a job, our staff in operations and maintenance staff 
receive training on the requirements of maintaining a safe system. These 
are embedded in formal rules, general guidelines and standardised 
frameworks. 
2 8 5 0 
B3 Our staff in operations must adhere to standard operating procedures but 
also pro-actively identify potential sources of failure and actions to stop 
faults from escalating.  
2 8 4 0 
X1 Our staff question procedures when in doubt about their 
appropriateness. 
1 7 3 1 
X2 In unforeseen situations, staff in operations doesn’t follow rules blindly, 
but negotiate the course of action in a collegial manner with more 
experienced staff and supervisors.  
1 7 4 0 
X3 During a water quality incident, staff in operations establish an 
emergency response team for joint decision making in order to avoid 
overlooking complex circumstances.  
7 4 1 0 
B4 All our staff maintains a commitment to continuous learning and seeks 
the acquisition and improvement of skills.  
0 7 4 1 
B5 In our organisation we learn from failures, near misses and mistakes by 
other utilities and use these as a means to study the failure susceptibility 
of the own organisation. 
3 5 3 1 
B6 In our organisation, even minor errors and incidents provide a source for 
learning which are assessed through root cause analysis. 
0 4 6 2 
B7 Our organisation develops a collective memory for failures, incidents 
and root causes for failure which helps the organisation to anticipate 
future problems. 
0 6 7 1 
B8 In our organisation, we share a sense that learning from trial and error is 
not feasible to understand our water supply system. For staff training, 
we use offline methods of learning which consist of realistic drills, 
simulations and exercises to replicate potential failure scenarios. 
0 7 4 1 
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Table 39 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit (continued) 
 
Ref.  Observable in the  
organisations 
 Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA): Av>=0 
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Effective and varied patterns of communication     
C1 Our communication system makes our water supply system better 
understandable, predictable and controllable.  
1 7 4 0 
C2 Our organisation operates in an information rich environment. All 
processes are measured and understood. Data are transparent and made 
available to all.   
1 7 5 0 
C3 Our staff in operations is encouraged to share their experiences relating 
to the reliability of the system. Communication is designed as bottom up 
and top down to ensure rapid flow of information through the hierarchy 
of the system. Rapid dissemination of information helps the organisation 
to respond to water quality incidents with corrective action aiming to 
prevent the escalation of failure. 
1 9 3 0 
X1 During a water quality incident, the response team maintains “closed 
loop” communication with all stakeholders within the organisation 
1 7 6 0 
X2 During a water quality incident, the organisation maintains “closed loop” 
communication with the public, regulators and government authorities 
1 7 3 0 
C4 In our organisation, communicating information shapes the ‘big picture’ 
of our organisational vision, mission and responsibility of individuals 
towards reliability. 
1 6 5 0 
C5 Our organisation uses various channels to transmit different types of data 
and information relating to monitoring and control of our assets (and 
ultimately water safety).  
Direct and complementary information enhance information reliability 
and provides a form of redundancy. 
0 11 1 0 
C6 Multiple monitoring and control data from a variety of sources provide 
information density which allows individual signals to be scrutinised for 
fitting into the whole information pattern. Abnormal signals are treated 
as an indication for latent errors to unfold into failures. 
0 8 5 1 
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Table 40 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit (continued) 
 
Ref. Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA): Av>=0 
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Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible organisational 
structures 
    
      
D2 In our organisation, decentralisation is required to respond rapidly to 
unfolding failures.  An emergency can be confined to one sub-unit 
which is subsequently isolated from the entire system. The control 
over an emergency is decentralised to this subunit until the emergency 
is cleared. 
0 5 8 0 
D1/2a In our organisation, centralisation at collective level coexists with 
decentralisation at individual level. The organisation exhibits an 
adaptive, flexible or organic nature. 
4 6 3 0 
D3 Our organisation enforces the stringent adherence to standard 
operating procedures aiming for repeatability of action and routines. 
0 8 6 0 
D4 Our standard operating procedures are constantly updated and 
incorporate lessons learnt. Formal rules and procedures are effective 
elements to identify and control risk. 
2 5 3 2 
D5 In our organisation, activities which are not defined in standard 
operating procedures are based on decisions a most senior individual 
makes, as they should have the best knowledge of the system. 
0 4 8 0 
D6 Our organisation has a hierarchical structure for decision making 
which reflects expertise, know-how and seniority. Each level has 
controls and regulating mechanisms.  
0 10 4 0 
D8 Our decision-making processes have slack in-built in order to assess 
and challenge decisions to avoid faulty decisions to escalate into 
failure.  
1 5 4 1 
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Table 41 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit (continued) 
 
Table 42 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit (continued) 
 
It can be identified that the number of HRO principles has reduced from 51 HRO 
principles in the HRO framework to 44 HRO principles with an average, positive cost 
benefit. In 36 of the 44 HRO principles, the majority of respondents ‘strongly agree’ or 
‘agree’ to having observed the stated HRO principle in their organisation 
Ref Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA): Av>=0 
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System and human redundancy     
E1 Our organisation maintains reserve capacity in the system. This 
includes back-up functions, overlapping tasks and responsibilities. 
3 3 4 2 
      
Precise procedures in managing technology     
      
F2 In water supply systems design, our organisation aims to simplify 
complex technical systems and avoid unnecessary automation. 
1 6 5 0 
F3 New technology acquisition is only justified if existing equipment 
does not perform to required specification. 
3 2 7 0 
F5 In our organisation, maintenance activity and protocols as well as 
performance data are used to monitor the healthy operation of the 
system. 
2 9 2 0 
Ref. Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA): Av>=0 
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Human resource management practices that support reliability     
G1 In recruitment and selection, our organisation acquires suitable and 
skilled candidates for the jobs aiming to match the complexity of the 
environment with an equally complex set of people to understand the 
system. Diverging backgrounds for staff offer different ways of looking 
at systems.  
3 8 3 0 
G2 Since most people do what is rewarded, our organisation remunerates 
reliability with incentives, recognition and career opportunities.  
2 5 5 1 
G3 In our organisation, job rotation increases networking between teams 
and helps the organisation to transfer and diffuse knowledge and lessons 
learnt. 
0 6 5 1 
G4 Our organisation has systems in place to monitor the behaviour of staff. 1 6 3 2 
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In Appendix 4.2.1, those HRO indicators with the minimum 95% confidence interval 
for cost benefit analysis exceeding the value zero are also presented. These HRO 
principles are considered to have a 97.5% chance of being cost beneficial. Here, the 
number of HRO principles has significantly reduced to 18 in comparison to the initial 
HRO framework of 51 HRO indicators. It should also be noted that HRO principles 
relating to ‘organisational culture of reliability’ now forms the largest group of relevant 
indicators. For all indicators (18 out of 18), it can be identified that the majority of 
responses ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ to having observed the stated HRO principle in 
their organisation.  
In Appendix 4.2.1, the individual responses from the survey participants were further 
analysed. For each participant the HRO scores for observable HRO principles are 
presented. Since the data was anonymised, the participants are described by the size of 
their water utility and the asset ownership model.  
 
A number of sub-hypotheses were initially formulated with a view to underpin 
subsequent studies in this and the following chapters and the series of interviews aimed 
to explore some of those HRO principles in more detail. One of the HRO principles 
relates to ‘staff in operations and maintenance staff receive training on the requirements 
of maintaining a safe system’ and in this context one senior manager (participant no.16) 
commented on the role of operator training to manage the potential for human error: 
“Previously the UK water industry had no formal training processes for its operators 
so, in that extent, we were lagging, for instance, the American Water industry but our 
company has established a national and vocational qualification training course and 
got that accredited through the appropriate bodies. … [Name of] University …run 
training courses on our behalf. The outcome of which can be an NVQ up to Level 4 
qualification in Water Process Control, for instance, and each of our operators either 
has or will go through that process and, dependant on their appointment to positions of 
particular responsibility, we would not put them in that position until they’d had the 
appropriate training and accreditation. So it’s what we call a licence to operate; that 
licence is periodically reviewed so they should understand the processes that their plant 
that they operate or maintain is intended to perform, the implications of that plant 
operating in a sub optimal or defective manner and the procedures that they should 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  173 
institute or trigger to recover that situation and, as the situation goes outside a 
particular envelope of compliance. What they have to do to escalate awareness of that 
event within the organisation.  So they are empowered to control the plant to make a 
range of decisions directly to record and report what they’ve done but they understand 
the boundaries of that empowerment and the need to escalate up any non-
compliances.” 
With respect to incident preparedness, one senior asset manager (participant no.18) 
reported: “We have regular [incident training] - it must be every few months we seem to 
have dummy incidents.  The real big incidents … are done less frequently obviously 
because they take a huge amount of time to organise with the Emergency Services and 
everything but we do have mock up incidents where we get the Fire Brigade and the 
Police and everyone involved……but more regularly we have in-house incidents where 
you know when something’s going to happen, you don't know whether it’s going to be a 
burst or a tanker spill or something, you just know that something is going to happen on 
that day and it will be a full blown sort of incident…All the team leaders will have 
incident management training in terms of a small mission command type training. You 
will be trained, if you’re an operator or a team leader. You’ll be trained in what will be 
expected of you.” 
It was hypothesised that organisations ‘learn from failures, near misses and mistakes by 
other utilities and use these as a means to study the failure susceptibility of the own 
organisation.’ In the survey, it was identified that 25% of the survey participants 
strongly agreed to having observed this HRO principle in their organisation. 41.7% of 
the participants agreed, 25% of the participants disagreed and 8.3% of the participants 
strongly disagreed to having observed this HRO principle in their organisation. In the 
cost benefit analysis it was identified that the survey group considered this HRO 
principle to be beneficial in the context of the cost involved to implement and maintain 
this HRO principle. It can be concluded that the HRO principle to ‘learn from failures, 
near misses and mistakes by other utilities and use these as a means to study the failure 
susceptibility of the own organisation’ is a cost beneficial HRO principle and the majority 
of participants strongly agreed or agreed to having observed this principle in their own 
organisation. The hypothesis is accepted. Considering the ‘type 2’ error, the test is not 
significant. 
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It was hypothesised that organisations ‘even minor errors and incidents provide a source 
for learning that are assessed through root cause analysis.’ In the survey, it was 
identified that 33.3% of the survey participants agreed to having observed this HRO 
principle in their organisation. 50% of the participants disagreed and 16.7% of the 
participants strongly disagreed to having observed this HRO principle in their 
organisation. In the cost benefit analysis it was identified that on average the survey 
group considered this HRO principle to be beneficial in the context of the cost involved 
to implement and maintain this HRO principle. However, the survey group rejected the 
positive cost benefit at the 95% confidence interval. It can be concluded that the HRO 
principle to ‘learn from failures, near misses and mistakes by other utilities and use 
these as a means to study the failure susceptibility of the own organisation’ is - in the 
average opinion of the survey participants - a cost beneficial HRO principle, yet, the 
majority of participants disagreed or strongly disagreed to having observed this 
principle in their own organisation. The hypothesis is therefore rejected. Considering 
the ‘type 1’ error, the test is significant. With respect to learning from failure, one 
interviewee (participant no.16) reported: “We have a post incident review process and 
part of that is to identify lessons learned. There are recommendations for improvement 
which require to be signed off by the responsible General Managers and the budget 
holders so we don’t make recommendations that are unfunded and never get done as a 
result.  So recommendations for improvement action are agreed and they are tracked 
subsequently through to completion by the Emergency Planning Manager’s team.  So 
we have a log going back – I instituted this about seven or eight years ago, so we can 
track all of the incidents that have occurred in the business that have been formally 
declared as incidents.” 
It was hypothesised that organisations ‘develop a collective memory for failures, 
incidents and root causes for failure which helps the organisation to anticipate future 
problems.’ In the survey, it was identified that 42.86% of the survey participants agreed 
to having observed this HRO principle in their organisation. 50% of the participants 
disagreed and 7.14% of the participants strongly disagreed to having observed this HRO 
principle in their organisation. In the cost benefit analysis it was identified that on 
average the survey group considered this HRO principle to be beneficial in the context 
of the cost involved to implement and maintain this HRO principle. However, the 
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survey group rejected the positive cost benefit at the 97.5% confidence Interval. It can 
be concluded that the HRO principle that ‘organisations develop a collective memory 
for failures, incidents and root causes for failure which helps the organisation to 
anticipate future problems’ is - in the average opinion of the survey participants - a cost 
beneficial HRO principle, yet, the majority of participants disagreed or strongly 
disagreed to having observed this principle in their own organisation. The hypothesis is 
therefore rejected. Considering the ‘type 1’ error, the test is significant. One interviewee 
(participant no.16) commented on developing a collective memory for failures: “Where 
I would say we are relatively weak is in translating [learning from incidents] into a 
lessons learned database.  We’ve had several attempts at this and I think … most of the 
focus has been on IT based systems and I’m increasingly sharing the view that that isn’t 
necessarily the best way to go and you need something which is softer and more 
culturally based than something which is a hardware solution. That said, I think 
hardware solutions have a part to play. One of the things we do is, through lessons 
learned and post incident reports [is to] to cascade discussion and awareness of the 
root causes of incidents through team briefings.  We have, or we should have, a regular 
team briefing infrastructure within the business.”  Learning from incidents as a subset 
of training staff and incident preparedness will be further discussed in the context of the 
Regional Water Utility.  
 
With a view to the next chapter on asset management, it was hypothesised that ‘existing 
technology is maintained to exceptionally high standards as we do not tolerate 
defective, substandard or malfunctioning equipment’. In the survey, it was identified 
that 66% of the survey participants disagreed to having observed this HRO principle in 
their organisation. 25% of the participants agreed and 8.3% of the participants strongly 
agreed to having observed this HRO principle in their organisation. In the cost benefit 
analysis it was identified that the survey group considered this HRO principle to be not 
beneficial in the context of the cost involved to implement and maintain this HRO 
principle. It can be concluded that ‘existing technology is not maintained to 
exceptionally high standards’ and the hypothesis is rejected. Considering the ‘type 1’ 
error, the test is significant. 
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In conclusion of this study, it was found that many HRO principles are not novel to the 
water sector. Although the sample size used in this survey is insignificant to the vast 
number of water utilities in the highly developed world, it can be concluded that the 
surveyed water utility managers and professionals are familiar with many HRO 
principles and were able to observe many of them in their organisations. In this study, 
the survey participants evaluated the benefit and cost of implementing HRO principles 
in their organisation. In the analysis of the survey responses, it was found that a positive 
correlation exists between the observation of HRO principles and their perceived 
benefit in context of cost. The study of individual responses identified a range of 
observed HRO principles in the respective organisations. Whereas a number of 
participants identified many of the HRO principles in their organisations, others were 
less able to do so.  
 
3.4.2 HRO principles in the Regional Water Utility 
3.4.2.1 The HRO survey in the Regional Water Utility 
With regard to the HRO survey, the author received 12 completed questionnaires from 
the participants in the survey after a number of ‘reminders’ were sent out to all invited 
participants to prompt participation. The majority of the surveys were received by post 
after conducting the interview series with the majority of survey participants. In Table 
43 and Table 44, the observation of HRO principles of the participants in the Regional 
Water Utility is summarised in percentage of all observations. The alpha-numeric 
reference number refers to the HRO principles in Table 27 to Table 31. The detailed 
data analyses are presented in Appendix 4.2.2. It can be identified that HRO principles 
are not observed homogeneously across the Regional Water Utility. The majority of 
observations confirm that a particular HRO principle may be observable by a number of 
participants, whereas others have not observed them in their specific work environment. 
In 28 out of 51 HRO principles, i.e. 54.9%, the majority of participants ‘strongly agree’ 
or ‘agree’ to having observed those principles in their working environments. In total, 
57.9% of the overall responses ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with having observed the 
stated HRO principles. Thereof, 19.2% of the overall responses ‘strongly agreed’ and 
38.8% of the responses ‘agreed’ with having observed the stated HRO principles. 
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33.9% of the overall responses ‘disagreed’ and 8.2% ‘strongly disagreed’ with having 
observed the stated HRO principles. 
 
  Percentage of participants observing HRO principles 
Reference to 
HRO principle 
Combined 
‘Strongly agree’ 
& ‘Agree’ 
Strongly 
agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
A1 100.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
A2 66.7% 16.7% 50.0% 33.3% 0.0% 
A3 100.0% 63.6% 36.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
A4 100.0% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
A5 100.0% 41.7% 58.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
A6 66.7% 8.3% 58.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
A7 41.7% 8.3% 33.3% 41.7% 16.7% 
A8 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 33.3% 41.7% 
A8a 75.0% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
A9 41.7% 8.3% 33.3% 50.0% 8.3% 
A10 66.7% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
B1 66.7% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
B2 75.0% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
B3 75.0% 33.3% 41.7% 25.0% 0.0% 
X1 41.7% 0.0% 41.7% 41.7% 16.7% 
X2 58.3% 8.3% 50.0% 41.7% 0.0% 
X3 91.7% 58.3% 33.3% 8.3% 0.0% 
B4 58.3% 25.0% 33.3% 41.7% 0.0% 
B5 41.7% 16.7% 25.0% 58.3% 0.0% 
B6 46.2% 7.7% 38.5% 53.9% 0.0% 
B7 18.2% 0.0% 18.2% 63.6% 18.2% 
B8 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 50.0% 16.7% 
C1 91.7% 33.3% 58.3% 8.3% 0.0% 
C2 66.7% 16.7% 50.0% 33.3% 0.0% 
C3 50.0% 8.3% 41.7% 41.7% 8.3% 
X1 66.7% 8.3% 58.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
X2 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 50.0% 16.7% 
C4 66.7% 25.0% 41.7% 33.3% 0.0% 
C5 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 66.7% 8.3% 
C6 25.0% 8.3% 16.7% 41.7% 33.3% 
C7 8.3% 0.0% 8.3% 50.0% 41.7% 
  Continued overleaf 
Table 43 Summary of observed HRO principles in percentages of all observations from 12 
participants in the Regional Water Utility 
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  Percentage of participants observing HRO principles 
Reference to 
HRO principle 
Combined 
‘Strongly agree’ 
& ‘Agree’ 
Strongly 
agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
D1 50.0% 8.3% 41.7% 41.7% 8.3% 
D2 58.3% 16.7% 41.7% 41.7% 0.0% 
D1/2/a 100.0% 58.3% 41.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
D3 83.3% 41.7% 41.7% 16.7% 0.0% 
D4 75.0% 16.7% 58.3% 25.0% 0.0% 
D5 66.7% 25.0% 41.7% 33.3% 0.0% 
D6 41.7% 8.3% 33.3% 41.7% 16.7% 
D7 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 58.3% 8.3% 
D8 83.3% 33.3% 50.0% 16.7% 0.0% 
E1 83.3% 33.3% 50.0% 16.7% 0.0% 
E2 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 33.3% 50.0% 
F1 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 50.0% 16.7% 
F2 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 58.3% 8.3% 
F3 66.7% 25.0% 41.7% 33.3% 0.0% 
F4 8.3% 0.0% 8.3% 41.7% 50.0% 
F5 83.3% 25.0% 58.3% 16.7% 0.0% 
G1 75.0% 16.7% 58.3% 25.0% 0.0% 
G2 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 
G3 41.7% 8.3% 33.3% 41.7% 16.7% 
G4 50.0% 16.7% 33.3% 33.3% 16.7% 
Sum 57.9% 19.2% 38.8% 33.9% 8.2% 
Table 44 Summary of observed HRO principles in percentages of all observations from 12 
participants in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
 
In Table 45 the survey results are summarised and represented in the 7 categories of 
HRO principles ‘organisational culture of reliability (A)’, ‘continuous learning and 
intensive training (B)’, ‘effective and varied patterns of communication (C)’, ‘adaptable 
decision making dynamics and flexible organisational structures (D)’, ‘system and 
human redundancy (E)’, ‘precise procedures in managing technology (F)’ and ‘human 
resource management practices that support reliability (G)’. 
From this table it can be identified that 71% of the responses ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ 
to having observed an ‘organisational culture of reliability (A)’ in their work 
environment. 55.3% of the responses ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ to having observed 
‘continuous learning and intensive training (B)’.  48.1% of the responses ‘strongly 
agree’ or ‘agree’ to having observed ‘effective and varied patterns of communication 
(C)’.  65.7% of the responses ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ to having observed ‘adaptable 
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decision making dynamics and flexible organisational structures (D)’. 50% of the 
responses ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ to having observed effective use of  ‘system and 
human redundancy (E)’, only 45% of the responses ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ to having 
observed ‘precise procedures in managing technology (F)’ that are found in HROs. 
Finally, 54.2% of the responses ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ to having observed ‘human 
resource management practices that support reliability (G)’. 
 
 
Percentage of participants observing HRO 
principles  
 
 Strongly 
agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 Total 
counts 
Group A      
Sum 38  55  30  8  131  
Percent 29.0% 42.0% 22.9% 6.1%   
Group B       
Sum 25  48  53  6  132  
Percent 18.9% 36.4% 40.2% 4.6%   
Group C       
Sum 12  40  43  13  108  
Percent 11.1% 37.0% 39.8% 12.0%   
Group D       
Sum 25  46  33  4  108  
Percent 23.2% 42.6% 30.6% 3.7%   
Group E       
Sum 4  8  6  6  24  
Percent 16.7% 33.3% 25.0% 25.0%   
Group F       
Sum 8  19  24  9  60 
Percent 13.3% 31.7% 40.0% 15.0%   
Group G       
Sum 5  21  18  4  48  
Percent 10.4% 43.8% 37.5% 8.3%   
Table 45 Summary of HRO survey results presented in HRO sub-categories 
 
Based on the scoring system introduced in the methodology, a numerical analysis of the 
data was conducted and the average, SD, SE and CI 95% for all survey responses 
calculated. The averages for the observed HRO principles and the cost benefit analysis 
were derived to conduct a significance test that compares the observations of HRO 
principles within the Regional Water Utility to the HRO survey results from the 
international water utility managers. The statistical data analysis and significance test is 
presented Appendix 4.2.2. 
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It was found that 44 observations in the Regional Water Utility out of the 51 observable 
HRO principles were not significantly different in comparison to the HRO survey of the 
international water utility managers. In two instances, the responses for observing HRO 
principles in the Regional Water Utility was significantly more positive, i.e. the 
participants agreed stronger than the international sample. In 5 instances, the responses 
for observing HRO principles in the Regional Water Utility were significantly more 
negative, i.e. the participants agreed less than the international sample.  
The former are: 
 ‘In our organisation, centralisation at collective level coexists with 
decentralisation at individual level. The organisation exhibits an adaptive, 
flexible or organic nature (D1/2/a)’; and  
 ‘Our organisation enforces the stringent adherence to standard operating 
procedures aiming for repeatability of action and routines (D3)’. 
 
The latter are  
 ‘Our staff in operations are obliged to report their mistakes without fear of 
punishment (A7)’;  
 ‘In general, our staff are attentive, alert and act with care (A10)’;  
 ‘During a water quality incident, the organisation maintains “closed loop” 
communication with the public, regulators and government authorities (CX2)’;  
 ‘Our organisation uses various channels to transmit different types of data and 
information relating to monitoring and control of our assets (and ultimately 
water safety). Direct and complementary information enhance information 
reliability and provides a form of redundancy (C5)’; and  
 ‘In our organisation, existing technology is maintained to exceptionally high 
standards as we do not tolerate defective, substandard or malfunctioning 
equipment (F4)’. 
 
In analogy to the previous study, the cost benefit of implementing and maintaining 
HRO principles was investigated and it was identified that the number of HRO 
principles reduced from 51 HRO principles to 36 when only considering an average, 
positive cost benefit. For 27 of those 36 HRO principles, the majority of respondents 
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‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ to having observed the stated HRO principle in their 
organisation. Furthermore, the number of HRO principles that are considered to have a 
97.5% chance of being cost beneficial reduced to 18. For 14 out of those 18 HRO 
principles (77%) the majority of respondents ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ to having 
observed the stated HRO principle in their organisation. This is higher in comparison to 
the entire HRO framework or the HRO principles with an average positive cost benefit. 
The detailed analysis is presented in Appendix 4.2.2. 
Finally, the standard deviations of the observed HRO principles in the Regional Water 
Utility with the HRO survey of international participants were compared. For this 
analysis, the author considered all HRO principles as well as those HRO principles with 
an average, positive cost benefit and a significantly (97.5%) positive cost benefit. In all 
three cases, the standard deviation and standard error of observed HRO principles 
within the Regional Water Utility is higher in comparison to the international HRO 
survey.  
 
 Average  SD SE CI 95% lower CI 95% upper 
All HRO 57.0  35.3  1.5  54.1  59.8  
CBA Av>0 65.9  33.0  1.6  62.8  69.0  
CBA CI 95%lower>0 71.7  30.8  2.1  67.6  75.8  
Table 46 Statistics for observed HRO principles in the Regional water utility 
 
 Average SD SE CI 95% lower CI 95% upper 
All HRO 58.3  33.2  1.3  55.7  60.9  
CBA Av>0 62.7  31.9  1.4  60.1  65.4  
CBA CI 95%lower>0 73.7  27.2  1.8  70.1  77.2  
Table 47 Statistics for observed HRO principles in the international study 
 
It was anticipated that the standard deviation and standard error within the Regional 
Water Utility would be significantly lower than in the international survey. It was 
assumed that the perception of HRO principles within one organisation would converge 
towards a common view within one company (possibly based on the principles of 
‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1972)). It seems that the perceptions within the Regional Water 
Utility are diverse and suggest that more than one common perception prevails on the 
‘culture’ of the organisation. In the interpretation of the results, it has to be considered 
that personnel from various departments and functions in the Regional Water Utility 
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were invited to partake. Furthermore, the invited participants were all involved in recent 
incidents. Gigerenzer et al. (1999) aimed to explain diverging perceptions with the 
concept of constructing heuristic models that people use to reduce complex 
environments into understandable models of reality and explained heuristics as a range 
of simplifying and confidence-sustaining mental short-cuts that enable quick decisions 
in circumstances when pausing to undertake a full analysis would be unwise 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Using a number of simplifying strategies, or rules of thumb, 
to make decisions whilst working through the questionnaire may have contributed to 
this standard deviation in the survey results. In particular, availability heuristics (people 
pay more attention to information that is easily available, e.g. from recent incidents) and 
retrieveability heuristics (overweight memories that are more easily retrievable either 
because they are emotionally vivid or have personal relevance) may be a factor to 
consider in the evaluation of results. The HRO principles introduced in this study may 
be highly subjective and individual participants may have interacted and corresponded 
to the survey using their heuristic understanding of their working environment to make 
sense of the HRO principles.  
 
In the following section the principles of operations and incident management are 
described. For this study, the author acted as a passive and silent observer in the 
operations – and incident control centre. Since the operations control centre is an 
access-controlled environment, an explicit permission or invitation was required from 
the operations manager on duty to observe operations and incident management in the 
control centre. As a result, two incidents could be observed in the control room and four 
more at the site of the incident. In addition, the author was invited to attend one incident 
review meeting. The HRO framework was used to record and document observations. 
The detailed findings of the observational studies can be found in Appendix 4.2.4. In 
addition, interviews with staff were conducted who were involved during some of these 
and other incidents. Extracts of these interviews are presented where appropriate in the 
context of the author’s observation and incident case studies are used complementary to 
the findings. Findings from the detailed analysis of documented incidents that occurred 
between 2004 and 2006 are also presented in the following section.  
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3.4.2.2 Observing HRO principles in incident management 
In the observational study it was found that the operations management department uses 
the water supply system aiming to deliver safe and reliable drinking water to customers. 
It meets demand for drinking water by operating the physical asset base and actively 
manages human and intangible ‘assets’ of the organisation. It was observed that staff 
are constantly aware that the water supply system is prone to failure and they actively 
sought to identify signs and indicators of failure. On detection of abnormal operating 
conditions, the incident management procedures were invoked until a safe and reliable 
drinking water supply is re-instated. The incident management processes and 
procedures were invoked in response to the awareness of a failure scenario that is 
defined by the organisational objectives (level of service). The incident management 
organisation used systems redundancy to reduce the impact of the incident on customers 
and re-instate the safe operation of the water supply system. 
Based on the analysis of 145 incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2006, the means 
of identifying incidents were identified. With reference to Figure 32, it was found that 
the majority of incidents were notified to the water utility by customers reporting an 
unusual observation relating to their drinking water supply. The majority of these 
customer contacts referred to ‘loss of supply’ and ‘aesthetical problems’ due to 
discolouration. 17.9% of the incidents were escalated from an operator to the incident 
management team. 17.2% of the incidents were detected on Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) units, i.e. IT-based monitoring and control. 8.3% were 
reported by contractors who worked on or in close proximity of the asset that caused the 
incident.  
5.5% of the incidents were identified via water quality laboratories confirming the 
pollution or contamination of drinking water. With a turnaround duration of 12 to 24 hrs 
for bacteriological test for drinking water quality parameters it has to be assumed that 
contaminated water has, in the meantime, passed beyond the customer tap. Therefore, 
the majority of incident notifications including  ‘customer contact’ and ‘water quality 
laboratories’ indicates that customers were exposed to hazards before reactive incident 
mitigation can be carried out by the incident management team. Both methods of 
incident identification are well established business processes: in particular, for 
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customer contacts, a dedicated call centre has been established to identify and 
characterise symptoms of an incident.  
 
Regulator, 2.1%
Emergency services, 
0.0%
Customer contact, 
43.4%
Member of public, 
1.4%
Contractor, 8.3%
IT Management, 4.1%
Laboratory results, 
5.5%
SCADA, 17.2%
Operator, 17.9%
 
Figure 32 Identification of incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
There is a heavy reliance on customers to report their experiences to the water utility, in 
particular relating to incidents in the water distribution network. Efforts are underway to 
reduce the reliance on ‘end of tap’ reporting for incidents. A test trial is currently 
planned to provide sufficient pressure and flow monitoring devices to increase the 
incident detection capability in an area distribution network. With this arrangement, any 
deviation of observed pressure and flow patterns from expected patterns will raise an 
alarm in the control centre so that an incident investigation team can be dispatched to 
investigate the source of the abnormality. This system will enable the reduction of the 
response time to an incident considerably. One incident manager (participant no.22) 
reported: “If a burst takes a water supply away then that is such a big burst that you’d 
think we’d be able to spot it before it became such a big burst. So we’re looking … at 
getting telemetry right across our network.  We have a pilot ... where we’re getting in 
what we call alerts rather than alarms; alerts are just saying there’s a slight variance 
on the flow or we’ve got a drop in pressure … that needs investigation. So potentially, 
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we’re getting a lot closer to knowing real time if there’s something starting to happen 
before it becomes customer impacting. It’s actually measuring live-flows and pressures 
and taking those against historic values and creating some what we call alerts against 
those either dialogue patterns or the average flow patterns, profiles against a day and a 
week at different days of the  week.” 
 
After an incident was detected, the organisation responded by assuming an 
organisational incident management structure for decision making with a centralised 
command and control hierarchy. From the control room, the incident manager co-
ordinated efforts to reduce the impact of the incident and to re-instate safe water supply. 
From here, the incident manager monitored the entire systems response to the incident 
and the incident management efforts. The incident manager led the incident 
management team within the control room but also field staff who perform the required 
tasks at the source of failure or within the area affected by the incident. The incident 
manager directed all resources at his disposal, e.g. additional staff and systems 
redundancy, towards reducing the incident impact and re-instating safe operations.  
Additional staff from departments other than operations and operations management 
can be called upon during an incident. One asset engineer (participant no.14) reported 
on the role of the asset management team during an incident: “Basically, we act as like 
a support to our field teams or to the [Incident] Manager down in the [incident control 
centre] - either if they’ve got an ongoing incident and that we get involved - either, in 
fairness, at a fairly late stage just before it hits the fan instead of getting involved at an 
early stage. We do a standby rota anyway, an asset management consultancy sort of 
role, and the [Incident] Manager will phone us up out of hours…. Sometimes it’s not an 
incident, sometimes they just phone us up for advice …. Usually it’s either, if there’s an 
ongoing discolouration incident they might phone up for some advice whether to either 
let it run or to go out and do some proactive flushing or, if they’re overrunning say on a 
burst repair and they look like they might be failing the DG3, see if there’s any way that 
we can rezone and get some water. 
The field technician on site sometimes might phone us up directly like he has done this 
morning to say contractors have damaged a twelve inch main….” 
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During large-scale incidents, the organisation was capable to decentralise to respond to 
rapidly to a unfolding failure. During a major storm event which had significant impact 
on many technical subsystems due to wide-spread power failures, a number of incident 
managers were called up to respond to particular aspects of the region-wide incidents. 
Although centralisation is essential in this tightly coupled technical systems where 
interdependencies are high, it was capable to de-couple the system so that 
decentralisation in the incident management response provided for action at the point of 
need. During large scale incidents affecting the entire region, the organisation 
demonstrated a centralised incident management response in order to maintain an 
overview of the entire system but also decentralisation where particular incident aspects 
could be confined to one sub-unit which is then isolated from the entire system.   
The organisation has set definition for escalating an incident to more senior managers 
who would assume the role of the incident manager. With respect to escalating an 
incident to a more senior manager, one reporter (participant no.7) commented:  “In 
terms of that [incident] it was managed by myself because it didn’t go beyond, it 
stopped.  Had that contaminated water got into [Name of] reservoir and gone on into 
the supply then all sorts of people would have been here but it was manageable by 
myself.  [Name of a colleague], who was in as well that day, had another incident going 
on and he took charge of that with somebody out on site so I just focussed on this fault 
with the alarm.” 
With reference to Figure 33, the incident documentation was studied to identify the 
ability of the organisation to adapt its organisational structure to respond to the needs 
arising during an incident. It was found that in 88.3% of the incidents, the organisation 
assumed an effective organisational structure to place it in the best possible 
circumstance for effectively reducing the incident impact on customers and to re-instate 
normal operations. In 9.7% of the incidents, the assumed organisational structure was 
deemed ‘adequate considering the circumstances’. In this category, a number of 
improvements could have led to better performance in reducing the impact of the 
incidents or the re-instating of normal operations. A number of incidents in this 
category reflect highly challenging or trying conditions and the incident management 
response demonstrated a reasonable successful outcome. In only 2.1% of the incidents, 
the incident management organisation was rated as ‘inflexible’ suggesting that the 
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organisational structure assumed during the incident was inadequate to manage the 
complexity of the incident situation.  
 
Inflexible, 2.1%
Adequate considering 
the circumstances, 
9.7%
Adaptable to situation, 
88.3%
 
Figure 33 Adaptability of the organisational structure to the incident situation for incidents 
between 2004 and 2006 
 
Detailed SOPs would not exist for every incident scenario although procedures are in 
place for many aspects of incident management and for frequently occurring failures, 
e.g. water mains failures. In unforeseen or unique events, the decision making process 
required to devise an action plan to recover a failed system and to re-instate normal 
operating conditions. The process had in-built slack for critical decisions in order to 
assess and challenge decisions by a more senior member of staff. Furthermore, the 
incident manager had specialist staff at his disposal to guide his decisions.  
The assessment of incidents between 2004 and 2006 also focussed on the effectiveness 
of decision making. With reference to Figure 34 it was found that 64.8% of the incident 
management efforts could be characterised for ‘good decision making’. The decision 
taken during the incident significantly and pro-actively contributed to reducing the 
impact on customers and to re-instate normal operations as soon as possible. In 
commenting on one incident an operations engineer (participant no.3) noted: “It was all 
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coordination pulled together and decisions were made in the correct manner. I believe 
that the incident was dealt with quite well and professionally.  I believe that the 
majority of all the people involved did everything, you know, by the book and correct 
really.” 
One operations manager (participant no.6) commented: “I think once we realised the 
error of what had happened then I think the organisation put things into place quite 
quickly.  We got scientists involved and we were working out what the impact on the 
customer would be and exactly what had happened and things like that.  So I felt that 
was quite effective. It was what created the incident was the problem, I think normally 
with this company when we do have incidents or once we’ve recognised that 
something’s gone wrong there’s usually a very good response from every department to 
pull it round and rectify it.” An asset engineer (participant no.2) stated: “I think in 
general the decisions that we were made when the problem was identified were very 
appropriate and the right decisions made at the time.” 
In 24.8% of the incidents, the decision making was ‘responsive to needs’ meaning that 
the incident management efforts pursued an effective course of action by reasonably 
practical means. The remainder of the incidents were, in hindsight, characteristic for 
poor judgement, poor decision making and non-adaptive to the incident situation. These 
were identified as being ineffective to recover the incident situation to normal operation 
as soon as possible and provided scope to learn lessons for enhancing the incident 
management response. Overall, the organisation demonstrated that decision making 
under trying conditions effectively drew the necessary and correct conclusions from the 
data presented to the incident management team during an incident. This is also 
reflected in the assessment on data availability during an incident but also on the 
competence of the decision makers involved during an incident. In 10.3% of the 
incidents scope for improvements in data availability and/or competence in decision 
making were identified.  
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24.8%
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Poor judgement, 
2.07%
Poor decision making, 
4.8%
Good decision making, 
64.8%
 
Figure 34 Characterisation of decision making during incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
In concluding this section on ‘decision making’ during incidents, it was found that the 
organisation aimed to recruit and select suitable and skilled candidates that match the 
complexity of their working environment. Suitability, skills and competencies are 
defined by the functional role individuals occupy in the organisation. An incident 
manager has to be able to cope with highly uncertain situations and demonstrate rational 
decision making under ‘trying conditions’. An incident manager has to be able to 
communicate effectively with the staff and stakeholders involved in incidents. S/he 
requires the ability to demonstrate decisiveness and firm leadership to remain in control 
of adverse situations. S/he also requires a good understanding of the entire water supply 
system whilst drawing on the expert knowledge in the incident management team. 
 
A critical aspect in effective incident management is ‘communication’. Effective 
communication facilitates a complex system to become more understandable, 
predictable and controllable. With the rapid developments of information technology, 
water supply systems are increasingly fitted with advanced monitoring and control 
instruments. They are part of an effective communication strategy to maintain safe and 
reliable drinking water supplies. In the organisation, the monitoring and control 
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philosophy has been advanced to a stage where physical assets such as water treatment 
works are no longer operated with staff on site. Monitoring and control is performed 
with ‘Process Logic Controls’ and ‘Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition’ in the 
remote control centre. The control centre is the hub for managing drinking water supply 
for the entire region. However, information technologies have their disadvantages. In 
the first years of implementing the strategy of advanced monitoring and remote control 
of water supply assets, an increase of incidents due to the failure of such technologies 
was observed (Figure 15).  
Secondly, too much data can overload the process and grouping alarms together may be 
considered to manage data overload without jeopardising critical data availability 
during critical situations. Data overload may result in critical alarms being ‘lost’ or not 
acted upon. Similarly, grouping alarms together in alarm groups make the identification 
of the precise incident causes difficult to identify. Having the right information 
available at the right time in the right place was an important aspect of water utility 
incident management.  
Where monitoring and control equipment fails, the status of a system becomes 
unknown. One operations engineer (participant no.1) commented on one incident “I 
wouldn’t say [the incident] could have been avoided but there was another alarm which 
came in beforehand which wasn’t acted upon because it was misunderstood.  It was a 
very vague alarm and sometimes you get alarms which are very clearly defined like ‘pH 
low’ so you know your pH is low but then other times you get grouped alarms which are 
very obscure.  So you could get a sample pump failed but it might just come up as a 
Group 3 alarm. Until you go to site and actually look on SCADA and actually go to the 
Group 3 alarm section there might be fifteen alarms grouped under that one generic 
alarm.  Then it’s up to the person on standby to make that decision whether they go in 
or not and, unfortunately, on this occasion it wasn’t acted upon and that alarm in turn 
meant the link between SCADA and [the control centre] was down so there was a sort 
of a dead band in the alarms until I got in during the morning.“  
 
During the management of incidents, the incident manager took control over assets and 
resources. A number of databases provide an overview the available water supply 
resources and assets. One incident manager (participant no.7) also commented on the 
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challenges of data overload to manage an incident: “You can have twenty six databases 
open at the same time and my reaction to that, I’ve never had twenty six but it’s 
interesting because the fact is you could have twenty six databases open to do with that 
incident, that’s appalling because you can’t possibly deal with that.”  
During an incident, inter-personnel communication was designed as both bottom up and 
top down to ensure rapid flow of information through the hierarchy of the incident 
management team.  Rapid dissemination of information helped the organisation respond 
to an incident, with corrective action aiming to prevent the escalation of the incident 
into an emergency. One critical commentator (participant no.23) reflected on effective 
communication: “I mean, to be honest, as you’re well aware that most incidents occur 
or escalate and get worse because of the communication so that tends to still be one of 
the biggest things.”   
In an analysis of documented incidents, the effectiveness of communication during the 
incident management response to the incident was investigated. In Figure 35, 72.4% of 
the incident management responses were characterised for ‘effective communication’. 
Here, the communication between the stakeholders involved in an incident generated ‘a 
big picture’: observations, decisions and water supply systems performance were 
effectively communicated to all relevant staff and external bodies which enabled 
comprehensive judgement on the due course of action. These actions were effectively 
communicated to staff and their implementation communicated back to the decision 
maker.  
One interviewee (participant no.1) commented on communication during a major 
incident: “The Control Room was informed of what was happening all the time, of how 
we were progressing because they needed … [to be] informed of how long before the 
site was back operational. Yeah, it was just like a normal process, that you keep 
Control informed.  In hindsight, from looking back you think, yeah, there was this, this 
and this which occurred which whatever should have happened but at the time it was a 
case of ‘we’re getting on and starting the plant up, we’re aware of what’s happening 
and we’re informing the System Controllers on the production capability of the site and 
when it should be back online’.   
In 6.9% of the incidents, the incident documentation identified aspects of excellent 
communication that significantly contributed to the effectiveness of the incident 
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management response. One operations manager (participant no.10) noted: “I was 
involved right from the beginning and it was escalated to all the appropriate levels and 
the appropriate people were actually involved. I can say that confidently, yes, [the 
incident] was very effectively communicated.” 
In 13.1% of the incidents some areas of improvements were identified which meant that 
the incident was unnecessarily prolonged. In 6.2% of the incident, ‘poor 
communication’ had a significantly, adverse impact on the overall performance of the 
incident management response. One senior operations manager (participant no.5) 
commented on poor communication: “There were some communication issues …; I 
think we didn’t get all the feedback that was helpful.  I happen to remember we didn’t 
always get … certain bits of key information updates which are business critical and I 
did remember that I think we were trying to find out what was happening at certain 
times…. There was a little bit of a void of information not coming back into the 
Centre.” Another operations manager (participant no.8) commented on the lack of 
communication from a site perspective where the incident occurred: “I think some 
learning about the incident was that we could have communicated better with the 
[Incident] Manager earlier on. I got in touch with the [Incident] Manager after I’d 
initially heard about [the incident] but I think there was some wording to say we could 
have got in touch with him earlier.” The Incident Manager (participant no.22) who was 
managing this incident reported: “A lot of the times people just think the company needs 
to know about it and they escalate it at the right time but, in this case and in a number 
of other cases, they tend to contact us when they’ve run out of ideas.  They’ve been 
desperately trying to manage it on site, trying to keep it quiet and mitigate all these 
results like whereas if they’d contacted us, in this case two days beforehand, they could 
have done a lot more to prevent it being the incident it was. So the main learning 
outcome is getting as much information as you can on the first call.  They’d tried to 
keep it under their hat locally. So I think it’s not a learning point for me so much in the 
role but just generally from other people to trust the [Incident] Managers. That’s the 
element of it: they don’t want to be seen as failing so they keep it as local as they can.” 
In commenting on one incident, an asset engineer (participant no.2) even suggested that 
the incident was avoidable if communication had worked better: “There were a number 
of learning outcomes and I think the major one was around getting the communications 
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right, so around identifying the problem, communicating the problem correctly so that 
appropriate remedial action could have been taken. I think communications fell down in 
identifying the incident in a, I guess, in a sufficiently timely manner. I mean, essentially 
if communications had happened when they should have happened then the incident 
potentially wouldn’t have happened.” 
 
Effective 
communication, 72.4%
Excellent 
communication, 6.9%
Not known, 1.4% Poor communication, 
6.2%
Areas of improvement 
were identified, 13.1%
 
Figure 35 Assessment of communication during incidents between 2004 and 2006 
 
Communicating information allowed staff to shape and share the ‘big picture’ of the 
organisations vision, mission and responsibility of individuals towards reliability. It was 
found to be important for integrating asset management teams into the daily operation 
of the water supply system so that effective working relationships emerge under trying 
conditions. One asset engineer (participant no.33) reported: “Well, I think we have a 
good working relationship and when things are addressed then we try to deal with them 
collectively.” 
The asset engineers require the information input from operators to assess asset risks. 
Via risk assessments, resources may be made available for asset investment or 
maintenance. One operations engineer (participant no.3) commented on the 
communication between operation management and asset management teams: “If we 
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think we’ve got an asset deficiency or a problem, we would raise that with Tech Support 
and discuss it with them and then if they agreed with us then they would probably take it 
forward to one of the meetings with Asset Management and raise it there.” An asset 
engineer from Tech Support (participant no.24) responded: “Part of the job is providing 
technical support to field operations on a day-to-day basis and we do all the system 
configurations on zone work and things like that in configuring the distribution and 
leakage controls.” 
One operations engineer (participant no.1) explained the role of asset engineers in his 
team: “There’s normally a good communication between them [asset management 
teams and operations management] because you’ve got like a technical support guy 
who’s [in] ‘Production’ but his role takes him into the asset side of the job.  Basically, 
you’ve got your Production guys supported with your operation manager who’s there to 
manage the team and then you’ve also got a technical support guy there who is like a 
grade above Process Engineers basically and he’s there to offer technical support to 
the team and put forward improvements to site, like raise risks and get involved in the 
Asset side of things. You have to use [risk assessments] but it tends to be down to the 
Tech Support guy doing the [risk assessments] and the Production guy giving him the 
support and the information he needs to get a successful [risk assessment] through to 
ensure that all the risks are highlighted and covered. 
 ‘Production’ and ‘Asset’ do need to work together closely anyway on the day to day 
role.  So, yeah, there’s normally good cooperation between the teams ….” According to 
one asset engineer (participant no.24): “We work closely with the field teams.  They’re 
run separately from us but we’ve a close relationship with the teams.  We’re not based 
with the teams, the teams are based at the depots within the area but we’re based at 
[Name of site], we’re not directly based with the field teams.  And the other thing is we 
do a standby rota as well, out of hours standby to support field guys as well and the 
Control Room. We would do investigations as well, if there was a problem on the 
system that wasn’t apparent to the field at the time, if we were struggling from say an 
instance where we got high head losses in the system or we’re failing pressure 
standards and things like that, we would investigate those issues and that would then 
result in us possibly have to do a capital scheme through the capital system, the [risk 
assessment] system.” Other asset engineers have only peripheral interfaces with 
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operations management. According to one asset engineer (participant no.11): “I’m not 
so involved with the day to day running, it’s more around fitting the capital working 
around the constraints of running the sites and the distribution system.” 
Returning to the management of incidents, one operations manager (participant no.10) 
commented on the role of asset engineers during incident review meetings: The asset 
engineer’s “role was to understand what had gone wrong to actually then take the 
appropriate actions and next steps to carry out audits at other sites that may be 
similarly affected, to actually be proactive in addressing those in the future.” Another 
operations engineer (participant no.1) commented: “They [asset engineers] had the 
same goal of finding out what happened, why it happened and trying to pin it down and 
to make sure it wasn’t a fault which was going to happen on other sites, that fault was 
just specific to that site and that issue, it was just a one off type thing and it wasn’t a 
generic fault which could occur at any site.” 
 
The next section focuses on learning from failure and incidents. Here, the processes and 
learning capability from incidents in the organisation were investigated. 
Simultaneously, it was sought to uncover sociological factor, i.e. normative, coercive 
and mimetic pressures that contribute to providing safe and reliable drinking water.  The 
organisation has processes in place to review incidents, failures, near misses and 
mistakes and uses these as a means to study the failure susceptibility to avoid future 
incidents. Even minor errors and incidents provide a source for learning which are 
assessed through root cause analysis. In dedicated incident review meetings an incident 
is analysed for potential learning opportunities.  
According to one senior operations manager (participant no.5) “there’s a standard 
agenda we go through [after an incident].” The agenda of the incident review meeting 
takes the form of ‘identifying who was present, an update and the current situation of 
the incident, ongoing effect on the customer, a review of the log events, issues arising 
and further data/investigation requirements, identifying issues that went well, what has 
occurred that could be done better, lessons learnt and recommendations arising and 
confirmation of next steps’. Actions arising are recorded on a business process database 
that tracks the progress and monitors the completion of actions.  
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During the incident review meeting the incident log book was scrutinised. The incident 
log captures data and information on physical, information and human assets involved 
during the incident.  It captures the incident impact on customers and 3rd parties with 
particular emphasis on the hazard types, the size of affected population and the timing 
between incident occurrence and incident awareness as well as the incident response 
times. It records data of the condition and performance of the drinking water supply 
system and assets, the planning, implementation and operation of an incident response, 
actions taken to reduce the impact of the incident, monitoring data and information 
relating to the water supply systems response to any intervention but also any actions, 
behaviours and actions by incident management team members, operators, field staff 
and 3rd parties.  
During the review meeting, the actions and activities prior to and during the incident 
were evaluated. It identified causes and contributing factors in the build-up to the 
incidents and, secondly, the effectiveness and efficiency of reducing the incident impact 
and re-instating of normal supply. One operations manager (participant no.6) reported: 
“You start off by explaining the normal mode of operation to give a background into 
how the plant operates, what should happen under normal circumstances, what are our 
operating parameters.  Then you’ll do a time line of the day or maybe start it from the 
day before, who attended site, what time, what actions they took, that type of thing.  The 
investigation then will look at maintenance that’s gone on site over that week, we’d go 
through the jobs that were put on the system for our maintenance providers in case 
there’s been any other breakdowns that might be linked.  We’d analyse all the trends on 
site our SCADA systems and we’d go through RTS reporting for alarms that had been 
generated.” 
In commenting on one incident, one asset manager (participant no.23) reported: “We 
look at absolutely everything that contributed to it but then come up with what we feel is 
the most significant feature.  And then obviously after we’ve identified what the learning 
is, [we identify] … what’s gone well, what could have gone better, I produce a table of 
actions and who is the responsible person for dealing with that action and a date to 
complete it.” 
According to the senior operations manager (participant no.5), the incident is recorded 
by the Emergency Planning team: “Normally we ask that Emergency Planning do the 
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administrative minuting of all the statements of what went wrong and just confirm all 
the points of action in the log or the diary and then we go onto what was the cause of 
the problem as we understood it at that point, recognising what the impact on  
regulation was or what the customer impact were and then we like get them trying to 
find out what went well and what didn’t go so well and then document the actions and 
learning as an output which is then tracked by the Emergency Planning team.” 
According to the senior operations manager (participant no.5), not only incidents but 
also ‘near misses’ or near failures are analysed: [In the incident review], “we probably 
pick up quite a few near misses as well, they’ve have not quite got there but we’ve listed 
them up anyway and we qualify through the learning and review process whether they 
are definitely a significant incident or just an ordinary incident.  There are occasions 
where we would actually raise incidents as well where we know they’re not significant 
but we value the learning from the event that took place.  … we can pick up any 
learning points locally and then look at trying to share those across the business.  
I think we’ve come across quite a few what we would term near misses; it’s creating the 
visibility and the right learning approach for that. There is actually something 
particularly within the distribution arena which is looking at service failures and 
operational issues where there’s a new database just about to be launched called the 
‘Events Service Failure Database’. I’m quite keen on making sure we get the learning 
process right.  
We’re  looking at an adjustment from what we currently work to - towards a more 
bespoke specification about saying ‘at this classification event we will undertake a 
significant review, at this classification event there will be an incident and we will have 
a joint review still’ and there as a third aspect which might be deferred more as well, 
it’s not caused any breach or anything but it’s something that shouldn’t have happened, 
we’ve got to stop – we’ve not only got to make sure that we’ve picked that up but share 
that across the rest of the businesses and develop some action plans out of that.” 
The thoroughness of the incident review is partly due to the regulator. After an incident, 
they may even review the particular risk assessment and risk management protocol to 
investigate the causes for the incident. According to the expert on distribution network 
assets (participant no.4): “[The regulator] now want to see that the DOMS is referred 
back to whenever there’s an incident in the company. So it’s the instruction to us that, 
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right you’ve written this, we want to see that you’re using this and this is underpinning 
day-to-day operations and your planning to make sure that this is what you’re following 
and, if you have an incident, we’ll be coming back to you and saying “in your DOMS 
you say that you’re tying in”, you know, your policy of what you’re doing so why didn’t 
it happen during that incident”. So it’s a bit of a change and a bit of an instructive that 
you need to be doing what you say you’re going to be doing. So what I think the DWI 
are saying, say every incident that happened that will come into [the Regional Water 
Utility] as part of their investigation and say, right we’ve had your DOMS, they’ve got 
this, and they’ll specifically say “on page 85 you say that you’re aware of the risks 
posed by the operation of sluice valves on trunk mains and we’ve taken that into 
account as part of your day to day policy procedures with appropriate training for field 
staff, they should not operate valves until they’re signed off to do it so what went 
wrong”.  And so they go round the table saying why didn’t you follow that, why didn’t 
you follow your own DOMS strategy.” 
Care has to be taken to avoid ‘blaming’ involved staff without jeopardising the 
enforcement of accountability of individual responsibilities. One asset engineer 
(participant no.24) pointed out: “The meetings I’ve attended have tended to be what I 
call factual and not, if you will, finger pointing…– I don’t treat them as a witch hunt, if 
you will, they’re dealt with in a factual manner trying to prevent things happening in 
the future.” One operations engineer (participant no.1) pointed out: “… we don’t want 
to find a culprit and pin it down on somebody but sometimes do people do feel as 
though it’s a case of if I don’t cover my own backside enough by ensuring I do 
everything correctly even if it means taking twice as long over something and you’re 
being pressurised to perform all the time, it is getting to that stage and people are 
aware of it so it’s only a good thing.  If it can help people realise that you’ve got to 
think of everything you do nowadays, you’ve got to think in-depth because you are at 
the front line.” 
Another asset engineer (participant no.11) reported: “I’ve seen a few incident reviews 
where people have come out of it feeling like it was a finger pointing exercise, in other 
words, it was on human error and they weren’t looking at the actual truth - across the 
business risk and what happened to cause the incident in the first place.  But the ones 
that I’ve been involved with, I’ve not allowed them to point the finger, I’ve said we’re 
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here to review so, before you start pointing fingers, that’s the last thing you want to be 
doing, it’s more around did we follow operating procedures, do we need to make any 
amendments to the operating procedures, does this need to be resolved by capital spend 
or can it be resolved by operation maintenance or, you know.” According to one asset 
engineer (participant no.14): “Some people view it as trying to find either a scapegoat 
… for it going wrong but I’ve not had that sort of experience when I’ve ‘gone up’.  I 
mean, they’ve usually been quite thorough, you know.  There’s always a lot – what I’ve 
always found with the hindsight, you know, with the incident review, there’s always a 
lot of hindsight.  It’s a wonderful thing, isn’t it, because then you think “oh yeah, we 
could done it different like that in hindsight”. They review the whole incident, see what 
you could have done better and then hopefully next time if you have a similar situation, 
nothing goes wrong, you hopefully learn from some of the reviews.” You know, some of 
them are incident reviews and everything’s gone great, we’ve done as much as what we 
possibly can so there’s no sort of blame culture as such.  Some of them are, you know, 
our fault where we’ve either shut a main off and not sort of either thoroughly gone in 
and looked at the implications of doing that and some of them are caused by our 
contractors, you know, which a lot of them are out of our control, we’ve only got 
involved obviously when it has caused a problem as such. I must admit, every one that 
I’ve been to there’s never sort of been “oh right, he were to blame for this” and “he 
shouldn’t have done that” sort of thing, you know what I mean, no sort of finger 
pointing or anything like that.  It were “right, what do we think caused it” and say do a 
bit of an analysis on that.” 
One asset engineer (participant no.11) reported: “As an Operations person I used to 
feel: I was controlling, I was coordinating that day, did I fill out the log properly and 
one thing and another and you’re in a bit of a panic to make sure that you followed all 
your procedures when the incident took place.  So, I mean, it does feel like that for the 
people that run the assets but for Asset Management I would have said it’s not a finger 
pointing exercise, it’s more of a what can we do to improve it, is it something that we 
need to maintain more often, a procedure we should have been following that hasn’t 
been written properly, that needs reviewing, you know, things like that.   
Actions that were agreed in the incident review meeting are recorded on a database and 
monitored for pursuit and completion. According to one operations manager 
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(participant no.6): “We have an action tracking system, basically that’s a database 
where the - I believe it’s the Emergency Planning team who put actions on the system 
for us.  So they would facilitate the incident review, the outcome of the review would be 
a number of actions and learning points … well, that would go on the action tracking 
system with a deadline and after the deadline it flags up that the deadline has been 
exceeded and that usually goes – I think that now actually goes to you and your 
manager. We’ve had incidents before where we’ve had a dosing line failure, a loading 
value failure, and so the action on Asset Management would but to have all dosing lines 
and make sure that it couldn’t happen anywhere else, for instance.  That would be given 
to an engineer and he would probably then work with field process engineers to gather 
that data and sign that action off.” 
One incident manager (participant no.7) commented on tracking actions and learning 
from failure for a wider audience: “I don’t think we’re very good at completing 
[actions] properly, we used to be and this is something in this environment that’s gone.  
There were certain actions I identified that day and I don’t think that anybody 
particularly owns them. There is a chance that we’re not as good at that as we should 
be. I think where we get it wrong is that it’s learning through all the people that were 
involved but the other people that weren’t involved don’t necessarily get it so they can 
sometimes make the same mistakes again.  I think that’s where we slip up a bit but we 
try to avoid that. There’s not too many new things really if you think about it, all the 
incidents that come along are just a version of another one in a slightly different format 
so people have learned over time.   I don’t think we’re as slick as probably we should 
be.” 
According to the principles of the action tracking system, failures in one part of the 
organisation can be used as a means to study the failure susceptibility of the entire 
organisation or, at least, of other, similar sub-systems. According to one operations 
manager (participant no.6): “… we’d assess what we feel the root cause was and then 
put some learning points and actions in place to make sure it doesn’t happen again and 
that would then normally be rolled out to all of the teams in the company.” One 
incident manager (participant no.22) provided an example for this type of learning. 
Following an incident on one site, other sites were investigated “We’re only talking 
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about probably thirty five plants but the records were scoured and onsite checks were 
made to make sure that this couldn’t reoccur at other places.” 
A total of 2,830 actions are currently listed on the database. These actions were 
investigated using a string search. Key words were used to identify the number of 
actions that features those strings. It was found that only 83 actions contained the words 
‘asset’ or ‘asset management’, 56 actions the word ‘maintenance’, 44 actions the word 
‘inspection, 34 actions the word ‘review’, 31 actions the word ‘incident’, 12 actions the 
word ‘risk’ or ‘risk assessment’ and merely 11 actions the word ‘failure’. Although a 
business process is in place to cascade learning outcomes from incident reviews into the 
business and, in particular, to the asset management function, the process – it seems - is 
hardly utilised. One asset engineer (participant no.12) reports: “I’m very, very critical of 
the company on that because certainly within the last two years there’s been several 
failures of my sites that could have happened on similar sites with similar assets and 
we’ve decided to invest where we’ve had the incidents on my sites but we haven’t 
looked at similar equipment and similar assets throughout the company. Certainly, I 
can think of one or two incidents where we’ve had health and safety near misses where 
we have addressed it on the site in question but we haven’t looked at the whole 
company and I’ve, you know, I’ve made people aware of that in [Regional Water 
Utility] but, you know, at the end of the day that’s all I can do, it’s not my role to look 
at the whole company’s asset strategy, I‘m just responsible for one of five areas.” 
From an asset management perspective, the asset engineer who attends the incident 
review meeting would focus on the technical issues arising from that incident. One asset 
manager (participant no.12) reported: “I would normally just take away technical 
issues.  All sorts of operator issues or human error issues would be - they’d be managed 
or investigated by the operation manager. I sometimes get involved in revising 
operating procedures but that tends to be more done by the process engineers within the 
field team.” 
The asset strategy following an incident may have different stages to provide a short 
terms solution and subsequently a long-term solution. According to one asset engineer 
(participant no.11), “usually you’ll have an incident review straight away and then 
you’ll have a post incident review to say how you’re going to go forward with this. The 
Asset Engineers, they will sit down with Operations and say what went wrong, why did 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  202 
it go, you know, what do we need to do on a permanent basis, what can we do short 
term. Then you have a review which then how we go forward with this, how quickly can 
we get the risk assessment through [the process of making an asset investment or 
maintenance decision];, can we get a scheme this year, can it be fitted into the capital 
programme this year because obviously every time that fits - something else … [in] the 
capital programme has to drop out. So it’s got to be a bigger business need than the 
rest of the capital programme for it to have the focus of getting its attention.” 
 
Learning outcomes for incidents are as diverse as the causes for incidents. With the 
majority of incidents being a result of distribution water mains failures and 
discolouration it was thought to further expand on learning outcomes for such incidents. 
With respect to water main failures, the predominant root causes for mains burst are 
‘age’, ‘material’ and ‘soil conditions’ that govern corrosion and, ultimately, failure. The 
structured collection and analysis of water mains failures enables multi-regression 
analysis for the derivation of risk profiles for the entire water distribution network as 
previously described in (Oliphant et al., 1997; Emde et al., 2006; Herz, 2005). These 
models are used to prioritise maintenance and replacement programmes (Mcall and 
Green, 2005). Similarly, from an operational maintenance perspective, DOMS 
[Distribution Operations and Maintenance Strategy] are used to derive optimal network 
cleaning and flushing strategies to prevent discolouration. According to the expert on 
distribution network assets (participant no.4), “DOMS is ever evolving; it’s something 
which is now just starting to come into the company.  There’s going to be what they’re 
calling the DMA service plans - one of those elements is the … proactive cleansing of 
DMA where you have discolouration problems.  That is flushing work that specifies the 
velocities that can clean the mains out and then strip the material out and hopefully we 
don’t have to go back into that mains for several years because we’ve given it a good 
clean through. That’s one type of planned intervention which has now been prioritised 
from the quarterly DOMS process as we’re running it. A lot of pages in [the DOMS 
assessment for DMA’s] are focussing on the policies and procedures and how water 
quality may be affected by any of those policies and procedures themselves. “ 
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Learning outcomes from incidents are also a component in staff training schemes. In 
addition to operators being required to gain professional accreditation in form of college 
certificates as a license to operate a water supply system, learning from previous 
incidents and failures are communicated to staff and emphasise the requirements for 
maintaining a safe system. There are, however, commercial restraints that limit the 
ability to provide extensive training for operators: One incident manager (participant 
no.7) reported: “We give a lot of training and we have the licence to operate but, again, 
because of the pressures to move forward, that’s one of the things that’s creaking a 
little bit. I would say we do recognise that the way to learn is not to keep cocking it up 
but that’s the problem we’ve got, we’re not doing enough offline [training].  They get a 
lot of training before they get released on their own; normally we have about three 
months before somebody works on their own in a shift.” 
On the other hand, asset engineers require a very different skill set and have different 
training needs. The asset engineer requires analytical skills and competencies in 
assessing technical systems as well as the technical means to provide and maintain safe 
and reliable drinking water supplies. Their job role is reactive in learning from incidents 
and pro-active in assessing potential sources of failure. Increasingly, the asset engineer 
has to consider technical system risks and communicate them in systematic risk 
assessment to the custodians of the risk management process. The asset engineer 
requires good communication skills, in particular to communicate with operators and 
operations management. One asset manager (participant no.23) commented: “I’m quite 
fortunate within my Asset team -  they’re quite multi skilled in that a lot of them have 
come from an operational type background and worked their way up so, therefore, they 
have an ability already and a skill that they’ve already been there and done that job, 
they can have the input and bounce ideas off the people in Operations who are coming 
up with the risks and stuff and, therefore, can help influence what we need to do to 
manage a risk.  So they can offer quite good complex operational solutions to problems 
as well as looking at what we need to do for capital investment, if required.” 
 
In-house training and training on the job are important components of continuous 
professional development. Recently, a risk training programme was launched to provide 
staff with a better understanding of risk identification and assessment skills. It made 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  204 
participants aware of the risk perception horizon people have and develop over time. 
Risk training not only explores the economic-rational perspective on risk used for 
decision making in the organisation but also ‘re-frames’ psychological and social 
construction and understandings of the organisational risk concept. The training is 
aimed for reducing the deviation in quality of risk assessments with a view to enhance 
the consistency of investment and maintenance decision making. In that sense, the 
communication of incidents to staff helps the organisation to communicate the failure 
proneness and future risks of the system to its staff. The general interest in this training 
scheme demonstrates that staff maintain a commitment to continuous learning and seeks 
the acquisition and improvement of skills. This training programme has been recognised 
as industry leading and earned a number of industry awards.  
 
Taken together, all of these dimensions were observed to contribute to the effective 
management of incidents affecting water safety and reliability in this organisation. In 
the web of organisational culture (Johnson, 1992) some key findings of this research 
component (Figure 36) are summarised. 
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Figure 36 A cultural web of organisational culture in operations and incident management 
 
3.4.2.3 Evaluating the effectiveness of HRO principles in the management of 
incidents  
In the following analysis, the impact of incidents is correlated with an assessment of 
observed HRO principles during the management of incidents. The assessment was 
carried out in a review of documented incidents aiming to find documented evidence for 
adherence to HRO principles during their management. In this analysis, it was aimed to 
explain the residual incident impact on customers as function of observed HRO 
principles during the incident management. For the years 2004 to 2006, 36 well 
documented incidents were selected that represent significantly high, average and 
significantly low incident impacts. The incidents were reviewed for evidence relating to 
the HRO principles identified in the HRO framework.  
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In Figure 37, three data sets are presented: firstly, the incident impacts of 36 selected 
incidents were correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles based on 
all HRO indicators: the average score was calculated from the 51 HRO principles if 
sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. Secondly, the incident impact of 36 selected incidents was correlated with 
the average score for observed HRO principles using only those principles that were 
previously identified to have an average, positive cost benefit. Thirdly, the incident 
impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO 
principles using only those principles that were previously identified to have a 
significant cost benefit, i.e. indicators with the minimum confidence interval of 95% 
exceeding zero.  
It can be identified that all datasets have a minimal, positive correlationship between the 
incident impact on customers and the average score for observed HRO principles. 
Considering all HRO principles regardless of their cost benefit, a positive correlation 
described with y=0.41x + 62.8 between the incident impact and the average score for 
observed HRO principles can be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0454 
only explains 4.5% of the variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as 
a function of the incident impact.  
Considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with an average, 
positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.30x + 71.3 between the 
incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles can be identified. 
The coefficient of determination R2=0.019 only explains 1.9% of the variation in the 
average score for observed HRO principle as a function of the impact scores.  
Finally, considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with a 
significant positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.32x + 74.3 
between the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles can be 
identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.021 only explains 2.1% of the 
variation in the average score for observed HRO principle as a function of the impact 
scores.  
In all three datasets, the y-axis intercept ranges between 62.8 and 74.3. This suggests, as 
previously enquired in the survey of water utility managers, that HRO principles form 
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part of the organisational culture during normal operations (at zero adverse impact on 
customers) but also during an incident.  
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Figure 37 Correlating the incident impact on customers with average scores for observed HRO 
principles 
 
The marginal, positive relationship between increasing incident impact and average 
scores for observed HRO principles is an interesting finding because it was initially 
hypothesised that a higher incident impact would negatively correlate with the scores 
for observed HRO principles. In other words, it was assumed that low observance of 
HRO principles would have an adverse impact on customers, i.e. prolonging the 
incident or aggravating the hazard exposure of the population. It is not believed that a 
causal relationship between increased observation of HRO principles and increased 
incident impact exist. This would mean that increased scores in HRO principles would 
have an aggravating effect on customer impact from incidents. To the contrary, it is 
stipulated that a higher perceived or potential threat to customers during an incident 
triggers a more focussed incident management response that resembles the 
characteristics described with the HRO principles. Another attempt to explain the 
findings may also arise from the quality of data used in the survey. It may be argued 
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that higher impact incidents are better described and the HRO principles are more 
evident in the incident documentation. A further source for error may arise from 
incidents that resorted to well tried and tested incident management routines as opposed 
to novel incident situations. For example, a pipe burst with impact on customers (‘loss 
of supply, ‘low pressure and ‘discolouration’) frequently occurs in the organisation and 
the incident management response for such a scenario is a well established incident 
management procedure, whereas truly ‘trying conditions’ arise in unprecedented and 
unforeseen situations that were never experienced before.  
In conclusion, the coefficients of determination below 4.5% are too low to explain the 
variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of the impact 
scores. It is concluded that the incident impact on customers does not correlate with the 
observation of HRO principles.  
In a follow-up analysis, the scores for individual groups of HRO principles (A – G) 
were correlated with the impact of incidents. Throughout this analysis the coefficient of 
determination did not exceed 15% and in most instances did not exceed 1%. This 
suggests that variation in the average score for observed HRO principles can hardly be 
explained as a function of the incident impact scores. The detailed analyses are 
presented in Appendix 4.2.3.  
It has been previously argued that the effectiveness of incident management requires a 
measure of reduction in incident impact, i.e. deducting the actual incident impact from 
the potential impact. In the previous study, the ultimate or final incident impact was 
correlated with the observed HRO principles without taking into account the potential 
incident impact that could have arisen without effective incident management. So, in 
this study, a number of incidents were selected to anticipate the potential incident 
impact in perspective of the actual incident impact on customers. Hence, the reduction 
of incident impact was correlated with the score average for observed HRO principles 
identified in the review of documented incident management responses. The incidents 
were chosen from the trying conditions that were used to compare HRO scores with the 
ultimate incident impact scores. The narratives and the analysis of these incidents are 
presented in Appendix 4.1 as case studies; for each year between 2004 and 2006, 4 
incidents were selected that represent significantly low as well as significantly high 
incident impacts on customers. The findings are presented in Table 48 and Figure 38. In 
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this correlation, a positive relationship between observed HRO principles and incident 
impact reduction can be identified. However, the coefficient of determination only 
explains 26% of the variation in incident impact reduction as a function of HRO 
principles. 
 
Incident 
year 
Actual 
incident 
impact 
Incident 
impact 
score 
Potential 
incident impact 
HRO 
score 
Impact reduction 
attributed to HRO 
principles (Score) 
2004 High 27.3 Significantly 
higher 
89.7 Medium (3) 
2004 High 27.3 Significantly 
higher 
86.1 Medium (3) 
2004 Low 3.3 Significantly 
higher 
84.6 High (4) 
2004 Low 4 Significantly 
higher 
67 Very high (5) 
2005 High 27.3 Insignificantly 
higher 
65.9 Low/Medium (2) 
2005 High 3.3 Significantly 
higher 
78.6 High (4) 
2005 Low 4 Significantly 
higher 
78.6 High (4) 
2005 Low 4 Insignificantly 
higher 
62.3 Low/Medium (2) 
2006 High 12.7 Insignificantly 
higher 
64.2 Low/Medium (2) 
2006 High 12.0 Insignificantly 
higher 
53.0 Low/Medium (2) 
2006 Low 6.0 Medium 
 
43.8 Low/Medium (2) 
2006 Low 4 Significantly 
higher 
67.5 High (4) 
Table 48 Correlating the reduction in incident impact with observed HRO principles 
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Figure 38 Correlating the reduction of incident impact with observed HRO principles 
 
3.5 Summary 
The studies in this chapter were designed to investigate the benefit of HRO principles in 
incident management and to correlate incident impacts on customers and impact 
reductions with observation of high reliability principles under trying conditions. A 
survey series was conducted with water utility staff to identify the familiarity of water 
utilities with HRO principles. As an observer in an operations and incident control 
centre, the author watched the management of unfolding incidents. The observational 
studies were further enhanced by staff interviews and document reviews, e.g. standard 
operating procedures, policies, communiqués, etc.  
 
The author set out to investigate the familiarity of the water sector with the principles of 
high reliability organisations (HRO). It was aimed to identify the benefit of HRO 
principles in providing safe and reliable drinking water to customers in the context of 
the cost to implement, operate and maintain these principles. Here, it was found that 
many principles of HRO could be readily observed in operations and incident 
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management of the water utilities that participated in the HRO survey and the Regional 
Water Utility.  
Secondly, the author was interested if HRO principles in incident management have a 
significant effect reducing the public health impact on a population during an incident. 
Based on the documentary study of incidents and their management it could be 
demonstrated that HRO principles have a positive effect in reducing the incident impact 
on customers (Figure 38). 
 
Two hypothesises were used to structure the investigation. Firstly, it was hypothesised 
that the water sector is familiar with the principles of HRO in the context of providing 
safe and reliable drinking water to customers. Secondly, a water utility makes 
provisions for the “short periods of ‘stress’” (World Health Organisation, 2004) with 
the design of incident management procedures that are based on HRO principles.  
The results of this study confirmed that a significant number of HRO criteria are readily 
observable in the investigated water utilities and that many HRO principles were 
considered cost beneficial in contributing to the management of a safe and reliable 
drinking water supply. It was found that the Regional Water Utility makes provisions 
for the “short periods of ‘stress’” (World Health Organisation, 2004) with the design of 
an incident management capability that are based on many HRO principles. In the study 
of incidents, it was found that the Regional Water Utility is well positioned to manage 
incidents and many HRO principles can be readily identified as management practice 
under ‘trying conditions’. It was found that the observance of HRO principles 
significantly contributes to the resilience of the organisation to provide and maintain a 
safe and reliable drinking water supply. The incident management procedures are tried 
and tested procedures: Considering the frequency of incidents that occur in the Regional 
Water Utility, a dedicated team of incident managers are available 24 hours/day, 7 days 
a week to oversee efforts of reducing the impact of incidents on customers and to re-
instate ‘normal operation’. In a number of incident cases, the Regional Water Utility 
demonstrated a competent approach to manage unforeseen and often complex incident 
circumstances.  
A number of sub-hypotheses were used that are specifically relevant for subsequent 
chapters in this thesis. In particular, it was hypothesised that 
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  ‘water utilities maintain existing technology to exceptionally high level’; 
  ‘water utilities use root cause analysis of minor errors and incidents as a source 
for learning’; and 
 ‘Water utilities develop a collective memory for failures, incidents and root 
causes for failure to help anticipating future problems’. 
 
It was found that the majority of survey respondents ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ 
that ‘maintenance of technology to exceptional high standard’ could be observed in the 
participating water utilities. They also considered this to be not beneficial in the context 
of the cost involved. In the previous chapter, the frequency of incidents per year 
associated to asset failures suggested that organisations must develop some form of 
organisational competence to manage incidents. The frequency of asset failures 
corresponds with the observations in this study that incident management is a highly 
routinised job and it could be argued that incident management forms part of the normal 
operation in the Regional Water Utility. It could also be argued that technical reliability 
of physical assets is substituted by organisational reliability in incident management to 
reduce the impact of incidents on customers and to re-instate ‘normal’ operations.  
With respect to learning organisations, the HRO principle of ‘learning from failures, 
near misses and mistakes as a means to study the failure susceptibility of the 
organisation’ was perceived as cost beneficial and, according to the surveys, was 
observable in the majority of water utilities.  Root cause analysis of minor errors and 
incidents was identified to provide a source for learning and ‘developing a collective 
memory for failures, incidents and root causes for failure to help the organisation 
anticipating future problems’ was perceived as cost beneficial. Evidence was found that 
the Regional Water Utility uses detailed incident review procedures and thorough 
incident analysis techniques to investigate incidents. In an incident review meeting the 
circumstances of incidents are investigated considering technical issues as well as 
human factor. It evaluates the performance of the technical system but also organisation 
and individual performance prior to and during an incident.  
In theory, learning from incidents is facilitated by a process of identifying root causes, 
agreeing actions to consider the prevention of re-occurrence and communicating 
learning outcomes to the wider business, in particular were similar incidents could 
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occur. A number of interviewees in the Regional Water Utility shared the view of this 
process being effective, whereas others were more critical about the learning capability 
from incidents. On the other hand, the incident review meeting enforces the adherence 
to standard operating procedures because the explicit investigation of human error 
drives out poor behaviour by individuals. In that sense, sociological pressures help the 
organisation to promote safe actions and interventions in the technical system.  
 
The primary purpose of the incident documentation is to report individual incidents to 
senior management and the regulator.  Documented incidents are stored in an incident 
database that underpinned the majority of the above analyses. After an incident, 
learning opportunities are immediately communicated to relevant staff in the 
organisation but then the incident documents end up on the incident database, which is 
merely a repository of incident records. So far, limited evidence was found that the 
organisation uses the incident database for structured analysis as performed in the 
previous chapter. One major exception is the structured analysis of water main burst 
data that is used to predict the failure susceptibility of water mains in the future. In 
regressional analyses the occurrence of water main bursts are correlated to ‘material 
type’, ‘age of the asset’ and ‘soil conditions’ as well as other factors.  
Organisational learning, in particular from incidents, in the context of asset 
management decision making is the subject of further investigations. The forthcoming 
chapter introduces decision-making processes for risk-based asset investment and 
maintenance and incorporates ‘learning from incidents’ to enhance the process of 
identifying and assessing risks. 
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4 Learning from failure in risk-based asset 
management 
4.1 Introduction 
In the introduction to this thesis, three main aspects were introduced for investigation in 
this project: firstly, the nature of incidents and their impact on customers; secondly, the 
need for an organisational capability to manage incidents and its role in maintaining a 
resilient water supply system that minimises the impact of incidents on customers. 
Thirdly, risk-based asset management strategies that provide and maintain the technical 
reliability of the water supply system with a particular emphasis on opportunities to 
enhance the perception and understanding of risk. The latter aspect is the subject of this 
chapter.  
In the previous chapter, the HRO framework was introduced with a specific section on 
‘precise procedures in managing technology’. In the surveys, it was found that the 
majority of survey respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that ‘maintenance of 
technology to exceptional high standard’ could be observed in their water utilities. They 
also considered this to be not beneficial in the context of the cost involved. In practice, 
water utilities are now embarking on an explicit trade-off between investment cost and 
risk for asset investment and maintenance decision making (MacGillivray et al., 2006). 
Formalised cost risk trade-off mechanisms are becoming common practice (Lifton and 
Smeaton, 2003; MacGillivray et al., 2006; Pollard et al., 2004) that use risk registers 
and cost benefit analysis (CBA) in asset investment and maintenance decision making 
to evaluate the benefit of risk reduction in the context of the cost for asset investment 
and maintenance. This places risk assessments at the centre of investment and 
maintenance decision making. 
In the previous chapter, it was enquired if ‘water utilities use root cause analysis of 
minor errors and incidents as a source for learning’ and if ‘water utilities develop a 
collective memory for failures, incidents and root causes for failure to help anticipating 
future problems’. These HRO principles are thought to be an effective learning 
strategies to verify, validate and enhance risk assessments based on learning from 
previously experienced incidents. In this chapter, the derivation and use of risk 
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assessments in decision making are investigated with a particular focus on the risk data 
quality to derive effective decisions. Previously experienced incidents are used to 
validate the risk model and to verify the data derived in risk assessments as a means to 
learn from failure.  
The objective of this chapter is to identify learning opportunities from incident analyses 
to enhance risk assessments that are subsequently used for asset investment and 
maintenance decision making in asset management. The sought learning opportunities 
arise from comparing perceived future risks to actual incident data.  
 
4.2 Theoretical development 
From an economic perspective (Bonart and Peters, 1997), a water utility uses 
technologies to transform input factors into outputs. The three main input factors are 
capital, labour and natural resources. The management process considers which 
production factors to use, how to combine these production factors and the prices for 
production factors and outputs. Similar to capital, labour and natural resources, risk can 
be allocated an incremental unit and a price or cost. Increasingly, risk assessments are 
used in the water sector to identify the units of risk in water supply systems (Deere et 
al., 2001) and commercial or monetary evaluation methods are used to derive the cost 
of risk (Lifton and Smeaton, 2003; Abell, 2005). The incremental units of risk and their 
‘market price’ can take the form of opportunity cost that a water utility customer is 
willing to pay in order for a risk event not to occur (UK Water Industry Research 
Limited, 2002) This methodology for non-market valuation of benefits aims to generate 
estimates of customer benefit and preferences for different service attributes and their 
associated risks (Bateman et al., 2002). In that sense, risk becomes the fourth 
production input factor in a water utility production function. 
A production function describes the quantitative correlation between production input 
factors and outputs (Bonart and Peters, 1997) and in substitutional production functions 
the input factors can be substituted within a reasonable area of the function (Bonart and 
Peters, 1997). As with the other substitutional input factors, risk i1 can be substituted by 
the production factors labour, natural resources and capital without an effect on the 
overall output. In Figure 39, the Cobb-Douglas function is such a production function 
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(Bonart and Peters, 1997) that describes the explicit trade-off between unit risk (Deere 
et al., 2001) and the units of assets required to reduce risks. A number of examples were 
added to explain the trade-off concept.  
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Figure 39 The trade-off between risk and water supply system assets 
 
So far, this relationship between units of risk and assets has not considered the price or 
cost for risk and assets. Assuming the need to maximise benefit (or profit) the optimal 
equilibrium between risk and assets is governed by their respective ‘market’ prices or 
costs. Based on this principle, Equation 8 describes the rate of technical substitution 
between risk (di2) and assets (di1) to be the negative ratio of their production input 
factor prices (pi1 and pi2) (Bonart and Peters, 1997). 
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Equation 8 The optimal rate of technical substitution 
 
It suggests that the optimal rate of substitution for production input factors is directly 
dependant on their factor prices (Bonart and Peters, 1997). This is the governing 
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principle of economic-rationale cost risk trade-off in decision making. A detailed 
derivation of Equation 8 can be found in the Appendix 1.  
Since the privatisation of the water industry in England and Wales (Office of Water 
Services, 1993; Parker, 2004), 26 regional water companies now serve between 400 and 
8,231,000 customers (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2007). The Regional Water Utility 
investigated in this project provides water and wastewater services to 4.7 million 
customers and represents a significantly large customer base in comparison to all water 
utilities in England and Wales.  Over 95% of its customers are linked into an asset 
network of water resources, treatment and distribution pipes. The network of 
interconnected assets has over 1,200 major elements including 147 reservoirs, 5 river 
sources, 80 boreholes, 86 water treatment works, 300 pumping stations, over 650 
treated water storage reservoirs and 32,000 km of distribution pipelines to satisfy a daily 
drinking water demand of 1,250 Ml.  
Currently, the Regional Water Utility has ca. 86,000 risk assessments collected in an 
asset risk database. In these risk assessments, the failure of an asset is assessed as a 
probability to have an impact on customers. Impacts on customers relate to water 
quality, discolouration, low pressure, loss of supply, etc., i.e. reflecting the objective to 
provide safe and reliable drinking water to customer (International Water Association, 
2004) and more specifically the ‘level of service’ indicators set by the regulator (Office 
of Water Services, 1998). Considering the vast asset base of regional water supply 
systems and a centralised decision making process of financial resource allocation for 
investment and maintenance, high consistency in risk assessments is required to 
effectively and optimally allocate capital and operational expenditures across the asset 
base. Based on Equation 8, the economic effect of inconsistencies in risk assessments 
can be explained with the conceptualised Figure 40.  
At individual asset level, the over-estimation of risk attracts excess cash for risk 
reduction, whereas underreported or underestimated risks for assets attract deficient 
amounts of resources. Across the entire asset base, a large standard deviation in the 
assessed units of risks introduces a similar standard deviation in the rate of technical 
substitution between risk (di2) and assets (di1) (Bonart and Peters, 1997). Over- or 
underestimating as well as over- or underreporting risks distorts the economic optimal 
allocation of cash resources and imbalances the optimal risk-asset equilibrium. Hence, a 
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consistent approach to risk assessments is required that builds on consistent risk 
assessment processes and a common understanding and perception of risk is required 
that shapes the individual’s psychological and heuristic constructs of risks towards the 
organisational standard or norm.  
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Figure 40 Inconsistency in risk assessments for one asset 
 
In this chapter, the quality of risk assessments is investigated and opportunities to 
enhance risk assessments based on learning from previously experienced incidents 
identified. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
This chapter methodology is dominated by an action research strategy that has been 
promoted by practitioners as a moral responsibility to work socially meaningful in 
changing a situation for the better by the researchers involvement (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994; Greenwood and Levin, 1998). It is “research becoming praxis – practical, 
reflective, pragmatic action – directed towards solving the problems in the world” 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994) and has a deliberate interaction with the subject areas of 
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study. The object of action research was to statistically analyse the incident data 
previously derived in Chapter 2 with risk assessment data held by the Regional Water 
Utility and to identify and to improve the gaps in the risk assessment and management 
process. The former object of study consisted of a quantitative statistical data analysis to 
compare risk assessments as they are perceived by individual risk assessors with actual 
past incidents. With respect to the latter object of study, it was thought that action 
research provided the distinct advantage of using the researchers skills and expertise in 
an interactive process with experts in the Regional Water Utility to explore the 
processes of risk analysis and assessment and its interaction with staff, in particular 
relating to their perception of risk. The research results of this study were documented 
in similarity to the previously conducted observational studies on HRO principles in 
incident management and recorded how the researching individual experiences events, 
actions and processes. Furthermore, observational methods were used to investigate 
what groups or individuals do and recording their actions and describing their activities 
offers data rich accounts of real-world research (Robson, 2002).  
Although an acclaimed advantage of action research, there is the obvious danger of the 
researcher to influence the results of the object of study, in particular when considering 
mental frameworks that have shaped his/her expectations or heuristic models.  
In addition to the action research component, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with staff who are engaged in the risk-based asset management process. This 
represents a form of triangulation to the action research programme and represents a 
form of phenomenology as a method of trying to understand how individuals perceive 
and construct their reality (Robson, 2002). Although this form of research provides 
highly detailed data based on highly personalised and subjective experiences it was 
thought that the content analysis based on semi-structured interviews provides rich and 
detailed data with expressive and enlightening information (Wengraf, 2001) on how 
staff experience and make sense of the risk assessment process despite the lack of 
standardisation in its results. A further advantage over structured interviews is the 
ability to react to emergent topics that are raised by the interviewee (Robson, 2002).  
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4.3.1 Risk-based asset management in an international water sector 
context 
Six water utility professionals from a range of international water utilities in highly 
developed countries were invited to participate in an interview series. The interviews 
were designed as a pilot study to further define the scope of the in-depth, main study in 
the Regional Water Utility. The selection criteria for inviting participants focussed on 
risk-, operations- and asset managers who were attending a workshop on risk 
management culture in December 2006 in Banff, Canada. The invitees represented a 
range of water utility sizes and various water utility ownership models. The participants 
represented  
 large-sized, privately owned water utilities from England and Wales (participant 
no.16 and 17),  
 a large-sized, corporatized, publicly-owned water utility in Scotland (participant 
no.18), 
 medium-sized, corporatized, publicly-owned water utility in Canada (participant 
no.19 and 20), and 
 a small to medium - sized, publicly owned and operated water utilities in Canada 
(participant no. 21). 
 
In the first part of the questionnaire, the participants were required to identify their 
organisational objectives followed by questions relating to public health, asset 
management and, finally, questions relating to incident management. The questionnaire 
(Appendix 4.3.3) was peer reviewed by academic supervisors and the AWWARF 
Project Advisory Committee.  
4.3.1.1 Data quality 
In this study, a limited number of interviews were conducted with participants from a 
range of water utilities in an international context. The number of interviews is not 
representative for the water sector. Secondly, the interviewee group was potentially 
biased for their common professional interest in risk management and their attendance 
at the risk management workshop. Furthermore, the interviewees may express their 
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opinions based their professional experience that shaped their heuristic beliefs and 
understandings of their environment.  
 
4.3.2 Risk data quality in risk-based asset management decisions  
The main study was carried out in the Regional Water Utility during a 6 month research 
placement. In this placement, the author conducted structured observations and data 
analyses in the strategic asset management department. Based on the theoretical 
developments above, the design of the asset risk management system was studied as 
well as work processes, procedures and activities relating to asset investment and 
maintenance planning. This time, the author had a more active role in the organisation 
that could be described as action research: The Regional Water Utility had an interest to 
enhance their risk management capability and the author applied his technical and 
organisational expertise to evaluate and enhance the socio-technical and socio-
economic business concept of risk-based asset management in the organisation. As an 
external to the organisation, the author aimed to remain independent in thought and 
action.  
In a series of case studies, it was investigated how the organisation assesses and 
incorporates future “trying conditions” (Weick, 1987) in risk assessment for asset 
investment and maintenance decision making. For this purpose, a number of roles were 
assumed – as an analyst of business processes, a risk assessor, an asset engineer/ 
manager, consultant and facilitator of a risk experiment - to capture a holistic 
understanding of the risk model.  
A major component of this chapter was to evaluate the quality of risk data as perceived 
by risk assessors in the organisation. The risk data were available in a risk database. In a 
structured analysis, these risk data were compared and correlated with findings 
previously obtained, analysed and evaluated in the chapter characterising incidents. 
Findings of the data analysis were triangulated with observations and document 
reviews. A series of interviews was also conducted to understand the perception of risk 
assessors on the user-ability of the current risk assessment model and the means of 
learning from previous incidents.  These interviews guided the author in the analysis of 
data, confirmed understanding and facilitated the interpretation of research results. The 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix 5.3.1. 
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4.3.2.1 Data quality 
The main source of data in this study originated from the Regional Water Utility who 
provided unlimited access to a vast repository of documented incidents and risk 
assessments. The predominant source of data used in this study are risk assessment 
files, documents, reviews, communiqués and personal accounts of staff involved in risk 
assessments. The risk files describing individual risk scenarios contained detailed 
technical analyses and personal communications of staff. The motivation of providing 
unrestricted access to data can be explained by the Regional Water Utility’s interest to 
enhance their risk assessment capability.  
The structured analysis of the data consisted of building a number of databases to code, 
analyse and statistically process data. The information and knowledge derived from the 
analyses were reviewed by representatives from the Regional Water Utility to validate 
the methodological approach and to verify the results. The verification and validation 
process aimed to ensure that the models used to code the data were relevant and 
applicable to the set research question.  
One important aspect in this process was the awareness that the outcomes of this data 
analysis depend on the reference models used to collect incident and risk data. Since 
only one source of data is used in this analysis a risk was identified that the data 
acquisition and collection process within the water utility is subject to cultural bias. 
Although it was a primary objective to identify bias in the process of assessing risk, this 
analysis used a number of triangulating techniques to reduce the bias and ambiguity of 
the author. Case studies, interviews and observations were used to investigate, analyse 
and evaluate the risk-based asset management system. The use of multiple approaches 
for this research (triangulation) aimed to reduce personal bias whilst aiming to 
understand processes and the cultural norms in the organisation. 
 
4.4 Results and Discussion of Results 
4.4.1 Risk-based asset management in an international water sector 
context 
In this inquiry, approaches to risk-based asset management were investigated. Firstly, it 
was aimed to identify how prevalent risk-based asset management strategies are across 
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the participating water utilities. It was found that asset management capability ranges 
from not existent to very advanced. On asking one utility manager (participant no.21) if 
they use public health risk assessments or whether they have an asset management 
decision process, the manager replied: “I’d have to say really not.  Our agenda has been 
driven mostly by regulations” and “by dealing with particular risks that we either 
perceived or knew through testing.  We are entering into an area where we are looking 
at asset management.” “Now we’re implementing a system where we actually have an 
asset management database in GIS that we will use to make decisions on. So we’re 
certainly going in that direction”. 
Another reported (participant no.19): “We’ve got a very formal risk management 
process that we have to go through and set objectives and look at the risks associated 
with it and that’s tied into our budget process. Asset management then decide where 
we’re going to spend our capital dollars. Part of our budget process is actually to 
highlight what the risks are, what are our current mitigations, what the residual risks 
are and then what we’re doing in terms of our budget, you know, both in terms of kind 
of resources to address the issues of our capital expenditures to address the issues of 
the process.” 
The traditional engineering approach to asset management was reported from this 
interviewee (participant no.20): “For a long time our Engineering Department has done 
asset management on the pipe infrastructures - so for about twenty five years we’ve 
been keeping track of break history.” “We’ve done enough work that we know the life 
of our infrastructure, you know, what the demographics of it are and we’ve got a 
capital plan to support the sustainable renewal rate.” 
One reporter (participant no.18) from an advanced water utility highlighted how their 
public health risk assessments are integrated into asset management plan: “At high level 
it’s in the drinking water safety plans ….  Prior to drinking water safety plans, it was 
more discrete risk assessments so – but now we have drinking water safety plans - it’s a 
source to tap risk assessment. So, within the drinking water safety plans, you … have 
DOMS which is another version of a process – you’ve got a process procedure, …you 
have written procedures, written work instructions so – but drinking water safety plans 
at a high level is the methodology we use to monitor and manage public health risks 
and that’s continuously updated and within drinking water safety plans we have 
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SWARM which links back to the business impact.” The interviewee (participant no.18) 
also reported on the process of deriving risk assessments and decision making: “So, 
SWARM is like the heart of drinking water safety plans and that allows you to evaluate 
risk in the catchment, treatment [and] transmission down to the customer.  SWARM 
isn’t just about capital interventions, within SWARM an intervention might be write a 
new procedure or put extra staff on them, greater surveillance. SWARM is very effective 
now … – because we’re looking at failure modes, potential failure modes source to tap, 
and then you’re looking at intervention measures for each failure mode and, as I said, a 
failure mode doesn’t have to have happened, it could be a possible thing on the horizon 
which means you’ll have the likelihood. So because we’re cash constrained we have a 
set amount of money. SWARM … will come out with a big long list of interventions and 
you have to just draw the line when the money runs out.  So you’re getting your best 
bang for your buck, you’re getting the best risk reduction for that amount of money and 
that’s for all above ground assets. …because our risk reduction is in pounds, in theory, 
the closer (the cost benefit ratio) to zero obviously the better value it is.  If you get [a 
cost benefit ratio] of one, it means that you’re spending four million pounds for 
avoiding a four million risk which is still pretty good. It’s balanced but you might be 
happier if you were spending four pounds to get rid of a four million pound risk so the 
closer to zero your risk reduction index is the more likely you’ll invest in it.” 
However, there are challenges and weaknesses in the cost benefit approach: “SWARM is 
a system and you need operator intervention - you need someone, some person to have 
a look at it because if you just used the risk reduction index you could end up doing a 
whole load of cheap schemes which gives you big risk reductions but you may leave 
some big risks on there, huge risks to companies that – it makes the index look very 
expensive to get rid of..” 
Another utility manager (participant no.16) reported on their decision making tool: “We 
do, in making any investment decisions now, apply what we call our ‘trade off diamond’ 
for investment decisions related to the water infrastructure.  So the ‘trade off diamond’ 
looks at alternative options for achieving improvements through project investment and 
compares options for what we call ‘whole life costs’ so the capital cost and the 
maintenance cost in capital terms and the operating cost in revenue terms with the 
benefit in risk reduction that you achieve through selection of one of the competing 
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options. So we’re able by looking at the impact and the probability – or the probability 
of occurrence and the frequency of individual events reoccurrence. Over the life of that 
asset and, if we’re looking at different assets so concrete and steel versus wrinkly tin 
kind of thing which have different asset lives, we bring those to a common base. We’ve 
got a good idea of what we call the ‘probable cost of risk’ associated with choosing a 
particular investment option over a standard lifetime which might be thirty or forty 
years, for instance.  
So the impact criteria have a number of different consequences. We use water quality, 
public health, legal, regulatory are some examples of the impact criteria that we use. So 
we’re able by doing that analysis and bringing those together to form a view of what 
benefits we’re getting through risk reduction vis a vis the investment we’re making on a 
particular option.  So we’re able to incorporate public health risk assessment in the 
wider risk assessment associated with choosing between investment options or choosing 
not to invest at all. Cost is the lowest common denominator so we reduce everything 
into an equivalent in cost terms.” For the assessment of consequential cost, he reported 
to “use in lieu of data” – “and this is where [the Regional Water Utility] are more 
advanced than we are because they started a data acquisition process far earlier than 
we have done .” 
The interviewees were asked to comment on the acceptable level of risk: “What is still 
not as mature as I would like is an understanding of what represents a tolerable level of 
risk within the organisation and I’m just promoting discussions to more clearly 
understand the distinctions between hazard tolerance, control acceptance and 
opportunity appetites really which are the three subsets of what is generically known as 
risk appetite (participant no.16).”  On that issue, the previous interviewee (participant 
no.18) reported: “I must admit we haven’t got a very good act on this one.  We’ve sent 
through the statistical analysis of the water policy risks to determine the site specific 
risk to achieve an overall corporate risk level. It is very data hungry and all we can 
hope for at the moment is we try to maintain our risk levels the same because we can 
score all our sites through SWARM and come up with this site here is three hundred 
and twenty, that site there is two hundred and forty. We don’t say we need to get both 
sites down to two forty, all we say at the moment is we’ll invest to keep that site at three 
forty, this site at two forty and so we’re not trying to move them all towards an 
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equivalent level of risk across [Name of Water Utility]. We’re trying to hold them at the 
moment until we’ve got a lot more data to understand. All we can do is saying the 
plants we operate are offering a sufficient level of service at the moment and we’ll 
invest to maintain that.” 
To the contrary, another (participant no.20) reported: “Really we don’t assess the risk 
that’s tolerable, the risk’s not tolerable. So we don’t get into decisions like what’s the 
risk of not having a spare pump there versus a spare pump here. We say if we’re going 
to need a spare pump in both places, then we’ll provide it.” 
Regarding lesson learnt, one interviewee (participant no.16) reported: “In terms of 
lessons learned, we conduct post incident reviews from each incident that occurs so if 
there are lessons learned there then we attempt to build those into our controls and our 
corporate knowledge but … retention and accessibility of corporate knowledge is 
something that is a challenge for all Water companies. [More] recently … we were 
concerned about whether the learnings within the group that did the incident review … 
were not getting broadcast out far enough. What we’ve actually done is we set up a 
group and on a monthly basis we’ve used this when an incident has occurred across the 
corporation - these are not just water quality but safety and environment - and then 
basically we quickly go through and review it.”  
Regarding the implementation of changes after an incident one interviewee (participant 
no.19) reported: “I mean, some of the incidents are just very particular to a certain site 
and a certain location but, if there’s themes in terms of incidences or an incident that 
would be applicable to a bunch of other sites, that is brought out and then basically the 
group meets, reviews these and then has to put up the key learnings that came out of all 
the incidents that went down. That’s set out in the review. Depending on how significant 
the result is … there’s a control process [for] changing a procedure… Part of that is 
coming up with a plan. If you’re going to go in and change a procedure, then you have 
to come up with a plan on how you’re going to do that.  It might be something that just 
affects a small group so then you want to have a small training session with ten people. 
It might be something that’s corporate wide or there might be more of a formal roll out 
process of how you do it.” 
In conclusion, it was found that risk-based asset management strategies range from very 
little capabilities towards very advanced risk-based asset decision-making processes. 
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Whereas some (smaller) utilities struggle to even set up adequate accounting practices 
for asset depreciation and re-investment to sustain a stable accounting value of assets, 
others are advancing beyond the traditional model of asset depreciation and re-
investment towards trade-off’s between risk reduction and capital as well as operational 
spending. Risk assessment processes were described in a couple of advanced water 
utilities that require the acquisition of risk data to underpin decision making.  
A few interviewees described the process of ‘learning from failure’ as a mechanism to 
identify investment needs but also needs to change business processes and procedures. 
These themes were further investigated in the Regional Water Utility.  
 
4.4.2 Risk data quality strategies in the Regional Water Utility  
4.4.2.1 The risk assessment model 
The Regional Water Utility implemented a risk assessment and management system to 
prioritise capital and operational expenditures in asset creation, operation and 
maintenance. It conceptualised a risk assessment framework aimed at identifying risks 
relating to not delivering service to customers with its current asset base. Risks are 
expressed as a function of probability (p), severity (s) and quantity (q), which are 
defined as: 
p = probability of at least one service failure occurring 
s = severity of the impact on the customer  
q = scale of the impact in terms of people affected 
 
For the management of these risks, the organisation identifies 
• solutions to risks; 
• estimates of the benefits from undertaking a solution (risk reduction); and 
• assessments of the costs involved in undertaking a solution. 
 
According to one asset planning manager (participant no.25) “the organisation has a 
system in place to estimate the cost of solutions using unit cost models contained within 
a unit cost database.  The process allows an assessment of alternative solutions to 
reduce the same risk. Each solution usually requires different levels of CAPEX and 
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OPEX and has potentially different effects on risk reduction. Optimal solutions in terms 
of CAPEX, OPEX and risk reduction are modelled in a cost benefit assessment.” 
Currently, the organisation uses the following severity scales for impact assessment 
(Table 49). 
 
Risk effect Severity 
score 
Description 
Very low Compliance but customer complaint 
Low Trivial sample failure 
Medium PCV failure leading to an undertaking 
High Prosecution by regulator. Boil order as risk of illness through 
drinking water 
Water quality 
Very high Public health effect. Illness through drinking water 
Very low 1-2 complaints per 1000 properties, < 50ug/l Iron and no events - 
Slight discolouration noticed in customer bath 
Low 2-4 complaints per 1000 properties, 50-100 ug/l Iron and no 
events. Particulate material visible in clear water 
Medium 4-7 complaints per 1000 properties, 100-150ug/l Iron or minor 
events. Translucent and discoloured resembles orange juice or 
lager. 
High 7-10 complaints per 1000 properties, >150 ug/l or notable events. 
Opaque and discoloured resembles weak milky tea. 
Discolouration 
Very high >10 complaints per 1000 properties, >200ug/l Iron or DWI 
reportable incident. Highly discoloured, resembles beer or 
Guinness 
Very low <3 hours 
Low 3-6 hours 
Medium 6-12 hours (6 hrs is reportable) 
High 12-24 hours 
Interruption to 
supply 
Very high > 24 hours 
Very low Not defined 
Low Not defined 
Medium Property added to register (<15m pressure) 
High No flow upstairs at peak demand period (<10m pressure) 
Low pressure 
Very high No flow at peak demand period (<5m pressure) 
Very low <10%, small leaks on mains and services <2 l/prop/hr 
Low 10-20%, 2-4 l/prop/hr 
Medium 20-25%, few visible leaks with failures on mains and services 
infrequent - 4-6 l/prop/hr 
High 25-35%, 6-8 l/prop/hr 
Leakage 
Very high >35% high levels due to severe weather conditions, numerous 
visible leaks - >8 l/prop/hr 
Very low Loss of yield < 0.5 ML/d or increased grid costs or increased 
tankering to rural zones 
Low Loss of yield 0.5 - 0.99ML/d or move to alternative grid systems 
Medium Loss of yield 1 - 9.99ML/d or voluntary restrictions e.g. publicity 
campaign(local press and radio) 
High Loss of yield 10 - 50ML/d or no practical alternative supply or 
compulsory restrictions e.g. hose pipe ban and closure of car 
washes 
Security of supply 
Very high Loss of yield >50ML/d or emergency restrictions e.g. rota cuts, 
standpipes 
Table 49 Impact assessments for risks 
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These severity scales directly reflect the level of service indicators set by the water 
industry regulators (Office of Water Services, 1998; Drinking Water Inspectorate and 
Office of Water Services, 2001) – an approach previously criticised by Dunn (2004) for 
not necessarily obtaining full potential to reach “asset wisdom”. 
The organisation uses three distinct processes to identify risks. According to a senior 
asset manager (participant no.26): “We’ve got three main processes, one is the 
automatic failure prediction, the second one is the source to tap type approach which is 
very much focussed on people’s views and current risks, and then the third is just 
manual entry of as and when problems arise or people are surveying a water treatment 
works.” “Risks which occur for reasons other than asset death but lead to service 
failures are captured in Source to Tap studies. These are facilitated events where above 
and below ground assets of a catchment are studied in detail by operational and asset 
management teams.  The teams review historical data and knowledge to identify and 
assess risks and to propose conceptual solutions to reduce risks. Asset capability risks 
are assessed for assets and asset groups that are incapable to meet future obligations 
such as regulatory and statutory requirements. This risk type also includes supply and 
demand imbalances arising in growth areas or e.g. areas of industrial decline.” 
The acquisition of risk data involves a number of sub-processes: For the purposes of 
asset death related risk the Regional Water Utility periodically conducts site surveys to 
collect asset data for each site and assets. It has developed an asset register to ensure 
consistency in data collection. An assessment record lists all elements of a facility (e.g. 
a Water Treatment works) down to equipment level (e.g. pumps, valves and actuators). 
Depending on the asset type and its function in the water supply system, the number of 
equipment can range from 7 for a borehole, 16 for a water pumping station, 70 for a 
service reservoir to 700 on a water treatment works. The assessment is undertaken 
utilising the expert opinion of the asset management and operation teams, who deal with 
these assets on a day-to-day basis. In terms of data quality, the organisation has 
introduced the use of ‘technical approach’ manuals as a guide to conduct asset 
assessments. These set out the detailed requirements of the data, formats for collection, 
and definitions for assets. Staff are trained ‘on the job’ to carry out these assessments.  
Based on the acquisition of asset data, the probability of asset death is calculated: The 
senior asset manager explains (participant no.26): “It’s based on the likes of a Weibull 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  230 
curve or a risk tree in the scoring system and that’s based on static asset data, dynamic 
performance data, looking at the two and coming up with a scoring system.  That’s then 
validated against performance data, actual bursts or actual breakdowns at a water 
treatment works, that kind of thing.”  
One senior asset manager (participant no. 28) explained the use of Weibull functions: 
“It’s a standard deterioration curve recognised that uses minimum and typical life and 
age to … draw a curve and deteriorate an asset through its condition grade until 
failure”.   
The majority of risk data in the risk database use Weibull distribution curves and 
network model derived assessments. For asset death, the risk data identifies the 
probability of asset failure for equipment at any given point in time using mathematical 
failure distributions, hence allowing it to identify current and future probability of 
failure for particular assets. However, the asset failure does not necessarily impact on 
customers due to system redundancy. One senior asset planning manager (participant 
no.25) noted: A “pump failure may not always lead to an impact because of standby or 
storage or flow rate or normal mitigation etc. and this is not always clear in the 
thinking of those scoring the probability.  There are many instances where the 
probability is clearly that of the asset failing and the impact is assumed to have a 1 to 1 
relationship.  This separation requires the two parts to be thought of individually and 
should lead to more accurate and consistent scoring.” The probability of impact on 
customer objectives requires a water supply systems assessment. For this purpose, the 
organisation recently introduced a two stage probability assessment to account for 
redundancy in the systems design. Hence, the probability of an asset is assessed at 
equipment level whereas the probability assessment of impact uses a customer 
perspective.  
The assessment procedure for non-Weibull probability assessment is depicted in Figure 
41. This is a structured assessment based on a decision tree. 
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Start
Probability
of Event = 1
Decide year when breach 
likely to Occur (Yr ’x’).
(Stepped P=1 @ date)
Yes
No
No
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Define Weibull parameters to calculate
Probability of event
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and predict year of asset death) 
Yes
What frequency of events expected
- Number of events in x years
- Return period
- % chance next year
Frequency now 
and in 5years
- no. of events
- return period
- % chance
No
Do you
expect event to
occur in the next 
year
No
Number 
of events
next year
Yes
Will (next) 
Failure Event be due 
to asset being life
expired?
Yes
Yes
Is 
Probability of Event
likely  to Increase
In future
Is there 
currently a continuous
ongoing Event
Is the 
Event a breach of 
a future Statutory 
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Does 
there need to be 
a second Failure event
to incur an 
impact
No
Define 
Failure Event
21 3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 12
13
Has failure 
event 
occurred?
Yes/No
Tick box outside 
of Probability tree 
as it does  not 
influence the P 
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Yes
 
Figure 41 Probability assessment for risks 
 
The assessment procedure to derive the impact probability on customers is depicted in 
Figure 42. In addition, the severity of the risk has to be ‘manually’ assessed using Table 
49. 
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Start
How likely is it that the described 
Impact will occur?
Relationship to Probability of Event
ie 2:1,  3:1,  4:1,  5:1  etc   or
1 in x events  or
% chance     or
Almost certain                95 - 99%
Highly probable              85 - 95%
Likely / Probable 65 - 85%  
Better than even 55 - 65%
E ven 45 - 55%  
Worse than even            20 - 45%
Unlikely / Improbable    10 - 19%
Highly unlikely                 0 - 9%
Will the Impact occur 
with every event?
Yes
No
Probability of 
Impact = 1
Assume Event 
has occurred
14 15
16
 
Figure 42 Probability of customer impact assessment 
 
Due to the hidden nature of below ground assets, the derivation of distribution network 
risk assessments use burst data records, the analysis of Geographical Information 
System (GIS) and other spatially related data to model the probability and consequence 
of water main failures. One interviewee (participant no.26) reported that computer 
simulated models also model leakage, pressure, discolouration and water quality risks 
and use “failure mode trees” to derive failure probabilities and impact on customers. An 
example of a ‘failure mode tree’ for a catchment pressure model is presented in Figure 
43.  
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Figure 43 Example for risk assessment decision tree 
 
Despite increased use of statistical derived probability and severity data in risk 
assessment programmes, a significant number of assets require ‘manual’ determination 
in terms of their failure modes and how that risk may impact on service provision to 
customers. Although processes are defined and the organisation has experience in using 
its risk assessment methodology for assets, it relies on the competence of asset 
engineers to identify and assess risks. These risks are recorded in defined cause – effect 
relationships. The current choice of cause effect relationships is presented in Table 50.  
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Causes of failure to be 
assessed as probability of 
occurrence 
Risks relating to water safety and supply reliability to 
be assessed as probability of impact and the severity 
of impact on customers 
A) Physical 
i) Asset 
component level 
Asset failure 
Civil failure 
Water mains failure 
Mechanical failure 
Electrical failure 
 
Site level 
Power failure 
Process failure 
Security failure 
Hydraulic effect 
Fitness for purpose 
Insufficient capacity 
Change in demand 
 
ii)Environment 
Raw water quality 
Adverse weather 
Pollution 
3rd party 
 
B) Information 
Control systems failure 
 
C)Human  
Operator error 
Drinking Water Quality (Biol./Chem.) 
Drinking Water Quality (Discolouration) 
Interruption to Supply 
Low Pressure 
Leakage 
Security of Supply 
Table 50 Cause - effect relationships in risk assessments 
 
Once risk assessments and notional solutions are filed on the database, the cost benefit 
(risk reduction) analysis tool will determine the viability of an investment. In the 
following section, the use of the model, the motivation of risk assessors and its user-
ability from a risk assessors’ perspective are further investigated.  
4.4.2.2 Usage and user-ability of the risk assessment model 
Risk-based decision making requires the acquisition of risk data. That, in turn, requires 
risk assessors to identify, assess and record risks on the risk assessment database for 
subsequent decision making. In a series of interviews the use of the model, the 
motivation of risk assessors and its user-ability from a risk assessors’ perspective were 
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inquired. It was also sought to uncover the heuristic models risk assessors have when 
engaging in the risk assessment process.  
One senior operations manager (participant no.10) commented on the need of having a 
risk assessment database: “I think the fundamental drive is that you get the risk on the 
system, how they’re actually scored is important, but it comes later.  It’s actually 
making sure that it’s flagged up as a risk.” One risk assessment model user (participant 
no.27) reported: “I use [the risk assessment model] occasionally to solve problems and 
to make a bid for money.  When I put the problem on, I know we’ve got a problem and I 
understand that there isn’t enough money to solve everybody’s problem. [The risk 
assessment model] is a way of deciding which problems are the worse and which we’d 
get the most benefit from.” 
According to one operations manager (participant no.10), there seems to be a 
misunderstanding on the purpose of the risk assessment model: “It is actually a 
receptacle for both OPEX and CAPEX derived solutions, not just CAPEX.  I think that’s 
a misconception that a lot of people in our company have. I think lots of people use the 
[risk assessment] system to attract capital funding but it’s not actually for that, it’s to 
log risk whether it’s OPEX or CAPEX or whatever scale and I think that is not clearly 
understood.” 
 
From a strategic perspective, one senior asset manager (participant no.28) reported on 
the implementation of the risk assessment models and the challenges they faced: “I 
think initially before when we introduced [the risk assessment model], we had a big 
struggle in … [in the] strategic asset management [and] investment planning 
[departments] to incentivise people to put problems and risks onto [the risk assessment 
model].  As we’ve moved on, I think people have gradually bought into the process.   
We’ve had a number of investment criteria rules that have caused problems such as the 
red [high] risk policy. When people started learning that, as a business, we only really 
want to invest in red risks, that drove bad behaviours because people over scored risks 
to get them into the red.” He expanded on the incentives to use the risk assessment 
database: “In terms of recording problems and short term risks that we want to spend 
capital on…, I think there’s plenty of incentive now to get them on [the risk database], 
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… and I think people are incentivised to do that.  Obviously now we’re beginning to get 
a bit short on cash.”  
From an asset-risk trade-off perspective, the ‘red risk policy’ contravenes the spirit of 
cost benefit analysis since medium risks could be reduced with very little capital and 
operational expenditure if the monetary benefits of reducing risks exceed cash 
requirements. The policy was introduced to increase spending to reduce high risks. The 
‘shortage’ of cash has distinct effects on the risk management policy in the organisation, 
in particular relating to maintenance. According to one asset engineer (participant 
no.24): “The situation we have at the moment is a lot of the time we’re doing reactive 
work, i.e. things that have already gone wrong, … we can still put [pro-active] schemes 
into [the risk assessment model] but obviously if they don’t score in the red. At the 
moment it’s not likely that there will be funding available. So the difficulty that I see 
with that [risk assessment model] is in the ‘predicting’ [i.e. pro-active maintenance]. 
You’re supporting schemes that impact on the customer that are causing immediate 
problems, aren’t you and all [the risk assessment model is] going to be [is] a method of 
dividing that money up, you know.  It’s not going to be predictive, is it? If you were 
doing it properly you wouldn’t want any in the red risk, would you, because one it’s 
gone into the red you should have sorted it out before really.” 
 
Other engineers and managers commented on the scoring system for risks. One asset 
engineer (participant no.14) noted: The risk assessment model “is only a database for 
storing problems what we identify through the asset management work, you know, 
either reactive or proactively. Basically, the risk matrix and the scoring system on [the 
risk assessment model] for customer problems is a load of rubbish…in true fairness 
because we’d naturally be failing standards of service, i.e. we’re failing our standards 
on flow at the boundary or we’re failing standards on pressure and it would still only 
come out as a medium risk. So basically, what we have to end up doing is trying to get it 
into the red risk category.  We … have to try and frig it to try and get stuff through and 
we shouldn’t have to do that when you’re getting assets which are failing or customers 
who are phoning up saying they haven’t got any water and you’ve gone out and proved 
that they are failing at the boundary, they’ve got insufficient flow and then you go into 
[the risk assessment model], you put your information in and then it still comes out as a 
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medium risk and it doesn’t score into the red.  So there’s something drastically wrong 
somewhere with that and I’ve told them about it but I might as well just talk to a wall.” 
He also commented on the need to raise multiple risk assessments and failure scenarios 
for individual assets (participant no.14): “A reservoir, it can either be a water quality 
problem either ingress through a roof so then you put it as a water quality problem in 
[the risk assessment model] for a service reservoir and then it might not score [red]  so 
then you have to then try and raise it then as either a ‘health and safety’, either 
‘structurally unsound’ and then it might not still score red again … so  you’re ending 
up having to raise about four different failure scenarios and attach it to the solution ….  
And we have the same problem on structural mains - they’re bursting all the time. [The 
risk assessment model] for Asset Management wants a bit of an overhaul to get it to 
score correctly based on the customer’s standards of service, OFWAT’s standards of 
service and [the Regional Water Utility’s]  standards of service as well and it doesn’t.” 
One operations manager (participant no.6) also commented on the scoring factors: “I 
think it’s a good tool for capturing risk but I’m not sure whether the scoring system is 
all that effective sometimes.  He [his asset engineer] knows that for my team it is a ‘red’ 
risk, he sometimes finds it hard for the [risk assessment model] to show it as a red risk.  
I mean, for me, my team, my area team, that issue is red risk definitely, it does have 
problems but when you put it through [the risk assessment model]” is doesn’t score as 
such.  
Another asset engineer reported (participant no.12): “[The risk assessment model], I 
think overall it seems a reasonable system to me.  I don’t have any problems in the way, 
you know, getting things through ‘Challenge’.  The only criticism I do have with [the 
risk assessment model]  is that I don’t think that the risk matrix for health and safety 
risks is accurate enough.” 
One interviewee (participant no.11) reported: “Well, I mean, the problem with the … 
risk [assessment] model is everybody has their own interpretation of risk and I think 
what you find within this system is that, I could review a risk and when I do the review I 
might only review it as ‘high’ on the list but someone from Operations team, because 
they work with the asset and they believe that they’re sick of being on the bore list as an 
operational issue could say it’s a red risk and they could over-exaggerate that risk. So, 
I mean, for me it’s open to risk interpretation…. I don’t know how many times we’ve 
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done this, we’ve come to pick a scheme up and have actually looked at the risk and 
what’s come through as a ‘red’ risk I’ve actually re-evaluated it and said “hang on a 
second, this is an amber risk, do we need to spending money on this at this stage” and 
we have actually kicked schemes out for that reason.” 
Another asset engineer (participant no.9) commented on the customer perspective of 
risk assessments and the effect of system redundancy: “The only issue I see with the 
business risk model is if you’re trying to evaluate something that doesn’t have a direct 
impact on a customer.  So, for instance, if it’s boreholes etc, they don’t tend to score 
high because usually you have an alternative supply say from the grid and so it’s hard 
to score that on its own merits.” 
One asset engineer commented on an improvement initiative to enhance the risk scoring 
system (participant no.14): “I’ve sat down and had a couple of meetings with people 
who’ve come round with ways to improve [the risk assessment model] and what have 
you and is it in the scoring system and I put it all down with our suggestions and that, 
you know, and it all seemed to tie in correctly with the [the Regional Water Utility’s] 
levels of service, standards of service and what have you, and then she came back and 
said “yeah, they’ve altered all the scoring”, tried it again, basically it were even worse 
than it were before.” 
The user-ability of the risk assessment model was inquired and interviewees were asked 
how long it takes to assess a risk scenario. One asset engineer (participant no.24) 
reported: “I mean, it could be a couple of hours to a day or so.  It depends on how much 
information you’ve got to seek and how big the scheme is because, to be honest, [the 
risk assessment model]  is a panacea for everything so it could be a hundred yards of 
main or it could be a completely new treatment works … .” Another (participant no.24) 
reported: “Yeah, it’s quite a long process even for small schemes.  I mean, I shouldn’t 
say but in some cases it’s perhaps a sledge hammer to crack a nut.” One asset engineer 
reported (participant no.12):  “It is quite time intensive but then again it is forming the 
basis of project contracts for contractors.  I mean, there are a lot of fields to fill in on 
the solution.  I can’t really see a way around that, to be honest.  It’s not something that 
I get worked up about, you know.” 
One operations manager (participant no.10) reported: “It’s absolutely horrendous, it’s 
populating information for information’s sake.” It has got “too many fields” to fill in … 
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“if they took half the fields out that might help.”  One asset engineer reported 
(participant no.27): “It is that it’s a bit of a sledge hammer to crack a nut, because I’m 
having to fill in things to do with finance and accounting so I presume somebody has 
decided that we will fill finance and accounting things in.  Sometimes I have a struggle 
filling boxes in with a meaningful explanation. There seems to be more emphasis on 
filling the [risk assessment data]  in correctly than in solving the problem that the [risk 
assessment model]  is designed to do. I struggle filling some of the fields. I like 
collecting data and all the rest of it, what I struggle with is then making it fit into the 
[risk assessment] system. There’s no money, no matter how complex they set the [risk 
assessment model] entries and all the rest of it, if there’s no money there’s no job gets 
done, bottom line.  So why does it need to be so complicated?”   
Another asset engineer (participant no.11) explained:” … it’s all these extra forms that 
you have to fill out now that go along with the [risk assessment model] that have to go 
to site.  These OPEX forms, you have to go round site finding out speeds of motors of 
what you’re replacing so that you can work out what the OPEX cost is up front as well 
as so you’ll have an OPEX saving on the scheme and it’s all good information which I 
need, it’s not information that’s readily available.” 
Finally, one reporter (participant no.24) commented the data requirements to predict 
future risks: “It’s using some sort of judgement assessment.  You can rank the severity 
because that’s really against – a lot of those are against particular standards e.g.  loss 
of supply, iron content in water, water quality issues and you can rank those because 
you’ve got that information.  The probability is more difficult because you’ve having to 
make an assessment.  If you were trying to say ‘we think there’s a risk here’, it’s 
predicting that risk accurately in terms of assets and having the information to do that. 
How do you have the information to determine whether a section of main will break or 
be defective in five years time and how do you get from reactive to proactive?” 
4.4.2.3 Deriving the required quantity of risk assessments for consistent decision 
making 
The quantity of risk assessments supporting decision making is a factor to consider. In 
the following analyses, the risk assessments filed on the risk database are reviewed in 
the context of assets managed by the Regional Water Utility and incidents that 
previously occurred on these asset types. In Table 51, the number of risk assessments 
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per asset type filed on the risk database is presented and the percentage of total risk 
assessments calculated. Here, 55.6% of the risk assessments were conducted for the 
distribution management areas (DMA) and 15.9% for Water Treatment Works.  
 
Asset type Borehole River 
Impounding 
reservoir 
Water 
treatment 
works 
Service 
reservoir 
Water 
tower 
Water 
pumping 
station DMA 
Sum of Risk 
assessments  1174 9 2383 4201 1315 350 2133 14696 
Percentage 
of all risk 
assessments 4.4% 0.03% 9.0% 15.9% 5.0 % 2.0% 8.1% 55.6% 
Table 51 Current number of risk assessments per asset type 
 
In chapter 2, the asset types that caused incidents between 2004 and 2006 were 
identified. They are summarised in Table 52. Here, only 42.2% relate to the distribution 
management areas, whereas 23.1% relate to water treatment works. Major discrepancies 
arise for boreholes and impounding reservoirs. Only 0.7% of incidents involved 
boreholes, yet they represent 4.44% of the risk assessments. Similarly, only 2.7% of the 
impounding reservoirs caused an incident, yet they represent 9.0% of the risk 
assessments.  
 
Asset type  
Percentage of all incidents between 2004 and 
2006 involving the specified asset type 
Catchment/IRE 2.7% 
BH - Pump/motor/valve 0.7% 
WTW - Structure 0.0% 
WTW - Process 7.5% 
WTW - Pump/motor/valve 1.4% 
WTW - Chemical treatment equipment 14.3% 
SRE  - Structure 2.7% 
SRE - Pump/motor/valve 1.4% 
WPS - Pump/motor/valve 1.4% 
Trunk mains - SRE/WPS/WT 4.8% 
Trunk mains - Distribution 8.8% 
Water mains - Distribution 33.3% 
Distribution- Pump/motor/valve 0.0% 
Power - Supply/generation 10.2% 
Power - UPS failure 4.8% 
IT - Monitoring/control/telemetry 6.1% 
Table 52 Previous incidents per asset type 
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The introduction of Weibull distributions for asset failures and risk assessment models 
for distribution networks has significantly contributed to the availability of probability 
data. According to the official guidance note on risk assessments: “In terms of quantity 
of data, the appropriate degree of resolution is of significance and much consideration 
has been placed on what asset level gives sufficient resolution for consistency with 
project delivery, at the same time as not overloading the asset management processes.” 
The organisation has selected the ‘element component’ level as the general level for risk 
assessments. The asset hierarchy for a water treatment works as an example is depicted 
in Table 53.  
 
Site Installation Process 
Group 
Process Element Element 
Component 
Name WTW Primary 
Treatment 
Filtration Building Component 1 
Component 2     Civil 
Structure Component 3 
Component 4     M & E 
Component 5 
    Process Component 6 
Table 53 Asset hierarchy used in risk assessments 
 
From a theoretical perspective the number of possible risk assessments for the entire 
regional water system was determined if this policy is fully implemented. In Table 54, it 
is estimated that the total number of possible risk assessments at component level may 
raise to ca. 770,000 risk assessments at component level for water supply assets. All 
anticipated combinations of cause and effect relationships (Table 50) are considered for 
each component in the water supply system. However, this number does not yet include 
risks assessments for the 32,000 km of water mains in the distribution network. In 
comparison, the organisation has ca. 86,000 risk assessments logged on their database 
for water and wastewater assets. These risk assessments include above and below 
ground assets and, hence, incorporate assessments for the distribution network. From a 
theoretical perspective, a major discrepancy between actual and potential risk 
assessments arises from the data.  
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Asset type Number 
of 
assets 
Typical 
number of 
element 
components 
Number of 
possible 
risk 
causes 
Number of 
possible 
risk effect 
Risk 
assessment 
per site 
 
Total number of 
risk 
assessments at 
element 
component level 
Impounding 
Reservoirs 
147 35 11 6 282 41,454 
River Intake 5 7 13 6 114 570 
Borehole 20 7 15 6 114 2,880 
Water 
Treatment 
Works 
86 700 17 4 4,278 367,908 
Water 
Pumping 
Station 
300 16 12 4 150 45,000 
Service 
Reservoirs 
650 70 17 5 480 312,000 
Total  1,208 115,820    769,812 
Table 54 Theoretical number of risk assessments 
 
From a practical perspective, it is unlikely that the organisation will ever assess 
perceivable 770,000 risks for above ground assets at ‘element component’ level. Means 
of prioritisation are required to guide the risk assessor to assess risks of importance or 
criticality. The discrepancy between the number of risk assessments and the total 
number of possible assessments indicate a problem of consistency in assessing risks.  
The following Table 55 shows the average number of (current) risk assessments per 
asset and per component. It shows the average number of risk assessment per asset and 
per component varies significantly between different asset types and highlights the 
inconsistent application of the risk assessment procedure across the asset base. For 
example, boreholes are recorded to have an average of 2 risk assessments per 
component whereas water treatment works have only 0.1 risk assessments per 
component. 
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Asset type Borehole River 
Impounding 
reservoir 
Water 
treatment 
works 
Service 
reservoir 
Water 
pumping 
station DMA 
Number of risk 
assessments  1,174 9 2,383 4,201 1,039 2,133 14,696 
Number of 
assets  80 5 147 86 650 300 32,000 
Estimated 
number of 
components 7 7 35 700 70 16  
Average risk 
assessment per 
asset 14.7 1.8 16.2 48.9 2.0 7.1 0.5 
Average risk 
assessment per 
component 2.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.03 0.4 0.5 
Table 55 Current number of risk assessments per assets and component 
 
From an economic viewpoint, inconsistent numbers of risk assessments across the asset 
base distorts the true representation of actual risk in the asset decision-making process 
leading to higher assessed risks for assets with many risk assessments. On the other 
hand, assets with low numbers of risk assessments are evaluated with a comparatively 
lower risk. The decision-making process requires an optimal number of risk 
assessments whilst considering the cost and benefit of deriving risk assessments. The 
value of increased numbers of risk assessments for asset decision making has to balance 
with the organisational cost to identify, assess and process risk assessments. According 
to one interviewee (participant no. 34), this presents an enormous problem to the 
organisation. Currently, there is no clear definition for the number of risk assessments 
to be conducted whilst the asset failure predictor (Weibull) generates more and more 
asset failure predictions that are not linked to customer impacts. Furthermore, some 
asset engineers have figured out that increasing the numbers of risk assessments for one 
asset increases the benefit of a solution aimed to reduce risk (e.g. boreholes). Hence, 
with increasing benefit the chance of implementing an engineering solution rises. If 
asset engineers have incentives built into their salary or receive annual boni on 
performance of their assets or dread being associated to failed assets, the assessment of 
multiple risks per asset will increase the cash spending and, hence asset performance. 
On the other hand, one interviewee reported that there are also discouraging elements in 
the risk management process. As mentioned before, the organisation only makes 
investment and maintenance resources available for high risks. One risk assessor 
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reported (participant no.29): “I might do a risk assessment but I know it won’t come out 
as a red (high) risk. I already know that no cash is going to be allocated towards my 
asset. Why would you do a risk assessment if your asset comes out as amber [medium] 
risk? Where is the point of doing the assessment?” 
 
In this section it was found that discrepancies exist between risk assessments and past 
incidents but also between the theoretical and actual number of risk assessments.  
 
Not only the quantity of risk assessments per asset distorts the asset decision making 
process but also the quality of risk assessments. In turn, the perceived causes, effect, 
probabilities and impacts of assessed risks in the risk database are reported.  
4.4.2.4 The cause and effect relationships assessed in risk assessments on the risk 
database  
During the characterisation of the 145 incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2006, 
the risk database was searched for risk assessments that predicted the particular 
incidents to occur. For the purpose of this assessment, only the primary incident causes 
and primary incident impact categories were considered. It was identified that 44% of 
the assets involved in the incident had been previously assessed for the incident-specific 
type of failure scenario. The remainder of assets had no risk assessment filed for the 
particular failure scenario at this asset.  
In the following analysis, the cause and effect relationships assessed by risk assessors 
are reported. These risk assessments indicate how risk assessors perceive incidents to 
unfold. In Figure 44, risk assessors identified those assets that were perceived to cause a 
water quality incident. Figure 44 is based on 4,912 risk assessments. 
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Figure 44 Identified assets attributed to water quality risks  
 
In comparison, 93 out of 426 incidents that occurred between 1997 and 2006 were 
water quality incidents. The asset types that caused this incident are presented in Table 
56. 52.6% of incidents were related to water treatment works, yet, only 11.9% of risk 
assessments were filed for this type asset. Distribution management areas caused 34.4% 
of all water quality incidents in that time period. In comparison, 49.8% of risk 
assessment relate to this asset type. Service reservoirs are also overrepresented in risk 
assessments in comparison to actual incident caused by that asset type.  
 
Asset type Percentage 
Water treatment works 52.6% 
Distribution Management Area 34.4% 
Service reservoir 5.4% 
Borehole 2.2% 
Water tower 1.0% 
River 1.0% 
Unknown 3.2% 
Table 56 Asset types that caused water quality incidents 
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In Figure 45, the perceived causes for water quality incidents in the risk database are 
identified.  
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Figure 45 Perceived causes for water quality risks in risk assessments 
 
The identified causes for water quality incidents between 1997 and 2006 are presented 
in Table 57. 19.3% of all incidents were attributed to chlorination failures which could 
be regarded as mechanical failure of equipment. Risk assessors only identified 12.1% of 
all perceived future incidents to be caused by mechanical and electrical failures. This 
figure, however, includes all mechanical equipment across all assets, whereas 
chlorination failures commonly affect water treatment works only. The majority of risk 
assessments state a lack in ‘fitness for purpose’ as the main cause for water quality 
incidents. This category is a generic description for various failure causes.  
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Incident cause Percentage 
Chlorination failure 19.3 % 
Asset contamination 13.9 % 
Asset failure 12.9% 
Asset maintenance  11.8% 
Power failure 2.0% 
Adverse weather 2.0% 
Monitoring and control failure 2.0% 
Unknown 18.3% 
Table 57 Causes for past water quality incidents between 1997 and 2006 
 
A total of 2,835 risk assessments were conducted for water discolouration. Of these, 
94% were assessed for distribution management areas. The remainder were conducted 
for water treatment works (0.5%), Service reservoir (0.2%), water towers (0.2%), and 
impounding reservoirs (0.04%). 4.8% of the risk assessments did not specify an asset.  
In comparison, 115 out of 426 incidents that occurred between 1997 and 2006 were 
discolouration incidents. The majority of these incidents (74.7%) were associated to the 
distribution management areas, 12.2% to water treatment works and 13% to water 
towers, service reservoirs and water pumping stations. It can be identified that risk 
assessments for distribution management areas disproportionately dominate the risk 
database, whereas discolouration risk for water treatment works are underrepresented.  
The perceived causes for discolouration incidents in the risk assessments were 
identified as lack of ‘fitness for purpose’ (93.3%), water mains failure (3.3%) and 
hydraulic effects (2.3%). In comparison, the identified causes for discolouration 
incidents between 1997 and 2006 are identified in Table 58. 
 
Incident cause Percentage 
Burst main / reactive maintenance  52.2 % 
Operational intervention 14.8 % 
Asset failure 4.3% 
Treatment process failure 4.3% 
3rd party intervention  3.5% 
Power failure 3.5% 
3rd party impact/damage 2.6 % 
Unknown 14.8% 
Table 58 Causes for past discolouration incidents between 1997 and 2006 
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A total of 7,078 risk assessments were conducted for ‘interruption to supply’. In Figure 
46, risk assessors identified those assets that were perceived to cause an ‘interruption to 
supply’ incident.  
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Figure 46 Identified assets attributed to ‘loss of supply’ incidents 
 
In comparison, 121 out of 426 incidents that occurred between 1997 and 2006 were loss 
of supply incidents. The asset type that caused this incident is presented in Table 59.  
 
Asset type Percentage 
Distribution Management Area 59.5% 
Water pumping stations 11.6% 
Water treatment works 10.7% 
Service reservoirs 10.7% 
Power failure 3.3% 
Water Tower 1.6% 
Table 59 Assets types that caused 'loss of supply' incidents between 1997 and 2006 
 
Lastly, the perceived causes for interruption to supply incidents in the risk assessments 
were identified as water mains failure (40.1%), mechanical and electrical failure 
(30.4%), civil failure (14.0%), ‘fitness for purpose’ (6.9%), asset failure (2.8%) and 
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power failures with 1.1%. In comparison, the identified causes for interruption to supply 
incidents between 1997 and 2006 are identified as burst main and reactive maintenance 
(71.0%), asset failure (9.9%) and operational intervention (2.5%). Again, major 
discrepancies between perceived risk and actual experience can be identified in 
comparing the risk assessments with past incident data.  
4.4.2.5 Probability and outage assessments on the risk database  
In the following analysis the accuracy of the probability assessments on the risk 
database were evaluated. For this purpose, the structured incident assessment tool that 
was used to characterise the 145 incidents between 2004 and 2006 had a feature that 
multiplied the previously assessed probability of failure or incident frequency with the 
actual outage of that asset due to a failure. This figure represents the anticipated non-
availability of an asset to provide service. The calculated factor for anticipated non-
availability of an asset was compared to the actual asset outage during the incident. 
From this comparison, it was found that only 10 (15.9% of the available risk 
assessments) risk assessments accurately predicted the non-availability of the asset due 
to an incident. 53 risk assessments (84.1%) were deemed to underestimate the non-
availability of the asset due to an incident.  
From another perspective, the probability of asset failure in the risk assessments were 
converted into a frequency using Equation 9. 
 
F = 
P
%100
 
 with 
 F = frequency as 1 in X years 
 P = probability [in %] to fail per year 
Equation 9 Probability frequency relationship 
 
The obtained frequency was used to search the incident database for re-occurrence of 
asset failures for specific assets to cause an incident. This analysis presented a serious 
challenge, in particular for low probability assessments. A probability of 5% equates to 
a failure return period of 1 in 20 years and exceeds the time length of the incident 
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database. Furthermore, an asset failure may not have resulted in an incident and the re-
occurrence of a water mains failure may not have been recorded on the incident 
database.  This is particularly relevant for below ground assets such as water mains. 
Despite these constraints, it was found that probability assessments were more accurate 
than previously anticipated. The probability assessments for water mains failures were 
ca. 60% accurate, i.e. the probability assessments converted into burst frequencies 
resembled the actual return period for specific main failures. For water mains, this can 
be explained by the derivation of probability assessments. Here, network models use 
previous burst data in multi-regression analyses that correlate age, soil properties and 
asset condition to compute the probability of future failure.  
4.4.2.6 Incident impact assessments for risks on the risk database  
In the following analysis, the impact of future, perceived incidents in risk assessments 
as perceived by risk assessors is compared to the actual impact of previously 
experienced incidents. For this purpose, all incident impacts in the risk assessments of 
the Regional Water Utility were converted to match the impact assessment previously 
used to assess the impact of incidents (chapter 2). In this process, data on hazard type 
and affected population were readily available in the risk assessments of the 
organisation. However, the anticipated duration for an incident does not feature in the 
current format of risk assessments. Hence, a duration of 28 hours for hazard exposure 
relating to water quality incidents was assumed. This was estimated from the average 
water quality incident duration between 1997 and 2006. Here, the average is 27.7 hours 
and the maximum confidence interval at 95% is 32.1 hours. For discolouration events, a 
duration of 13 hours for hazard exposure relating to discoloured water was assumed. 
This was estimated from the average discolouration incident duration between 1997 and 
2006. Here, the average is 13.4 hours and the maximum confidence interval at 95% is 
14.7 hours. 
The converted risk assessments and the previously experienced incidents that occurred 
between 1997 and 2006 were plotted into a probability – impact matrix. The previously 
experienced incidents were plotted at 100% probability (representing a realised risk). 
Figure 47 shows the anticipated impacts for water quality risks in the risk database and 
the impacts of past water quality incidents, respectively.  
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Figure 47 Comparison between incident impacts and risk impact assessments for water quality 
 
In Table 60, a significance test formally compares both datasets. It can be identified that 
the risk assessments significantly over-evaluate the impact of water quality risks in 
comparison to previously experienced water quality incidents and it is believed that risk 
assessors have not considered the effect of incident impact reduction via the capability 
of the incident management team and the use of redundancy.  
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Risk statistics 
(A) 
Hazard 
score (H) Population 
Population 
score (P) 
Duration 
score (D) 
Severity 
score (I) 
      
Count  4900 4912 4901 4912 4912 
Av 38.6 22205.7 10.0 8.0 18.6 
SD 30.7 102841.8 29.7 0.0 15.5 
SE 0.4 1467.4 0.4 0.0 0.2 
CI 95 % lower 37.7 19329.6 9.2 8.0 18.2 
CI 95% upper 39.5 25081.7 10.8 8.0 19.1 
 
     
 
     
Incident statistics (B) 
    
All years H Pop P D Sum 
No  82 82 82 82 82 
Average 27.8 6293.9 4.1 8.0 13.3 
SD 24.8 37575.5 14.0 10.6 10.7 
SE 2.7 4149.5 1.5 1.2 1.2 
CI 95 % lower 22.4 -1839.2 1.1 5.7 10.9 
CI 95 % upper 33.1 14426.9 7.1 10.3 15.6 
 
     
Significance 
testing 
     
Mean A - Mean B 10.8 15911.8 5.9 0.1 5.4 
Var A + Var B 7.7 19371725.3 2.6 1.4 1.5 
SE (A,B) 2.8 4401.3 1.6 1.2 1.2 
CI 95% lower -5.4 -8582.6 -3.1 -2.3 -2.4 
CI 95% upper 5.4 8626.6 3.1 2.3 2.4 
Test result A>>B A>>B A>>B A=B A>>B 
Table 60 Significance test comparing incident impacts and risk impacts for water quality 
 
Figure 48 shows the impacts for discolouration risks in the risk database and past 
incident impacts, respectively.  
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Figure 48 Comparison between incident impacts and risk impact assessments for discolouration 
 
In Table 61, a significance test formally compared both datasets. It can be identified that 
the risk assessments significantly under-rate the impact of discolouration risks in 
comparison to previously experienced discolouration incidents.  
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Risk assessments 
for discolouration (A) 
Hazard 
score (H) Population 
Population 
score (P) 
Duration 
score (D) 
Severity 
score (I) 
Count 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835 
Av 11.5 1544.0 2.5 4.0 7.3 
SD 7.4 20500.8 7.0 0.0 3.6 
SE 0.1 385.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
CI 95% lower 11.2 789.3 2.2 4.0 7.1 
CI 95% upper 11.8 2298.6 2.7 4.0 7.4 
 
     
Incidents affecting 
aesthetics (B) 
     
All years H Pop P D Sum 
No  131 131 131 131 131 
Average 32 7508.7 4.1 4.2 13.4 
SD 0 15272.9 7.1 3.9 2.8 
SE 0 1334.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 
CI 95% lower 32 4893.3 2.9 3.5 12.9 
CI 95% upper 32 10124.1 5.3 4.8 13.9 
 
     
Significance testing 
     
Mean A - Mean B -20.5 -5964.7 -1.6 -0.2 -6.2 
Var A + Var B 0.02 1928858.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 
SE (A,B) 0.14 1388.83 0.63 0.34 0.25 
CI 95% lower -0.27 -2722.11 -1.24 -0.83 -0.49 
CI 95% upper 0.27 2722.11 1.24 0.83 0.49 
Test result B>>A B>>A B>>A A=B B>>A 
Table 61 Significance test comparing incident impacts and risk impacts for discolouration 
 
Finally, Figure 49 shows the risk assessments and impacts for loss of supply risks and 
past incident impacts in that category, respectively.  
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Figure 49 Comparison between incident impacts and risk impact assessments for 'loss of supply' 
 
In Table 62, a significance test formally compared both datasets. It can be identified that 
the risk assessments and incident impacts are not significantly different at the 
significance level of 5%  
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Risk statistics (A) Population Duration 
Population 
score (P) 
Hazard 
score (H) 
Duration 
score (D) 
Severity 
score (I) 
Count  7056  7055 7056 7056 7056 
Av 21475  8.2 16 4.6 9.5 
SD 151863.4  39.7 0.0 2.9 13.3 
SE 1807.9  0.5 0.0 0.03 0.2 
CI 95% lower 17932.1  7.3 16 4.5 9.2 
CI 95% upper 25019.1  9.16 16 4.6 9.8 
 
      
Incidents Loss of 
supply (B) 
      
 Pop Dur P H D Sum 
No  127 127 127 127 127 127 
Average 77583.0 14.7 10.8 16 4.4 10.4 
SD 584395.6 19.0 62.2 0.0 6.2 21.1 
SE 51856.7 1.7 5.5 0 0.6 1.9 
CI 95% lower -24056.2 11.4 -0.02 16 3.4 6.7 
CI 95% upper 179222.1 18.0 21.6 16 5.5 14.1 
 
      
Significance 
testing 
      
Mean A - Mean B -56107.4 -14.7 -2.6 0 0.1 -0.9 
Var A + Var B 2692388710.1 2.9 30.7 0 0.3 3.5 
SE (A,B) 51888.2 1.7 5.5 0 0.6 1.9 
CI 95% lower -101700.9 -3.3 -10.9 0 -1.1 -3.7 
CI 95% upper 101700.9 3.3 10.9 0 1.1 3.7 
Test result A=B N/A A=B A=B A=B A=B 
Table 62 Significance test comparing incident impacts and risk impacts for 'loss of supply' 
 
In conclusion, it was found that the anticipated impact of future incidents relating to 
water quality and discolouration varies significantly from past experience and it was 
demonstrated how incident data from past incidents could be used to benchmark risk 
assessments that anticipate future incidents. Although a methodological problem arises 
in comparing past events with future event, significant differences were evident. The 
methodology assumes that future risks mirror past incidents although demographic, 
socio-technical and socio-economic developments, technological advancements, 
investment and maintenance in assets and changes in the operations and asset 
management philosophies and procedures change the nature and character of a water 
utility. Despite this limitation, it was previously argued that the slow clock-speed of 
physical water utility assets allows some comparison between future risks and past 
incidents.  
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In the next section, the risk perceptions that risk assessors have when evaluating risks 
was further explored. It was aimed to identify how consistent risk assessments are 
conducted by a number of people for an identical asset.  
4.4.2.7 Risk perception in risk assessments 
In this experiment, six risk assessors evaluated a water main for its probability to have 
adverse impacts on customers. The participants used the risk assessment procedure 
prescribed by the Regional Water Utility.  
Across the six obtained risk assessments, evidence was found for inconsistencies in the 
assessment of risk. A varying range of risk assessments had been constructed to assess 
the probable consequences of perceived failure scenarios for that specific asset. A 
number of risk assessments were constructed identifying one cause and effect 
relationship. Others used multiple cause and effect relationships to assess the overall 
risk for that asset. In some cases, confusion was identified regarding the definitions of 
severity categories: One example is ‘leakage’ and ‘loss of supply’. The definition for 
leakage anticipates continuous leakage rather than being instantaneous due to a water 
main burst. Both indicators have been used to assess the impact of a water mains burst. 
It was also observed that some risk assessors only derived the probability of the asset to 
fail but not the probability of this asset failure to have an impact on customers.  
From this experiment it was concluded that biases and ambiguities in the methodology 
are evident that can lead to inaccurancies and inconsistencies in risk assessments. A 
more detailed analysis of this experiment can be found in the Appendix 5.1. 
 
Staff in the Regional Water Utility acknowledged that inconsistencies can arise in the 
risk assessments and a number of strategies have been adopted to enhance personnel’s 
perception and understanding of risk.  
One strategy pursued by the organisation to enhance the quality of risk assessments is 
risk training. This was previously introduced in the preceding chapter. The organisation 
planned and implemented a staff development programme specifically for risk 
appreciation. Risk training not only explores the economic-rational perspective on risk 
used for decision making in the organisation but also (participant no.25) “re-frames 
psychological and social construction and understandings of the organisational risk 
concept”. It is aware that risk assessors have their own understandings and knowledge 
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of risk and the training is aimed to reduce the deviation in quality of risk assessments 
with a view to enhance of consistency in investment and maintenance decision-making. 
Furthermore, the asset and operations management teams organise regular joint 
meetings to discuss operational issues which may have implications for asset design and 
maintenance. These meetings are aimed to provide an information exchange between 
asset engineers, operators, operations managers and general managers aiming to 
disseminate the organisational understanding of risk and best practice in risk assessment 
and management techniques.  
 
In the previous chapter, it was found that learning from failures provides one form of 
‘reframing’ risk perceptions and failures, near misses and mistakes provide 
opportunities to learn via incident analysis and disseminating findings into the wider 
business.  Whenever information on failures, near misses and mistakes become 
available, they can provide an opportunity to review assets, processes and effectiveness 
of operations and asset management. Learning from failure requires skills to identify 
multi-causalities and interdependencies in the build up and during the incidents. 
Complex cause and effect relationships can be disguised by an array of contributing 
factors and circumstances. Appropriate learning models are required to investigate 
incidents – a number have been used to structure the analysis of incidents in chapter 2. 
In the literature, it was found that scientists used different ‘heuristic’ models to reduce 
and interpret complex incident circumstances into more understandable scenarios. 
Similarly, risk assessment models also use simplified cause and effect relationships to 
assess the probability and impact of adversity on a defined objective. Embedded within 
a system wide framework, only systematic and consistent risk assessments provide a 
basis for effective operations, investment and maintenance decision making. In the 
Regional Water Utility, it was found that learning from incidents is limited to the direct 
actions that were identified after individual incidents. In the previous sections it was 
demonstrated how water utilities can validate their risk models and verify the data using 
a meta-process of statistical analysis of all incidents experienced in their company. 
 
In the above analyses and experiment, it was identified that the assessments of 
probability and impact of perceived, future incident can significantly vary. In the next 
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section, the existing risk assessment process and procedure is further analysed from a 
business process perspective.  
4.4.2.8 A business process review of the risk assessment model 
As an evaluative tool to review the risk assessment and management model, the 
Johnston and Clark (2005) matrix was adapted that has been proposed to characterise 
processes in operations management. It maps out process definition, process variation 
against economies of scale and volume of processes. The four corners of the matrix 
were defined as capability, consistency, complexity and simplicity. In Johnston and 
Clark (2005) it was suggested that only the axis between capability and consistency are 
viable for effective organisational processes. On this axis, ‘decision context types’ were 
introduced (Figure 50).  
 
 
Figure 50 Process characterisation for risk assessments 
 
The design of the risk assessment model adopted in the Regional Water Utility can be 
characterised for decision context type C. A significant number of highly variable 
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processes were used to forge a capable and competent approach to risk management. A 
significant number of mathematical, economic and technical considerations were 
identified and selected to provide a system which is capable to process risk assessment 
data in a cost benefit trade-off.  During the design phase of the model, processes were 
hardly defined and relied on the expertise of professional risk managers, 
mathematicians, economic analysts and business managers. An information system was 
designed to log risks on a risk database. The model had to be capable to process high 
volumes of data since the database also houses risk data derived in statistical analyses 
on distribution network assets. The risk assessment model was implemented in a top 
down approach. 
During the design phase, it was considered that the operation and use of the model is 
highly decentralised with data input interfaces for field asset engineers and asset 
managers cum risk assessors who report and file risks bottom up from asset level to a 
strategic asset management level. One concern in a decentralised risk assessment 
system and database is the consistency in captured data, if data acquisition and data 
recording is not highly defined and controlled. It had to be considered that the model 
user requires high process definition with low process variation to consistently process 
large numbers of asset risk assessments. The model user requires an interface with the 
model which is characteristic for decision context type A. Hence, the user interface 
requires high process definition and a low variety of processes to conduct in identifying 
and assessing risk. Currently, the user interface is semi-structured to guide the risk 
assessor in providing reasonably accurate and consistent risk assessments. 
Although risk assessments have to be conducted following a guided structure, 
inconsistencies in the number of risk assessments per asset arise and the quality of these 
assessments can significantly vary. For this reason, the strategic asset management 
group introduced a ‘quality assurance’ system for the data stored in the database. 
“Company experts review the assessment of risks and solutions to ensure that processes 
and procedures have been followed in line with technical approach guidance issued to 
the asset management teams. (participant no.28)”. Currently, the risk assessment 
process relies on the competency, skills and experience of asset managers and asset 
engineers to identify and evaluate risks accurately. Deviations from accurate and 
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consistent risks reported on the risk database are reactively sought out with quality 
assurance procedures.  
A first-time-right approach to enhance the quality of primary risk data is to provide a 
highly structured risk assessment procedure that removes process variations and 
increases the process definition for risk assessments. During the assessment of incidents 
between 2004 and 2006, an inductive incident investigation methodology was 
developed to characterise incidents. In analogy to this incident assessment model, a 
structured risk assessment methodology was developed that better resembles the causes, 
effects, probabilities and consequences of future incidents. A structured root cause 
analysis and effect analysis was developed to characterise the impact on customers. The 
root cause analysis for future perceived incidents allows the risk assessor to identify a 
number of incident causes, as opposed to the current model. They range from asset 
failures and process failures to human error. The risk model allows the user to identify 
multiple impacts of incidents. E.g., a burst main can be assessed to cause ‘loss of 
supply’ for one group of customers, ‘low pressure’ and ‘discolouration’ for others. The 
model incorporates the current two-stage probability assessment for asset failure 
probability at asset component level and customer impact probability, whilst explicitly 
considering asset and systems redundancies that reduce probabilities of impact on 
customers. 
In the current risk assessment model, the probability is defined as “the occurrence of at 
least one service failure within the next year (participant no.25)”. If a service failure is 
guaranteed to occur within the next year, the probability is 100%. If that service failure 
is perceived to occur more than once, e.g. 4 main bursts, within the next year, the 
probability is still only 100%. As a result, the new probability assessment was extended 
to allow the assessment of frequency of failure. In addition, the new methodology 
considers the outage of an asset due to failure, since considering the outage of an asset 
further prioritises the risk. For example, a water mains failure can be fixed within 12 
hours. However, the structural failure of a rapid gravity filter will take months to 
replace. Considering the outage of an asset does not necessarily correspond to the 
hazard exposure of the population because the incident management team can use 
system redundancy to reduce the impact of an asset failure on customers. This is also 
accounted for in the new model. Finally, the model incorporates the current severity 
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assessments whilst using hazard type, size of population and duration of perceived 
future incidents as weighting factor. This is shown in Table 63 
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Estimate 
frequency 
of hazard 
Estimate magnitude of hazard  Estimate 
duration 
of 
hazard 
 Estimate 
no. of 
customers 
affected 
by hazard 
 
Score 
(F) 
Hazard type 
 
Score 
(H) 
Duration 
in days 
Score 
(D) 
Customers Score 
(P) 
1 in X yrs Aesthetics above guidelines, 
>200ug/l Iron or DWI reportable 
incident. Highly discoloured, 
resembles beer or Guinness 
32 < 0.5 2 0 – 7,500 2 
 Aesthetics, >150 ug/l or notable 
events. Opaque and discoloured 
resembles weak milky tea. 
24 0.5 – 1 4 7,500 – 
15,000 
4 
 Aesthetics, 100-150ug/l Iron or 
minor events. Translucent and 
discoloured resembles orange 
juice or lager. 
16 1 – 2 8 15,000 – 
30000 
8 
 Aesthetics, 50-100 ug/l Iron and no 
events. Particulate material visible 
in clear water 
8 2 – 4 16 30,000 – 
60,000 
16 
 Aesthetics, < 50ug/l Iron and no 
events - Slight discolouration 
noticed in customer bath, 
Compliance but customer 
complaint 
0 4 – 8 32 60,000 – 
120,000 
32 
 Unwholesome, potential health 
effects 
48 8 – 16 64 120,000 – 
250,000 
64 
 Chemicals present above 
guidelines, Trivial sample failure 
8 16 – 32 125 250,000 – 
500,000 
125 
 Chemicals present above 
guidelines, health effects 
envisaged, PCV failure leading to 
an undertaking 
32 32 - 64 250 500,000 – 
1,000000 
250 
 Potential biological pathogens 
present 
6 64 – 128 500 > 
1,000,000 
500 
 Potential biological pathogens 
present, health effects envisaged 
48 > 128 1000   
 Biological pathogens present, 
Trivial sample failure 
8     
 Biological pathogens present, PCV 
failure leading to an undertaking 
32     
 Biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged, Boil order 
as risk of illness through drinking 
water 
64     
 Biological pathogens present, 
Public health effect. Illness through 
drinking water 
125     
 Loss of supply, potential 
contaminant ingress 
16     
X in 1 yr       
Table 63 Enhanced risk impact assessment model 
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In the assessment of incidents, a simpler version of Table 63 was used and a re-
evaluation of the hazard scores, population scores and duration scores may be required 
to reflect customer or public health specialist priorities for water safety and reliability. 
The proposed enhanced risk assessment model was presented to the Strategic Asset 
Management Department in the Regional Water Utility. A number of considerations are 
required to evaluate the benefit and costs of implementing and operating the new model. 
Firstly, the current risk model already houses ca. 86,000 risk assessments. Their risk 
impact assessments need to be re-configured and incorporated into the new model. 
Secondly, the new model captures significantly more data; hence, the risk assessor 
requires more time to perform risk assessments. In light of some interviewee comments 
about the user-ability of the existing model, this may be a major obstacle. Thirdly, the 
new model has significantly more structure and could be perceived to be inflexible to 
adapt for novel risks or future business requirements. A major advantage of the model is 
its enhanced reflection of real incidents as they previously occurred. According to a 
number of risk assessors, the old model is perceived to be too abstract and the severity 
categories were designed on the back of regulatory performance measures but do not 
reflect how water incidents in reality unfold.  
 
4.5 Summary 
HROs have been described to maintain existing technology at exceptionally high 
standards and there is zero tolerance of defective, substandard or malfunctioning 
equipment (Roberts, 1990b). The Regional Water Utility does not maintain its system to 
highest standard but takes a more differentiated, risk-based view in resource allocation 
in line with the ‘Common Maintenance Framework’ (UK Water Industry Research 
Limited, 2002). In this point, the Regional Water Utility significantly differs from the 
theory of HROs. Maintenance decisions are based on risk assessments and a trade-off 
between cost of maintenance and perceived, monetary value of risk reduction. The 
organisation provides monetary resources for maintenance in circumstances where the 
monetary value of risk reduction (benefit) exceeds the monetary requirements for 
maintenance, if that risk is classed as a high risk. This process heavily relies on accurate 
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and consistent risk assessments - accurate, for a ‘true’ representation of ‘real’ risks, and 
consistent, for company-wide, comparative assessments.  
In the outset of this chapter, it was suggested that previously experienced incidents 
provide learning opportunities to anticipate future risk and to enhance risk assessment 
processes. It was identified that incident review data provide a means of learning to 
anticipate future incidents and risks. A business process is in place that creates actions 
for staff to review assets, procedures and policies as well as operator behavior. These 
learnings are based on individual incidents but little evidence was found that the 
Regional Water Utility uses the incident database for structured analysis of incidents. 
One exception is the structured data analysis for water main bursts. The high frequency 
of distribution asset failures enables a multi-regression analysis that correlates water 
main age, condition, material and soil condition with burst data. In computer models, 
probabilities for water mains failure are derived and various customer impacts 
determined. These customer impacts are ‘loss of supply’, ‘low pressure’ and 
‘discolouration’. Increasingly, Weibull functions are used to determine the failure 
probability of asset components. The determinants for the Weibull functions are often 
based on professional judgment and the expected asset life.  
This chapter was designed to identify learning opportunities from incident analyses to 
enhance risk assessments that are subsequently used for asset investment and 
maintenance decision making in asset management. With a major emphasis on risk in 
decision making, the quality of risk assessments was investigated and various 
methodologies to enhance risk assessments suggested. A particular emphasis was 
placed on learning from failure to enhance risk assessments and a methodology was 
introduced to validate the risk model and verify risk data. Significant inconsistencies in 
the quality of risk data were identified when comparing risk assessments in the risk 
database with past incidents. These inconsistencies relate to the number of risk 
assessments conducted for water supply assets but also to the cause and effect 
relationships for perceived, future incidents and their impact on customers. Unless the 
actual risk profile has significantly changed, there is little rational explanation for these 
discrepancies. It is believed that the current risk assessments reflect the psychological 
and sociological perceptions of risk rather than a rational explanation. Based on the 
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review of incidents in Chapter 2 an enhanced risk assessment methodology was 
introduced which aims to enhance the quality and consistency of risk assessments.  
 
In Johnson’s (1992) web of organisational culture (Figure 51), the main findings of this 
chapter describing an effective organisational risk management culture are summarised.  
 
 
Figure 51 A cultural web for risk-based asset management 
 
So far, the author was unable explain why incidents happen. It was found that risk based 
decision making uses cost benefit analysis to compare the benefit, i.e. perceived value 
of risk reduction, to the cost of reducing risk. One possible explanation is that the 
benefit of risk reduction is insufficiently valued to deem risk reductions economically 
viable. Different strategies have been adopted by water utilities to assess the benefit of 
risk reduction. In the Common Maintenance Framework, the concept of ‘willingness to 
pay’ has been proposed to evaluate the benefit of risk reduction and the Regional Water 
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Utility has adopted this approach for non-market valuation of benefits (Bateman et al., 
2002). Other water utilities consider their internal benefit from reducing the frequency 
and impact of incident. Here, the opportunity cost, i.e. the costs avoided that would be 
incurred by an incident, defines the benefit of risk reduction (Lifton and Smeaton, 2003; 
Lifton, 2005). The following chapter investigates the valuation of risk from a financial 
and customer perspective. Firstly, it is investigated how company share markets 
evaluate the business risks of privatised, stock-market listed water utilities. Secondly, it 
is investigated how customers perceive the value of risk.  
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5 The price of risk and incidents in the water sector  
5.1 Introduction 
In order to achieve the water sector’s objective (International Water Association, 2004), 
water utilities invest in capital assets that form a barrier between the source of hazards 
and the consumer. A number of these assets also introduce new hazards (e.g. chemicals) 
that require appropriate management. Failure to provide or maintain such assets may 
correspond with chronic exposure to hazard or incidents, respectively. From an 
economic perspective, the exposure to hazards, pathogens or incidents are consequential 
‘costs’ to society. The consequential ‘costs’ of a pathogen outbreak leading to disease in 
the population range from loss of life as moral cost, cost of hospitalisation, 
compensation, cost for law suits, criminal charges leading to imprisonment, fines, the 
impact on the economy such as health services, lost time (Hughes and Ferrett, 2003) 
and, finally, the costs for reinstating a safe drinking water supply. These are direct, 
often non-monetary costs to society and to a water utility. Two further perspectives for 
valuing public health risk can be considered: a financial perspective representing the 
owners of water utility assets and a customer perspective. These are considered in this 
chapter with the aim to explain why incidents still occur in highly developed water 
supply systems.  
This chapter evaluates business risks in the water sector from a stock market 
perspective and, secondly, public health risks from a customer perspective. The 
objective of this chapter is to investigate the prevalence of incidents from a financial 
and customer perspective on the ‘price’ of risk and the benefit arising to customers from 
reducing the frequency or probability of incidents.   
 
5.2 Theoretical development 
5.2.1 Water utility business risk 
From a financial perspective, a firm aims to maximise the value of a business (Bonart 
and Peters, 1997; Myddelton, 2000) for its shareholders. According to financial theory, 
the value of a business is reflected in the share price multiplied by the number of shares 
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issued to shareholders. The current value of a business represents the net present value 
(NPV) of anticipated, future cash flows. These cash flows incorporate future revenues 
and costs of the business. The financial evaluation of a business is conceptualised in 
Figure 52 (Myddelton, 2000).  
 
 
Figure 52 The value of capital assets 
 
Accordingly, in Figure 53, the deterministic method to evaluate a business or an asset is 
to discount future cash flows to NPV with an appropriate interest rate (Myddelton, 
2000). The relevant cash flows are shown in Figure 53. In order to determine the value 
of the equity in a business, company debts are deducted (Myddelton, 2000).  
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Figure 53 Cash flows for the derivation of the value of assets 
 
The interest rate used to discount future cash flows represents the cost of capital. They 
reflect shareholder expectations for economic returns (Myddelton, 2000) that can be 
explained with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or the Dividend Growth 
Model (DGM) (Myddelton, 2000). Both models use the underlying assumption that an 
investment generates shareholder wealth whilst taking “time preference, inflation and 
risk” into account (Myddelton, 2000). In the CAPM, risk is a measure of the volatility 
of a share’s return in dividends and capital gain and is measured as a beta factor 
(Myddelton, 2000) which is a retrospective measure of cash flow volatility or the 
volatility of the shareprice (representing the expected, future cashflows) in the past 60 
months (Myddelton, 2000). Cash flow volatilities arise from revenues and costs in a 
water utility and in this chapter the effect of incidents on cash flows are investigated.  
In the CAPM, the required return of a particular equity share has a definite relationship 
to the return of an investment in the market as a whole (Myddelton, 2000). Therefore, 
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the beta value is a measure for one stock in relation to the whole market (Vernimmen, 
2005). This methodology eliminates the systemic risk arising in the market and derives 
a representation for the risk of an individual company. The underlying calculation 
method for beta is a least square linear regression over a period of 5 years (60 months) 
using the monthly change in the share price for one stock J (stock return) plotted against 
the monthly change in the stock market index M (market return) (Datastream, 2005). 
The share price is regressed against the respective total market index using log changes 
of the closing price on the first day of each month (Datastream, 2005).  
Statistically, the beta of a stock J is defined as (Brealey et al., 2006) 
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Equation 10 The Definition of Beta 
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with 
rJ = expected future return of stock J 
rM = expected future return of the market M 
pi,k = probability of joint occurrence (correlation coefficient of returns)  
pi = probability of each of the possible return occurring 
Equation 11 Equity beta 
 
Beta corresponds to the slope of the regression of the stock J’s return with that of the 
market M. The resulting equity beta is a geared beta coefficient (Datastream, 2005) and 
relates to the cost of equity capital in a geared company using shareholder capital and 
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loans. Hence, the equity beta represents financial and business risk (Myddelton, 2000). 
The asset beta that only represents business risk is derived by extracting total debt 
figures from the company accounts (Datastream, 2005) to calculate the debt ratio (Reid 
and Myddelton, 2000). The relationship between asset beta, equity beta and the dept 
ratio is shown in Equation 12. 
( )DE
E
EA +
= ββ  or )1(*
A
L
EA −= ββ  
with 
βA = Asset beta 
βB = Equity beta 
E = market value (equity) 
D = Total debt 
L = Long-term liabilities 
A = Total assets less current liabilities 
Equation 12 Asset beta 
 
As a result, the asset beta is obtained that reflects the expected future volatility of cash 
flows based on retrospective analysis of shareprices in a water utility.  
Based on previous incident analyses of incidents reported to the DWI (Drinking Water 
Inspectorate, 2005b; Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2006; Drinking Water Inspectorate, 
2007), it is investigated how incident in water utilities affect the stock market evaluation 
of asset risks, i.e. the volatility of their cash flows.  
 
5.2.2 Customer risk evaluation 
In a further perspective, it is investigated how water utility customers evaluate risk. 
According to Abell (2005), the Regional Water Utility determined the “willingness to 
pay” (UK Water Industry Research Limited, 2002) for service enhancements, i.e. the 
reduction of risk. The methodology adopted for these studies originated from a 
guideline for non-market valuation (Bateman et al., 2002) that aims to generate 
estimates of customer benefit and preferences for different service attributes and their 
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associated risks. The Regional Water Utility conducted a three step choice experiment 
consisting of 
 a qualitative research phase to determine general priorities for service attributes; 
 a semi-quantitative research phase to evaluate the perceived customer benefit 
from different levels of services, i.e. from different levels of risk, and to identify 
customer priorities for risk reduction within the group of service attributes 
identified in the qualitative research phase; and 
 a quantitative data analysis to derive the optimal customer benefit expressed in 
the water price, and a calculation of the price or cost of risk based on the 
preferences expressed for risk reduction. 
 
According to the documentation of the organisation, “the qualitative phase consisted of 
8 focus groups to discuss service issues generally before focussing on the water services 
experienced.” Based on the customer surveys, the service areas or risk to service of 
importance to customers are indicated in the Table 64 below.  
 
Risks relating to water safety and supply reliability 
Inadequate Mains Pressure 
Interruption to Supply 
Security of Supply 
Drinking Water Quality (Biological/Chemical) 
Drinking Water Quality (Discolouration) 
Leakage 
Pollution 
Personal Injury 
Table 64 Service priority for customers 
 
The quantitative phase consisted of 1,500 face-to-face interviews aiming to cover 
representative samples of domestic and business customers. Each participant was 
offered a series of service attributes, each with a combination of decreasing, improving 
or stable levels of risk. These service attributes were ‘traded-off’ against potential 
impact on the water price.  
The derived function provides monetary values for changes in the level of service 
provided and changes in the probability and severity of service impacts are incorporated 
as weighting factors representing level of service changes. The monetary value for 
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benefits from risk reduction of an investment programme to the average customer is 
described by equations similar to the one below.  
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with 
 α = current water price  
j = service areas (e.g. water quality) 
 i = solutions (e.g. water quality improvement) 
 ∆R = Risk reduction due to changes in severity and probability  
 Q = quantity of service in m3 drinking water provided 
N = number of service measures represented in the WTP equation 
 M = total number of Solutions in the portfolio being evaluated 
Equation 13 Customer benefit equations derived from 'willingness to pay' studies 
 
The β and γ are coefficients that were derived for the perceived utility of customers for 
individual service attributes. As result, equations were derived that calculate the 
perceived customer benefit for risk reductions relating to water quality, loss of supply, 
low pressure and discolouration.  
In this chapter, a number of case studies are presented that demonstrate how the average 
customer values risk. The case studies also demonstrate how the risk may reduce after 
the implementation of a technical solution.  
 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Water utility business risk 
In the following study, the business or asset risk for five privatised, stock marked listed 
water companies in England and Wales was evaluated. Financial data provided by 
Datastream (Datastream, 2005) was used to calculate a time series of assets betas. The 
London Stock Exchange ‘FTSE All share’ is used as the reference market. The ‘FTSE 
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All share’ aggregates 803 shares listed from ten industry sectors and 39 sub-sectors 
(Myddelton, 2000).   
A Datastream software application was used to calculate a time series for equity beta 
between April 1995 (ca. 6 years after privatisation) and April 2005. In order to calculate 
the asset beta, the debt ratio published for all water companies in company accounts 
was used to calculate the asset betas. These are plotted as a time series and analysed.  
The analysis focuses on the volatility of cash flows that determine the market evaluation 
of asset beta. The findings are compared to the findings of the incident analysis from 
chapter 2.  
 
5.3.2 Customer risk evaluation 
From a customer perspective, a number of case studies were selected to demonstrate the 
willingness to pay of customer to reduce risk. In a number of cases, the cost benefit (i.e. 
risk reduction) of engineering schemes is used to show how the average customer 
valued the monetary benefit for those particular schemes. The case studies also reflect 
on the perceived risk reduction from a water utility perspective. The trade-off model in 
Equation 14 that describes the rate of technical substitution between risk (di2) and assets 
(di1) to be the negative ratio of their production input factor prices (pi1 and pi2) (Bonart 
and Peters, 1997) is used to calculate the cost benefit. In this trade-off model pi2 
represent the willingness to pay. The Regional Water Utility provided the benefit 
equations that were used for the numerical analyses.  
2
1
1
2
i
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p
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−=  
Equation 14 The optimal rate of technical substitution 
 
5.4 Results and Discussion of Results 
5.4.1 Water utility business risk 
Five time series of asset betas for stock-market listed companies were calculated. They 
are presented in Figure 54. A number of significant observations can be made. 
Throughout the time series for all water companies, the asset beta is generally below the 
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portfolio market risk with the asset beta < 1. Since 1998, the asset beta reduced 
considerably and stabilised at around an asset beta of zero. Since 2004, a marginally 
upward trend can be identified.  
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Figure 54 Time series (1995 – 2005) of asset beta for UK stockmarket listed water companies 
 
From an asset owner perspective, the above water utilities operated in a near-risk free 
business environment between 2000 and 2004 relative to the portfolio market. This can 
be largely explained with two major influences: Firstly, water companies in England 
and Wales have a reasonably steady and predictable inflow of cash in their revenues. 
The product ‘water’ follows a predictably steady demand pattern for which water 
companies charge customers periodically. Secondly, the water price is not subject to 
changes in demand and supply but rather capped by the industry regulator (Office of 
Water Services, 1993) who will periodically review the water prices for customers in 5 
year cycles. From an investor’s perspective, the main source of volatility in cash flow 
arise in the business costs of providing product and services. That also includes the 
consequential cost of incidents.  
In the previous analysis of incidents, it was found that the above water utilities 
frequently experience incidents. In 2006 alone, Severn Trent, United Utilities and 
Yorkshire Water reported ten incidents each. Anglian Water and Northumbrian Water 
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reported eight and five incidents, respectively. The consequential cost arising from 
these incidents incur cash flows e.g. to operate and maintain an incident management 
infrastructure but also direct, consequential cost. At that rate of incident frequency, the 
consequential costs become normal operating expenditure associated to managing these 
incidents that do not seem to affect the volatility of cash flows. As a result, incidents do 
not seem to affect the evaluation of business risk in the asset beta.  
It was previously argued that chronic exposure to hazard and instantaneous incident 
represent an often non-monetary cost to society. The Drinking Water Inspectorate is the 
regulating body watching over water utilities in their performance of duties, i.e. they 
ensure that the ‘cost’ to society from public health incidents and risks are controlled in 
accordance to public interest. Between 1993 and 1996, a total of 36 successful 
prosecutions were led against water companies in England and Wales of which 95% of 
the offences related to drinking water supplied unfit for human consumption (Drinking 
Water Inspectorate, 2008). From Table 65, the average fine of £13,770 imposed on 
successfully prosecuted water utilities represents the internalised externality of ‘social 
cost’ (Endres, 1994).  
 
 Average  SD SE Minimum 
Confidence Interval 
at 95%  
Maximum 
Confidence 
Interval 95%  
Fines £13,770 13,932 2,231 £9,397 £18,142 
Legal cost £10,857 13,758 2,2,03 £6,539 £15,175 
Table 65 Regulatory fines for incidents 
 
The five stock-market listed companies reported 547 incidents to the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate between 1998 and 2005. Of these, 19 prosecutions were initiated and 
completed (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2008). This represents a ratio of 3.5%. 
Considering the average fine imposed on successfully prosecuted water utilities, the 
average ‘social cost’ per incident amounts to £478.29 in addition to the direct cost for 
the water utility for reinstating a safe system and damages.  
In the previous chapter, the asset risk trade-off model described the rate of technical 
substitution between risk (di2) and assets (di1) to be the negative ratio of their 
production input factor prices (pi1 and pi2). Legal fines are one factor in the price of risk 
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and, in considering the trade-off between risk and assets to reduce risk, low fines shift 
the equilibrium towards accepting higher (public health) risk as an optimality criterion.  
From a cost risk trade-off viewpoint, a higher price paid for incidents by the water 
utilities would encourage further risk reduction, if that was in the interest of the public 
and customers. The effect of increasing the price of risk can be demonstrated with an 
initiative by OFWAT to reduce the risk of abusing the bounded rationality of the 
regulator arising from the monopoly position of water utilities. In April 2004, Ofwat 
launched “a consultation over new powers it will have to fine water companies. 
Companies could face a financial penalty if they breach their licence conditions, or fail 
either to deliver required customer service standards or meet their legal obligations” 
(Office of Water Services, 2004). Since April 2005 Ofwat can impose financial 
penalties of up to 10% of turnover where a company contravenes its licence or 
appointment conditions or fails to meet required standards in performing its duties 
(Department for Environment et al., 2005) and since then it has fined e.g. Thames 
Water 0.7% of turnover (£9.7 million) for misreporting information and delivering poor 
service to customers in April 2008 (Office of Water Services, 2008a) and Southern 
Water a total of £20.3 million for deliberately misreporting information and delivering 
poor service to customers in February 2008 (Office of Water Services, 2008b). More 
recently, it confirmed its intent to fine Severn Trent Water 3% of its turnover - a total of 
£35.8 million - for deliberately providing false information to the regulator and 
providing a poor service to its customers (Office of Water Services, 2008c). These 
measures are designed to increase the price of risk to ensure that water utilities do not 
abuse their monopoly position. In analogy to fines for mis-reporting company 
performance data, an increase in fines for incidents would increase the price of risk and 
shift the equilibrium of the trade-off model towards reducing risks and, hence, incidents 
from occurring. This would, however, have an impact on the overall water price as 
further investments for risk reduction would be required that need to be financed.  
Increasing fines as an incentive to enhance performance also draw criticism: Law 
professor Bruce Welling (1991) describes the logic from a shareholder perspective: 
“The practical business view is that a fine is an additional cost of doing business. A 
prohibited activity is not inhibited by the threat of a fine so long as the anticipated 
profits from the activity outweigh the amount of the fine multiplied by the probability of 
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being apprehended and convicted. Considering the amount of the average fine, 
deterrence is improbable in most cases. The argument is even more obvious regarding 
prevention and recidivism. The corporation, once convicted and fined, will simply have 
learned how to cover its tracks better.” 
 
5.4.2 Customer risk evaluation 
From a customer perspective, the Regional Water Utility evaluated the benefit of risk 
reduction for customers. In ‘willingness to pay’ studies, the price for one unit risk was 
determined and this price is used to evaluate the benefit of risk reduction schemes. The 
risk asset trade-off model is used to compare the cost of engineering schemes with the 
benefit derived for customers.  
In the following Table 66, the monetary benefit for reducing one unit of risk is stated 
for a number of service measures. It can be identified that customers have different 
preferences for risk reduction for the various levels of service provided by the Regional 
Water Utility. 
 
Service Measure Willingness to pay for reduction 
of one risk unit in £ p.a. 
£ NPV over 40 years 
at 6.0% discount rate 
Security of Supply 0.1549 2.03 
Drinking water quality 0.0018 0.02 
Inadequate Mains Pressure 1.4566 19.11 
Interruptions to Supply 0.0023 0.03 
Leakage 78.8249 1033.84 
Drinking water Discolouration 0.0299 0.39 
Table 66 The price of risk from a customer perspective 
 
Based on the willingness to pay by customers for risk reduction, real investment 
scenarios can be considered. In Table 67, a project to reduce discolouration in a 
drinking water main is considered. The project reduces the risk of discolouration by 
9.27 risk units. The customer benefit from this project is valued at £91, whilst the cost 
of the project amounts to £115,000. In conclusion, the project was not cost beneficial, 
hence the benefit cost ratio is below 1.  
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Drinking water Discolouration 
Pre 
Prob. 
Post 
Prob. 
Pre 
Sev. 
Post 
Sev. ∆Risk 
£PV of 
customer 
benefit  work type 
units 
(m) 
unit 
cost 
NP 
Cost 
Benefit 
/ Cost 
Ratio 
           
0.7 0.55 0.160 0.035 9.28 91.01    115000 0.00079 
      cleaning 2461 6.70 16500  
      
Scrape & 
reline 911 44.69 40719  
      cleaning 833 41.15 34284  
      
Scrape & 
reline 14 166.64 2333  
      overheads   21164  
Table 67 Investment scenario based on the price for risk 
 
In the following case study, an incident was triggered by a burst water main. The main 
was repaired only to find another burst further down the water main. Due to the fragility 
of the water main, another burst occurred a few hours later. The refurbishment of the 
water main was previously considered for reduction of leakage and interruption to 
supply in the risk database. Based on the overall benefit cost ratio of 0.03 (Table 68), 
pro-active maintenance was not pursued.  
 
Leakage / Interruptions to Supply 
Pre 
Prob. 
Post 
Prob. 
Pre 
Sev. 
Post 
Sev. ∆Risk 
£PV of 
customer 
benefits 
units (m) 
water mains 
replacement 
unit cost 
per m water 
mains 
replacement NP cost 
Benefit 
/ Cost 
Ratio 
0.76 0.71 0.07 0.00 5 5240.13 173.56 131.00 22736.00 0.02 
0.35 0.34 0.72 0.72 1 1.26 1193.00 130.52 155710.00 0.00 
Total     5241.39 1366.56  178446.00 0.03 
Table 68 An investment scenario assessed previous to an incident 
 
In another incident, a burst occurred; this was brought to light by a number of customers 
from the village ringing in with ‘no water’. A technician was dispatched to site but the 
burst proved very difficult to find in the rural location and was finally found in a field. 
The contractor attended with a mini digger however, due to the depth of the main and 
the ground conditions being extremely boggy, the mini digger got stuck and the work 
was delayed while a JCB got to site. The interruption to supply lasted for up to 10 
hours. 
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Pro-active maintenance of the water main was previously considered but rejected as 
non-beneficial (Table 69). It should also be noted that the reduction in incident 
probability from pro-active maintenance amounted to 0.08 units, according to the risk 
assessment. 
 
Leakage and interruption to supply 
Pre 
Prob. 
Post 
Prob. 
Pre 
Sev. 
Post 
Sev. ∆Risk 
£PV of customer 
benefits NP Cost 
Benefit / Cost 
Ratio 
0.67 0.59 1 1 8 8,270.74 23,000 0.027 
0.79 0.79 1 1 0 0 52,000 0 
Table 69 An investment scenario assessed previous to an incident (2) 
 
In this incident, a regulatory sample from a service reservoir was reported as failing 
with counts of 3/3 for E. coli. The usual precautionary slug dosing and investigation 
sampling was done. The following day, the resample failed with counts of 6/6 from the 
service reservoir and 1/1 from one of the distribution samples. The risk was previously 
assessed in the risk database with two investment options. Both options were rejected 
due to a low benefit cost ratio (Table 70).  
 
Drinking Water quality enhancement 
Pre 
Prob. 
Post 
Prob. 
Pre 
Sev. 
Post 
Sev. ∆risk 
£PV of 
customer 
benefit Investment option NP Cost 
Benefit 
/ Cost 
Ratio 
0.86 0.29 1.00 1.00 57 1,354.22 Replace seals 8,100.00 0.17 
0.75 0.10 0.10 0.10 6 52.58 Replace SRE 294,994.00 0.00 
Table 70 An investment scenario assessed previous to an incident (3) 
 
In another incident, heavy rainfall resulted in very poor raw water to a water treatment 
works. The treatment process on site cannot treat highly turbid raw water and, hence, 
turbid water was passed forward into the clean water tank. In addition, the turbidity 
used up more chlorine than usual resulting in low chlorine residuals coming off the 
plant. Process enhancements were previously considered but rejected due to a low 
benefit cost ratio (Table 71).  
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Treatment process enhancements 
Pre 
Prob. 
Post 
Prob. Pre Sev. 
Post 
Sev. ∆Risk 
£PV of 
customer 
benefits 
Investment 
options NP cost 
Benefit 
/ Cost 
Ratio 
0.85 0.85 0.73 0.73 0 0 Option 1 255,700 0 
0.95 0.5 1 0.73 59 4.19 Option 2 20,925 0.00 
1 0 0.73 0.73 72 8611.63 Option 3 136,3000 0.01 
0.99 0.2 0.73 0.46 62 11.87 Option 4 38,000 0.00 
Table 71 An investment scenario assessed previous to an incident (4) 
 
In this incident, a treatment works shut down however the chlorine dosing continued 
due to a lost link between SCADA and the control centre. The result of this was super-
chlorinated water was making its way into the distribution network once the works 
started up. Over the next two days, this resulted in a number of taste and odour 
complaints. In Table 72, the benefit cost ratio rejected a pro-active installation of 
failsafe chlorination equipment.  
 
Water quality enhancement / Failsafe chlorination  
Pre 
Prob. 
Post 
Prob. 
Pre 
Sev. 
Post 
Sev. ∆Risk 
£PV of customer 
benefit  NP cost 
Benefit / Cost 
Ratio 
0.6 0.0 1.0 1.0 6.0 36,519.67 354,718.00 0.008 
Table 72 An investment scenario assessed previous to an incident (5) 
 
The above case studies demonstrate that there are instances where risk assessments 
were carried out and the cost of risk reduction considered. However, the benefit of 
reducing that risk was deemed too low to pursue pro-active maintenance or investment.  
With deriving the value of risk reduction from a customer perspective, a water utility 
has a strong position to defend the number of incidents that occur in their water supply 
area. From a shareholder perspective, the number of incidents that customers experience 
is in the customer interest, because the customer is not willing to pay for reducing that 
risk. Following that logic, customers are willing to accept risks even when they are 
realised in the unfolding of incidents. Yet, water utilities are required to maintain levels 
of service to customers (UK Water Industry Research Limited, 2002) and, in chapter 2, 
evidence in the Regional Water Utility was found that the number of incidents increased 
by an average of two incidents per year between 1997 and 2006. Furthermore, the 
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Regional Water Utility forecasted the number of high risks on their risk database for 
assets in the next ten years. According to this forecast, the number of high risks for 
water quality will increase by 36% between 2007 and 2018 if the organisation is unable 
to finance investments and maintenance (Figure 55).  
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Figure 55 Forecasted high risks for water quality from 2007 to 2018 
 
As a policy, the Regional Water Utility aims to maintain the number of high risks at its 
current level rather than maintaining (or reducing) the number of incidents. This is a 
rather odd parameter considering the current weaknesses with the risk data acquisition 
process.  
Either way, the organisation has to finance investment and maintenance programmes to 
maintain or reduce the number of incidents and to maintain the overall risk profile for 
assets stable. The current rhetoric of customer ‘unwillingness to pay’ will not release 
water utilities to fulfil their statutory obligations. Despite that, there are a number of 
weaknesses in ‘willingness to pay’: 
Firstly, as introduced in the methodology, the derivation of customer preferences is an 
interpolation of a limited number of scenarios, i.e. lower service, maintaining service 
and service enhancement in perspective of the anticipated impact on water prices. 
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Secondly, the ‘willingness to pay’ is an average for all customers. A customer who is 
regularly affected by incidents may have a much higher ‘willingness to pay’ for service 
improvement. However, individual preferences are ‘averaged out’ and high risks 
affecting individuals cannot be financed. In using ‘willingness to pay’ it ought to be 
considered to use a higher water price that reflects the upper standard deviation or the 
maximum confidence interval at 95% to ensure that a higher ‘willingness to pay’ above 
average is adequately recognised.  
Thirdly, ‘willingness to pay’ does not consider the direct consequential cost for the 
water utility. In the above case studies, the regional water utility had to mobilise 
resources to manage the impact of the incident and to repair and re-instate the water 
supply system. Incidents were managed via an incident management infrastructure that 
already represents a ‘sunk cost’ and represents an organisational overhead in business 
costs. Eliminating all incidents would also eliminate the need for these ‘overheads’.  
Fourthly, the ‘willingness to pay’ by customers is also dependent on the way the 
questions are put to customers. Relating to water quality the Regional Water Utility 
explained to survey participants: Water quality “is about how good the tap water is in 
relation to chemical and biological (bacteria) content. Currently 144 of the company’s 
water quality samples fail the Drinking Water Inspectorate’s requirements for chemical 
and biological content, which is equivalent to a pass rate of 99.95%. With increased 
investment this could be reduced to 75 failed samples (equivalent to 99.97% passing), 
50 failed samples (99.98% passing) or 25 failed samples (99.99%). With reduced 
investment this could increase to 1,500 failed samples (99.43% passing).” The 
explanation for water quality does not explicitly mention water quality incidents that 
have arisen instantaneously in the past or their effects on customers. The Regional 
Water Utility rather uses the pass rate of 99.95% for water quality samples as a base 
line. The customer question is further biased by setting the water quality sample record 
into context of the investments required for reducing the chronic exposure to 
contaminants and makes no mention of asset reliability to prevent instantaneous asset or 
processes failures that could lead to an incident. They state: “Because of the intensive 
treatment processes needed to control the chemical and biological content of your tap 
water, even remaining at the current level of service would result in a small increase in 
your charges.”   
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Considering the funding for investment and maintenance programmes, there are several 
more sources of funding, namely profits and dividends exceeding the risk-free return on 
investments, loans and efficiency savings. With respect to the latter, the theoretical asset 
risk trade-off model assumes highest possible efficiency whereas, in reality, the 
regulator periodically identifies efficiency savings that are reflected in the periodic 
determination of the water price (Office of Water Services, 2008d) and indentifies 
opportunities to operate more efficiently.  
In re-considering the investment scenarios in the above case studies, another interesting 
observation was made: It was previously identified that the stock-market listed water 
utilities have an asset beta at or near zero. In effect, that represents zero business risk or 
the risk for shareholders to lend money at 4% interest. It appears that the Regional 
Water Utility charges an extra risk premium of 2% on capital projects to calculate their 
revenues and cost cash flows.  
 
5.5 Summary 
The objective of this study was to investigate the prevalence of incidents from a 
financial and customer perspective on the ‘price’ of risk and the benefit arising for 
customers to reduce the frequency or probability of incidents. From a financial 
perspective, it was found that shareholders in stock market-listed water utilities can 
expect a risk-free rate of return on their investment. This was explained to be the result 
of a number of factors. Firstly, water utilities provide an essential service to customers. 
Continuous provision of drinking water guarantees a steady cash flow of revenues 
charged for service provided. Secondly, the water utilities appear to have steady cost 
cash flows to operate their business. As a result, the volatility of profits converges 
towards zero. This is reflected in the asset beta of water utilities.  
The impact of incidents on a water utility was investigated and it was found that the 
periodic occurrence of incidents also seem to represent a steady cash flow that does not 
increase the volatility of profits. From a regulatory perspective, the consequential cost 
of incidents was investigated and the regulatory fines evaluated that follow successful 
prosecutions of water utilities. It was found that the average imposed fines are 
considerably low (Table 65). As a result, the occurrence of incidents is accepted by the 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  286 
water utility because of the ‘prohibitive’ cost of reducing the number of incidents via 
cost benefit analysis for asset investment and maintenance.  
From a customer perspective, the use of ‘willingness to pay’ data in the context of 
investment decision making was investigated. In the Regional Water Utility, it was 
found that customers were given the opportunity to evaluate their benefit of risk 
reduction. These represent the unit cost of risk that is used to compare investment 
proposals with the perceived benefit of risk reduction. In a number of incident cases, it 
was found that the risk and the benefit of risk reduction have previously been assessed. 
Based on low benefit cost ratios, service enhancements, i.e. risk reduction, did not 
warrant an investment decision. From an economic-rational viewpoint, the customer 
was better off accepting the probability of an incident to occur, although consequential 
‘costs’ were incurred during and after the incident.  
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6 General Discussion 
This thesis set out to investigate the hypothesis that the “principles of HRO facilitate a) 
organisational resilience under trying conditions and b) learning from failure to 
enhance the safety and reliability of drinking water supply”. 
A number of research objectives were formulated to structure this thesis and to 
investigate the components of this research project. They were identified as: 
 To characterise “the short periods of stress” (World Health Organisation, 2004) 
in an assessment of incidents frequencies, cause and effect relationships and 
impact on customers. 
 To investigate the benefit of HRO principles in incident management and to 
correlate incident impacts on customers and impact reductions with observation 
of high reliability principles under trying conditions. 
 To identify learning opportunities from incident analyses to enhance risk 
assessments that are subsequently used for asset investment and maintenance 
decision making in asset management.  
 To investigate the prevalence of incidents from a financial and customer 
perspective on the “price” of risk and the benefit arising for customers to reduce 
the frequency or probability of incidents.   
 
Each objective is discussed in turn. 
 
6.1 The nature and impact of incidents 
In chapter 2, the objective was to characterise “the short periods of stress” (World 
Health Organisation, 2004) in an assessment of incident frequencies, cause and effect 
relationships and impact on customers. In the review of incidents that occurred in 
England and Wales between 2004 and 2006 as well as incidents in the Regional Water 
Utility between 1997 and 2006, a methodology was introduced that enabled a direct 
comparison of incident impacts on customers. This methodology was used throughout 
this thesis a) to evaluate individual incident impact, b) to evaluate the effectiveness of 
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incident management responses and c) to evaluate and enhance risk assessment 
capabilities in the Regional Water Utility.  
Incidents were investigated for their cause and effect relationships based on the 
availability of historical data and personal accounts of staff involved during incidents. 
Based on detailed descriptions and documentation of incidents it was aimed to identify 
not only single root causes of failure but also contributing factors in terms of assets 
(Figure 12), processes (Figure 16) and human factors (Figure 17) that contributed to the 
unfolding of incidents. It was found that the majority of incidents arise as failures of 
drinking water distribution assets that led to ‘loss of supply’ and ‘discolouration’ of 
drinking water (Table 17). The second largest category of asset failures were associated 
to the failure of chemical treatment equipment in water treatment works causing a 
deterioration of drinking water quality due to the loss of chlorination (Figure 12).   
Beyond asset failures and process failures, the human factors were considered that 
contributed to the unfolding of incidents. Human factor considered any adverse 
influence of decision making during the design and operation of physical assets and 
processes. Some incidents were reported as a result of incomplete or outdated operating 
procedures. One interviewee pointed out that the sheer volume of operating procedures 
is also a factor to consider explaining the non-adherence to operating procedures. This 
has to be regarded in the context of fewer field staff that are increasingly looking after 
more and more water supply assets. This may induce time pressures that contribute to 
‘corners being cut’. On the other hand, the thorough review of incidents emphasises that 
operators and field staff work according to standard operating procedures. 
The analysis of incidents considered the positive effect of asset and systems redundancy 
during the management of incidents and their effectiveness to reduce the impact of 
incidents on customers (Figure 19 - Figure 22). It was found that many incidents have 
no immediate redundancy available (e.g. water distribution mains) or redundancy was 
ineffective due to common cause failures. In a number of case studies, it was found that 
redundancy did not operate effectively despite being specifically provided for the 
failure scenarios that occurred. The provision of diesel generators as a means of 
uninterruptable power supply did not – in some instances – operate due to technical 
problems that were traced back to their design.  
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Considering the availability and usage of redundancy, the impact on customers was 
evaluated (Figure 23 - Figure 25). This impact assessment commenced from identifying 
the single highest impact on customers towards the evaluating multiple customer 
impacts an incident can have.  
An interesting finding in the Regional Water Utility was an increasing trend of the 
number of incidents that occurred between 1997 and 2006. It was found that the number 
of incidents increased by ca. two incidents per year on average (Figure 26), despite a 
regulatory requirement to maintain or enhance the level of service for customers (UK 
Water Industry Research Limited, 2002).  
 
A critical issue in the design of this research element was the availability and quality of 
data. The review of incidents in England and Wales used tertiary data that was pre-
filtered by the reporting water utilities and the Drinking Water Inspectorate to report 
incidents to the lay public. However, it provided sufficient detail to evaluate the impact 
on customers and the failing asset type causing an incident. In the Regional Water 
Utility, the author had access to primary and secondary data.  It has processes in place 
to review every incident that occurs and the author had access to detailed, documented 
incident records. These included log books, detailed incident minutes, personal 
communications of staff involved during the incidents, maps and raw data from 
monitoring and control equipment.  One important aspect in evaluating research results 
was the awareness that the outcomes of the incident review meeting as described in the 
incident documentation may be subject to cultural bias. The models used to analyse 
incidents may represent heuristic simplifications of complex circumstances that 
represent a simplified or limited version of a complex reality. Furthermore, according to 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994), documentation can be highly biased due to the views the 
authors may had at the time recording data. This is particularly relevant in light of the 
regulatory requirements to report incidents. It is important to understand the motivation 
of the organisation to investigate incidents. On the one hand, a systematic bias may 
have motivated authors to ‘misrepresent factual data’; on the other hand, a strong desire 
may exist to learn from failure driven by a code of professional conduct.  
It was found that pressures and conflict can arise in the attribution of root causes to 
error. A common concern amongst individuals involved during incidents and 
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subsequent incident review meetings is the issue of blame, in particular when human 
factors were considered that might have led to the incident. MacGillivray (2008) 
recently pointed out that “incident investigations are all too often contaminated by 
political interests, social forces, and psychological biases” and that “organisations are 
generally intolerant of dissent, and so employees often fear the negative repercussions 
of speaking up, and may not believe that doing so would make any difference”. He 
further points out that “this is amplified in that management often feel threatened by 
negative feedback, and so try to avoid receiving it, and when they cannot, they may try 
to ignore it, dismiss it as mistaken or attack the credibility of the source.” 
Political factors are not so easily reduced to a nihilistic viewpoint on inability to learn 
from failure. A number of factors and safeguards have been identified in the Regional 
Water Utility that prevent - or at least reduce - abuse or biased learning from failures 
and false reporting of incidents. Firstly, the incident review meeting is attended by a 
complex set of people. These are operators, operations managers, asset engineers, asset 
managers and emergency planning officers who are less likely to submit to coercive 
pressures. The incident review process deliberately plays out conflicting opinions on the 
causes of incidents. Operators are skilled workers trained at BTEC/NVQ level in Water 
process control. Their educational background primarily reflects asset operation and 
public health considerations should asset fail and provides them sufficient 
understanding of technical and organisational issues to deliver their account of an 
incident. Secondly, undue ‘finger pointing’ at operators can have adverse impacts on the 
working relationship between operators and management which, in turn, can lead 
towards operators working only ‘to the book’, i.e. the minimum required hours and only 
following instructions and procedures. As a general observation, it was found that the 
conflict between operators and management is best described as ‘co-opetition’, i.e. a 
symbiosis of competition and co-operation. This relationship plays out in the review of 
incidents and was evidenced in the series of interviews that were conducted in the 
Regional Water Utility.  
Thirdly, the management of a water utility has an interest to identify the ‘true’ causes of 
failures - not only from a public health perspective but also from a shareholder 
perspective. It was demonstrated in chapter 4 that learning from failure provides an 
opportunity to anticipate future risks. This, in turn, makes the performance of a water 
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utility more predictable and, hence, enables enhanced investment and maintenance 
decision making. ‘Short-termism’ to boost the share price of a water utility whilst 
managing long-term investments in physical assets is a problem to consider: One 
interviewee (participant no.7) pointed out that “our senior management understand that 
the industry we’re in now there’s a game to be played, there’s a bit of gloss here and 
there’s a bit of reality here but they understand what the gap is ….  They don’t pretend 
there isn’t a gap, they understand that for all the investment we’ve got we’re still short 
of what we’d like to do and I think what we have to deal with is we can’t ‘bleat on 
generic’ we’re about to close gaps, it’s a case of this one has dropped through, we need 
to take some action and generally speaking we make a selection.” 
A further form of safeguard arises in the punishment of water utilities to miss-report 
incidents to the regulators. The introduction of heavy fines by the Office of Water 
Services aim to reduce the risk of miss-reporting. The recent case of Severn Trent mis-
reporting data demonstrates how uneconomic cheating can be, unless significantly 
higher returns on investment can be achieved (Welling, 1991).  
A much more interesting political factor that drives the understanding of incidents and 
risks arises from the introduction of ‘willingness to pay’. In the Regional Water Utility, 
it was found that root cause for failures are increasingly identified by ‘customer 
expectation’, i.e. the customer and the regulator are not ‘willing to pay’ for preventing 
these incidents since the budget for investments and maintenance spending are 
constrained by the water price set by the OFWAT. Although this is a highly simplified 
explanation of the regulatory mechanism, it has set foot in the belief of a number of 
staff.   
MacGillivray (2008) makes a valid point in suggesting that incident investigations can 
be “contaminated by political interests, social forces, and psychological biases”  but 
significantly more evidence is required that these distortions actually play out in water 
utilities. From having reviewed a significant number of incidents with access to primary 
data and from the interviews conducted with staff who attended incident review 
meetings, little evidence was found that ‘groupthink’ and ‘blame culture’ inhibited 
learning from failure. It was found that incident reviews are facilitated meetings which 
enabled the thorough scrutiny of multiple incident accounts of staff who were involved. 
The primary purpose of the meeting that the author attended was to provide an objective 
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and valid as well as trustworthy narrative of the incident for internal and external 
reporting. Internal reporting, to some extent, aims to prevent identical incidents to re-
occur and external reporting to inform the public health regulator of the problems that 
were identified and the measures put in place to prevent re-occurrence. As a suggestion 
for further research it is proposed to study conflicting interests, social forces and 
psychological biases in the conduct of incident review meetings.  
 
This thesis set out to enhance the learning opportunities beyond individual incidents to 
improve risk assessments that anticipate future incidents. Before returning to the 
opportunities to ‘learn from failure’, the findings with respect to incident management 
capabilities to identify and manage incidents are discussed.   
 
6.2 Incident management and high reliability principles 
In chapter 3, the objective was to investigate the benefit of HRO principles in incident 
management and to correlate incident impacts on customers and impact reductions with 
observation of high reliability principles under trying conditions.  
The following sections discuss the observed HRO principles in incident management.  
 
6.2.1 Organisational culture 
A strong organisational culture of reliability was a stipulated requirement as a bulwark 
against failure resulting in catastrophic consequences. In observations and staff 
interviews it was observed that staff in operations and incident management have a 
strong sense of the primary mission of the organisation. These were commonly 
expressed as ‘providing a safe and reliable drinking water for customers in line with 
regulatory requirements’. Operations managers, engineer and operators share a common 
system of beliefs and perceptions when water safety is concerned. The water supply 
system is constantly monitored for any abnormal operating condition. In the observation 
of unfolding incidents, it was found that staff have a highly developed understanding of 
their contribution to water safety regarding their role in the technical system and in the 
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decision making process. In particular during incidents staff act in a collaborative and 
collegiate manner.  
Constant vigilance and concern for water safety and reliability dictates the behaviour of 
staff. This is particularly relevant to field operators but also control room staff who act 
with alertness, attentiveness and care in monitoring the healthy operation of the entire 
water supply system. Employees are encouraged to take responsibility, in particular 
where problems are identified and immediate corrective action programmes are 
required. On first sight of a problem with a particular aspect of the water supply system, 
an alarm is raised and the need for instigating the incident management procedures is 
assessed. With the introduction of information technology and automated monitoring 
and control system, the majority of asset failures are picked up by monitoring 
equipment and an alarm is raised. One major exception is the identification of water 
mains burst and water discolouration arising in the distribution network. Here, the 
organisation relies on customers to call in and report their service experience. Here too 
things are starting to change with the use of online, real time monitoring of flows and 
pressures in the distribution system in an attempt to identify potential issues before they 
become customer impacts. 
The commitment of senior management to water safety and reliability of the 
organisation is communicated to all levels in the organisation and demonstrated with 
investments in technology, processes and personnel as long as the conflicting objectives 
of public health and shareholder value align. In our observations and in interviews, 
members of staff have communicated their strong sense for collective needs and goals. 
Individuals ‘monitor, advise, criticize and support’ another, in particular during critical 
incidents which are immensely stressful situations and quick decisions have to be taken. 
 
6.2.2 Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible organisational 
structures 
As pointed out before, Perrow (1999) argues that complex and tightly coupled systems 
can only prevent accidents with a high level of centralisation because low level decision 
makers have insufficient understanding of the inter-relationship between their actions 
and consequences on other elements of the system (Rochlin et al., 1987). Perrow’s 
definition of systems referred to technical assets such as nuclear power plants. Here, it 
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is not claimed that technical systems in the water sector are complex technologies, yet, 
it is the combination of physical, information, human and intangible assets that form 
socio-technical systems with increased levels of complexity. Complicated designs of 
technical systems, monitoring and control philosophies, significant human machine 
interfaces and significant interfaces with the environment, potential for human error and 
difficult decision making processes in incident, operations and asset management 
characterise the complexity of the large water supply system operated by the Regional 
Water Utility.  
It was found that during an incident, the organisation assumed a centralised command 
and control hierarchy. This is reflected in the organisational structure in operations 
management in which process and performance data of the technical system are 
reported to a centralised control room. From this control room, the incident manager co-
ordinated efforts to reduce the impact of the incident and to re-instate safe water supply. 
From here, the incident manager will monitor the entire system’s response to the 
incident and the incident management efforts. The incident manager leads the incident 
management team within the control room but also field staff who perform the required 
tasks at the source of failure or within the area affected by the incident. The incident 
manager directed all resources at his disposal, including systems redundancy, towards 
reducing the incident impact and re-instating safe operations. During large scale 
incidents, the organisation was capable to decentralise if this is required to respond to 
rapidly unfolding failures (Figure 33). During a major storm event which had 
significant impact on many technical subsystems, a number of incident managers were 
called up to respond to particular aspects of the region-wide incidents. Although 
centralisation is essential in tightly coupled technical systems where interdependency is 
high, it was possible to de-couple the technical system so that decentralisation in the 
incident management response provided for action at the point of need.  
The organisation requires stringent adherence to procedures and guidelines aiming for a 
repeatability of actions and routines. Activities based on decisions that are not defined 
in procedures are taken at a more senior level. Every incident that was investigated had 
unique and novel aspects to consider for which detailed procedures were not available. 
These arise out of the specific incident circumstances, e.g. the environment in which the 
incident occurs. Since many of these incidents occurred in unforeseen circumstances, 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  295 
only high level principles and guidelines are available to direct incident response efforts 
as particular SOPs would not exist for such particular scenarios. In such events, the 
decision making process had in-built slack in order to assess and challenge decisions by 
a more senior member of staff. Furthermore, the incident manager had specialist staff at 
his disposal to guide his decisions.  
In the review of past incidents, it was found that the organisation in the majority of 
incidents effectively adapted its organisational structure to respond to the needs arising 
during an incident (Figure 33). However, there were also cases where the inadaptability 
of the organisational structure prolonged the incident. The incident assessment also 
focussed on decision making during the incidents. It was also found that - in the 
majority of cases – the decision making process could be characterised for ‘good 
decision making’(Figure 34). The decision taken during the incident significantly and 
pro-actively contributed to reducing the impact on customers and to re-instate normal 
operations as soon as possible. Yet, there were also cases that could only be described 
for ‘poor decision making’ These were identified as being ineffective to recover the 
incident situation to normal operation in a reasonable time-frame and provided scope to 
learn lessons for enhancing the incident management response.  
 
6.2.3 System and human redundancy 
The organisation maintains reserve capacity in its technical and organisational system 
that includes back-up functions, overlapping tasks and responsibilities.  As it was seen 
in chapter 2, in many cases, the organisation is capable to isolate the source of hazard 
whilst using other asset types to compensate for the loss. These situations would prevent 
an incident to occur and are, hence, not classed as an incident. For example, the 
distribution network has re-zoning capability to isolate a burst main and provide water 
supply from other sources. During major power failure incidents, the organisation can 
mobilise stand-alone power supply units to critical water supply assets if they have no 
on-site power generation.  
The majority of the water supply system builds on duty standby systems, excess 
capacity and inter-connectivity to isolate a failed asset and compensate for its loss. The 
use of systems redundancy was investigated as part of the incident management 
response. It was found that in the majority of incidents no systems redundancy was used 
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or could be used to reduce the impact or avoid customer impact. This figure pre-
dominantly arises from water distribution main failures. In the majority of these 
incidents, the water utility resorted to the supply of bottled water. In many cases, the use 
of systems could not avoid customer impact although it had a reducing effect or 
significantly reduced the impact of incidents on customers and avoided the impact for a 
much larger customer base. These figures have to be regarded in context of 
undocumented ‘near failures’ and ‘near misses’ where redundancy avoided the 
unfolding of an incident altogether.  
As mentioned before, it is important to recognise that designing redundancy for a 
system can be counterproductive, as back-up functions can increase technical 
complexity, conceal errors and lead individuals into not performing their required tasks 
under the assumptions that someone else takes care of his task (Sagan, 1994). System 
redundancy also affects maintenance policies that could be regarded as 
counterproductive. Based on observations in the Strategic Asset Management 
department and following the logic of cost benefit analysis in maintenance decision-
making, it is believed that maintenance decisions can be deferred due to multiple 
technical redundancy in-built into the supply system: duty standby systems considered 
as a system have a significantly reduced probability of failure. Such type of risk 
assessment considers the probability of asset failure and the probability of that asset 
failure to have an impact on customers. Considering redundancy in the risk assessment 
may lead to an assessment of low systems risk and, hence, low priority in maintenance 
spending.  
 
6.2.4 Effective and varied patterns of communication 
Effective communication facilitates a complex system to become more understandable, 
predictable and controllable. With the rapid developments of information technology, 
the Regional Water Utility’s supply system is increasingly fitted with advanced 
monitoring and control instruments. They are part of an effective communication 
strategy to maintain safe and reliable drinking water supplies. In the organisation, the 
monitoring and control philosophy has been advanced to a stage where physical assets 
such as water treatment works are no longer operated with staff on site. Monitoring and 
control is performed with ‘Process Logic Controls’ and ‘Supervisory Control and Data 
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Acquisition’ that relay data to remote control centre. The control centre is the hub for 
managing the entire water supply system. In the first years of implementing the strategy 
of advanced monitoring and control, an increase of incidents due to the failure of such 
technologies could be observed. Where monitoring and control equipment fails, the 
status of a system becomes unknown but since then technological developments – such 
as status monitoring for control and monitoring equipment – have reduced these 
incidents over the last few years.  
Processes in water production and distribution are measured and understood, with data 
made transparent and available to all.  An interesting observation we made is the need 
to manage potential overload of information during critical situation in an incident. 
Having the right information available at the right time in the right place is an important 
aspect of water utility incident management.  
During an incident, inter-personnel communication is designed as both bottom-up and 
top-down to ensure rapid flow of information through the hierarchy of the incident 
management team.  Rapid dissemination of information helps the organisation respond 
to an incident, with corrective action aiming to prevent the escalation of the incident 
into an emergency. 
It was found that there is a heavy reliance on customers to report their experiences to 
the water utility, in particular relating to incidents in the water distribution network 
(Figure 32). Efforts are underway to reduce the reliance on ‘end of tap’ reporting for 
incidents. A test trial is currently planned to provide sufficient pressure and flow 
monitoring devices to increase the incident detection capability in an area distribution 
network. With this arrangement, any deviation of observed pressure and flow patterns 
from expected patterns will raise an alarm in the control centre so that an incident 
investigation team can be dispatched to investigate the source of the abnormality. This 
system will enable the reduction of the response time to an incident considerably.  
Communicating information allows staff to shape and share the ‘big picture’ of the 
organisations vision, mission and responsibility of individuals towards reliability. It was 
found that integrating asset management teams into the daily operation of the water 
supply system was considered to be important. The asset engineers require the 
information input from operators to assess asset risks. Via risk assessments, cash may 
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be made available for asset investment or maintenance. Furthermore, the asset engineer 
can provide technical support during incident management. 
In the analysis of documented incidents, the effectiveness of communication during the 
incident management response to the incident were investigated. In the majority of 
cases, the incident management responses were characterised by ‘effective 
communication’ (Figure 35). Here, the communication between the stakeholders 
involved in an incident generated ‘a big picture’: observations, decisions and water 
supply systems performance were effectively communicated to all relevant staff and 
external bodies, which enabled comprehensive judgement on the due course of action. 
Yet, there were also cases where some areas of improvements were identified which 
meant that the incident was unnecessarily prolonged. Only the minority of incidents, 
‘poor communication’ had a significantly, adverse impact on the overall performance of 
the incident management response.  
 
6.2.5 Continuous learning and intensive training 
The performances of tasks are embedded in formal rules, generalised guidelines and 
standardised frameworks. These are expressed in SOPs, risk assessments and method 
statements. Yet, the emphasis is not merely on adherence to SOPs but also on 
identifying potential sources of failure and actions to stop faults from escalating. In 
order to facilitate continuous learning and intensive training, the operations 
management function review their processes and standard operating procedures (SOPs), 
in particular after an incident in an incident review meeting. In these meetings, the 
incident is scrutinised, ‘lessons learnt’ are identified and communicated to relevant 
parties in the organisation. The water utility learns by studying the failures, near failure 
and mistakes that occur within the organisation which are identified using ‘root’ cause 
analysis. It was found that the investigation of incidents, in particular analysing human 
error, enforces normative expectations to comply with standard operating procedures. 
If necessary, actions for the asset engineer to review a particular system or actions for 
an operations manager to review a particular procedure can be formulated and their 
progress and completion monitored. Poor behaviour by staff that led to an incident is 
identified and countered with additional training. Failures in one part of the organisation 
could be used as a means to study the failure susceptibility of the entire organisation or, 
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at least, of other, similar sub-systems. However, limited evidence was found that 
incident review meetings are designed to highlight and prompt cross organisational 
learnings in other parts of the business.   
One effective cross-learning strategy from incidents arises from water mains failures: In 
the Regional Water Utility, the majority of incidents affect the distribution network in 
form of mains bursts (Table 17). Root causes for mains burst have many contributing 
factors such as age, material, soil condition and the operating regime (Figure 13). The 
structured collection and analysis of water mains failures enables multi-regression 
analysis for the derivation of risk profiles for the entire water distribution network. 
These models are used to prioritise maintenance and replacement programmes.  
Other than that, little evidence was found that cross-learning initiatives from incidents 
informed the risk assessment process for other assets, although a business process is in 
place to communicate ‘learnings’ to a wider audience in the organisation. The author 
will return to this issue in a subsequent section.  
Staff training is extensive and focuses on the requirements for maintaining a safe 
system. In the organisation, operators are required to gain professional accreditation in 
form of college certificates as a license to operate a water supply system. This training 
scheme is a customised training programme for operators in that particular region. In-
house training and training on the job are also important components of continuous 
professional development. Recently, a risk training programme was launched to provide 
staff with a better understanding of risk identification and assessment skills. This 
training programme has been recognised as industry leading and earned a number of 
industry awards. It made participants aware of the risk perception horizon people have 
and develop over time. The general interest in this training scheme demonstrates that 
staff maintains a commitment to continuous learning and seek the acquisition and 
improvement of skills.  The training programme was rolled out to over 170 people in 
the first year and included representatives from all areas of the business including 
contract partners. 
 
6.2.6 Human resource management practices that support reliability 
Suitability, skills and competencies are defined by the functional role that these 
individuals occupy in the Regional Water Utility. An incident manager has to be able to 
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cope with highly uncertain situations and demonstrate rational decision making under 
“trying conditions”. The incident manager has to be able to communicate effectively 
with the staff and stakeholders involved in incidents. S/he requires the ability to 
demonstrate decisiveness and firm leadership to remain in control of adverse situations. 
S/he also requires a good understanding of the entire water supply system whilst 
drawing on the expert knowledge in the incident management team. On the other hand, 
an asset engineer requires a very different skill set. The asset engineer requires 
analytical skills and competencies in assessing technical systems as well as the technical 
means to provide and maintain safe and reliable drinking water supplies. Their job role 
is reactive to incidents and pro-active in assessing potential sources of failure. 
Increasingly, the asset engineer has to consider technical systems risks and 
communicate them as a systematic risk assessment to the custodians of the risk 
management process. The asset engineer requires good communication skills, in 
particular to communicate with idiosyncratic operators and operations management.  
 
6.2.7 Correlating HRO principles with incident impact on customer 
In Figure 37 it was aimed to correlate the incident impact on customers with observed 
HRO principles during the management of incidents. A marginal, positive relationship 
was identified although it was hypothesised that a high incident impact negatively 
correlates with the scores for observed HRO principles. It was initially assumed that 
low observance of HRO principles would have an adverse impact on customers, i.e. 
prolonging the incident or aggravating the hazard exposure of the population. 
It was then stipulated that the impact on customers would have to consider the potential 
incident impact, i.e. a measure for incident impact reduction was required to evaluate 
the effectiveness of HRO principles and in Figure 38 it was demonstrated how the 
reduction of incident impact correlates with observed HRO principles. Here, it could be 
concluded that the observance of HRO principles has a positive effect on reducing the 
impact on customers.  
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6.3 High reliability principles for risk-based asset management 
In chapter 4, the objective was to identify learning opportunities from incident analyses 
to enhance risk assessments that are subsequently used for asset investment and 
maintenance decision making in asset management. In chapter 2, a large proportion of 
incidents were associated to asset failures which, in turn, define the technical reliability 
of the water supply system and in this section, the management of technical reliability 
and learning opportunities to enhance risk assessments relating to technical reliability 
are further discussed.  
In practice, many water utilities are nowadays embarking on an explicit trade-off 
between investment cost and risk for asset investment and maintenance decision making 
(MacGillivray et al., 2006). In Appendix 1 it was demonstrated that - similar to capital, 
labour and natural resources -, risk can be allocated an incremental unit and a price or 
cost based on risk assessments and evaluation. In substitutional production functions the 
input factors can be substituted (Bonart and Peters, 1997) with units of risk. This 
mathematical derivation underpins the optimal outcome of cost benefit analysis for 
investment decision making as long as all risk including social costs through 
externalities are accounted for. 
In the Regional Water Utility, it was found that the asset management function is 
concerned with the provision of the infrastructure which enables the operations function 
to provide safe and reliable drinking water. It was found that the organisation does not 
necessarily require ‘state of the art’ equipment but rather considers the assessed 
reduction of risk and its monetary evaluation alongside capital investment requirements 
in the decision making process. The organisation aims to maximise capital spending 
efficiency to a point where the monetary value of risk reduction balances cash 
requirements for investment.  
The assessed reduction of risk has to consider the compliance of technology outputs 
with the ever increasing standards of water quality parameters which corresponds to the 
lack of control over raw water quality sourced in a catchment. Such technology has 
potential to increase the technical complexity of a water supply system.   
HROs have been described to maintain existing technology at exceptionally high 
standards and there is zero tolerance of defective, substandard or malfunctioning 
equipment (Roberts, 1990b). In the Regional Water Utility, maintenance decision 
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making takes a more differentiating view on capital maintenance which is in line with 
the ‘Common Maintenance Framework’ (UK Water Industry Research Limited, 2002) 
building on economic principles described above. Maintenance decisions are 
increasingly based on risk assessments and a trade-off between cost of maintenance and 
perceived, monetary value of risk reduction (cost benefit analysis). This process heavily 
relies on accurate and consistent risk assessments. The risk assessment procedure has 
been implemented in a top down approach and requires asset managers and asset 
engineers to report and file risks bottom up from asset level to the Strategic Asset 
Management Department. An information system was designed to log risks on a risk 
database. The database is semi-structured to guide the risk assessor in providing 
accurate and consistent risk assessments.  The database also houses risk data derived 
from risk evaluation models based on quantitative risk assessments via statistical 
analysis designed to evaluate failure probabilities and impacts Yet, the process relies on 
the competency, skills and experience of asset managers and asset engineers to identify 
and evaluate risks accurately. Similarly, the design of quantitative risk assessment 
models depends on the availability of failure data and competency in designing these 
models. Deviations from accurate and consistent risks reported on the risk database are 
sought out with quality assurance procedures to ensure effective allocation of cash. The 
aforementioned risk training programme was also launched to enhance the capability of 
risk assessors to identify and assess risks.  
 
6.3.1 Learning from incidents to enhance risk assessments 
In this thesis, further opportunities were investigated to learn from failure with a view to 
enhance risk assessments. The collection of incident data in the incident database 
represents a collective memory for failures and incidents. It was stipulated that the 
incident history of the Regional Water Utility could help to anticipate future problems 
in enhanced asset risk assessments.  
The Regional Water Utility identifies risks at component level. From a theoretical 
viewpoint, the maximum possible number of risk assessments based on the current risk 
assessment framework used in the Regional Water Utility was calculated in Table 54. 
This was compared to the actual number of risk assessments currently filed on the risk 
database and it was found that the numbers significantly deviate. By comparing risk 
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assessments per asset type it was found that smaller, less complex assets with a small 
number of components are generally overrepresented with risk assessments, whereas 
water treatment works with substantially more components are underrepresented (Table 
55). From an economic viewpoint (cost benefit analysis), the ratio of risk assessments 
per component should be equal for all assets.  
Risk assessments were then compared to past incidents to compare the frequency or 
probability, causes, effects and customer impacts of past failures with perceived future 
risks. It was found that these parameters often significantly deviated from another 
representing a discrepancy in the perception of risk compared to the reality of actual 
incidents. Unless the supply and demand patterns, the operating environment and the 
actual risk profile of assets have significantly changed, the parameters for long-term 
physical assets should not be significantly different between risks and incidents. The 
only exception arises for the introduction of new technologies. For instance, the 
introduction of IT systems for enhanced monitoring, control has led to an increase of 
unprecedented incidents, and learning from failure is only possible in the short-term 
since new technologies will supersede older versions of monitoring and control 
equipment and systems. It was sought to explain this phenomenon with the influence of 
psychological and sociological perception of risk as opposed to strict (economic) 
rationality. 
It was further sought to explain why risk assessments can deviate from another and it 
was aimed to uncover how risk assessors perceive risk. In a small experiment, a number 
of staff were given a case study to assess risk for an asset. It was found that the risk 
assessors returned risk assessments that significantly deviated from the average. Three 
main factors were identified for this phenomenon: firstly, risk assessors may have 
incentives to over-estimate risk. They can arise from their (risk averse) concern for 
public health but also from incentives the organisation has in place to honour good 
performance or stigmatise poor asset performance. Secondly, a lack of understanding of 
‘the risk concept’ can lead to under-representing risks. Thirdly, the time element of 
filing risk assessments may lead to insufficient risk assessments available for decision 
making. This is particularly applicable for large asset systems with significantly many 
components and interacting subsystems.  
 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw  Page  304 
In a further attempt to improve the consistency of risk assessment data, it was argued 
that highly structured risk assessment templates and procedures are required to assess 
asset risks. Based on the incident review methodology adapted to identify the causes, 
effects and impacts of incidents (Appendix 3.3.1), a highly structured risk assessment 
template was developed that closely resembles the unfolding of incidents (Appendix 
5.2). Since operators commonly understand how incidents unfold, it was thought that 
the new system enhances the artificial concept of probability and consequence 
assessment by prompting the risk assessor to think through an incident scenario in a 
decision tree structure.  
The new risk assessment template significantly deviates from the current business 
process used in the Regional Water Utility. It also requires significantly more detail 
and, hence, prolongs the risk assessment process for individual risk assessors. This is a 
critical factor since the existing process was criticised by interviewees for the amount of 
detailed analysis required for populating risk assessments. Nevertheless, it provides 
some distinct advantages compared to the current risk assessment process in that it 
reduces the heuristic ambiguity of ‘risk’ into tangible resemblance of true incidents that 
are considered with a probability of occurrence.   
 
6.4 The price of risk and incidents 
In Chapter 5, the objective was to investigate the prevalence of incidents from a 
financial and customer perspective on the ‘price’ of risk and the benefit arising for 
customers to reduce the frequency or probability of incidents.   
It was previously discussed that the water sector is increasingly embarking on the 
explicit trade-off between cost and risk. In cost benefit analyses, the relationship 
between units of risk and assets needs to consider the price or cost for risk and assets. 
Assuming the need to maximise benefit (or profit) the optimal equilibrium between risk 
and assets is governed by their respective ‘market’ prices or costs. The determination of 
the risk price may consider the direct cost of incidents to the utility but also the ‘social’ 
cost (Hughes and Ferrett, 2003) for the affected population. Alternatively, the 
incremental unit of risk and their ‘market price’ can also take the form of opportunity 
cost that a water utility customer is willing to pay in order for a risk event not to occur 
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(UK Water Industry Research Limited, 2002). The ‘Common Maintenance Framework’ 
(UK Water Industry Research Limited, 2002) proposes an assessment of the risk price 
to be a reflection of customer benefit. It was found that the Regional Water Utility 
conducted customer service studies to inquire their perceived benefit of risk reduction. 
These evaluations are used for asset investment and maintenance planning. Based on 
the latter principle, it was demonstrated how the Regional Water Utility define the rate 
of technical substitution between risk and assets that is governed by the negative ratio of 
their production input factor prices (Bonart and Peters, 1997).  
A substantial amount of risk assessments are used in the Regional Water Utility that 
assess the probability of an impact from incidents, yet, little funding is available to 
reduce those risks. In a number of case studies (Chapter 5), it was found that the benefit 
of reducing the probability of incidents had been assessed previous to the occurrence of 
an incident. Due to the low cost benefit ratio, these investments were not carried out. As 
a consequence, these incidents were accepted by the Regional Water Utility as the best 
possible customer interest since reducing the risks i.e. the probability of incidents was 
not deemed to be in the interest of customers.  
Once the incident occurred the water utility mobilises its resources to reduce the impact 
of incidents and to re-instate normal operations. For this purpose, the Regional Water 
Utility maintains an incident control centre to manage incidents reactively.  
From a regulatory viewpoint, only a limited number of incidents led to prosecution and 
fines for water utilities (Table 65). From a theoretical perspective, it was argued that 
low fines discourage water utilities to reduce the frequency and impact of incidents on 
customers, since these fines are a factor to consider in the price of risk. If the price of 
risk would be higher by increasing the fines imposed on water utilities, the cost benefit 
equilibrium would shift towards more investment and maintenance spending. This, in 
turn, would require an increase in the water price to finance asset investment and 
maintenance, unless other sources of finance are obtained. 
In the current regulatory regime, it was found that shareholders in stock-market listed 
water companies enjoy near risk free returns on their investment (Figure 54) while their 
customers are exposed to frequent incidents from their water supply system.  
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6.5 Are water utilities high reliability organisations? 
This thesis set out to investigate High Reliability Theory in the context of water 
utilities. Technical and organisational reliability define the overall reliability of the 
organisation in pursuit of its organisational and societal objectives. It was found that the 
Regional Water Utility pursues two main objectives: Firstly, the provision of a safe and 
reliable drinking water supplies for customers in line with ‘level of service’ objectives 
set by the regulator and, secondly, shareholder value in investment, operations and 
maintenance decisions. It was found that this conflict of interest between financial 
returns on investment and public health concern is most evident in the asset 
management function. Here, the decision making processes consider the public health 
objective, public wealth objective (‘willingness to pay’) and the shareholder 
perspective. These conflicting objectives can be reduced to an asset risk trade-off model 
for investment and maintenance decision making. In this model, risks and risk 
reductions are assessed as monetary evaluation, i.e. risk units, the price of risk and the 
cost of asset investment and maintenance.  
With respect to HRO, the following model in Figure 56 was conceptualised. It 
represents a matrix to classify organisations according to their technical and 
organisational reliability.  
Traditional HRT consider a HRO to be technically and organisationally highly reliable. 
The evidence found in this research project does not consider water utilities to be 
technically highly reliable. It was found, however, that the reactive incident 
management organisation can be considered to be a high reliability function within the 
organisation. In this thesis, it was argued that many HRO principles were readily 
observable during incident management in the Regional Water Utility and the 
organisation excels in reactively responding to incidents. However, this was not 
observable consistently for all incidents investigated. In a number of case studies and 
incidents, the lack of one or more HRO principles during the management of incidents 
contributed to a prolonged incident duration or hazard exposure. A high reliability 
function – such as incident management – requires consistency in high reliability 
performance. On the other hand, the organisation has processes in place to review and 
learn from failure and deficiencies in the incident management response are sought out 
in incident review meetings. In considering the model below, the Regional Water Utility 
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is a medium reliability organisation based on medium to low technical reliability and 
medium to high organisational reliability in reactive incident management. 
Figure 56 also provides an economic perspective: In the Regional Water Utility, 
reactive asset maintenance and incident management are often considered to have a 
higher benefit cost ratio than pro-actively preventing incidents to occur. Again, 
technical and organisational reliability are, to some degree, substitutional. The reduction 
of incidents based on investments in technical reliability requires substantial investment 
and maintenance spending, whereas the comparative overheads for maintaining an 
incident management infrastructure are marginal in comparison.  
 
 
Figure 56 The trade-off between technical and organisational reliability 
 
In the outset of this thesis it is hypothesised that the “principles of HRO facilitate a) 
organisational resilience under trying conditions and b) learning from failure to 
enhance the safety and reliability of drinking water supply”. 
 
In Figure 38 it was demonstrated that the principles of HRO facilitate organisational 
resilience under trying conditions. It was shown that a positive correlation between 
incident impact reduction and increased observation of HRO principles exist. Therefore, 
the hypothesis is accepted. Considering type II error, the result is not significant.  
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In Chapter 5, it was demonstrated that the principles of HRO facilitate learning from 
failure to enhance the safety and reliability of drinking water supply. It was found that 
incident documentation and analysis can be effectively used to enhance risk 
assessments. These enhanced risk assessments could be subsequently used in asset 
investment and maintenance decision making. The hypothesis is accepted. Considering 
the type II error, the result is not significant.  
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7 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the observations and the studies conducted in the Regional Water Utility 
and other organisations suggest that many of the explored HRO characteristics 
contribute to reduce the public health impact of incidents and can also help a water 
utility to anticipate future risks and enhance their assessment.  
From a methodological perspective, HRO theory was specifically investigated under 
“trying conditions” (Weick, 1987) and the effects of HRO principles as a means of 
generating organisational resilience during incident situations were carefully studied. 
For this purpose, “the short periods of stress” (World Health Organisation, 2004) that 
define incidents were characterised in an assessment of incident frequencies, cause and 
effect relationships and impact on customers.  
 From the study of incidents, it is concluded that incidents frequently occur in the 
Regional Water Utility and water utilities in England and Wales.  
 The investigated incidents commonly unfolded under diverse cause and effect 
relationships.  
 The investigated incidents could be attributed to asset, process and human factor 
related causes. 
 In a number of incidents more than one cause was identified that contributed to 
the unfolding of incidents. 
 
The study of incidents was followed by an investigation of the benefit of HRO 
principles in incident management. Here, the incident impacts on customers and impact 
reductions were correlated with observation of high reliability principles under trying 
conditions. 
 It is concluded that many HRO principles were readily observable in the 
incident management capability of the Regional Water Utility.  
 A significant proportion of HRO principles are deemed cost beneficial in 
contributing to the safety and reliability of drinking water supply.  
 HRO principles contribute to a reduction of the incident impact on customers. 
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A specific HRO principle is the ability to learn from failure and, in this thesis, 
opportunities were sought and identified to learn from incident analyses to enhance risk 
assessments that are subsequently used for asset investment and maintenance decision 
making in asset management. 
 From the investigation into incident analysis and reviews it is concluded that the 
emphasis on technical failure and human error emphasises the need for operators 
to comply with standard operating procedures. These constitute normative and 
coercive pressures on staff to act in the interest of the organisation.  
 It is concluded that incident documentation and analysis provides a mechanism 
to learn from failures and incidents. 
 From the comparison of risk data with incident data it is concluded that 
discrepancies arise that may be explained with the psychological and 
sociological perception of risk rather than rational explanations.  
 Statistical analysis of incidents provides an opportunity to enhance and further 
structure risk assessments and can help organisations to prioritise risk 
assessment programmes.  
 
This thesis investigated the prevalence of incidents from a financial and customer 
perspective on the ‘price’ of risk and the benefit arising for customers to reduce the 
frequency or probability of incidents.   
 It is concluded that the price of risk can explain why incidents occur since a low 
price of risk in cost benefit analyses leads to lower investment and maintenance 
in water supply assets.  
 
A limited number of recommendations are formulated for how water utilities should 
make use of the research results obtained in this research project.  
Firstly, the comparative analysis of incidents may provide a tool for water industry 
regulators to monitor the frequency and impact of incidents on customers beyond the 
current level of service indicators used in England and Wales.  
From a regulatory perspective, the monitoring of frequency, exposure to hazard types 
and failure modes, the size of populations exposed to hazards or failures and the 
duration of exposure may provide effective performance monitoring criteria for 
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benchmarking effective risk management. Beyond the monitoring of operational 
performance of water utility, this methodology may also be used to strengthen their 
assessment of capital investment and maintenance by considering the costs of incidents 
and future risks. This cost evaluation should consider the direct consequential cost of 
incidents to water utilities, customer expectations and public interests whilst identifying 
the opportunity cost of enhanced investments and maintenance that reduce the cost of 
reactive incident management.  
The analyses of incidents in Chapter 2 may provide the basis for further strengthening 
failure reporting and analysis with a view to enhance the analysis of future risk as 
described in Chapter 4. In particular, the clear definition of failure modes, causes, 
effects and impact of incidents may enhance the practicality of failure analysis as a 
feasible methodology to anticipate future risks.  
 
Secondly, the HRO principles investigated in Chapter 3 may provide useful 
benchmarking criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of incident management 
interventions. Following an incident, these criteria may be used to evaluate the 
organisational effeciveness in managing the incident and may help water utilities to 
strengthen the organisational design for effective incident management capabilities. 
Water utilities may also want to consider these HRO principles for the management of 
interagency - and stakeholder relationships. To this end, it is recommended that water 
utilities evaluate these principles for interagency relationships concerning coordinated 
incident management but also for wider water utility relationships with agencies e.g. for 
capital investment and maintenance decision making.  
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8 Suggestions for further work 
This study has predominantly concentrated on one water utility and as such is not 
representative for the entire water sector. It was reasoned that “unlike pure sciences, in 
which theories are assessed by how much empirical activity they provoke, the insights 
of safety scientists and safety practitioners are ultimately judged by the extend to which 
their practical application leads to safer systems” (Reason, 2000b). In reflecting on 
Reason’s (2000b) quote, not the average water utility was of interest in this study but 
the ones who were thought to exceed their peer group in the provision of safe and 
reliable drinking water. In that sense, the selection of participants and the Regional 
Water Utility represent a non-random selection of “extreme samples” i.e. experts in 
their field and organisations with advanced risk management capabilities (Schnell et al., 
1995). In this project, it was sought to enhance risk assessment capabilities in one 
organisation that is already considered to be advanced in its approach to risk assessment 
and management. Hence, the study of excellence justified the use of limited contributors 
and the study of one Regional Water Utility, if that study reflects ‘best practice’ insights 
and learning opportunities for other water utilities.  
The ideas, concepts, models and methodologies in this thesis were previously publicly 
communicated and this thesis provides a channel for other water utilities to compare 
their systems, processes and operational philosophy to this case study. From an 
academic perspective, it is suggested to further investigate HRO principles and risk 
management practice in other water utilities. These studies should focus on the role of 
the incident review meeting and the psychological and sociological pressures that may 
bias the quality of incident review data. A further research need also arises for 
investigating the transition of organisations that aim to implement HRO principles and 
enhanced risk management capabilities in their organisations.  
 
A further research idea arose from the review of financial risk: In chapter 5, the 
financial evaluation of risk was introduced. It was found that financial risk in the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is evaluated as the retrospective measure of cash 
flow volatility in the past 60 months. An equity beta factor is calculated that is used to 
derive an interest rate for the valuation of assets or businesses. In capital valuation, the 
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net present value of future cash flows is calculated to derive its current value with an 
interest rate reflecting retrospective risk. Two methodological problems arise: firstly, it 
is assumed that the retrospective risk factor beta is representative for future risk. In 
reality, a high beta asset will be evaluated at a high interest rate even if future risks, i.e. 
volatility in future cash flows, are perceived to be lower. This could arise through 
enhanced risk management. Secondly, as a consequence, rapidly diminishing discount 
factors are used to evaluate future profits. This emphasises cash flows in the near future 
to be more relevant for the overall value of the business than cash flows further in the 
future. On the other hand, a low beta asset is evaluates future profit expectations at a 
low interest rate even if that asset faces high future risks. The discount factor used to 
evaluate future profits diminishes at a lower rate than a high interest discount rate. As a 
consequence, a low risk asset has a longer investment horizon than a high risk asset and, 
therefore, a high beta asset requires shorter term risk management capability than a low 
beta asset. In this proposed project, a different methodology to asset evaluation is to be 
investigated: Rather than using a retrospective asset beta derived interest rate, future 
cash flows are evaluated at a risk-free interest rate and risks that are perceived to affect 
an asset in the future are discounted as a future cash flow. This methodology would 
fully integrate risk assessment and management into the valuation of asset and places a 
greater emphasis on consistency and accuracy of risk assessments and risk evaluation.  
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1 Appendix - Asset risk trade-off model  
The following model, adapted from Bonart and Peters (1997), is a general mathematical 
model to facilitate the internalisation of risk in asset investment decision making.  
A water utility uses technologies to transform input factors into outputs. The three main 
input factors are commonly known as capital, labour and natural resources. The 
management process considers which production factors to use, how to combine these 
production factors and the prices for production factors as well as the market prices for 
the output. 
Similar to capital, labour and natural resources, it is assumed that risk can be allocated 
an incremental unit and a market price. Increasingly, risk assessments are used in the 
water sector to assess the inherent risk units of water supply systems (Deere et al., 
2001) and commercial or monetary evaluation  methods are used to derive the cost of 
risk (Lifton and Smeaton, 2003; Lifton, 2005; Abell, 2005). Based on this development, 
‘risk’, i.e. the probability of adverse effects, is assumed the fourth production input 
factor i1 besides labour, capital and natural resources.   
In this paper formalises the relationship between units of risk, their market value and the 
substitution of risk with risk reduction measures. 
 
A production function describes the quantitative correlation between production input 
factors and outputs (Bonart and Peters, 1997). Production functions can be distinguished 
in two different groups. Firstly, substitutional production functions and secondly, linear 
– limitational production functions (Bonart and Peters, 1997). In substitutional 
production functions the input factors can be substituted within a reasonable area of the 
function, whereas in limitational production functions the input factors are set at a 
particular ratio (Bonart and Peters, 1997). Substitutional production functions allow the 
substitution of production input factors without an effect on the overall output (Bonart 
and Peters, 1997). In analogy, risk can be substituted by investing in assets that are 
designed to reduce the exposure to health hazard. The Cobb-Douglas function is such a 
production function (Bonart and Peters, 1997). In Equation 1, it takes the form: 
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( ) ( )αα −∗∗= 12121 , iiaiio  
with 
o = output 
i = production input factor 
10 ≤≤ α  
Equation 1 Cobb-Douglas-production function 
 
Figure 1 shows a projection of iso-quantitative outputs, for Equation 1. For the purpose 
of this figure, the input factors capital, labour and natural resources were aggregated in 
i2. 
The axes of this figure represent unit values for risk and combined unit values for 
capital, labour and natural resource that produce a quantity of equal output. Each point 
on a graph represents equal output in units drinking water and theoretically 
demonstrates the substitutional character of the two production input factors to achieve 
constant unit output.  
It is important to note that only the combination of input factors provides an output, 
hence a full substitution of one input factor is not defined in this function. This is, e.g., 
reflected in the idea that a residual risk in a water supply system cannot be reduced to 
zero.  
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Figure 1 Horizontal projection of equal output in production based on substitution of production 
input factors 
 
Figure 2 is a vertical projection of a substitutional production function describing the 
correlation of a constant production input factor i1 (risk units) and a variable production 
input factor i2 (labour, capital and natural resources units) in relation to the output 
(Bonart and Peters, 1997).  
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Figure 2 Vertical projection of substitutional production function, adapted from (Bonart and 
Peters, 1997) 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the productivity of one input factor in relation to outputs and 
measures the change in output for an infinitesimal change of one variable production 
input factor i2 at a constant production input factor i1. Figure 2 illustrates the principle of 
diminishing marginal returns and increasing the variable input will eventually result in 
diminishing outputs. The productivity ratio is a differential equation for a variable 
production input factor i2, a constant i1 and output. This is shown in Equation 2 
2
'
2 i
o
oi δ
δ
=  
Equation 2 Differential equation for productivity with one variable production input factor 
 
The optimal combination of input factors depends on both factor productivities. 
Therefore, Equation 3 takes the form  
( ) ( ) ( ) 212'12,1'21 ;, 21 diiiodiiioiido ir ∗+∗=  
Equation 3 Total differential equation for productivity with two variables production input factors 
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For the optimal equilibrium, Equation 3 equals zero and the iso-quants shown in Figure 
1 can be derived that demonstrate the substitutional character of Equation 1 for a 
constant output. The rate of substitution is defined in Equation 4 
1
2
di
di
 at consto =  
Equation 4 Rate of technical substitution 
 
From re-arranging Equation 3 it can be demonstrated that the rate of substitution is the 
negative, reciprocal ratio of productivities for the variable production input factors. This 
is shown in Equation 5 
1
2
di
di ( )
( )12'
2,1
'
,
2
1
iio
iio
i
i
−=  at consto =  
Equation 5 Rates of substitution in relation to production input factor productivities 
 
Economic decisions in a firm are based on the overriding aim to maximise wealth for 
shareholders and owners. (In a water utility, the owner can be a public authority 
representing public interest.) In a free market, this is a function of turnover, i.e. market 
price times the production output minus costs. Equation 6 is the basis for decision 
making and determines the magnitude of production output in relation to the unit price 
for production input factors  
( ) ( ) )(, 212,121 21 ipipiiopiiP iio ∗+∗−∗=  
with 
P = profit 
p = market price 
Equation 6 Primary economic function for decision making in production 
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To maximize wealth, the differential equation for i1 and i2 in Equation 6 equal zero and 
take the form of Equation 7 
( ) )(
111 2,1
''
iioi piiopP −∗=   
( ) )(
222 1,2
''
iioi piiopP −∗=  
Equation 7 Differential equations to maximise wealth 
 
Equation 7 is the productivity of production input factor i1 and i2 taking into account the 
market price for services provided and the cost for unit input factors, i.e. price for unit 
risk and capital, labour and natural resource unit prices, respectively. Therefore, 
Equation 7 can be rewritten to Equation 8: 
o
i
i p
p
o 1
1
'
=  and 
o
i
i p
p
o 2
2
'
=  
Equation 8 Productivity relation to output price and production input factor prices 
 
With Equation 5 describing the rate of technical substitution to be the negative, 
reciprocal ratio of productivities for the variable production input factors, we can re-
write Equation 8 to  
2
1
2
1
'
'
i
i
i
i
p
p
o
o
=  
Equation 9 Ratio of production input factor productivities in relation to ratio of production input 
factor prices 
 
Equation 9 and Equation 5 are based on the ratio of productivities of production input 
factors and aggregate to 
2
1
1
2
i
i
p
p
di
di
−=  
Equation 10 Relation between the rate of technical substitution and ratio of production input factor 
prices 
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Equation 10 describes the rate of technical substitution to be the negative ratio of the 
production input factor prices (Bonart and Peters, 1997). It demonstrates that the 
optimal rate of substitution for production input factors is directly dependant on their 
factor prices (Bonart and Peters, 1997). This equation explains the need to optimize the 
production process whenever factor prices change so that a maximum level of wealth or 
benefit is being created (Bonart and Peters, 1997).  
Figure 3 is an example for the technical substitution of risk with assets that are designed 
to reduce the health effects from hazards in drinking water supply. In this model, the 
increasing provision of water treatment capability reduces public health risks or the 
exposure to water-related hazards.  
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Figure 3 Example for technical  substitution of risks with assets aimed at reducing the health 
exposure to hazards in a drinking water supply 
 
However, Figure 3 does not consider the cost of assets or the cost of risk to derive the 
optimal, technical rate of substitution between assets and risk. Whereas the cost of 
physical assets, labour and natural resources are commonly obtainable on markets, the 
derivation of the cost of risk is more complex. It depends on multiple factors such as the 
risk model used to derive the units of risk. In Deere et al.  (2001) this is function of the 
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dose response to hazards, the size of the population affected by hazards and the duration 
of hazard exposure. Evaluating the ‘price’ of risk can use several approaches that often 
depend on the type of organisation. An unregulated, private company that pursues the 
objective to maximise shareholder value would only consider its direct, consequential 
cost. These include all legal, economic and financial costs arising from adversities. 
From a public perspective, further costs can arise that are known as externalities 
(Endres, 1994), i.e. moral or social ‘costs’ that are not accounted for in the production 
function of a private company. These costs often represent non-monetary costs or costs 
that are less tangible, e.g. loss of life, reduced life expectancy, loss of earnings due to 
illness, reduced economic growth, costs for the National Health Service etc.. In other 
words, internalising these externalities in the production function may have additional 
benefits for society as a whole or individual groups. One of the reasons why the public 
sector is often seen to operate inefficiently is because they often have a wider 
understanding of benefits arising from their decision-making that considers social costs. 
An investment schemes that is financially not viable may have the additional advantage 
of reducing unemployment or stimulating economic growth. 
Another model to evaluate  the ‘price’ of risk evaluates ‘willingness of customers  to 
pay’  for benefits arising from measures to reduce risks or the likelihood of an incident 
to occur (UK Water Industry Research Limited, 2002). It is based on economic 
valuations with stated preference techniques (Bateman et al., 2002). Here, the ‘price’ of 
risk takes the form of opportunity cost that a water utility customer is willing to pay to 
reduce risk or the likelihood of an incident to occur (UK Water Industry Research 
Limited, 2002; Bateman et al., 2002).  
Using risk units and the ‘price’ of risk in investment decision-making is a form of cost 
benefit analysis. Here, the benefit arises through risk reduction that is balanced with the 
cost of investment and maintenance in assets. 
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2 Appendix - The asset management process 
The asset management process 
The asset management process is a multiple step process.  
The key steps of the asset management process are: 
• Setting operational objectives for assets 
• Definition of risk & risk identification 
• Data from asset performance, statistical data, reliability data 
• Acceptability criteria for public health risks, Health, Safety & Welfare, access, lifting & 
maintenance 
• Risk assessment & prioritisation 
• Specification of water safety criteria based on public health risk assessment 
• Engineering specification, e.g. technical reliability 
• Design specification for data flow, monitoring & control 
• Design of incident detection and response procedure 
• Normal & abnormal operating procedures 
A conceptual process flow model is shown below.  
 
 
Figure 4 The asset management process 
 
The Context of an effective water safety strategy has been identified and summarised from the water 
safety literature, engineering standards, regulatory expectations and industry practice (Deutsche 
Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) (DVGW). The DVGW, in particular, has designed 
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an audit-based water safety management system (TSM) (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) reflecting international understanding of best practice in utility management to 
achieve water safety. TSM does not fully match the requirements of a Water Safety Plan with respect to 
risk assessments. Therefore, additional criteria from the New Zealand framework for risk management 
plans (Ministry of Health, 2005a) with specific respect to risk assessments were introduced. 
 
 
Setting operational objectives for physical assets (British Standard Institution, 2003) 
GOAL 
The organisation identifies the required performance and reliability of assets and evaluates their failure in 
terms of impact on public health, Safety, Health, Environment, Welfare of employees.  
INPUT 
Strategic objectives for the organisation 
Data from asset performance monitoring  
OUTPUT 
Assessment criteria to identify risks in relation to strategic and operational objectives 
Clear vision and mission statements communicated to utility operations and functions in water utility 
DESCRIPTION 
The operational objectives identify the scope for asset management. From the organisational objectives, 
risks can be defined, identified and assessed.  
General aspects of utility management and decision-making 
Organisational structure (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation receives regular and up-to-date information relevant to the water sector. 
 The organisation maintains an organisational plan (organogram) mentioning functional units and 
the names of their directing managers. 
 The competencies, duties and responsibilities of functional units and their directing managers are 
defined and documented. 
 The allocation of staff and responsibilities to functional units is unambiguous with a clear 
reporting structure.  
 The organisational plan includes all employees. 
 The organisation plan highlights authorised personnel to obtain legal and regulatory permissions. 
 One functional unit is responsible for customer care and public communication.  
Functional descriptions and definition of duties and responsibilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des 
Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The functions of organisational units are described and highlight the main areas of duty and 
responsibility. 
 The interfaces between functional units are defined and described? 
 The functional description for management staff provides details on duties, authorisations and 
area of responsibility. They are provided to management staff. 
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 Functional managers are provided with a description of competencies, responsibility, reporting 
structure to superiors and subordinates. 
Rules of delegation (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Delegated powers and acting responsibilities for functional managers and directors are defined 
and made available to staff. 
 Delegated powers and acting responsibilities are documented in the organisational plan.  
Economic control (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 A long-term strategy to ensure the safety of drinking water resources, abstraction, treatment and 
distribution is defined.  
 Criteria for economic viability for individual capital investments are defined. 
 Criteria are defined to determine capital investment needs and their financing.  
 The organisation defines processes and responsibilities for billing, accounting and financial 
controlling.  
 The organisation has a defined system to maintain and administrate insurance cover.  
Qualifications of personnel/ CPD (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The responsible managers in functional units are sufficiently qualified. Their qualification is 
stated in the organisational plan and known across the organisation.  
 The organisation maintains documented requirements on qualifications and relevant experience 
for functional and task orientated employment positions. 
 The documented requirements on qualifications and relevant experience are defined and adhered 
to in the recruitment process or the process of promoting staff.  
 Qualifications of staff are kept on record and updated. 
 Functional and task orientated CPD and training are systematically derived according to the 
needs of the functional unit. 
 Regulatory requirements for training are planned, executed on the planned date and documented. 
The documentation includes the content of the training course and attending employees.  
 Employees are given the opportunity to contribute to the planning of CDP and staff training. 
 
 
Definition of risk & risk identification (hazard assessment and risk characterisation) (World Health 
Organisation, 2004) 
GOAL 
The organisation gains clarity of scope to manage risks. The definition and identification of risk focuses 
the attention of management towards assessment and control of risks.  
INPUT 
Definition of operational objectives from which the definition of risk is derived. 
Asset performance data 
Monitoring in normal operation 
Incident detection and response procedure 
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OUTPUT 
The output of this process is a risk register in relation to the organisational objective. The subsequent 
assessment benches the risk against acceptability criteria and prioritises all risks.  
 
DESCRIPTION 
The definition of risk comprises of adverse events or significant deviations from normal operations 
(failure event) and likelihood. The risk definition names and describes the relationship of “failures” from 
event as a top down approach from strategic level to operations level. The identification of susceptibility 
to failure events is a process that is informed by the definition of risk, asset performance data and 
operational objectives for assets in a bottom up approach from operations level to strategic level.  
 
 
Risk assessment ( hazard assessment and risk characterisation (World Health Organisation, 2004)) 
GOAL 
The organisation identifies the level of system reliability in a water supply system via the assessment of 
risks using the previous definition and identification of risks. 
The process of risk assessment considers probabilities, return periods or frequencies and the 
consequences of risk. Ideally, the consequences of risk are measures with a common denominator as unit 
risk (Deere et al., 2001).  
INPUT 
Definition and identified risk 
Acceptability criteria for risk 
OUTPUT 
Assessment of risks in comparison to overall risks in the organisation 
Prioritisation of risks  
Information to focus management activity, risk control and investment strategy 
DESCRIPTION 
The assessment process determines the level of safety built into a water supply system 
General  
 The assessment considers causes for public health risks, preventative measures, checking the 
preventative measures and corrective actions. Probability and consequence are assessed as rare, 
unlikely, possible, likely, almost certain and insignificant, minor, moderate, major and 
catastrophic, respectively (Ministry of Health, 2005a). 
 The assessment considers demographic change and age of population with respect to demand for 
water when assessing supply systems (Winkler, 2006). 
Hazard analysis/ risk assessment Catchment 
Surface and groundwater 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for source water 
(surface and groundwater) to assess receiving discharges or leachate from a contaminated site, 
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discharges from domestic or industrial processes (direct or indirect), discharges from mining 
operations, leachate from landfill sites, waste originally discharged to land, spillages or leakage 
from storage or use of hazardous substances, septic tank discharges, run-off from urban or sealed 
surfaces, material from surface impoundments, treated effluent or untreated effluent from ponds, 
waste disposal in wells and bores, leakage of contaminants from abandoned or decommissioned 
wells, faecal matter from livestock or feral animals, agrichemicals, contaminants washed into 
source water during irrigation, sediments and agrichemical from forestry activity, fertilisers 
during application, geothermal contaminants, mineral deposits, intruding saline water and 
potential of experiencing algae bloom. (Ministry of Health, 2002b) 
Hazard analysis/ risk assessment Abstraction 
Boreholes and Wells 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for boreholes 
and wells to assess potential for not enough source water available for abstraction, contamination 
of bore/well during construction, ingress of contaminated water into the bore/well from 
shallower depths, ingress of contaminated water getting into the bore/well from the surface, 
contamination of the aquifer and too little water can be drawn from the bore/well to meet 
demand. (Ministry of Health, 2001f) 
Groundwater abstraction – Springs 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for spring source 
water, in particular assessing availability of source water for abstraction, contamination of the 
spring box, contamination of the aquifer, too little source water to be drawn from the spring 
resulting in low pressures and potential sucking in contaminants (Ministry of Health, 2001g).   
Surface water abstraction 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the surface 
water abstraction from lakes and reservoirs, in particular assessing availability of source water 
for abstraction, raw water quality too poor for treatment, contamination of the lake or reservoir 
and factors contributing to flows too little water to be drawn from intake to meet demand 
resulting in low pressures and potential for suction of contaminant into the source(Ministry of 
Health, 2001j). 
River, Streams and Infiltration Galleries 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of source abstraction from rivers streams and infiltration galleries, in particular 
assessing availability of source water for abstraction, raw water quality too poor for treatment, 
contamination of the river or stream, water quality not improved by infiltration gallery, 
infiltration gallery producing insufficient flows, abstraction flows from the intake do not meet 
demand. (Ministry of Health, 2001k) 
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Hazard analysis/ risk assessment Water Treatment processes 
Design of treatment plant 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the design of 
water treatment plants, in particular assessing the potential of a treatment plant unable to produce 
water of satisfactory quality or sufficient flows. (Ministry of Health, 2001u)  
 
Operation of transmission, bore and process pumps  
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the operation 
of transmission, bore and process pumps, in particular assessing changes in pressures from the 
bore and the potential to suck contaminants into the water, changes in pressure (Transient 
pressures) from transmission pumps and the potential to suck contaminants into the water and 
incorrect chemical dosing leading to poor treatment performance. (Ministry of Health, 2002d) 
Water Transmission 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for water 
transmission, in particular assessing contamination entering into trunk mains, sediment 
containing contaminants being stirred up, contamination gets into open channel conduits and 
break pressure tanks.(Ministry of Health, 2001x)  
Destratification 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of destratification techniques in lakes and reservoirs, in particular assessing poor 
mixing of the water body leading to algae blooms, raw water unsuitable for treatment and 
difficult treatment control because of variability in raw water quality. (Ministry of Health, 
2001h) 
Application of algaecides 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of algaecides, in particular assessing events where too much algaecides are added to 
the water, algaecides dosing cannot reduce very high algae population and the formation of 
disinfection by-products when barley straw is used as an algaecide. (Ministry of Health, 2002a) 
Pre-oxidation  
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of pre-oxidation, in particular assessing oxidant doses too low or too high and the 
excessive formation of oxidant by-products (Ministry of Health, 2005b) 
Waste-Liquor Reintroduction 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the re-
introduction of waste-liquor re-introduction, in particular assessing re-introduction of previously 
removed contaminants and loss of process control. (Ministry of Health, 2001i)  
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pH adjustment 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment of pH 
adjustment, in particular too high pH resulting in poor disinfection with chlorine, pH levels to 
low dissolving heavy metals and germs introduced during aeration. (Ministry of Health, 2001t) 
Coagulation, Flocculation and Sedimentation 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of coagulation, flocculation and sedimentation processes, in particular assessing 
particles not being removed, natural organic matter not being removed and treatment chemicals 
carried into distribution system. (Ministry of Health, 2001o) 
Direct Filtration 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of direct filtration processes, in particular assessing particles not being removed, 
natural organic matter not being removed and treatment chemical carried into the distribution 
system. (Ministry of Health, 2001p) 
 
Slow sand filtration 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of rapid sand filtration, in particular assessing particles not being removed and 
natural organic matter not being removed. (Ministry of Health, 2001z) 
Rapid Sand filtration 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of rapid sand filtration, in particular assessing particles not being removed, natural 
organic matter not being removed and treatment chemicals carried into the distribution system. 
(Ministry of Health, 2001y) 
Application of cartridge filtration 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of cartridge filtration units, in particular assessing particle removal below 2-3 µm in 
size (Cryptosporidium ocysts), removal of target chemical contaminants and growth of germs in 
the filter. (Ministry of Health, 2001l) 
Membrane filtration 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of membrane filtration units, in particular assessing membranes not performing to 
specifications e.g. relating to Cryptosporidium ocyst removal, membrane failure and membrane 
cleaning chemicals present in water. (Ministry of Health, 2001r) 
Removal of iron and manganese 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of iron and manganese removal processes, in particular assessing not all manganese 
removed in oxidation or ion exchange, oxidant doses too high, germs introduced during aeration 
and build-up of germs in the resin bed. (Ministry of Health, 2002c) 
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Softening 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of softening processes in ion exchange units, in particular assessing build-up of 
germs in the resin bed (Ministry of Health, 2002e). 
Trace organics removal (Granulated Activated Carbon (GAC)) 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of trace organics removal, in particular assessing effects of too little or no powdered 
activated carbon dosed, inability of GAC to remove all trace organic compounds and growth of 
germs in the GAC bed (Ministry of Health, 2001v). 
Chlorination 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of chlorination, in particular assessing not enough free available chlorine, too much 
free available chlorine and excessive formation of chlorination by-products (Ministry of Health, 
2001m).  
Chlorine Dioxide 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of chlorine dioxide, in particular assessing the chlorine dioxide concentration too low 
or too high and excessive formation of by-products from chlorine dioxide application. (Ministry 
of Health, 2001n) 
Ozone disinfection 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of ozone disinfection, in particular assessing ozone concentrations too low and 
excessive formation of ozonation by-products (Ministry of Health, 2001s). 
UV irradiation 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of UV irradiation, in particular assessing too low UV doses and re-infection and 
germ revival (Ministry of Health, 2001w). 
Fluoridation 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for the 
application of fluoridation, in particular assessing fluoride concentrations greater than required 
for dental protection. (Ministry of Health , 2001q) 
Hazard analysis/ risk assessment Drinking water storage 
Post treatment storage 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for post 
treatment storage, in particular assessing excessive demand over supply as this reduces the 
pressure and may allow re-contamination of drinking water, introduction of contamination 
material into service reservoir, development and re-suspension of sediment within reservoir and 
chlorine contact time. (Ministry of Health, 2001c) 
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Hazard analysis/ risk assessment Drinking water distribution 
Distribution operation and maintenance  
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for normal 
operation and maintenance of distribution networks, in particular assessing the introduction of 
contaminating materials, re-suspension of contaminants in sediments, development of sediment 
or biofilms and failure to maintain sufficient water pressures.(Ministry of Health, 2001b) 
Backflow prevention 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for backflow 
prevention, in particular assessing water pressures in the distribution system in relation to 
supplied premises and requirements for backflow prevention devices (Ministry of Health, 
2001a). 
System pressure 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for maintaining 
adequate system pressures in the distribution network, in particular assessing the introduction of 
contamination from pressure fluctuation and re-suspension of sediments or biofilm within the 
mains by pressure fluctuations. (Ministry of Health, 2001d) 
 
Hazard Analysis/Risk Assessment 
Monitoring water quality from catchment to tap 
 The organisation carries out a public health hazard analysis and risk assessment for monitoring 
water quality from catchment to tap, in particular assessing water quality data used for supply 
management. (Ministry of Health, 2001e) 
 
 
Acceptability criteria and specification for public health risk control, physical asset reliability, 
access lifting and maintenance, Health & Safety, Welfare and Environment,  in relation to physical 
assets operation (Define monitoring and control measures) (World Health Organisation, 2004)  
GOAL 
The organisation defines the acceptability of risks in order to assess the need to control risks and identify 
acceptable controls for risks. These are the benchmarks during risk assessment and reliability of systems 
design. 
With risk acceptability criteria, the organisation has the ability to convert (public health) risk assessments 
into physical asset specifications. These asset specifications determine systems reliability for physical 
assets.  
INPUT 
Definition of risk  
Risk assessment  
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OUTPUT 
Acceptability criteria for risk 
Specifications for acceptable levels of risk in physical assets 
Ability to design solutions for multiple barriers to control risk to acceptable standard whilst optimising 
strategic business objectives 
DESCRIPTION 
The acceptability of a risk reflects societal values (moral, economic and financial cost). Acceptability 
criteria for risks are the benchmark in risk assessments but also establish a specification for the design of 
a multiple barrier system to control risks to acceptable standards. The reliability of a system is ultimately 
specified for the interaction between assets, equipment and component with performance criteria that are 
subject to a risk assessment.  
Documentation of Specifications (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Codes of practice, design standards and specifications are kept up to date and are readily 
available. 
 Acts of parliament and specific regulations are kept up to date and are readily available. 
 Changes to acts of parliament, regulations, codes of practices, design standards, specifications 
are assessed and disseminated to functional units within the organisation.  
 Functional units have access to any information above customised to their needs and level of 
detail required.  
Specification for watershed/aquifer protection  
Surface and groundwater 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2002b). 
Specification of water abstraction facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  
2003) 
 The organisation has defined criteria for the exploration of water resources that consider the 
known, natural environment. The definition contains criteria for source protection, flow and 
quantitative criteria, riparian competition for water resources.  
 The choice of service providers commissioned to explore water resources for the organisation 
considers their qualifications, expertise and compliance with technical specifications.  
Boreholes and Wells 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001f). 
Groundwater abstraction – Springs 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001g).   
Surface water abstraction 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001j). 
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River, Streams and Infiltration Galleries 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001k) 
 
Specification of water treatment facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  
2003) 
 The organisation has defined criteria for the planning of water treatment facilities.  
 The defined specifications aim to achieve legislative and regulatory requirements for safe 
drinking water. 
 In addition to compliance with legislative and regulatory requirements for safe drinking water, 
specifications reflect best practice in the design of water treatment processes based on water 
sector experience (e.g. turbidity, iron, manganese). 
 The organisation maintains an asset register of water treatment works which operate processes 
critical to public health, i.e. where process failure has an impact on public health. 
 The organisation maintains an asset register of water treatment works where microbiologically 
contaminated raw water is processes and disinfected. The organisation ensures that no public 
health impact can arise from these plants.  
 Wastes from treatment processes have specified routes of disposal (e.g.  recycling, disposal, 
discharge) which reflects legislative and regulatory requirements.  
 Disinfection products and processes are specified. 
Design of treatment plant 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001u)  
Operation of transmission, bore and process pumps  
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2002d) 
Water Transmission 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures.(Ministry of Health, 2001x)  
Destratification 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001h) 
Application of algaecides 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2002a) 
Pre-oxidation  
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2005b) 
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Waste-Liquor Reintroduction 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001i)  
pH adjustment 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001t) 
Coagulation, Flocculation and Sedimentation 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001o) 
Direct Filtration 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001p) 
Slow sand filtration 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001z) 
Rapid Sand filtration 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001y) 
Application of cartridge filtration 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001l) 
Membrane filtration 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001r) 
Removal of iron and manganese 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2002c) 
Softening 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2002e). 
Trace organics removal (Granulated Activated Carbon (GAC)) 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001v). 
Chlorination 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001m).  
Chlorine Dioxide 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001n) 
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Ozone disinfection 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001s). 
UV irradiation 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001w). 
Fluoridation 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health , 2001q) 
 
Specification of water storage facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  
2003) 
 The organisation has defined criteria for the planning of water storage facilities.  
 The organisation has defined criteria for the usage of materials approved for water storage 
facilities. 
 Cement-based plant components that are in direct contact with drinking water have specified 
material properties.  
 Cleaning agents and process are specified. 
Post treatment storage 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001c) 
 
Specification of water distribution facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  
2003) 
 The organisation has defined criteria for the planning of water distribution mains and networks. 
 The organisation has defined criteria to distinguish between pipe work repair and replacement. A 
process is in place to assess the results from pipe inspections that systematically considers 
criteria of increased leakage frequencies. 
 The organisation has defined criteria for consultants and contractors to plan and design water 
distribution mains and networks (Contract specifications).  
 Plant components which are in direct contact with drinking water have specified material 
properties (cement based, metals) 
 The welding processes are defined and specify criteria for the qualification and experience of 
welders. 
 The procedure of tying-in pipe work to existing mains & networks and disinfection is specified. 
 Setting out procedures are defined and specified.  
 A pressure test for new pipe work is specified. 
 A commissioning procedure incl. water quality testing for new pipe work is specified. 
 The organisation defines criteria for CaCO3 solubility.  
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 The organisation defines specifications for pipe materials.  
Distribution operation and maintenance  
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures(Ministry of Health, 2001b) 
Backflow prevention 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001a). 
System pressure 
 Based on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures. (Ministry of Health, 2001d) 
 
Quality monitoring and assurance (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The location, water quality parameters and intervals for water quality sampling is specified. 
 Water quality sampling for distribution networks is specified for regular intervals but also during 
maintenance and cleaning procedures. 
 The analysis of water quality samples is executed in accredited laboratories where personnel is 
trained, qualified and accredited. The accredited laboratory operates a quality assurance system.  
 The laboratory is accredited under ISO 17025.  
 The laboratory immediately reports exceeding water quality parameters. A robust system of 
communication is in place.  
 
Monitoring water quality from catchment to tap 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the organisation has specifications and specified procedures for 
control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001e) 
 
Management of materials (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 A system is in place that defines responsibilities and interfaces for the technical specifications 
and the selection of materials and equipment that is used for plant design and work procedures. 
 Minimal requirements for materials are specified, monitored and controlled.  
 Minimal requirements for stocking of material are specified for incident and emergency 
responses. 
 Minimal stocking levels for materials are controlled and monitored. 
 The storage of materials complies with manufacturers’ recommendations and specifications. 
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Design definition  of process control data, information (Define monitoring and control measures) 
and definition of operator interface (Standard Operating Procedure) (Supporting programmes) 
(World Health Organisation, 2004) 
GOAL 
The organisation has the ability to monitor (operational) performance risks within a designed system 
architecture of operational data and clear operating definitions at operations level. The operator interface 
enables the ability of clear decision making during normal operations and highlights abnormal operating 
conditions.  
The operational interface for operators is designed for optimal operability, access lifting and maintenance. 
INPUT 
Design objectives for asset 
OUTPUT 
Design specification for project implementation, asset creation & integration 
DESCRIPTION 
The data strategy facilitates data and information required for optimal operation of physical assets. 
The definition of the operator interface drives the optimal design of assets to be operable, accessible and 
maintainable. It defines clear operating procedures for routine tasks and facilitates adequate ability to 
intervene during emergencies. Standard operating procedures and emergency responses are clearly set out 
in the operations & maintenance (O&M) manual.  
 
Project Implementation, Asset creation & integration (design, construction and commissioning) 
(Supporting programmes (World Health Organisation, 2004)) 
GOAL 
The organisation has the ability to effectively integrate new asset projects. The integration considers 
design, construction, commissioning and handover to operations.  
The integration process effectively manages risks to existing operations but also future risks from the 
asset being created.  
INPUT 
Acceptability criteria for risk 
Specifications for assets 
OUTPUT 
Operational assets that comply with risk based specifications for public health protection, acceptable risk 
in HSE, designed for operability, access, lifting and maintenance 
DESCRIPTION 
The creation and integration of new assets into the existing infrastructure entails the processes are design, 
construction and commissioning. The new asset requires the “translation” of specifications, design 
rationale and scope into an operable asset. Process controls are required to ensure that specified reliability 
of the system is built into the infrastructure, i.e. performance requirements are met in the subsequent 
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operation of the asset. Furthermore, the asset creation process has to manage risks to existing asset 
operations.  
Planning of water abstraction facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  
2003) 
 The pre-selection process for exploration of water resources uses an expert peer review to 
determine the feasibility. 
 The criteria for planning water abstraction plants are defined and documented.  
 The criteria for planning water abstraction plants comply with legislative, regulatory 
requirements and codes of practices (e.g. well head protection against floods, water ingress from 
ducting, etc).  
 Constraints from the licensing and regulatory authorities during design and construction of water 
abstraction plants are adhered to and complied with.  
Construction of water abstraction plants (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  
2003) 
 The organisation has defined criteria for the choice of consultants and contractors to build water 
abstraction plants.  
 The monitoring and supervision of construction activities is ensured. 
 The monitoring and supervision of construction activities is documented (e.g. daily log). 
 Constraints from planning and regulatory authorities are monitored for compliance. 
 The handover procedure for the plant is defined, documented and kept on record for the duration 
of the asset life.  
Capital maintenance and decommissioning of water abstraction plant (Deutsche Vereinigung des 
Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The responsibilities for maintenance within the organisation are defined. 
 The maintenance of water abstraction plant is conducted by competent personnel, consultant or 
contractor 
 The condition of plant is monitored and documented.  
 The responsibilities for decommissioning within the organisation are defined. 
 The decommissioning of water abstraction plant is conducted by competent personnel, 
consultant or contractor 
Planning of water treatment works (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The criteria for planning water abstraction plants are defined and documented.  
 The criteria for planning water abstraction plants comply with legislative, regulatory 
requirements and codes of practices. 
 Constraints from the licensing and regulatory authorities during design and construction of water 
abstraction plants are adhered to and complied with.  
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Construction of water treatment works (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  
2003) 
 The organisation has defined criteria for the choice of consultants and contractors to build water 
treatment plants.  
 The monitoring and supervision of construction activities is ensured. 
 The monitoring and supervision of construction activities is documented (e.g. daily log). 
 Constraints from planning and regulatory authorities are monitored for compliance. 
 The handover procedure for the plant is defined and in compliance with strategic objectives and 
specifications. The handover procedure is documented and kept on record for the duration of the 
asset life.  
Capital maintenance and decommissioning of water treatment works 
 The responsibilities for maintenance within the organisation are defined. 
 The maintenance of water treatment plant is conducted by competent personnel, consultant or 
contractor 
 The condition of plant is monitored and documented.  
 The responsibilities for decommissioning within the organisation are defined. 
 The decommissioning of water treatment plant is conducted by competent personnel, consultant 
or contractor 
Planning of water storage facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The criteria for planning water abstraction plants are defined and documented.  
 The criteria for planning water abstraction plants comply with legislative, regulatory 
requirements and codes of practices. 
 Constraints from the licensing and regulatory authorities during design and construction of water 
storage facilities are adhered to and complied with.  
Construction of water storage facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  
2003) 
 The organisation has defined criteria for the choice of consultants and contractors to build water 
storage facilities.  
 The monitoring and supervision of construction activities is ensured. 
 The monitoring and supervision of construction activities is documented (e.g. daily log). 
 Constraints from planning and regulatory authorities are monitored for compliance. 
 The usage of materials is compliant with specifications.  
 The handover procedure for the plant is defined and in compliance with strategic objectives and 
specifications. The handover procedure is documented and kept on record for the duration of the 
asset life.  
Capital maintenance and decommissioning of water storage facilities 
 The responsibilities for maintenance within the organisation are defined. 
 The maintenance of water storage facilities is conducted by competent personnel, consultant or 
contractor 
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 The condition of plant is monitored and documented.  
 The responsibilities for decommissioning within the organisation are defined. 
 The decommissioning of water storage facilities is conducted by competent personnel, 
consultant or contractor 
Planning of water distribution facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  
2003) 
 The criteria for planning water abstraction plants are defined and documented.  
 The criteria for planning water abstraction plants comply with legislative, regulatory 
requirements and codes of practices.  
 The planning and design from external consultants and contractors is monitored against 
specifications.  
 Permission to access private land, highways and footpaths is applied for prior to construction to 
commence.  
Construction and maintenance of water distribution facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation has defined criteria for the choice of consultants and contractors to build water 
storage facilities.  
 External consultant or contractors are sufficiently ensured against third party liabilities. 
 The usage of materials is compliant with specifications.  
 The welding processes and welder qualifications from internal or external contractors are 
monitored and documented. 
 The usage of ground rockets ensures adequate safety distances to other underground services. 
 The monitoring and supervision of construction activities is ensured. Enhanced monitoring and 
supervision is ensured for newly employed contractors.  
 The monitoring and supervision of construction activities is documented (e.g. daily log). 
 Constraints from planning and regulatory authorities are monitored for compliance. 
 The compliance with procedures for tying-in and disinfecting new pipe work is monitored.  
 The responsibilities and co-operation for tying-in pipe work affecting different organisational 
units, contractors and third parties in defined and documented.  
 The setting out for pipe work is compliant with specifications.  
 During commissioning of pipe work a pressure test is executed and documented. 
 Construction activities, in particular relating to safety relevant materials, equipment and 
components clearly marked and documented.  
 Prior to handover to operations, pipe work is sufficiently flushed and disinfected. After flushing 
and disinfection, a water sample is tested for E. Coli and other microbiological indicators.  
 The results for water sample testing are documented.  
 The commissioning process completes with a commissioning certificate signed by authorised 
and present personnel.  
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Normal operation/ Asset performance monitoring (Define monitoring of control measures) (World 
Health Organisation, 2004) 
GOAL 
The organisation is able to operate its assets effectively and reliably. 
The organisation is competent to make effective decisions in maintenance and improvement of assets.  
INPUT 
Operational asset from asset creation 
Definition of process control data and operator interface 
Data from normal operation 
Data from incident detection and emergency procedure 
OUTPUT 
Safe operational asset 
Data analysis of asset performance  
Information for risk assessments and acceptability criteria 
Recommendations for operational objectives for system 
DESCRIPTION 
Operating assets in the water sector takes up the longest time period in the lifecycle of an asset. 
Throughout the operational lifetime, the system is prone to technical and human error. Reducing human 
error but also technical error is our concern.  
The monitoring of asset performance facilitates the planning of asset maintenance and operational 
improvements. The monitoring builds on operational data from asset operations enhanced with data, 
information and knowledge on asset condition.  
Operations management (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation maintains a central control centre. The organisation of the control centre is 
defined and documented.  
 Roles and responsibilities in the control centre are defined and documented.  
 Control centre staff are qualified and provided with information, training, instructions and 
supervision.  
 Control centre staff is regularly trained. Training is documented. 
 The availability of the central control centre is always maintained (, i.e. within/without working 
normal working hours).  
Delegation of responsibility (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Operators are specifically nominated to operate plant and equipment. Nominations are 
documented.  
 The organisation nominates personnel for specific functions regulated by legislation, regulatory 
requirements and union representation. (E.g. health and safety, water quality monitoring, 
reservoir engineers) 
 The nomination of personnel for specific function contains a documented description of roles 
and responsibilities.  
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 The nomination of personnel for specific functions relating to plant safety is provided for all 
functional units. 
 The organisation has access to specialists for occupational health and safety.  
 The organisation has access to specific medical consultation. 
 The organisation reviews the need for nominating personnel dedicated to waste management and 
implements a nomination where required.  
 The organisation nominates personnel responsible for transportation of hazardous materials.  
 The organisation nominates personnel responsible for emission control. 
 The organisation nominates personnel responsible for incident detection and emergency 
response.  
 The organisation nominates personnel responsible for data protection.  
 The organisation nominates personnel responsible for waste management. 
 The organisation nominates personnel responsible for watershed and aquifer protection. 
 The organisation nominates personnel responsible for radiation control.  
 The organisation nominates personnel responsible the control of working with asbestos.  
Work procedures (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation provides work procedures, procedures describing duties and responsibilities, 
process procedures, operating procedures, Operations- and Maintenance Manual.  
 The organisation provides an overview on relevant and applicable procedures. 
 Staff is furnished only with recent and most up-to-date procedures. 
 The roles and responsibilities for writing, dissemination, making public and maintain procedures 
is clearly defined. 
 The processes for handling, changing, maintaining up-to date and dissemination of Operations- 
and Maintenance Manuals is clearly defined. 
 The organisation operates a version control for O&M manuals. 
 The compliance with procedures and the O&M manual is supervised. Supervision is 
documented. 
Watershed/aquifer protection zones (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Working in watershed/aquifer protection zones ensures adequate protection for the water body 
and avoids adverse impact on raw water quality. 
 The organization ensures that regulatory requirements relating to water protection zones are 
complied with and adhered to.  
 The reporting of activities with potential adverse impact on water quality to regulatory 
authorities is defined.  
 Discharges of wastewater from water treatment processes are compliant with regulatory 
requirements and have the necessary discharge consent.  
 Hazardous substances are controlled to avoid pollution of watercourses.  
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Surface and groundwater 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2002b). 
 
Operations and maintenance of water abstraction plant (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
Operation 
 The responsibilities for operations within the organisation are defined. 
 The abstraction flows in relation to the hydraulic conditions are well understood and 
documented.  
 The risk of contamination has been assessed and is documented.  
 The catchment area around the water abstraction plant is a water protection zone based on 
regulatory authority or decree. 
 The catchment area is regularly inspected in order to identify changes that can have an impact on 
drinking water quality. The inspection is documented.  
 The water levels in an aquifer are monitored and documented (in line with abstraction licensing 
conditions and constraints). 
 The usage of the catchment area for hazardous plant, activities and occurrences which could 
adversely impact on drinking water resources is documented.  
 The quality of raw water in the abstraction plant and in the catchment is regularly monitored 
(with a monitoring program). The intervals for sampling are defined. 
 The raw water quality samples are analysed, documented and retained for future decision-
making. 
 The intervals for visual and functional inspection of water quality sampling and monitoring are 
defined.  
 Maintenance 
 The responsibilities for maintenance within the organisation are defined. 
 The maintenance of water abstraction plant is conducted by competent personnel, consultant or 
contractor 
 The condition of plant is monitored and documented.  
 The intervals for inspection (e.g. functional assessment, regeneration, operational testing) and 
maintenance are defined and execution documented.  
Boreholes and Wells 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001f). 
Groundwater abstraction – Springs 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001g).   
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Surface water abstraction 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001j). 
River, Streams and Infiltration Galleries 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001k) 
 
Operation and maintenance of water treatment works (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The responsibilities for operations within the organisation are defined. 
 The responsibilities for maintenance within the organisation are defined. 
 The maintenance of water abstraction plant is conducted by competent personnel, consultant or 
contractor 
 The condition of plant is monitored and documented.  
 The intervals for inspection (e.g. functional assessment, regeneration, operational testing) and 
maintenance are defined in the O&M manual and its execution documented.  
 Wastes from treatment processes are recycled, disposed, or discharged according to legislative 
and regulatory requirements.  
 Disinfection products and processes are specified and their compliance with required 
specifications is monitored  
 The quality assurance monitoring of disinfection products is defined and carried out by 
competent personnel. 
 The concentration of water quality parameters, in particular additives (e.g. disinfection products, 
water treatment chemicals), are monitored and documented. 
 The usage of new or infrequent additives is communicated to the public/customers prior to 
commencement of operation.  
 The usage of all regular water treatment additives is annually communicated to the 
public/customers. 
 Weekly consumption of water treatment additives is monitored and documented. 
 The disinfection residual for specified disinfection products is monitored at least daily, if not 
continuously, and documented. 
 The effective concentration of water treatment additives other than disinfection products is 
monitored, aggregated to weekly consumption and documented. 
 An operational logbook is used to record operational data. The logbook is filed for 6 years.  
Operation of transmission, bore and process pumps  
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2002d) 
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Water Transmission 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures.(Ministry of Health, 2001x)  
Destratification 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001h) 
Application of algaecides 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2002a) 
Pre-oxidation  
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2005b) 
Waste-Liquor Reintroduction 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001i)  
pH adjustment 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001t) 
Coagulation, Flocculation and Sedimentation 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001o) 
Direct Filtration 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001p) 
Slow sand filtration 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001z) 
Rapid Sand filtration 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001y) 
Application of cartridge filtration 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001l) 
Membrane filtration 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001r) 
Removal of iron and manganese 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2002c) 
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Softening 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2002e). 
Trace organics removal (Granulated Activated Carbon (GAC)) 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001v). 
Chlorination 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001m).  
Chlorine Dioxide 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001n) 
Ozone disinfection 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001s). 
UV irradiation 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001w). 
Fluoridation 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health , 2001q) 
Operation and maintenance of water storage facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The responsibilities for operations within the organisation are defined. 
 The responsibilities for maintenance within the organisation are defined. 
 The maintenance of water storage facilities is conducted by competent personnel, consultant or 
contractor 
 The intervals for inspection (e.g. functional assessment, cleaning, and operational testing) and 
maintenance are defined in the O&M manual and its execution documented.  
 An operational logbook is used to record operational data. The logbook is filed for 6 years.  
 The usage of cleaning agents and processes is compliant with specifications.  
 Wastes from cleaning processes are disposed off (recycled, disposed, discharged) in compliance 
with legislative and regulatory requirements 
Post treatment storage 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001c) 
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Operation and maintenance of water distribution facilities (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The responsibilities for operations within the organisation are defined. 
 The responsibilities for maintenance within the organisation are defined. 
 The underground pipe work inspection requires the walking off the route. Pipe work inspection 
is documented.  
 Above ground pipe work is inspected and documented.  
 The repair of leakages imminently repaired.   
 Pipe fittings are regularly inspected. Street furniture is inspected. 
 Roles, responsibilities and processes for the inspection of hydrants are defined and inspections 
executed at regular intervals.  
 A residual of disinfectant for drinking water can be maintained in the distribution network at all 
times. 
 The inflows of drinking water from different water treatment sources maintain the specification 
for CaCO3 solubility. 
 Maintenance of pipe work ensures the compliance with pipe material specifications. 
Distribution operation and maintenance  
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001b) 
Backflow prevention 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001a). 
System pressure 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001d) 
Electo-technical assets, Remote supervisory control and data acquisition, wireless communication 
(Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation defines roles and responsibilities for the operation of electrical assets, including 
remote supervisory control and data acquisition units, in particular with respect to regulatory 
requirements. 
 Electrical assets are monitored for performance and maintained by competent personnel. 
 Remote supervisory control and data acquisition, wireless communication and communication 
units are regularly monitored for performance and maintained to ensure availability.  
Monitoring equipment (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation defines roles and responsibilities to monitor the performance of monitoring 
(e.g. pressure gauges, water quality instruments) equipment. 
 The organisation ensures that monitoring equipment is monitored for performance, calibrated 
and adjusted.  
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 The organisation defines processes to monitor the performance of monitoring equipment. The 
processes are documented.  
Monitoring water quality from catchment to tap 
 Based  on the risk assessment, the normal operation has defined management procedures to 
check and monitor control (preventative) measures (Ministry of Health, 2001e). 
Asset documentation (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation keeps and maintains an asset register that contains planning and layout 
drawings, design drawings, survey charts and information on services (e.g. gas, water, 
electricity. The information on the asset register highlight adherence to codes of practice, 
normative standards and regulatory requirements. 
 The organisation keeps and maintains copies of the asset register in a safe location protected 
from the elements (e.g. water, fire, etc.). 
 Asset register information is updated and reflects new infrastructure and modifications. 
 The organisation uses survey maps and plans when setting out new infrastructure. Personnel is 
qualified (e.g. surveyors) to set out new infrastructure. New information is kept and maintained 
on record and is reflected on the asset register.  
 Layout and detailed design drawings are inspected for accuracy, completeness and plausibility.  
 The organisation has a system in place to keep on record, maintain and disseminate information 
on services (e.g. water mains, electricity, and gas) to third parties, i.e. construction firms, 
regulators. 
 The organisation provides information to third parties for any work carried out in the vicinity of 
underground services. 
 The provision and receipt for information to third parties on underground services is 
documented. 
 Construction firms commissioned to undertake groundworks for municipalities, public 
authorities and developers (e.g. road construction) are made aware of the duty to request 
information on underground services from utilities.  
 The documentation of assets for water abstraction, treatment, storage and distribution of drinking 
water includes layout & detail design drawings for wells, artesian and monitoring wells, 
schematics, licences, commissioning and handover documents, test certificates and amendments 
to the original design. Documents are complete, updated and designed for ease of reading and 
understanding.  
 The documentation of raw water abstraction includes abstraction licenses, maps and regulatory 
approval of water protection zones. Documents are complete, updated and designed for ease of 
reading and understanding.  
 The documentation for distribution networks includes layout &detail design drawings, lists of 
construction materials, welding protocols, test and commissioning certificates. Documents are 
complete, updated and designed for ease of reading and understanding.  
 All documentation of assets is readily available for incident and emergency response. 
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 The organisation keeps and maintains copies of the asset documentation in a safe location 
protected from the elements (e.g. water, fire, etc.). 
Safe systems at work (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Work procedures are assessed for risks; the assessment is documented. 
 The organisation forms an occupational health and safety council that meets on a regular basis. 
 The occupational health and safety council meetings are documented and actions for 
implementation are monitored.  
 Responsibilities for occupational health and safety are delegated to management staff of 
functional units. The delegation of responsibilities is documented.  
 Personal protective equipment is provided for staff. 
 Special personal protective equipment for enclosed and confined areas (e.g. gas monitors, 
harnesses) and staff working alone is provided to staff where necessary. 
 A system is in place for replacement and maintenance of personal protective equipment.  
 The use of personal protective equipment is monitored and supervised.  
 Safe working procedures are formulated for safety critical tasks.  
First aid (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 First aiders are trained and available to all functional units. 
 Continuous first aid training is provided to staff according to regulatory requirements. 
 First aid kit is readily available and their location specified, documented and displayed.  
 First aid kit is checked on a regular basis and the usage controlled and restocked or replaced.  
 The reporting procedures for accidents are defined and contact details are updated.  
Fire safety (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Appropriate fire extinguishers are provided in sufficient quantities. 
 The location for fire extinguishers is clearly indicated and displayed with fluorescent signs. 
 Fire extinguishers, fire detection monitors and automated fire extinguishing equipment is 
maintained according to specifications and regulatory requirements. Maintenance intervals are 
recorded and documented.  
 Staff receive training for the use of fire extinguishers.  
 Emergency escape routes are kept clear and are clearly marked and displayed. 
Security (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Access to site and equipment is controlled for authorised personnel only.  
Hazardous materials (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation maintains a register/database of hazardous materials. 
 The organisation maintains chemical safety data sheets for all hazardous materials. 
 The use of hazardous materials is documented and work procedures are defined.  
 Regular staff training is provided for the use of hazardous materials. Training is documented. 
 A system is in place to introduce new hazardous materials. The process is defined and 
compliance monitored and supervised.  
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 A system is in place for the safe transportation of hazardous materials. The systems consider 
specifications for the vehicle, loading requirements and transport documentation.  
Waste management (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Waste disposal routes are defined and documented. The certificates of disposal are maintained.  
 Processing wastes from the treatment processes are disposed according to legislation, regulation 
and codes of practices. Documentation of disposal is maintained.  
Plant safety (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Assets, equipment and components deemed for inspection according to regulatory requirements 
are centrally recorded, inspected and maintained. Inspection and maintenance is documented.  
 The responsibilities for inspection and maintenance are defined.  
 The methods of inspection and maintenance and intervals or dates for inspection and 
maintenance are defined, recorded and monitored.  
 Equipment for inspection and maintenance is available and accessible.  
 Equipment and plant containing hazardous materials are bunded and contained. 
Third parties (e.g. contractors, temporary staff) (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches 
e.V.  2003) 
 Third parties adhere to work procedures defined by the organisation.  
 Third party employees receive relevant information, training, instruction and supervision, in 
particular relating to aspects of plant safety and risks to operations. Provision of information, 
training, instruction and supervision is documented.  
 The selection process for third parties considers criteria of qualification and previous experience. 
 Contract specifications detail the roles and responsibilities, in particular relating to specifications 
of plant safety and work procedures.  
 Where appropriate, external health and safety coordinators are appointed to manage third parties. 
The selection criteria for health and safety coordinators consider their qualification and 
experience.  
 Where third parties are employed to work on public highways, the selection process ensures that 
traffic management is provided and supervised by a competent person.  
 The performance of third parties in relation to compliance with safety requirements and 
specifications is monitored, documented, audited and reviewed.  
Training (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Training and CPD are provided and documented for call-out staff operators and maintenance 
staff. 
Control of radon (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation ensures the compliance with regulatory requirements for the exposure of 
personnel and plant with radon gas.  
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Welding (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation has nominated a qualified supervisor for welding operations (metallic and non-
metallic).Welding operatives are supervised by a nominated supervisor and receive regular 
training. Training and supervision are documented.  
Quality monitoring and assurance (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The roles and responsibilities for quality assurance, mandatory reporting and investigation 
procedures for water quality incidents is defined and documented. 
 The specifications for water quality monitoring and assurance are adhered to.  
 Records of water quality analysis are kept on file for sufficient long time periods.  
 Monitoring equipment for the control of water treatment processes are regularly calibrated and 
checked. 
 Operational logbooks document activities and execution of procedures. Logbooks are retained 
for sufficiently long time periods. 
 
 
Incident detection and response procedure (Prepare management procedures) (World Health 
Organisation, 2004) 
GOAL 
The organisation has the ability to respond to abnormal operating conditions of its assets. 
We are interested how each level of the organisation responds to abnormal operating conditions. In 
particular relating to novel risks and well understood risks.  
INPUT 
Definition of operator interface 
OUTPUT 
Minimising the risk to organisational objectives 
Reliability in an emergency response 
DESCRIPTION 
The organisation is competent to respond to incidents. Incidents are detected, evaluated, and a response is 
initiated. The response procedure is a risk-assessed procedure with varying levels of process definition.  
Incident detection and emergency response (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  
2003) 
 A reporting and information process is in place to communicate exceeding water quality 
parameters to regulating authorities and the public/customers. 
 Immediate actions following exceeding water quality parameters are defined and co-ordinated 
with regulatory authorities.  
 Personnel is nominated to develop and maintain action plans for exceeding water quality 
parameters. 
 The organisation has a centralised data collection point to report damaged or failed equipment.  
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Exceeding water quality parameters (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 Personnel is nominated to develop action plans responding to exceeding water quality 
parameters. 
 Reporting and communication channels to regulating authorities and the public/customer are 
maintained.  
 Actions plans are immediately initiated after incoming reports of exceeding water quality 
parameters.  
Incident management (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The control centre has immediate access to a catalogue of questions and procedures for incoming 
reports on incidents.  
 The control centre has immediate access to all operational documentation (e.g. instructions, 
emergency response plans, telephone directories, incident report forms) 
 The process of managing an incident is documented from initial report to re-instatement of safe 
operation.  
 The control centre provides behavioural guidance for incident reporters.  
 The control centre has access to communication facilities to initiate an emergency response from 
standby staff or contractors.  
 The organisation of incident/emergency provides work procedures for commonly re-occurring 
incidents.  
Incident management (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation has defined the staff who manage the re-instatement of plant and networks. 
 In emergencies, a competent manager is available to direct staff in order to control risks and to 
communicate with authorities.  
Emergency response teams (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 The organisation of emergency response is defined and documented.  
 The design of emergency response organisation is adequately sized in relation to the water 
supply area and likely incidents/emergencies. The location of emergency response teams 
considers the response time from initiation to presence at site.  
 The planning for emergency response evaluates local and safety related factors, e.g. access 
roads, weight and height restrictions.  
 Emergencies are grouped according to levels of severity. The level of severity determines 
response times and communication and reporting routes.  
 The emergency response team/unit has access to communication links to other emergency 
services and civil protection units.  
 For high severity emergencies a communications and reporting chain to senior management and 
regulatory authorities is established.  
 The process of emergency response is documented so that incident/accident investigation can 
easily re-capitulate the sequence of events. 
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 Emergencies and incidents are analysed for root causes in order to define correction and 
preventative measures. 
 The effectiveness of corrective and preventative measures is assessed and evaluated.   
 The planning for emergency response considers contracts with other utilities or service providers 
to support efforts of emergency response.  
 The emergency response team has access to asset documentation.  
 The emergency response team has information, training, instruction and supervision to utilise the 
asset documentation for the needs of emergency response.  
 The emergency response teams have access to asset documentation in their vehicles.  
 Asset documentation for emergency response teams is up-to-date.  
 The vehicles of emergency response teams contain all tool, equipment and materials to contain 
the hazard and re-instate the plant.  
 An index of tools, equipment and materials for emergency response vehicles provides 
information on the capability of the emergency response team or unit.  
 The emergency response team/unit has access to required materials. 
 Response times from initiation to presence on site are documented.  
 The hygienic requirements of the emergency response team and their equipment are controlled, 
in particular when shared with other utilities or wastewater functions.  
 The process of emergency response initiates quick containment of a hazard and aims to reduce 
other related hazards to occur.  
 Emergency response planning is negotiated with all stakeholders and the documentation of the 
emergency plans is communicated and readily available to all stakeholders. 
 The reporting and external communication chains and emergency response procedures for high 
severity incidents, e.g. natural disasters, war and sabotage, are defined and established. 
 The emergency response for imminent danger/hazard is defined and established.  
 The emergency response for actual/acute dangers/hazard is defined and established. 
 The organisation ensures that emergency response procedures are imminently initiated from all 
stakeholders.  
Pipe work repair (Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V.  2003) 
 During repair of pipe work, the condition of the pipe work is assessed (aggressive soil, 
corrosion, condition of coating) and documented.  
 
Corrective action: Watershed/Aquifer protection/Surface and groundwater 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2002b). 
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Corrective actions: Abstraction 
Boreholes and Wells 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001f) 
Groundwater abstraction – Springs 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001g).   
Surface water abstraction 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001j). 
River, Streams and Infiltration Galleries 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001k) 
Corrective actions: Water Treatment processes 
Design of treatment plant 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001u)  
Operation of transmission, bore and process pumps  
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2002d) 
Water Transmission 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action 
programme(Ministry of Health, 2001x)  
Destratification 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001h) 
Application of algaecides 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2002a) 
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Pre-oxidation  
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2005b) 
Waste-Liquor Reintroduction 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001i)  
pH adjustment 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001t) 
Coagulation, Flocculation and Sedimentation 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001o) 
Direct Filtration 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001p) 
Slow sand filtration 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001z) 
Rapid Sand filtration 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001y) 
Application of cartridge filtration 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001l) 
Membrane filtration 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001r) 
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Removal of iron and manganese 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2002c) 
Softening 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2002e). 
Trace organics removal (Granulated Activated Carbon (GAC)) 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001v). 
Chlorination 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001m).  
Chlorine Dioxide 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001n) 
Ozone disinfection 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001s). 
UV irradiation 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action 
programme(Ministry of Health, 2001w). 
Fluoridation 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme. 
(Ministry of Health , 2001q) 
Corrective actions: Drinking water storage 
Post treatment storage 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001c) 
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Corrective actions: Drinking water distribution 
Distribution operation and maintenance  
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action 
programme.(Ministry of Health, 2001b) 
Backflow prevention 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme 
(Ministry of Health, 2001a). 
System pressure 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme. 
(Ministry of Health, 2001d) 
Corrective action: Monitoring water quality from catchment to tap 
 Based on the risk assessment and reliable information on water quality, the organisation 
responds to failures of control (preventative) measures with a corrective action programme. 
(Ministry of Health, 2001e) 
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3 Appendix – Incident analysis 
3.1 Case studies 
In the assessment of the 145 incidents between 2004 and 2006, a number of case studies 
were identified that reflect the “trying conditions” (Weick, 1987) for the organisation 
during incidents. These case studies reflect the diversity of asset involved during 
incidents but also reflect on the incident management response required to reduce the 
impact on customers and re-instate normal operations.  
Reducing incident narratives into statistical data simplifies and reduces the complexity 
of incident data to be more tangible and accessible. In previous analyses, it was 
demonstrated that the impact of incidents can even be expressed in numerical values. 
Here, it is aimed to demonstrate that incidents are complex and often uncertain events 
that require a competent approach to incident management. Although simplification and 
reducing complex causalities may be beneficial to learn lessons from incidents, a need 
was identified to present a number of case studies to demonstrate the diversity, 
complexity and uncertainty of circumstances under which incidents arise. These case 
studies - although only a selection and therefore not representative for all incidents - 
indicate the challenges for effective incident management. Foremost, these case studies 
demonstrate the need for a systematic approach to decision-making, communication and 
organisational flexibility for a speedy identification of incident causes and effect, 
effective reduction of the incident impact and the re-instating of a normal and safe water 
supply.  
In the following case studies the diversity, multicausality and interdependence 
prevailing during some incidents is demonstrated.  
 
3.1.1 Chlorination failure 
This case study demonstrates  
 how easy a construction activity on a site can unfold into an incident, 
 the rapid detection of an incident situation in the control centre, 
 the lack of a fail-safe chlorination system that could have led to unchlorinated 
drinking water to be passed into distribution, and  
 the effectiveness in the incident management response that was adopted to 
reduce the impact of the incident. 
 
Summary of Incident 
An interruption to chlorination at the Water Treatment works for around 2 hours 
occurred on Tuesday. At that time, contractors were working on the inlet meters on the 
outlet tank. When digging, the contractor did not come across any warning tape or sand 
that is used to identify a power cable further below. As no warning was visible, the 
contractor continued and hit the power cable that caused a power failure to site. 
The site logbook identifies the sequence of events: 
09:45 approx – Contractor hit the power cable 
09:45 1st alarm of power failure in the regional control centre  
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09:45 to 10:15 – Confirmation of control room actions and contractor confirmation of 
damage 
10:48 Operator arrived on site – cleared low alarms for final chlorine and resets 
chlorination system 
11:25 Operator tested treated water on service reservoir inlet and confirms low 
chlorine residual  
11:30 Operator tested treated water on service reservoir outlet and confirms low 
chlorine residual  
12:55 Operator notified Water Quality Department of power failure 
13:35 Operator had discussions with line management regarding the need to slug dose 
the service reservoir 
13:45 Operator commenced slug dosing 
Later on it was concluded that the 'normal level of chlorination' had been achieved for 
drinking water supplied to customers. This was due to the remaining residual of free 
chlorine in the service reservoir, the slug dosing procedure and the speedy intervention 
by the operator.  
 
What went well? 
• Contractor’s knowledge of the correct contact details 
• Co-ordinator role facilitating communication between the control centre, the 
water quality department and field operatives 
• Operations manager and site staff remained in constant communication 
throughout 
 
What can be improved? 
• Correct terminology of assets to be used in site documentation 
• Contactibility of staff via mobile 
 
Lessons learnt and recommendations arising 
• The plant’s fail safe system for chlorine needs to be reviewed and adjusted to the 
minimum time  
• Chlorine monitors need to be put on SCADA 
• Installation of uninterrupted power supply is required 
 
 
3.1.2 Power and subsequent chlorination failure 
This case study demonstrates  
 the vulnerability of water supply systems to external power supplies,  
 the reliance of the water utility on customers to report incidents, 
 the slow incident response due to other incidents unfolding simultaneously,  
 the secondary incident due to a lack of manpower for monitor the performance 
of an emergency power supply system, and  
 the impact of “overstretched” human resources required to manage an incident.  
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Summary of Event 
This Water treatment works takes water from an adit and receives chlorination and 
phosphate dosing. It directly supplies a number of villages and scattered properties 
the vicinity. A total population of 250 are supplied directly. The water treatment 
works also contributes to the supply of a larger village via a Service Reservoir. This 
population is estimated at around 1100.  
Following a power failure affecting the water treatment works there was a failure of 
the direct supply for up to 10 hours and a failure of chlorination for 3 hours. Boil 
advice was given to 113 properties on the direct supply. The service reservoir was 
slug dosed and disinfection was not regarded as being compromised. There was 
some intermittent discolouration at customer’s taps which was probably due to 
disturbance of sediment in the contact tank at the works. Turbidity in water leaving 
the WTW was greater than 1 FTU. The PCV of 4 FTU was also breached at 
customer’s taps. Three samples failed the Mn standard. 
 
Causes and impact of the event 
A power failure at around 05:00 on Saturday resulted in an automatic works 
shutdown. This fail safe procedure involves the inlet valve closing but the treated 
water in the contact water tank continuing into supply. The contact water tank 
eventually ran dry and the supply failed to some properties. The first no water 
complaint was received at 16:00 on Saturday and there were 11 others up to 16:00 
on Sunday. At 15:00 on Sunday a generator was installed and treatment re-started. 
The level of water in the contact water tank was close to zero at the time. At 21:00 
on Sunday the generator failed as it had run out of fuel. The chlorination ceased but 
on this occasion, probably because the Uninterruptable Power Supply had become 
exhausted, the works inlet did not shut down and untreated water passed into the 
contact water tank and then into supply. The works was shut down at 24:00 on 
Sunday by manually closing the outlet and inlet valves.  
Bottled water was delivered to the area in the early hours of Monday morning. The 
Service Reservoir was slug dosed with chlorine at around 00:30 on Monday 
morning. Leaflets advising customers to boil water were distributed before the water 
supply was restored on Monday 10 January. Leaflets advising customers to boil 
water were distributed by 16:00 on Monday and the outlet valve then opened and 
water allowed to pass into supply. 
Mains power was re-instated at around 06:00 on Monday and the works re-started. 
The boil order was lifted after two consecutive sets of bacteriological samples were 
clear of faecal indicators on Thursday.  
This incident took place against a background of numerous power failures across a 
very wide area affecting water production and supply. Personnel were severely 
stretched and there were delays in responding to alarms. Furthermore, there were 
interruptions in the supply of data because of the power problems. 
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3.1.3 Specification for Chlorination systems 
It is a policy in the Regional Water Utility, where possible, to automatically shutdown a 
treatment works upon disinfection failure or divert to waste.   
The Policy states that: - 
"All water treatment works should failsafe following failure of disinfection to minimize 
the risk of non disinfected water entering supply." 
The Drinking Water Inspectorate hold the view that a disinfection system may also be 
failsafe if there are full back up systems that take over dosing following failure of the 
duty system. 
The following specifications are used to audit chlorination systems on all water 
treatment works and facilities were chlorination is required. 
 
Failsafe specification for chlorination systems 
Specification 1.General Failsafe 
A site is classed as non-compliant if there is no failsafe facility. 
I.e. neither: 
 An Auto Shutdown in a fail-safe manner  
 An Auto Shutdown/divert to waste.  
 A fully replicated disinfection system.  
If either of these systems are present then the site will be considered compliant 
providing the installation meets the criteria listed below for that system. 
 
Specification 2. Auto Shutdown Systems 
Auto Shutdown Systems are classed as non-compliant if they do not comply with the 
following: 
 Plant and equipment is provided to prevent improperly disinfected water from 
entering the supply system preferably prior to the contact tank.  
 The shutdown operation (I.e. close on power failure) is installed with no flow 
validation.   
 The shutdown panel is protected with a dedicated UPS.  
 The shutdown panel outputs are failsafe on power failure.  
 Are triggered by illegal chlorine residuals at appropriate points to prevent 
improperly disinfected water from entering supply.  
 Shutdown is triggered by power failure  
 Shutdown is triggered by triple validation failure.  
 Shutdown is triggered by sample failure.  
 
Specification 3. Replicated Gravity Feed Sites and Power Supplies 
A site is classed as non-compliant if it has a gravity feed system and has no 
alternative/emergency power provision. 
When an alternative/emergency power supply is present, it must: 
 Auto start and auto switch.  
 Support the entire disinfection system.  
 If it is a second feed then it must be fed from a separate sub station.  
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Specification 4. Control Systems 
Control systems will be classed as non-compliant unless they comply with the following 
basic philosophy: 
 Samples are representative of water passing the sample point.  
 Sample lines are non-metallic and have a residence time of no greater than 6 
minutes.  
 Sample lines are dedicated to Chlorine residual analysers.  
 Sample lines are monitored by the appropriate instrumentation. (E.g. Flow and 
pressure switches or both)  
 Samples are buffered using the appropriate buffer.  
 Chlorine Control points are monitored by triple validated Chlorine residual 
analysers.  
 Critical instrumentation and control equipment is protected by dedicated UPS.  
 
Specification 5. Flow Measurement. 
Flow meters used on chlorination control systems will be classed as non-compliant 
unless: 
 They are magnetic flow meters. 
 The flow signal is validated using a separate device. 
 
Specification 6. Telemetry Alarms. 
The telemetry alarms for the Chlorine residual signals shall be considered non-
compliant unless: 
 For single chlorine instruments the analogue and the digital high and low alarms 
are hard wired to telemetry.  
 For triple validated systems the triple validated analogue signal and a triple 
validation failure digital alarm are hard wired to telemetry  
 Alarms have appropriate priorities and dead bands.  
 
 
3.1.4 Power failure 
This case study demonstrates  
 the vulnerability of water supply systems to external power suppliers and their 
services,  
 the increasing reliance on pumped systems as opposed to gravity-fed water 
supply and distribution system, 
 the technology issues for the installation of un-interrupted power supply, and  
 the need for effective communication during the incident.  
 
Summary of incident 
A power failure at a water pumping station in a distribution network caused widespread 
loss of supply. It is currently believed to have been due to a short duration power loss. 
Initially, the on-site generator failed to start. Even after manually starting the generator, 
the pumps would not power up and hence no water entered the adjacent Water Tower. 
Hence, supplies were lost from approx 08:00. The pumps were restarted by approx 
09:15 and supplies restored within the next 2 hours. Following restoration there were a 
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significant number of contacts logged for milky/air, fortunately very few for 
discolouration. 
 
Cause and effect of incident  
The logbook indicates the sequence of events: 
08:08 First Low Pressure contact from customer received  
08:18 First No Water contact from customer received 
08:27 Operator is onsite at water pumping station and is having problems with the 
incoming power - electrician is booked and on his way. Requests support from Regional 
Electricity Company. He has the generator started but cannot get it to drive the pumps. 
08:40  Electricians are on site and have reset the trip switch but they are still not able to 
get the pumps to recognise and run on generator power. 
08:45 Call centre informs the Incident manager of 100 of customer contacts 
08:46 Press Office is going to get the news on the local radio stations 
08:54 The fire brigade have been called to site because of all the smoke from the 
generator onsite.  
09:14 Operator and electrician have three pumps running and the system is charging 
up now starting with the tower. There are a number of things wrong:- 
1. Generator didn't start on auto when the power blipped and tripped the 
incomer, this was reset by the AMBS technician which  
2. When it was started on hand it does not drive the pumps. 
3. Trips switches have to be manually reset before the pumps can receive power 
from the generator. 
09:17  Press officer has just done a live interview with the local radio station and it is 
going onto the regional BBC website 
09:45 Supplies starting to recover.  
09:48 Checked with regional electricity company. Job not allocated yet and reference 
number quoted has been cancelled. Incident manager re-raised it, escalated it and 
formally complained regarding response. Electricity company will ring back with new 
timescale in ten minutes. 
10:44 Water quality sampling officer requests details of depressurised areas, as he is 
on site now to take samples. DM advises of locations.  
10:52 Incident manager contacts regional electricity company to request onsite time for 
their engineer just in case the info above was meant to close the contact down. Advised 
that they were struggling to find an engineer to attend and that they didn't have a fault 
on their systems. Incident manager advised the regional electricity company that 
assistance was urgently required onsite to meet with electricians and asset management 
staff to discuss both the security of current supply and the risks in switching back to the 
live incomer. Although supplies had been restored, the water supply system was still 
very susceptible to failure and the incident manager was unwilling to come off of the 
generator until we were sure this was the best option. They promised to send their 
engineer as soon as he is free. 
11:45 Incident manager faxes Consumer Council for Water with details although this 
does not breach the major customer impact for greater than 4 hours criteria. 
12:19 Operator advises that everything is back on mains power following a site 
meeting with all involved including the engineer from the regional electricity company. 
Everything is set in auto, however, there will need to be an interim procedure in place to 
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advise anyone attending site about the requirements for running the pumps on the 
generator.  
It turned out that there was a short duration incoming power failure followed by a spike 
when it came back. This tripped the main circuit breaker (which was reset early on in 
this incident). In hindsight, it became apparent that the generator was linked to the 
wrong phase of the incoming mains and so didn't recognise the failure and didn't start 
on auto. Once the generator was started, the pump control panel was still seeing 
incoming mains even though the panel tripped and so didn't accept the power from the 
generator until both, the generator and the pump, control panels were switched onto 
hand and forced to run. 
Effectively, 10,953 customers lost supplies for period approaching 2 hours. Following 
restoration, no water quality contacts were received from customers.  
 
Issues arising and further required investigations 
 Power breaker trip was not visible or indicated 
 Why didn’t the PLC recognise power status and take necessary actions? 
 Investigate why pumps can’t be run in hand and auto with current PLC 
configuration  
 Investigate training provision and onsite guidance for managing failure 
scenarios.  
 
What went well? 
 Response, attitude and speed of those involved was excellent  
 Communication was good from those involved.  
 Communication with the media  
 
 
3.1.5 Uninterruptable Power Supply failure 
This case study demonstrates  
 the vulnerability of water supply systems to external power suppliers and their 
services, and 
 the technology issues for the installation of un-interruptable power supply. 
 
Summary of incident 
A power failure affected the site on day 1. The generator started but did not power the 
site. The service partner electrician was called out but could not rectify the fault. The 
generator service partner was subsequently called out. The fault was traced to the local 
generator controller. A temporary fix was installed to allow the generator to power the 
works.  
However, after 8 hours outage and a burst in distribution, the service reservoir got as 
low as 7% but recovered quickly when the works was restarted and changes had been 
made in distribution. 
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3.1.6 Telemetry failure 
This case study demonstrates  
 the technology issues arising from remote-controlled water supply systems, 
 the need for fail-safe monitoring, control and telemetry systems, and 
 the need for personnel to check water supply systems on-site.  
 
Summary of incident 
At 07:30hrs on Tuesday, the Process Engineer attended the Water treatment works as 
part of his regular visiting programme. He found that the works was shut-down and that 
the Treated Water Reservoir was too low to allow the High Lift pumps to operate. At a 
similar time, the regional control centre received a Low Alarm for the nearby water 
tower. The SCADA system at the Water treatment works seems to have lost connection 
to regional control centre at 03:49hrs on Monday and the works shut down at 14:15hrs 
on the same day. No alarms from the water treatment works were received post 
03:49hrs on Monday. 
The control of the adjacent water pumping station was altered to put more water into 
system and hence the level in water tower was stabilised. In addition, the transfer flow 
from another water treatment works was increased to stabilise the water level in the 
regional service reservoir.  
The WTW was restarted and after intensive water quality checks, the works was 
returned into service at 14:45hrs on Tuesday.  
 
 
3.1.7 Simultaneous failure types 
This case study demonstrates  
 the adverse legacy of poor maintenance on existing assets causing two 
seemingly independent failures simultaneously, 
 the non-availability of resources to contain the impact of the incident, and  
 the conflicting objectives to notify customers of the incident.  
 
Summary of Incident 
At approx 19:20 on Day 1 a large number of no water contacts were received in the 
regional control centre. An investigator was sent to the Service reservoir in the affected 
area to investigate, as there was no burst reported. The local control panel was checked 
and the service reservoir No.2 was found to be empty - No.1 was out of service at the 
time. Technicians had been working on the auto control from the feed pumps of the 
service reservoir earlier in the day due to problems the previous evening with 
maintaining res levels. 
On investigation, it was found that the local control panel level readings for service 
reservoir No.2 were found to have been inhibited ca.  3 ½ years ago; the pump control 
was working on the level signal from service reservoir No.1 and hence was not starting 
up automatically as it was out of service. 
The following day 2, the regulatory combined sample (feeding from no.2) was reported 
to having failed with a count of 35 E. coli. The probable cause of contamination was 
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ingress due to faulty seals around the four hatch assemblies. According to site records, 
the failed regulatory sample was taken at 08:15 on Day 1, i.e. PRIOR to the reservoir 
running empty. Subsequently, on day 2, the tank was taken out of service for super-
chlorination and cleaning. However, at 10:20, operator 1 advises that there is no chorus 
available as the delivery due yesterday has been quarantined.  
10:48 The water quality manager is advising the incident manager of the potential need 
to issue a boil notice for the 3500 properties. Decision is postponed to await the first 
results of last night’s samples. They are expected for mid-afternoon. Incident manager 
agrees to pre-warn the Communication team about a potential letter drop. 
10:55 Operator 1 called to find out where we are with the delivery of chlorus. He 
advises it has been wrongly labelled and cannot be released until it has been relabelled - 
they are expecting this to happen sometime in the morning. 
11:02 Operator 2 and 3 advised of the increased requirement to dose to 1ppm. They 
advise they have nothing to carry the chlorus in and will go first to another site to pick 
up some bottles then go to another site to decant the required volume before attending 
the incident site.  
11:06 The reservoir cleaning team currently is currently at another site and are 
finishing up and making their way to the incident site to clean No. 1 today. This will 
then be filled (or part-filled) slug dosed and put into supply so that No. 2 can be isolated 
and cleaned.  
13:50 Incident manager calls Customer Communication Department regarding the 
need to issue a boil notice to 3500 customers if current action does not go to plan.  
14:03 Service reservoir No.2 is chlorinated.  
 
The SRE was chlorinated to 1 mg/l and this water drawn through the system to 
superchlorinate the associated water mains. The water pumping station was then started 
to feed supply direct via a pressure sustaining valve, and, therefore by-passing the 
service reservoir. 
However, problems occurred during the cleaning of the reservoir: A pump got stuck in 
the outlet main. 
19:20 Incident manager decides that boil orders are definitely not required  
Eventually, the pumps were started in hand and supplied that area; all supplies being 
restored by approx 20:45. Overall, potentially 1000 properties were affected by the loss 
of supply due to the “quick fix” solution of rigging the level control for the reservoir 
and one customer reported discoloured water. The response to the E. coli failure was 
inadequate.  
 
What went well? 
Response from technicians to rectify loss of supply. 
Precautionary sampling. 
Response of cleaning team. 
 
What went less well? 
Mobilisation of mobile chlorination (due to comms & enabling issues) 
Hesitation and failure to order a boil notice out of fear from bad press and regulatory 
ramifications.  
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3.1.8 Process failure 
This case study demonstrates  
 the impact of poorly maintained systems on the treatment process, 
 insufficient design of systems having an adverse impact during an incident,  
 the lack of visible indication of systems not operating, 
 the lack of resources to manage the incident (e.g. discharge consents to divert 
drinking water to waste), and 
 the extended duration of incidents due to a lack of speedy repair of failed assets 
 
Summary of incident 
Prior to Day 1, turbidity problems had been experienced at this water treatment works 
which were believed to originate from within the treatment process that treats raw water 
of reasonably poor quality. On the first day of the incident, a high turbidity spike led to 
a series of cleaning and maintenance schedules in logical sequence. These attempts 
failed to reduce the turbidity. It was then recognised that the speed of the stirrers on the 
primary and secondary flocculators were not the same. The Primary stirrer was running 
as specified, the Secondary was running too quickly and breaking up the previously 
formed floc. It was found the speed of the secondary stirrers could not be changed due 
to a wear issue. It was therefore decided to switch off the secondary stirrers on floc 
tanks. This was due to high turbidity off the floatation units onto first stage filters that 
were passing high turbidity into drinking water supply to customers. Following the 
stopping of the stirrers, the turbidity going onto first stage filters reduced from nine to 
3ftu. An order was raised for the secondary stirrer mechanism to be fixed and notice 
was attached to the relevant SCADA screen stating that the secondary stirrers should 
not be switched on.  
Historical telemetry records show that clarified turbidity was since increasing slowly 
and by Day 3 increased to similar values as experienced on Day 1.  This trend continued 
until mid morning on the 24th Day when the secondary stirrers were switched back on 
after repair. In the interim period, a significant amount of work was carried out to 
improve the turbidity levels by adjustments to the process and dosing. Efforts to reduce 
turbidity by these improvements or by increased filter washing were seriously hampered 
by the dirty wash water capacity and restrictions on discharge to waste. On Day 20, a 
short-lived turbidity spike triggered an alarm and response that indicated it was short 
lived and that acceptable turbidity levels had since resumed. On Day 22, a further 
significant spike caused an alarm that led to attendance at site, taking of samples and 
fitting of Crypto monitoring equipment. On the Day 24, further analysis and 
examination of trends was conducted and discussions were held between water quality 
science and process engineer that resulted in the secondary stirrers being brought back 
into operation. A significant turbidity spike occurred immediately after the stirrers had 
been switched on. By lunchtime, these spikes had turned into a serious turbidity issue 
through the works and a decision was taken to shut the works down rather than place 
treated water storage in jeopardy. In the following 18 hours, significant work went on to 
return the works into service and by Day 25 a flow of 15tcmd was restored to supply. 
Throughout the whole period, turbidity was also being addressed by manual instigation 
of filter washing which may account for the return to normal levels after some of the 
spikes.  
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Cause and effect of incident 
An essential secondary stirrer failed and was not repaired for over 24 days despite 
ongoing water quality problems and a perceived, elevated Cryptosporidium risk.  
The poor process performance was aggravated by the duty compressor of the DAF 
showing running when in fact it was not. The pressure control on the compressor was 
faulty and contributed to poor process performance.  The DAF nozzles also seemed 
inadequate to inject highly air charged water to the DAF tank. 
With respect to incident management performance, the current discharge to waste 
arrangement on the WTW site are limited with the effect that poor quality drinking 
water output from the works cannot be discharged appropriately. Water can only pass 
on into supply or the water treatment works needs shutting down.  
 
Effect on customers 
Repeated supply of drinking water with elevated and spikes in turbidity to customers.  
A number of discolouration contacts immediately downstream of the WTW. 
 
 
3.1.9 Susceptible customers 
This case study demonstrates  
 the major impact a human error can have,  
 the lack of understanding of customer needs, 
 the disproportionate effort to recover a failed system in relation to the ease of 
causing a failure, and  
 the full-scale escalation procedure and incident management capability of the 
water utility.  
 
Summary of incident 
At approximately 12:15 on Day 1, the supply to a District Hospital was inadvertently 
interrupted during rehab work of water mains by a contractor. Although the supply was 
made available again after 30 minutes the hospital management decided to isolate the 
hospital supply from the distribution system until clear bacti sample results were 
obtained. Bottled water was immediately supplied by the contractor and tankering and 
sampling arrangements put in place. The Chief Executive of the Regional Health Trust 
was contacted in response to the concerns regarding this interruption and the previous 
history of issues with the hospital. A press statement was prepared and the water utility 
assisted the hospital with tankering and bottled water. A significant part of the hospital 
was effectively closed because of the isolation, including the Critical Care Unit, the 
kitchens, the renal unit, the sterilisation unit as well as a number of wards. A sampling 
programme was agreed with the hospital although the water utility maintained that 
water quality had not been compromised and the hospital's actions were overly cautious 
– a view shared by the DWI. 
Tankering and bottled water supplies continued during Day 2 and close contact and 
consultation was maintained with hospital staff and Health Trust management. Clear 
bacti sample results were obtained on the evening of Day 2. The water utility worked 
for the hospital in precautionary cleaning and disinfection of the hospitals storage tanks 
prior to the hospital restoring mains supplies early morning on Day 3. 
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Cause and effect of the problem 
Work was being carried out to install a branch on the water main. The contractor closed 
a valve on the network, which should have been left opened.  Supply to the hospital was 
cut off until the valving operation was reversed to it normal operating position. Despite 
reassurance that water quality had not been compromised, the hospital’s “procedures” 
require supply to be shut down until water is proven bacteriologically sound.  
The timeline of the incidents reflects the challenges the water utility faced to re-instate 
normal operations.  
Day 1 
12:26  Received a call from the Hospital who reported no water at the hospital. 
 Contractor is carrying out mains renewal nearby but do not think they have 
caused this. Decision is taken to supply bottled water to the hospital by the 
contractor as a precaution. 
 The Hospital is concerned about allowing water back into the hospital when 
supplies return; they require a clear bacti samples similar to the situation at 
another Hospital in the previous week. 
12:44 The water utility receives confirmation of contractor that they have operated a 
valve that may have affected the hosp supply; Incident manager instructs them 
to reverse the valving ASAP. The view is that the supply may not have actually 
gone off, just low pressure to the hospital as a result. 
12:55 Water pressure is back on at the hospital. 
13:00 Hospital takes the decision to isolate their supply  
13:02 Hospital has confirmed all supplies were lost, not just low pressure. 
13:30 CEO of Health Trust is not at all happy about the loss of supply and request a 
call back. Decision is taken that a high-level contact from the water utility is 
needed to respond to her. 
 At this time, the cause of problem is finally established. 
14:15 High-level contact from the water utility is not currently available – there is a 
board meeting in progress. 
14:27 Hospital will have to cancel operations and clear the renal unit until normal 
supplies are restored. The hospital has called the fire service to fill the boiler 
tanks to stop them running dry. 
In the meanwhile, alternative water supply is arranged.  
15:24  Call from an operator: Whilst there are concerns regarding the quality of the 
hose pipes delivered to site to be used to provide alternative supplies, the 
hospital have now indicated they are not willing to accept any water from a 
hose and wish for a tank to tank transfer. 
15.57  Incident Vehicle going to site. Delegated incident manager is going to the 
hospital to support staff on site and to respond to media queries. 
18:05 Operator arrives on site with 'new unused food grade bagging (hose pipe)'. 
18:30 Chlorination and swabbing of bagging complete - water should be entering 
header tanks within 15 mins. 
22:00 Operator had an accident where he fell into an excavation (the banking 
collapsed).   
22:15 DWI informed. 
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Day 2 
00:58 The 2 tractor units are remaining on site as if the tankers are left in situ full 
they will sink into the tarmac car park over night. One driver is now on sleep 
time and the other is available to operate the units overnight.  
02:20 Water quality sampling at hospital. Unfortunately, the fire hydrants on site are 
in poor condition so there was a lot of work to do prior to taking the samples 
07:00 Meeting arranged with Hospital about their procedures and criteria to bring the 
water back into use.  
09:30 Confirmation of the first water quality samples: All samples are clear  
from bacteriological contamination  
10:30 Further samples taken from hydrant. If supplies switched on following on-site 
meeting later this morning, further samples from within the hospital are required 
10:50 10 portaloos arrive to site.  
13:40 Laboratory confirm that all further samples are clear from bacteriological  
 contamination.  Further sample results will be available at 21:00. 
15:55 Photographer is on his way from Evening News.  Senior management would  
 therefore like the operation to appear as inconspicuous as possible.   
To this end, as few people as possible should be on site.   
16:17 Confirmation that the photographer had been on site and some of the hospital 
 staff had almost posed for photos. 
21:28 Water quality sample results have been accepted by the Infection Control 
Nurse. 
21:45 Site is cleaned up 
22:02 Discussion on health and safety implications of cleaning team working very 
long hours. Contingencies made for stopping job if necessary, continuing 
tankering\bottled water and finding accommodation for resting the team. 
 
Day 3 
00:05 Health and safety concerns are discussed for cleaning team who clean and 
disinfect onsite water storage tanks - they have been at work since 07:00 
yesterday morning. Arrangements for accommodation and alternative transport 
discussed. 
00:37 Cleaning gang are currently working on the group on six tanks in the first 
building - the team are confident that the job is very straightforward and are 
looking to complete the job in one operation. The biggest delay is the standing 
time for chlorine disinfection.  
04:05 Cleaning of tank is still going well; they are currently draining the last of the 
six tanks at this location. There are no drain valves so each tank needs to be 
pumped out before cleaning and after chlorination - this is slowing things up a 
bit. The tanks are being tested by the hospital engineer and so far chlorine 
residuals have been satisfactory.  
 The team are OK so far regarding tiredness; none of them wants to stay over.  
 Arrangements are made for some rest prior to travelling back. When the last 
two tanks are being cleaned, there will be the chance for each team of two to 
get a couple of hours rest.   
06:47 Tankers are moved off site.  
08:15 It is anticipated the last two tanks will be complete by 10:00. 
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11:43 All the tanks on site have been cleaned and all RWU personnel and equipment 
have left site. 
 
What went well? 
Efforts of all teams involved in incident management.  
Communications between Press Office and incident team  
Timely deployment of incident support vehicle  
 
What could be improved? 
Use of specific plans for the hospital 
Communications around bottled water delivery 
Contactability of senior managers during incidents  
Appropriate use of senior managers in incident management  
Personal logging of actions 
Coordination of communications on site 
The Hospital had an internal procedure for loss of supply incidents that the water utility 
was unaware.  Do any other customers have internal restart procedures that the water 
utility needs to be aware of?  
 
 
3.1.10 Incident escalation procedures 
This case study demonstrates  
 the rapid escalation of technical issues resulting in an incident, 
 the need for fail-safe systems to avoid high risk process failures, and 
 the need for staff to operate existing incident escalation procedures. 
 
Summary of incident 
This incident commenced with polymer transfer pump No. 2 failing on the evening of 
Day 1 that resulted in no polymer being transferred to the day holding tank for several 
hours.  Ultimately, the day holding tank emptied as coagulation and clarification 
continued but clarification was eventually lost with the polymer holding tank running 
dry.  A manual changeover from batching tank No2 to batching tank No1 (and in turn 
polymer transfer from pump No2 to pump No1) did not take place until the operator 
arrived on site several hours after the loss of the transfer pump.  
Loss of the polymer dosing resulted in clarification being lost and the clarified water 
turbidity was elevated almost instantly to levels in excess of 10FTU.  This had the 
knock-on effect to latter stage of purification such that post filter combined turbidity 
was elevated to levels in excess of 3FTU (both were off the scale of instrument’s range) 
and therefore final water turbidity elevated to a peak of levels in excess of 8FTU. 
Water during this period continued to be supplied to Distribution. 
This continued for several hours before this was brought back under control with the re-
instatement of polymer dosing but it took longer for the turbidity of the water currently 
in the process and in the final water tank to be brought back under the acceptable levels 
and PCV.  The water in the final water tank was not back under PCV until much later in 
the morning of Day 2. 
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A regulatory sample taken early morning on Day 2 showing that the final water 
turbidity was measured as 1.4FTU. This sample was in breach of the 1.0FTU PCV 
level. However, no customer contacts during the 24-hour period following the incident 
were recorded. 
The incident manager was not made aware of the situation and events until informed by 
the line manager of the operator on site. No escalation of the events had taken place.  
The incident escalation and management procedure was not followed.   
Service reservoirs were slug-dosed with chlorine during Day 2 and no cryptosporidium 
occysts were measured in either the final water outlet sample.  
In conclusion, it appears that on several occasions, the following of the appropriate 
procedures did not take place and this resulted in the lack of opportunity to get others 
involved to approve and verify the actions taken. 
Following this incident, it was recommended that  
 An early warning system is required for inlet turbidity whereby an appropriate 
trigger level is established to alert the incident manager of a serious risk to 
treatment 
 An auto-shutdown facility should be installed for excessive levels of turbidity on 
the raw water inlet.   
 the need for training of individuals in quality management systems, incident 
escalation and decision procedures and the understanding of on-site process 
operation must be reviewed.  
 
 
3.1.11 Catastrophic consequences of asset failures 
This case study demonstrates  
 the catastrophic consequences of high hazard asset failures, 
 the multiple impacts of incidents. 
 
Summary of incident 
Between Day 1 and Day 3, an estimated 2,000 kg of 96% concentrated sulphuric acid 
leaked from an acid injection apparatus at the raw water inlet of a WTW causing a build 
up of sulphuric acid in the dosing chamber. This chamber is fitted with a submersible 
pump designed to keep the chamber free of rainwater. The pump removed the leaking 
acid from the chamber and pumped it to sewer where it travelled to the nearby 
wastewater treatment works on site and killed all the biological function of the works as 
well as damaging interstage transfer pipework. In addition, the acid escaped from the 
chamber drain pipe and then flowed into a local drain to nature reserve. The Acid 
pollution to the watercourse is believed to be contained at this point with some 
vegetation damage.  
On the morning of the 2nd August, two employees attended the Wastewater treatment 
works and came into contact with the fumes from the acid. This alerted staff of the 
incident and from there it was escalated, the source of the acid repaired and the flow 
stopped. The two employees were precautionally checked out at a local hospital and 
were discharged safe and well. The works and watercourse had a significant 
concentration and quantity of acid removed. 
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3.1.12 Failure of standby systems 
This case study demonstrates  
 the common cause failure due to poor condition of assets, and 
 the effective, temporary measures adopted to avoid the impact of the incident on 
customers.  
 
Summary of incident 
Problems were encountered with both booster pumps at a Water Tower that it feeds a 
whole area containing 1700 properties. Pump No. 1 stopped working on Friday evening 
and was not able to be repaired on site.  It was therefore removed for repair.  Pump No. 
2 was nursed along with much attention from staff, but unfortunately, that stopped 
working in the early hours of Sunday morning.  A combination of contingency 
measures were deployed to maintain supplies, these were:  
 Use of an Angus Fire Pump to put water into the DMA served by the tower, 
from an adjacent DMA. 
 Rezoning from an additional adjacent DMA to further reduce demand on the 
tower. 
 Installation of a pump removed from another water pumping station  
This was the more permanent solution, which was only made possible by the first two 
incident mitigation measures to “buy” some time. 
The tower reached a low level of 8% on Saturday morning and 15% on Sunday 
afternoon.  However, supplies were not lost to any customers. 
 
 
3.1.13 Failure of standby systems 
This case study demonstrates  
 the common cause failure due to poor design of assets, and 
 the long-term risk from asset failures.  
 
Summary of incident 
In the evening of Day 1 a 450mm main burst. Unfortunately, this main was laid close to 
the edge of a quarry and a bend had "blown" into the quarry causing a landslide leaving 
the main suspended over 35m above the ground. The alternative main to continue 
supply is only one metre away from the burst main and therefore unsafe to use. The 
affected area has been re-zoned onto water from another water supply source.  
As the mains permanent repair solution will be a very lengthy process, 8,000 properties 
are at medium risk of loosing their supply until the repair work is complete. 
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3.1.14 Design error 
This case study demonstrates  
 the impact of design flaws on safe operation of water supply systems. 
 
Summary of incident 
The dosing of Monosodium Phosphate at a WTW into a main - that had been shut down 
since Day 1 - continued in proportion to a flow signal from another water main that was 
controlling the dose. When the main was re-commissioned on Day 4, a slug of the 
chemical, estimated to be around 1 tonne, was pumped towards a Service Reservoir. 
This was detected later the same evening. 
An incident team was established in the control centre and in the Field. The senior 
scientist was consulted and extensive sampling initiated to determine the extent of the 
contamination. The slug was contained in the water mains section between two service 
reservoirs, before it reached any customers. A flushing programme for these mains was 
devised and implemented for one of the mains on Day 5. There was a serious risk of this 
water, with a high concentration of the chemical, being supplied customers. 
 
 
3.1.15  3rd party access to water supply systems 
This case study demonstrates  
 the vulnerability of drinking water distribution system to third party access.  
 
Summary of incident 
At approximately 18.00hrs on Day 1 a cluster of discoloured water contact were noted 
in one area. These quickly spread in the village and were followed by a more rapid and 
extensive spread downstream of the village. By 21.00hrs, there were over 30 complaints 
recorded and the DWI was notified. Extensive flushing was carried out until midnight. 
Samples were also taken. At 7.40 hrs on Day 2, further customer contacts were received 
and further investigation, flushing and sampling was undertaken. On the morning of the 
Day 3, a tanker was caught filling from a hydrant with a 2" standpipe. The driver denied 
being in the area in previous days but his Company is investigating. 
The excessive flows from the standpipe are deemed the most likely cause to having re-
suspended deposits in the water mains.   
 
 
3.1.16 Impact on public assets  
This case study demonstrates  
 the potential impact of burst water mains on 3rd party assets, and 
 the challenges in identifying an incident site, in particular involving below 
ground assets.  
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Summary of incident 
Customers in a particular area have been suffering poor pressure problems over the last 
two days. Despite intensive efforts from Field operations, no burst could be located until 
late yesterday afternoon. The area was rezoned and everyone now has an improved 
supply  
A repair was planned for last night but the actual site of the leak could not be located. 
Today a fracture on the 12" main running down a main has been discovered. 
Unfortunately, this leak has scoured a significant, bus-sized cavern under the road that 
will necessitate the closure of at least two lanes of the outbound carriageway. The road 
is a main arterial commuter route into a major city and hence the closure will cause 
significant traffic congestion. It is hoped that the road can be re-opened by the weekend 
but we await confirmation from the Highways Department of the full extent of road 
repair that will be required. 
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3.2 Further detailed data analysis 
3.2.1 Incidents in England and Wales between 2004 and 2006 
3.2.1.1 Chi Square analysis of asset type and asset life cycle phase 
 
Root causes to incidents     
For incident root causes, does a relationship exist between the categories of asset classes and asset 
life cycle phases? 
H0= In the distribution of most probable incident root causes asset type and asset life cycle are 
randomly distributed 
H1= In the distribution of most probable incident root causes asset type and asset life cycle are not 
randomly distributed. 
SL 0.05     
SL 0.001     
      
Observation based on 92 incident case studies in 2005  
  Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum 
Design 6 18 8 3 35 
Operations 6 19 11 22 58 
Maintenance  0 10 6 50 66 
Sum 12.00 47.00 25.00 75.00 159.00 
Expected values       
  Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum 
Design 2.64 10.35 5.50 16.51 35 
Operations 4.38 17.14 9.12 27.36 58 
Maintenance  4.98 19.51 10.38 31.13 66 
Sum 12 47 25 75 159 
Chi Squared      
  Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum X2 
Design 4.27 5.66 1.13 11.05   
Operations 0.60 0.20 0.39 1.05   
Maintenance  4.98 4.64 1.85 11.44   
Sum 9.85 10.50 3.37 23.54 47.26 
Degrees of freedom  6    
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X2 (Chi square table) 12.59 for SL 0.05  
47.26 > 12.59      
H0 is rejected at a SL of 5%     
There exists a dependency between asset type and asset life cycle phase to explain root causes to 
incidents.  
Variations between expected distribution of root causes to failure and actual distribution of failure 
root causes is sizeable.  
      
Degrees of freedom  6    
X2 (Chi square table) 22.46 for SL 0.001  
47.26 > 22.46      
H0 is rejected at a SL of 0.1%     
There exists a dependency between asset type and asset life cycle phase to explain root causes to 
incidents.  
Variations between expected distribution of root causes to failure and actual distribution of failure 
root causes is sizeable.  
Table 1 Chi square testing for incident occurrence in asset type - asset life cycle matrix 
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3.2.1.2 Incidents in England and Wales 
 
Drinking Water Incidents 2004      Hazard 
score 
Hazard 
score 
Hazard score 
       0.33 0.33 0.33 
 
Date Company Duration 
in hrs 
Days Population Hazard description Hazard categories P H D Sum  
01/01/2004 Yorkshire 72 3.00 10000 high turbidity Chemical present above guidelines 4 8 16 9.24 
05/01/2004 United Utilities 24 1.00 3600 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 8 13.86 
06/01/2004 United Utilities 72 3.00 20500 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 8 32 16 18.48 
08/01/2004 United Utilities 72 3.00 17000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 8 32 16 18.48 
13/01/2004 Three Valleys 5 0.21 2200 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 2 11.88 
16/01/2004 Southern 12 0.50 100000 Contamination of water Potential unwholesome, potential low health 
effect 
32 16 4 17.16 
18/01/2004 dwr cymru 576 24.00 77500 aesthetics (algae in raw 
water_) 
Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 32 32 125 62.37 
21/01/2004 South East 48 2.00 0 High turbidity and possible 
microbiological 
contamination 
Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 16 7.92 
23/01/2004 Thames 24 1.00 7300 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 8 13.86 
25/01/2004 Southern 24 1.00 197000 high chlorine in water Chemical present above guidelines 64 8 8 26.4 
29/01/2004 Severn Trent 48 2.00 12500 loss of supply loss of supply 4 16 16 11.88 
03/02/2004 dwr cymru 24 1.00 12600 potential for contamination Potential biological pathogens present 4 6 8 5.94 
03/02/2004 United Utilities 12 0.50 28500 high ph Chemical present above guidelines 8 8 4 6.6 
03/02/2004 Northumbrian 72 3.00 22600 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 8 32 16 18.48 
03/02/2004 dwr cymru 504 21.00 12900 high turbidity Chemical present above guidelines 4 8 125 45.21 
10/02/2004 dwr cymru 24 1.00 2000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 8 13.86 
11/02/2004 Yorkshire 7 0.29 700 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 2 11.88 
20/02/2004 Wessex 24 1.00 2000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 8 13.86 
10/03/2004 Northumbrian 48 2.00 3500 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 16 16.5 
15/03/2004 dwr cymru 72 3.00 2000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 16 16.5 
16/03/2004 United Utilities 48 2.00 5000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 16 16.5 
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19/03/2004 United Utilities 24 1.00 21000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 8 32 8 15.84 
01/04/2004 Yorkshire 48 2.00 7500 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 16 16.5 
05/04/2004 Northumbrian 48 2.00 540 Contamination of water Potential biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 48 16 21.78 
16/04/2004 Wessex 24 1.00 500 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 8 13.86 
16/04/2004 Yorkshire 48 2.00 4000 Aesthetics Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 16 16.5 
20/04/2004 Northumbrian 72 3.00 33200 Disinfection failure Potential biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
16 48 16 26.4 
24/04/2004 Northumbrian 72 3.00 370 plant failure with potential 
contamination 
Potential biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 48 16 21.78 
04/05/2004 Three Valleys 96 4.00 15 Wholesomeness concern Potential unwholesome, potential low health 
effect 
2 16 32 16.5 
10/05/2004 Yorkshire 168 7.00 620 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present 2 8 32 13.86 
12/05/2004 dwr cymru 72 3.00 100000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 32 32 16 26.4 
15/05/2004 Thames 30 1.25 145000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 64 32 8 34.32 
17/05/2004 Southern 0 0.00 0 Potential contamination from 
raw water 
Potential unwholesome, potential medium health 
effect 
2 64 2 22.44 
18/05/2004 Three Valleys 24 1.00 626000 low chlorine Potential biological pathogens present 250 6 8 87.12 
18/05/2004 United Utilities 168 7.00 673000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 250 32 32 103.62 
24/05/2004 Southern 72 3.00 150 potential contamination Potential unwholesome, potential medium health 
effect 
2 64 16 27.06 
28/05/2004 Yorkshire 6 0.25 17 Disinfection failure Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 2 3.3 
29/05/2004 Yorkshire 72 3.00 50000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 16 32 16 21.12 
03/06/2004 Yorkshire 96 4.00 175 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present, health effects 
envisaged 
2 64 32 32.34 
06/06/2004 Northumbrian 72 3.00 67500 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 32 32 16 26.4 
06/06/2004 Sutton east surrey 48 2.00 20 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present, health effects 
envisaged 
2 64 16 27.06 
10/06/2004 Southwest 312 13.00 115 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present, health effects 
envisaged 
2 64 64 42.9 
13/06/2004 Essex and Suffolk 0 0.00  Plant failure affecting 
disinfection 
Potential Biological pathogens present  6  1.98 
13/06/2004 Northumbrian 48 2.00 4500 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 16 16.5 
14/06/2004 Portsmouth 7 0.29 1500 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 2 11.88 
14/06/2004 Yorkshire 72 3.00 13700 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 4 32 16 17.16 
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14/06/2004 dwr cymru 168 7.00 130000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 64 32 32 42.24 
30/06/2004 Essex and Suffolk 72 3.00 250 Loss of supply and potential 
contamination 
Potential biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 48 16 21.78 
02/07/2004 Wessex 72 3.00 78000 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present 32 8 16 18.48 
14/07/2004 United Utilities 24 1.00 6700 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 8 13.86 
18/07/2004 Northumbrian 24 1.00 5000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 8 13.86 
24/07/2004 United Utilities 24 1.00 29300 Disinfection failure Potential biological pathogens present 8 6 8 7.26 
25/07/2004 Northumbrian 72 3.00 73000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 32 32 16 26.4 
29/07/2004 Yorkshire 24 1.00 87500 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 32 32 8 23.76 
30/07/2004 Yorkshire 144 6.00 6 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present, health effects 
envisaged 
2 64 32 32.34 
05/08/2004 Bristol 48 2.00 60000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 16 32 16 21.12 
07/08/2004 Northumbrian 72 3.00 200 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present, health effects 
envisaged 
2 64 16 27.06 
14/08/2004 Yorkshire 168 7.00 25 Contamination of water Potential biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 48 32 27.06 
16/08/2004 Bristol 96 4.00 18900 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present 8 8 32 15.84 
19/08/2004 dwr cymru 288 12.00 5600 high colour Chemical present above guidelines 2 8 64 24.42 
21/08/2004 United Utilities 72 3.00 6200 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present 2 8 16 8.58 
21/08/2004 Yorkshire 96 4.00 320 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 32 21.78 
21/08/2004 United Utilities 48 2.00 2500 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present, health effects 
envisaged 
2 64 16 27.06 
28/08/2004 United Utilities 96 4.00 6300 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 32 21.78 
31/08/2004 South East 24 1.00 0 No sample for crypto taken  2  8 3.3 
31/08/2004 dwr cymru 120 5.00 3200 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present, health effects 
envisaged 
2 64 32 32.34 
09/09/2004 United Utilities 96 4.00 12300 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 4 32 32 22.44 
13/09/2004 dwr cymru 72 3.00 32500 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present, health effects 
envisaged 
16 64 16 31.68 
15/09/2004 Yorkshire 12 0.50 5000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 4 12.54 
17/09/2004 Thames 168 7.00 11600 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present 4 8 32 14.52 
17/09/2004 Essex and Suffolk 4 0.17 460 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 2 11.88 
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25/09/2004 Yorkshire 96 4.00 41400 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 16 32 32 26.4 
01/10/2004 Severn Trent 48 2.00 82000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 32 32 16 26.4 
04/10/2004 United Utilities 48 2.00 25000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 8 32 16 18.48 
07/10/2004 Bristol 48 2.00 9200 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 4 32 16 17.16 
08/10/2004 Northumbrian 72 3.00 5300 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 2 32 16 16.5 
15/10/2004 United Utilities 72 3.00 12800 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 4 32 16 17.16 
21/10/2004 Northumbrian 504 21.00 22 Potential contamination (boil 
water notice) 
Potential biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 48 125 57.75 
25/10/2004 Three Valleys 168 7.00 20 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
biological pathogens present 2 8 32 13.86 
25/10/2004 Severn Trent 28 1.17 164000 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present 64 8 8 26.4 
02/11/2004 South 
Staffordshire 
15 0.63 19000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 8 32 4 14.52 
04/11/2004 dwr cymru 192 8.00 13300 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present 4 8 64 25.08 
08/11/2004 Bournemouth 
West Hampshire 
1 0.04 0 Plant failure affecting 
disinfection 
Potential Biological pathogens present 2 6 2 3.3 
24/11/2004 Anglian 72 3.00 5 Microbiological 
contamination in distribution 
Biological pathogens present 2 8 16 8.58 
28/11/2004 Essex and Suffolk 24 1.00 1000 Potential contamination (boil 
water notice) 
Potential biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 48 8 19.14 
07/12/2004 Yorkshire 48 2.00 100000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 32 32 16 26.4 
08/12/2004 Yorkshire 48 2.00 10000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 4 32 16 17.16 
09/12/2004 Sutton east surrey 24 1.00 10 high ph and odour Chemical present above guidelines 2 8 8 5.94 
14/12/2004 Yorkshire 10 0.42 30000 Discoloured water Aesthetics problems and above guidelines 16 32 2 16.5 
          
 
Average  80.15  38372.05   15.34 30.20 20.63 21.59 
SD  101.79  101868.36   39.01 17.25 23.44 15.47 
SE  10.79  10798.02   4.13 1.83 2.48 1.64 
CI 95 min  59.00  17207.92   7.24 26.62 15.75 18.38 
CI 95 max  101.29  59536.17   23.44 33.79 25.50 24.80 
Table 2 Drinking Water Quality incidents 2004 
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Drinking Water Incidents 
2005 
       Hazard 
score 
Hazard 
score 
Hazard score 
         0.333 0.333 0.333 
 
Date Company Duration 
in hrs 
Days Population Hazard' Boil notice/ 
Not to drink 
Hazard categories Unfit/ 
Breach of 
regulation 
P H D Sum  
01/01/2005 southern 840 35.00 42500 Water quality failure / 
Pesticide 
NA Chemical present above guidelines Breach 16 8 250 91.24 
06/01/2005 United 
Utilities 
24 1.00 96000 Water quality failure NA Potential unwholesome, potential low 
health effect 
NA 32 8 8 15.98 
07/01/2005 Thames 5 0.21 33181 Loss of supply, then 
disinfection failure 
NA loss of supply NA 16 64 2 27.31 
08/01/2005 Yorkshire 240 10.00 15035 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 8 32 64 34.63 
09/01/2005 Yorkshire 8 0.33 17000 Discoloured water Boil notice Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 8 32 2 13.99 
09/01/2005 Yorkshire 8 0.33 17000 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 8 32 2 13.99 
09/01/2005 Northumbrian 144 6.00 14903 Supply failure NA Potential biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged 
NA 4 48 32 27.97 
10/01/2005 Yorkshire 96 4.00 250 Disinfection failure Boil notice Potential biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged 
Unfit/ 
Breach 
2 48 32 27.31 
12/01/2005 United 
Utilities 
0 0.00 0 Sampling failure NA  Breach 2  2 1.33 
08/02/2005 Severn Trent 120 5.00 193980 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 64 32 32 42.62 
09/02/2005 Northumbrian 24 1.00 19347 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 8 32 8 15.98 
26/02/2005 United 
Utilities 
48 2.00 52500 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 16 32 16 21.31 
09/03/2005 Three Valleys 48 2.00 10 Aesthetics NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
Unfit 2 32 16 16.65 
17/03/2005 Bristol 18 0.75 237 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 4 12.65 
19/03/2005 Three Valleys 432 18.00 75 Aesthetics NA Chemical present above guidelines, 
health effects envisaged 
Unfit/Breac
h 
2 32 125 52.95 
22/03/2005 United 12 0.50 23265 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above NA 8 32 4 14.65 
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Utilities guidelines 
30/03/2005 Northumbrian 27 1.13 60248 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
Potential 
unfit/Breach 
16 32 8 18.65 
31/03/2005 southern 3 0.13 0 Disinfection failure NA Potential biological pathogens present Breach 2 6 2 3.33 
13/04/2005 South 
Staffordshire 
24 1.00 20000 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
Breach 8 32 8 15.98 
14/04/2005 Severn Trent 23 0.96 31000 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 16 32 4 17.32 
26/04/2005 United 
Utilities 
48 2.00 40000 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 16 32 16 21.31 
26/04/2005 Essex and 
Suffolk 
48 2.00 300000 Aesthetics NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 125 32 16 57.61 
29/04/2005 Folkestone 
Dover 
144 6.00 25 Disinfection failure, boil 
notice 
Boil notice Potential biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged 
NA 2 48 32 27.31 
06/05/2005 Three Valleys 1512 63.00 68912 Water quality failure / 
Pesticide 
NA Chemical present above guidelines, 
health effects envisaged 
Breach 32 32 500 187.81 
11/05/2005 dwr cymru 48 2.00 8000 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
Breach 4 32 16 17.32 
12/05/2005 Thames 3360 140.00 9775 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 4 32 1000 344.99 
20/05/2005 United 
Utilities 
48 2.00 32000 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 16 32 16 21.31 
25/05/2005 Yorkshire 30 1.25 4540 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 8 13.99 
26/05/2005 United 
Utilities 
24 1.00 20783 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 8 32 8 15.98 
27/05/2005 Northumbrian 13 0.54 4994 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 4 12.65 
03/06/2005 Wessex 168 7.00 12000 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present Breach 4 8 32 14.65 
03/06/2005 Anglian 48 2.00 10250 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 4 32 16 17.32 
06/06/2005 Anglian 20 0.83 937 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 4 12.65 
07/06/2005 Severn Trent 48 2.00 76 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 16 16.65 
07/06/2005 Northumbrian 48 2.00 11952 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 4 32 16 17.32 
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10/06/2005 United 
Utilities 
6 0.25 32500 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 16 32 2 16.65 
14/06/2005 Severn Trent 72 3.00 7 Contamination of water, 
not to drink notice 
Not to drink Potential biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged 
NA 2 48 16 21.98 
21/06/2005 South East 48 2.00 250 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 16 16.65 
24/06/2005 Severn Trent 50 2.08 465 Disinfection failure NA Potential biological pathogens present Breach 2 6 16 7.99 
29/06/2005 United 
Utilities 
216 9.00 18832 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 8 32 64 34.63 
06/07/2005 United 
Utilities 
24 1.00 21548 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 8 32 8 15.98 
07/07/2005 South East 144 6.00 200 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
Unfit/ 
Breach 
2 64 32 32.63 
08/07/2005 southern 72 3.00 725 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
Boil notice Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
NA 2 64 16 27.31 
18/07/2005 southern 48 2.00 146627 Water quality failure NA Chemical present above guidelines NA 64 8 16 29.30 
22/07/2005 Thames 120 5.00 87 Aesthetics NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 32 21.98 
27/07/2005 Anglian 0.5 0.02 16411 Loss chlorination NA Potential biological pathogens present NA 8 6 2 5.33 
28/07/2005 United 
Utilities 
10 0.42  Disinfection failure NA Potential biological pathogens present NA  6 2 2.66 
29/07/2005 United 
Utilities 
13 0.54 5000 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 4 12.65 
01/08/2005 dwr cymru 672 28.00 125000 Aesthetics NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 64 32 125 73.59 
09/08/2005 South 
Staffordshire 
9 0.38 7400 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 2 11.99 
16/08/2005 Thames 96 4.00 350 Aesthetics NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 32 21.98 
17/08/2005 Anglian 72 3.00 5000 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present NA 2 8 16 8.66 
20/08/2005 Essex and 
Suffolk 
96 4.00 30 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
Boil notice Biological pathogens present NA 2 8 32 13.99 
20/08/2005 southern 2 0.08 15200 Loss of supply, then 
discoloration 
NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 8 32 2 13.99 
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23/08/2005 Severn Trent 24 1.00 67905 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present NA 32 8 8 15.98 
24/08/2005 Anglian 120 5.00 162 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
Boil notice Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
NA 2 64 32 32.63 
26/08/2005 Thames 48 2.00 6500 Loss of supply NA loss of supply NA 2 16 16 11.32 
26/08/2005 Northumbrian 11 0.46 6792 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 2 11.99 
26/08/2005 Yorkshire 96 4.00 190 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution, boil notice 
Boil notice Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
NA 2 64 32 32.63 
31/08/2005 United 
Utilities 
96 4.00 50000 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 16 32 32 26.64 
05/09/2005 Severn Trent 1344 56.00 870000 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present NA 250 8 250 169.16 
09/09/2005 Northumbrian 48 2.00 43 high turbidity and potential 
ingress 
Boil notice Chemical present above guidelines, 
health effects envisaged 
NA 2 32 16 16.65 
10/09/2005 Anglian 168 7.00 470 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
Boil notice Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
NA 2 64 32 32.63 
12/09/2005 Wessex 120 5.00 500 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present NA 2 8 32 13.99 
12/09/2005 Yorkshire 432 18.00 75 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution, do not drink 
NA Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
NA 2 64 125 63.60 
19/09/2005 dwr cymru 72 3.00 2000 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present NA 2 8 16 8.66 
22/09/2005 Wessex 1176 49.00 34000 Water quality failure, 
aesthetics, algae bloom in 
res, 
NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
Potential 
unfit 
16 32 250 99.23 
03/10/2005 Portsmouth 0 0.00 0 Cryptosporidium detected 
in population 
Boil notice Potential biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged 
NA 2 48 2 17.32 
05/10/2005 Severn Trent 16 0.67 8422 Disinfection failure NA Potential biological pathogens present NA 4 6 4 4.66 
05/10/2005 Northumbrian 72 3.00 93070 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 32 32 16 26.64 
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08/10/2005 Yorkshire 12 0.50 6700 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 4 12.65 
10/10/2005 dwr cymru 168 7.00 12000 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
Breach 4 32 32 22.64 
17/10/2005 Sutton east 
surrey 
72 3.00 0 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present NA 2 8 16 8.66 
04/11/2005 dwr cymru 2016 84.00 70000 Cryptosporidium detected 
in population 
Boil notice Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
NA 32 64 500 198.47 
08/11/2005 Northumbrian 96 4.00 67500 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 32 32 32 31.97 
10/11/2005 dwr cymru 1008 42.00 2 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
Boil notice Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
NA 2 64 250 105.23 
11/11/2005 dwr cymru 120 5.00 28000 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 8 32 32 23.98 
14/11/2005 dwr cymru 96 4.00 180 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present NA 2 8 32 13.99 
15/11/2005 Wessex 48 2.00 5 Precautionary measure  Boil notice Potential biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged 
Potential 
unfit 
2 48 16 21.98 
17/11/2005 United 
Utilities 
8 0.33 200 Aesthetics Not to drink Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 2 11.99 
18/11/2005 Yorkshire 12 0.50 250 Water quality failure NA Potential unwholesome, potential low 
health effect 
NA 2 8 4 4.66 
22/11/2005 Severn Trent 144 6.00 1250 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 32 21.98 
24/11/2005 Sutton east 
surrey 
25 1.04 3750 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 8 13.99 
02/12/2005 Anglian 144 6.00 625 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present NA 2 8 32 13.99 
09/12/2005 Sutton east 
surrey 
15 0.63 2030 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 2 32 4 12.65 
12/12/2005 Severn Trent 24 1.00 8542 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present NA 4 8 8 6.66 
14/12/2005 southern 8 0.33 10500 Loss of supply, then 
disinfection failure 
NA Potential biological pathogens present NA 4 6 2 4.00 
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15/12/2005 Three Valleys 216 9.00 4750 Water quality failure, 
chemical, process failure 
NA Chemical present above guidelines NA 2 8 64 24.64 
16/12/2005 United 
Utilities 
5 0.21 12500 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 4 32 2 12.65 
16/12/2005 Severn Trent 24 1.00 35250 Discoloured water NA Aesthetics problems and above 
guidelines 
NA 16 32 8 18.65 
17/12/2005 Wessex 24 1.00 34000 Water quality failure, 
pesticide 
NA Chemical present above guidelines NA 16 8 8 10.66 
20/12/2005 Essex and 
Suffolk 
72 3.00 52 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
Boil notice Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
NA 2 64 16 27.31 
23/12/2005 Severn Trent 72 3.00 324000 Microbiological 
contamination in 
distribution 
NA Biological pathogens present NA 125 8 16 49.62 
Average  191.33  36071.98     14.20 29.96 50.98 31.52 
SD  472.44  103239.75     32.79 16.93 131.66 47.60 
SE  48.99 0.00 10705.46     3.40 1.76 13.65 4.94 
CI 95 min  95.31 0.00 15089.27     7.53 26.52 24.22 21.85 
CI 95 max  287.35 0.00 57054.69     20.86 33.40 77.74 41.20 
Table 3 Drinking Water Quality incidents 2005 
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Drinking Water incidents 
2006 
      Hazard 
score 
Hazard 
score 
Hazard 
 score 
        0.333 0.333 0.333 
 
Date Company Duration 
in hrs 
Days Population Hazard' Boil notice/ 
Not to drink 
Hazard categories P H D Sum  
29/12/05 Severn Trent 72 3.00 215,415 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Biological pathogens present 125 8 16 49.62 
09/01/06 Tendring 312 13.00 52,493 Water quality failure  Chemicals present above guidelines 16 8 64 29.30 
10/01/06 Anglian 312 13.00 132,826 Water quality failure  Chemicals present above guidelines 64 8 64 45.29 
15/01/06 Anglian 24 1.00 5,655 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 4 12.65 
23/01/06 Dwr Cymru 72 3.00 11,000 Loss of supply, then discoloration  Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 16 17.32 
27/01/06 United Utilities 12 0.50 457,500 plant failure with potential contamination  Aesthetics above guidelines 125 32 2 52.95 
31/01/06 Yorkshire 96 4.00 10,000 Water quality failure, chemical, process 
failure 
 Chemicals present above guidelines 4 8 16 9.32 
06/02/06 South West 144 6.00 6,250 taste and odour  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 32 21.98 
07/02/06 Southern 14 0.58 130,400 Plant failure affecting disinfection  Chemicals present above guidelines 64 8 4 25.31 
16/02/06 Dwr Cymru 48 2.00 1,069 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 8 13.99 
17/02/06 Wessex 24 1.00 3,150 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 4 12.65 
13/03/06 Wessex 18 0.75 500 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 4 12.65 
17/03/06 Southern 9 0.38 0 Plant failure affecting disinfection  Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 2 3.33 
19/03/06 Severn Trent 24 1.00 142 plant failure with potential contamination Boil notice  Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 4 4.00 
28/03/06 Yorkshire 5 0.21 13,597 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 2 12.65 
02/04/06 Dwr Cymru 48 2.00 5,941 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 8 13.99 
07/04/06 Northumbrian 48 2.00 5,702 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 8 13.99 
12/04/06 Dwr Cymru 24 1.00 23,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 8 32 4 14.65 
13/04/06 Southern 12 0.50 2,000 Loss of supply  Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
21/04/06 Dwr Cymru 72 3.00 100,000 Water quality failure, chemical, process 
failure 
 Chemicals present above guidelines 32 8 16 18.65 
23/04/06 Cambridge 24 1.00 30,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 8 32 4 14.65 
04/05/06 South East 48 2.00 30,919 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 16 32 8 18.65 
05/05/06 South West 48 2.00 1,000 Water quality failure Not to drink Chemicals present above guidelines, 
health effects envisaged 
2 32 8 13.99 
18/05/06 Yorkshire 24 1.00 78,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 32 32 4 22.64 
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19/05/06 Severn Trent 120 5.00 10 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Biological pathogens present 2 8 32 13.99 
22/05/06 United Utilities 4 0.17 282 Disinfection failure  Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 2 3.33 
23/05/06 Severn Trent 20 0.83 5290 Loss of supply  Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.33 
26/05/06 Anglian 4200 175.00 30 Contamination of water, not to drink notice Not to drink Chemicals present above guidelines, 
health effects envisaged 
2 32 1000 344.32 
05/06/06 Yorkshire 33600 1400.0
0 
3 taste and odour  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 1000 344.32 
05/06/06 Three Valleys 4 0.17 1,250 Plant failure affecting disinfection  Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 2 3.33 
06/06/06 Northumbrian 20 0.83 2,500 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 4 12.65 
08/06/06 Southern 24 1.00 100,300 Water quality failure, pesticide  Chemicals present above guidelines 32 8 4 14.65 
11/06/06 Yorkshire 44 1.83 6,250 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 8 13.99 
15/06/06 Wessex 22 0.92 3,865 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 4 12.65 
17/06/06 Yorkshire 144 6.00 193 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Biological pathogens present 2 8 32 13.99 
23/06/06 United Utilities 8 0.33 32,500 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 16 32 2 16.65 
30/06/06 Bournemouth 
West Hampshire 
48 2.00 25 Microbiological contamination in distribution Boil notice  Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 64 8 24.64 
03/07/06 Severn Trent 10 0.42 20,000 Loss of supply  Loss of supply 8 16 2 8.66 
03/07/06 Severn Trent 1.5 0.06 1,370,000 Disinfection failure  Potential biological pathogens present 500 6 2 169.16 
04/07/06 Yorkshire 11 0.46 6,747 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.99 
12/07/06 Dwr Cymru 48 2.00 20,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 8 32 8 15.98 
16/07/06 Dwr Cymru 48 2.00 27,000 Water quality failure, chemical, process 
failure 
 Chemicals present above guidelines 8 8 8 7.99 
18/07/06 South West 5 0.21 57,500 Disinfection failure  Potential biological pathogens present 16 6 2 7.99 
25/07/06 South 
Staffordshire 
12 0.50 20,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 8 32 2 13.99 
27/07/06 Severn Trent 24 1.00 51,000 Disinfection failure  Potential biological pathogens present 16 6 4 8.66 
30/07/06 Essex and 
Suffolk 
96 4.00 43 Contamination of water, not to drink notice Boil notice  Potential biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged 
2 48 16 21.98 
31/07/06 Anglian 360 15.00 33 Potential contamination (boil water notice) Boil notice  Potential biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged 
2 48 64 37.96 
03/08/06 South West 12 0.50 5 Disinfection failure  Chemicals present above guidelines, 
health effects envisaged 
2 32 2 11.99 
04/08/06 Sutton East 
Surrey 
840 35.00 275 Microbiological contamination in distribution Boil notice  Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 64 250 105.23 
06/08/06 South West 48 2.00 175 Microbiological contamination in distribution Boil notice  Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 64 8 24.64 
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09/08/06 Northumbrian 72 3.00 10,647 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 16 17.32 
11/08/06 United Utilities 840 35.00 85,569 taste and odour  Aesthetics above guidelines 32 32 250 104.56 
11/08/06 South East 3 0.13 11,684 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 2 12.65 
11/08/06 Thames 816 34.00 3 taste and odour  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 250 94.57 
16/08/06 Yorkshire 24 1.00 93,000 Plant failure affecting disinfection  Chemicals present above guidelines 32 8 4 14.65 
17/08/06 United Utilities 168 7.00 4,503 plant failure with potential contamination  Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 32 13.32 
18/08/06 Wessex 168 7.00 13,600 aesthetics (algae in raw water_)  Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 32 22.64 
19/08/06 Severn Trent 48 2.00 6,000 Loss of supply  Loss of supply 2 16 8 8.66 
24/08/06 Anglian 48 2.00 4,835 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Biological pathogens present 2 8 8 5.99 
24/08/06 Folkestone 528 22.00 11,995 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 125 53.61 
26/08/06 Yorkshire 12 0.50 62,500 Disinfection failure  Potential biological pathogens present 32 6 2 13.32 
06/09/06 United Utilities 9 0.38 575 Disinfection failure  Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 2 3.33 
06/09/06 Dwr Cymru 48 2.00 10,000 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Biological pathogens present 4 8 8 6.66 
15/09/06 Thames 48 2.00 14,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 8 14.65 
23/09/06 Anglian 288 12.00 150 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Biological pathogens present 2 8 64 24.64 
25/09/06 Wessex 96 4.00 5 Microbiological contamination in distribution Boil notice  Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 64 16 27.31 
28/09/06 Three Valleys 5712 238.00 88 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 1000 344.32 
28/09/06 Sutton East 
Surrey 
96 4.00 10 Microbiological contamination in distribution Boil notice  Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 64 16 27.31 
02/10/06 Anglian 840 35.00 8 Aesthetics  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 250 94.57 
03/10/06 Three Valleys 96 4.00 150 Microbiological contamination in distribution Boil notice  Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 64 16 27.31 
07/10/06 United Utilities 72 3.00 103 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Biological pathogens present 2 8 16 8.66 
09/10/06 Northumbrian 72 3.00 23 Microbiological contamination in distribution Boil notice  Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 64 16 27.31 
09/10/06 Three Valleys 48 2.00 120,000 Water quality failure, chemical, process 
failure 
 Chemicals present above guidelines 32 8 8 15.98 
12/10/06 Dwr Cymru 72 3.00 8 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Biological pathogens present 2 8 16 8.66 
14/10/06 Dwr Cymru 48 2.00 50,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 16 32 8 18.65 
15/10/06 Severn Trent 9 0.38 44,623 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 16 32 2 16.65 
15/10/06 Three Valleys 288 12.00 200 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Biological pathogens present 2 8 64 24.64 
26/10/06 Southern 768 32.00 150,000 taste and odour  Aesthetics above guidelines 64 32 125 73.59 
31/10/06 United Utilities 2856 119.00 110,323 taste and odour  Aesthetics above guidelines 32 32 500 187.81 
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01/11/06 South East 7 0.29 12,500 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 2 12.65 
05/11/06 Yorkshire 2 0.08 210,000 Disinfection failure  Potential biological pathogens present 125 6 2 44.29 
13/11/06 Thames 0 0.00 0 Plant failure affecting disinfection  Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 4.00 
19/11/06 United Utilities 36 1.50 33,695 Loss of supply  Loss of supply 16 16 8 13.32 
20/11/06 Mid Kent 6 0.25 30,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 8 32 2 13.99 
24/11/06 Northumbrian 24 1.00 3,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 4 12.65 
29/11/06 Anglian 96 4.00 6,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 16 16.65 
29/11/06 Three Valleys 0 0.00 8 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.99 
01/12/06 Dwr Cymru 24 1.00 3 Microbiological contamination in distribution Boil notice  Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 64 4 23.31 
04/12/06 Dwr Cymru 24 1.00 3 Microbiological contamination in distribution Boil notice  Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged 
2 64 4 23.31 
08/12/06 South East 48 2.00 0 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 8 5.33 
09/12/06 Thames 360 15.00 175 taste and odour  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 64 32.63 
11/12/06 United Utilities 24 1.00 1,600 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 4 12.65 
12/12/06 Dwr Cymru 13 0.54 100,000 Water quality failure, chemical, process 
failure 
 Chemicals present above guidelines 32 8 4 14.65 
19/12/06 Severn Trent 0 0.00 85,000 Microbiological contamination in distribution  Biological pathogens present 32 8 2 13.99 
20/12/06 Dwr Cymru 24 1.00 8,000 Discolouration  Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 4 13.32 
22/12/06 Southern 6 0.25 14,607 Loss of supply  Loss of supply 4 16 2 7.33 
31/12/06 Colderton 
district 
48 2.00 1,500 Disinfection failure Not to drink Chemicals present above guidelines, 
health effects envisaged 
2 32 8 13.99 
            
Average  579.82 24.16 44871.42    17.78 25.90 59.61 34.40 
SD  3475.06 144.79 149689.42    55.12 17.04 183.18 63.32 
SE  352.84 14.70 15198.66    5.60 1.73 18.60 6.43 
CI 95 
min 
 -111.75 -4.66 15082.05    6.81 22.51 23.15 21.79 
CI 95 
max 
 1271.38 52.97 74660.79    28.75 29.29 96.06 47.00 
Table 4 Drinking Water quality incidents 2006 
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3.2.1.3  Incidents in England and Wales according to hazard type 
2004 Aesthetics     Biological pathogens present   Biological pathogens present, health effects 
Number P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum  
1 2 32 8 13.86  2 8 32 13.86  2 64 32 32.34 
2 8 32 16 18.48  32 8 16 18.48  2 64 16 27.06 
3 8 32 16 18.48  8 8 32 15.84  2 64 64 42.9 
4 2 32 2 11.88  2 8 16 8.58  2 64 32 32.34 
5 32 32 125 62.37  4 8 32 14.52  2 64 16 27.06 
6 2 32 8 13.86  2 8 32 13.86  2 64 16 27.06 
7 8 32 16 18.48  64 8 8 26.4  2 64 32 32.34 
8 2 32 8 13.86  4 8 64 25.08  16 64 16 31.68 
9 2 32 2 11.88  2 8 16 8.58  2 48 16 21.78 
10 2 32 8 13.86  2 6 16 7.92  16 48 16 26.4 
11 2 32 16 16.5  4 6 8 5.94  2 48 16 21.78 
12 2 32 16 16.5  250 6 8 87.12  2 48 16 21.78 
13 2 32 16 16.5  2 6 2 3.3  2 48 32 27.06 
14 8 32 8 15.84   6  1.98  2 48 125 57.75 
15 2 32 16 16.5  8 6 8 7.26  2 48 8 19.14 
16 2 32 8 13.86  2 6 2 3.3      
17 2 32 16 16.5           
18 32 32 16 26.4           
19 64 32 8 34.32           
20 250 32 32 103.62           
21 16 32 16 21.12           
22 32 32 16 26.4           
23 2 32 16 16.5           
24 2 32 2 11.88           
25 4 32 16 17.16           
26 64 32 32 42.24           
27 2 32 8 13.86           
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28 2 32 8 13.86           
29 32 32 16 26.4           
30 32 32 8 23.76           
31 16 32 16 21.12           
32 2 32 32 21.78           
33 2 32 32 21.78           
34 4 32 32 22.44           
35 2 32 4 12.54           
36 2 32 2 11.88           
37 16 32 32 26.4           
38 32 32 16 26.4           
39 8 32 16 18.48           
40 4 32 16 17.16           
41 2 32 16 16.5           
42 4 32 16 17.16           
43 8 32 4 14.52           
44 32 32 16 26.4           
45 4 32 16 17.16           
46 16 32 2 16.5           
Average 16.87 32.00 16.67 21.63  25.87 7.13 19.47 16.38  3.87 56.53 30.20 29.90 
SD 38.40 0.00 18.44 15.21  64.25 1.02 16.47 20.23  4.93 8.26 29.58 9.72 
SE 5.66 0.00 2.72 2.24  16.06 0.26 4.12 5.06  1.27 2.13 7.64 2.51 
CI 95 min 5.77 32.00 11.34 17.23  -5.61 6.62 11.40 6.47  1.37 52.35 15.23 24.98 
CI 95 max 27.97 32.00 22.00 26.02  57.35 7.63 27.53 26.29  6.36 60.71 45.17 34.82 
N0    46     16     15 
Table 5 Drinking water incidents for 2004 by hazard category (selection) 
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2005 Aesthetics     Biological pathogens present   Biological pathogens present, health effects 
Number P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum  
1 8 32 64 34.632  4 8 32 14.652  2 64 32 32.634 
2 8 32 2 13.986  2 8 16 8.658  2 64 16 27.306 
3 8 32 2 13.986  2 8 32 13.986  2 64 32 32.634 
4 64 32 32 42.624  32 8 8 15.984  2 64 32 32.634 
5 8 32 8 15.984  250 8 250 169.164  2 64 32 32.634 
6 16 32 16 21.312  2 8 32 13.986  2 64 125 63.603 
7 2 32 16 16.65  2 8 16 8.658  32 64 500 198.468 
8 2 32 4 12.654  2 8 16 8.658  2 64 250 105.228 
9 8 32 4 14.652  2 8 32 13.986  2 64 16 27.306 
10 16 32 8 18.648  2 8 32 13.986  4 48 32 27.972 
11 8 32 8 15.984  4 8 8 6.66  2 48 32 27.306 
12 16 32 4 17.316  125 8 16 49.617  2 48 32 27.306 
13 16 32 16 21.312  2 6 2 3.33  2 48 16 21.978 
14 125 32 16 57.609  2 6 16 7.992  2 48 2 17.316 
15 4 32 16 17.316  8 6 2 5.328  2 48 16 21.978 
16 4 32 1000 344.988   6 2 2.664      
17 16 32 16 21.312  4 6 4 4.662      
18 2 32 8 13.986  4 6 2 3.996      
19 8 32 8 15.984           
20 2 32 4 12.654           
21 4 32 16 17.316           
22 2 32 4 12.654           
23 2 32 16 16.65           
24 4 32 16 17.316           
25 16 32 2 16.65           
26 2 32 16 16.65           
27 8 32 64 34.632           
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28 8 32 8 15.984           
29 2 32 32 21.978           
30 2 32 4 12.654           
31 64 32 125 73.593           
32 2 32 2 11.988           
33 2 32 32 21.978           
34 8 32 2 13.986           
35 2 32 2 11.988           
36 16 32 32 26.64           
37 16 32 250 99.234           
38 32 32 16 26.64           
39 2 32 4 12.654           
40 4 32 32 22.644           
41 32 32 32 31.968           
42 8 32 32 23.976           
43 2 32 2 11.988           
44 2 32 32 21.978           
45 2 32 8 13.986           
46 2 32 4 12.654           
47 4 32 2 12.654           
48 16 32 8 18.648           
Average 12.65 32.00 42.65 29.07  26.41 7.33 28.78 20.33  4.13 57.60 77.67 46.42 
SD 21.32 0.00 146.64 49.33  64.93 0.97 56.44 38.58  7.73 8.11 132.51 47.42 
SE 3.08 0.00 21.17 7.12  15.30 0.23 13.30 9.09  1.99 2.09 34.21 12.24 
CI 95 min 6.61 32.00 1.16 15.11  -3.58 6.89 2.70 2.51  0.22 53.49 10.61 22.42 
CI 95 max 18.68 32.00 84.13 43.02  56.41 7.78 54.85 38.16  8.04 61.71 144.73 70.42 
N0    48     18     15 
Table 6 Drinking water quality incident in 2005 by hazard category (selection) 
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2006 Aesthetics     Biological pathogens present   Biological pathogens present, health effects 
Number P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum  
1 2 32 4 12.654  125 8 16 49.617  2 64 8 24.642 
2 4 32 16 17.316  2 8 32 13.986  2 64 250 105.228 
3 125 32 2 52.947  2 8 32 13.986  2 64 8 24.642 
4 2 32 32 21.978  2 8 8 5.994  2 64 16 27.306 
5 2 32 8 13.986  4 8 8 6.66  2 64 16 27.306 
6 2 32 4 12.654  2 8 64 24.642  2 64 16 27.306 
7 2 32 4 12.654  2 8 16 8.658  2 64 16 27.306 
8 4 32 2 12.654  2 8 16 8.658  2 64 4 23.31 
9 2 32 8 13.986  2 8 64 24.642  2 64 4 23.31 
10 2 32 8 13.986  32 8 2 13.986  2 48 16 21.978 
11 8 32 4 14.652  2 6 2 3.33  2 48 64 37.962 
12 8 32 4 14.652  2 6 4 3.996      
13 16 32 8 18.648  2 6 2 3.33      
14 32 32 4 22.644  2 6 2 3.33      
15 2 32 1000 344.322  500 6 2 169.164      
16 2 32 4 12.654  16 6 2 7.992      
17 2 32 8 13.986  16 6 4 8.658      
18 2 32 4 12.654  2 6 32 13.32      
19 16 32 2 16.65  32 6 2 13.32      
20 2 32 2 11.988  2 6 2 3.33      
21 8 32 8 15.984  125 6 2 44.289      
22 8 32 2 13.986  2 6 8 5.328      
23 4 32 16 17.316           
24 32 32 250 104.562           
25 4 32 2 12.654           
26 2 32 250 94.572           
27 4 32 32 22.644           
28 4 32 125 53.613           
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29 4 32 8 14.652           
30 2 32 1000 344.322           
31 2 32 250 94.572           
32 16 32 8 18.648           
33 16 32 2 16.65           
34 64 32 125 73.593           
35 32 32 500 187.812           
36 4 32 2 12.654           
37 8 32 2 13.986           
38 2 32 4 12.654           
39 2 32 16 16.65           
40 2 32 2 11.988           
41 2 32 64 32.634           
42 2 32 4 12.654           
43 4 32 4 13.32           
Average 10.81 32.00 88.47 43.72  39.91 6.91 14.64 20.46  2.00 61.09 38.00 33.66 
SD 21.45 0.00 225.72 75.43  108.86 1.02 19.00 35.48  0.00 6.47 72.22 24.12 
SE 3.27 0.00 34.42 11.50  23.21 0.22 4.05 7.57  0.00 1.95 21.77 7.27 
CI 95 min 4.40 32.00 21.00 21.17  -5.58 6.48 6.70 5.64  2.00 57.27 -4.68 19.41 
CI 95 max 17.23 32.00 155.93 66.26  85.40 7.34 22.57 35.29  2.00 64.92 80.68 47.91 
N0    43     22     11 
Table 7 Drinking Water Quality incidents in 2006 by hazard category (selection) 
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Significance testing        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1: (F*H) for 2004  Legend  
          H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2: (F*H) for 2005  F Frequency of 
occurrence 
          SL: 5%       H Average 
incident impact 
per hazard 
category 
2004     2005              
 F H SE   F H SE  mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 
SE CI 
95% 
min 
CI 
95% 
max 
H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 46 21.63 2.24  Aesthetics 48 29.07 7.12  -400.32 55.72 7.46 -14.63 14.63 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2005 
Biological 
pathogens 
present 
16 16.38 5.06  Biological 
pathogens 
present 
18 20.33 9.09  -103.95 108.27 10.41 -20.39 20.39 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2005 
Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
15 29.90 2.51  Biological 
pathogens 
present, 
health effects 
15 46.42 12.24  -247.83 156.19 12.50 -24.50 24.50 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2005 
Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 
6 19.64 6.29  Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 
4 38.96 17.87  -38.03 359.01 18.95 -37.14 37.14 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2005 
     Chemical 
present, 
health effects 
3 85.80 52.07  -257.41 2711.25 52.07 -
102.06 
102.06 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2005 
Potential 
unwholesome 
medium health 
effect 
2 24.75 2.31  Unwholesome 2 10.32 5.66  28.85 37.38 6.11 -11.98 11.98 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2005 
Potential 
Unwholesome, 
low health 
effect 
2 16.83 0.33   0.00 0.00 0.00  33.66 0.11 0.33 -0.65 0.65 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2005 
Loss of supply 1 11.88 0.00  Loss of 
supply 
2 19.31 7.99  -26.75 63.87 7.99 -15.66 15.66 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2005 
Table 8 Significance test for incidents in 2004 and 2005 by hazard categories 
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Significance testing        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1: (F*H) for 2005  Legend  
          H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2: (F*H) for 2006  F Frequency of 
occurrence 
          SL: 5%       H Average 
incident impact 
per hazard 
category 
2005     2006              
 F H SE   F H SE  mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 
SE CI 
95% 
min 
CI 
95% 
max 
H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 48 29.07 7.12  Aesthetics 43 43.72 11.50  -484.52 183.01 13.53 -26.52 26.52 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2006 
Biological 
pathogens 
present 
18 20.33 9.09  Biological 
pathogens 
present 
22 20.46 7.57  -84.25 139.93 11.83 -23.19 23.19 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2006 
Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
15 46.42 12.24  Biological 
pathogens 
present, 
health effects 
11 33.66 7.27  326.01 202.75 14.24 -27.91 27.91 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2006 
Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 
4 38.96 17.87  Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 
11 18.16 3.48  -43.96 331.54 18.21 -35.69 35.69 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2006 
Chemical 
present, health 
effects 
3 85.80 52.07  Chemical 
present, 
health effects 
4 96.07 82.75  -126.87 9559.12 97.77 -
191.63 
191.63 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Unwholesome 2 10.32 5.66       20.65 32.05 5.66 -11.10 11.10 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2006 
Loss of supply 2 19.31 7.99  Loss of 
supply 
6 8.66 0.99  -13.32 64.85 8.05 -15.78 15.78 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
                   
Table 9 Significance test for incidents in 2005 and 2006 by hazard category  
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Significance testing        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1: (F*H) for 2004  Legend  
          H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2: (F*H) for 2006  F Frequency of 
occurrence 
          SL: 5%       H Average 
incident impact 
per hazard 
category 
2004     2006              
 F H SE   F H SE  mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 
SE CI 
95% 
min 
CI 
95% 
max 
H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 46 21.63 2.24  Aesthetics 43 43.72 11.50  -884.84 137.35 11.72 -22.97 22.97 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2006 
Biological 
pathogens 
present 
16 16.38 5.06  Biological 
pathogens 
present 
22 20.46 7.57  -188.20 82.80 9.10 -17.83 17.83 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2006 
Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 
15 29.90 2.51  Biological 
pathogens 
present, 
health effects 
11 33.66 7.27  78.17 59.17 7.69 -15.08 15.08 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2006 
Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 
6 19.64 6.29  Chemical 
present above 
guidelines 
11 18.16 3.48  -81.99 51.75 7.19 -14.10 14.10 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2006 
     Chemical 
present, 
health effects 
4 96.07 82.75  -384.28 6847.87 82.75 -
162.19 
162.19 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2006 
Potential 
unwholesome 
medium health 
effect 
2 24.75 2.31       49.50 5.34 2.31 -4.53 4.53 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2006 
Potential 
Unwholesome, 
low health 
effect 
2 16.83 0.33       33.66 0.11 0.33 -0.65 0.65 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Lower impact in 
2006 
Loss of supply 1 11.88 0.00  Loss of 
supply 
6 8.66 0.99  -40.07 0.98 0.99 -1.94 1.94 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Higher impact 
in 2006 
                   
Table 10 Significance test for incidents in 2004 and 2006 by hazard category 
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3.2.1.4 Comparison of incidents at regional level with national incidents 
 
   
Scaled down national frequency of incident occurrence according to 
number of population served by water utility (F) 
2004 
Frequency of 
occurrence in 
England and 
Wales 
Average 
incident 
impact F Thames 
F Severn 
Trent 
F United 
Utilities 
F 
Yorkshire F Anglian 
Aesthetics 46.00 21.63 7.19 6.47 6.18 4.18 3.62 
Biological pathogens present 16.00 16.38 2.50 2.25 2.15 1.45 1.26 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 15.00 29.90 2.34 2.11 2.02 1.36 1.18 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 6.00 19.64 0.94 0.84 0.81 0.55 0.47 
Potential unwholesome 
medium health effect 2.00 24.75 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.18 0.16 
Potential Unwholesome, low 
health effect 2.00 16.83 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.18 0.16 
Loss of supply 1.00 11.88 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.08 
Table 11 Scaled down national frequency of incident occurrence according to number of population served by water utilities in 2004 
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Scaled down national frequency of incident occurrence according to 
number of population served by water utility (F) 
2005 
Frequency of 
occurrence in 
England and 
Wales 
Average 
incident 
impact F Thames 
F Severn 
Trent 
F United 
Utilities 
F 
Yorkshire F Anglian 
Aesthetics 48.00 29.07 7.39 6.61 6.18 4.19 3.76 
Biological pathogens present 18.00 20.33 2.77 2.48 2.32 1.57 1.41 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 15.00 46.42 2.31 2.07 1.93 1.31 1.18 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 4.00 38.96 0.62 0.55 0.51 0.35 0.31 
Chemical present, health 
effects 3.00 85.80 0.46 0.41 0.39 0.26 0.24 
Unwholesome 2.00 10.32 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.17 0.16 
Loss of supply 2.00 19.31 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.17 0.16 
Table 12 Scaled down national frequency of incident occurrence according to number of population served by water utility in 2005 
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Scaled down national frequency of incident occurrence according to 
number of population served by water utility (F) 
2006 
Frequency of 
occurrence in 
England and 
Wales 
Average 
incident 
impact F Thames 
F Severn 
Trent 
F United 
Utilities 
F 
Yorkshire F Anglian 
Aesthetics 43.00 43.72 6.62 5.93 5.53 3.76 3.41 
Biological pathogens present 22.00 20.46 3.39 3.03 2.83 1.92 1.74 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 11.00 33.66 1.69 1.52 1.42 0.96 0.87 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 11.00 18.16 1.69 1.52 1.42 0.96 0.87 
Chemical present, health 
effects 4.00 96.07 0.62 0.55 0.51 0.35 0.32 
Loss of supply 6.00 8.66 0.92 0.83 0.77 0.52 0.48 
Table 13 Scaled down national frequency of incident occurrence according to number of population served by water utility in 2006 
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2004 Aesthetics     Biological pathogens 
present 
  Biological pathogens present, health 
effects 
 Chemical present above guidelines 
 P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum  
1.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.88  2.00 8.00 32.00 13.86  2.00 64.00 32.00 32.34  4.00 8.00 16.00 9.24 
2.00 2.00 32.00 16.00 16.50  2.00 6.00 2.00 3.30  2.00 64.00 32.00 32.34      
3.00 2.00 32.00 16.00 16.50       2.00 48.00 32.00 27.06      
4.00 16.00 32.00 16.00 21.12                
5.00 4.00 32.00 16.00 17.16                
6.00 32.00 32.00 8.00 23.76                
7.00 2.00 32.00 32.00 21.78                
8.00 2.00 32.00 4.00 12.54                
9.00 16.00 32.00 32.00 26.40                
10.00 32.00 32.00 16.00 26.40                
11.00 4.00 32.00 16.00 17.16                
12.00 16.00 32.00 2.00 16.50                
Average 10.83 32.00 14.67 18.98  2.00 7.00 17.00 8.58  2.00 58.67 32.00 30.58  4.00 8.00 16.00 9.24 
SD 11.52 0.00 9.96 4.88  0.00 1.41 21.21 7.47  0.00 9.24 0.00 3.05  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SE 3.33 0.00 2.87 1.41  0.00 1.00 15.00 5.28  0.00 5.33 0.00 1.76  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CI 95 min 4.32 32.00 9.03 16.21  2.00 5.04 -12.40 -1.77  2.00 48.21 32.00 27.13  4.00 8.00 16.00 9.24 
CI 95 max 17.35 32.00 20.30 21.74  2.00 8.96 46.40 18.93  2.00 69.12 32.00 34.03  4.00 8.00 16.00 9.24 
N0    12.00     2.00     3.00     1.00 
Table 14 Regional Water Utility drinking water quality incidents grouped by hazard category in 2004 
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2005 Aesthetics     Biological pathogens present, health 
effects 
Unwholesome  
 P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum  
1.00 8.00 32.00 64.00 34.63  2.00 64.00 32.00 32.63  2.00 8.00 4.00 4.66 
2.00 8.00 32.00 2.00 13.99  2.00 64.00 125.00 63.60      
3.00 8.00 32.00 2.00 13.99  2.00 48.00 32.00 27.31      
4.00 2.00 32.00 8.00 13.99           
5.00 2.00 32.00 4.00 12.65           
Average 5.60 32.00 16.00 17.85  2.00 58.67 63.00 41.18  2.00 8.00 4.00 4.66 
SD 3.29 0.00 26.94 9.40  0.00 9.24 53.69 19.60  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SE 1.47 0.00 12.05 4.20  0.00 5.33 31.00 11.32  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
               
CI 95 min 2.72 32.00 -7.62 9.61  2.00 48.21 2.24 19.00  2.00 8.00 4.00 4.66 
CI 95 max 8.48 32.00 39.62 26.09  2.00 69.12 123.76 63.36  2.00 8.00 4.00 4.66 
N0    5.00     3.00     1.00 
Table 15 Regional Water Utility drinking water quality incidents grouped by hazard category in 2005 
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2006 Aesthetics     Biological pathogens 
present 
  Chemicals present above guidelines 
 P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum  
1.00 4.00 32.00 2.00 12.65  2.00 8.00 32.00 13.99  4.00 8.00 16.00 9.32 
2.00 32.00 32.00 4.00 22.64  32.00 6.00 2.00 13.32  32.00 8.00 4.00 14.65 
3.00 2.00 32.00 1000.0
0 
344.32  125.00 6.00 2.00 44.29      
4.00 2.00 32.00 8.00 13.99           
5.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99           
Average 8.40 32.00 203.20 81.12  53.00 6.67 12.00 23.87  18.00 8.00 10.00 11.99 
SD 13.22 0.00 445.43 147.20  64.13 1.15 17.32 17.69  19.80 0.00 8.49 3.77 
SE 5.91 0.00 199.20 65.83  37.03 0.67 10.00 10.21  14.00 0.00 6.00 2.66 
               
CI 95 min -3.19 32.00 -187.24 -47.91  -19.57 5.36 -7.60 3.85  -9.44 8.00 -1.76 6.77 
CI 95 max 19.99 32.00 593.64 210.14  125.57 7.97 31.60 43.88  45.44 8.00 21.76 17.21 
N0    5.00     3.00     2.00 
Table 16 Regional Water Utility drinking water quality incidents grouped by hazard category in 2006 
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         H0: RWU H*RWU F = SN H*SN F     
2004 
Baseline (National standard 
(SN) for RWU  
Regional Water Utility 
(RWU) Incident Impact  H1: RWUH*RWU F<>SN H*SN F     
Hazard category SN F SN H SE  RWU F 
RWU 
H SE  mean Var SE  
CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max H0 
SL in 
% Result 
Aesthetics 4.18 21.63 2.24  12.00 18.98 1.41  137.29 7.02 2.65 -5.19 5.19 Reject 0.05 
RWU do 
worse than SN 
Biological pathogens 
present 1.45 16.38 5.06  2.00 8.58 5.28  -6.65 53.45 7.31 -14.33 14.33 Accept 0.05  
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 1.36 29.90 2.51  3.00 30.58 1.76  50.99 9.40 3.07 -6.01 6.01 Reject 0.05 
RWU do 
worse than SN 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 0.55 19.64 6.29  1.00 9.24 0.00  -1.47 39.61 6.29 -12.34 12.34 Accept 0.05  
Potential 
unwholesome medium 
health effect 0.18 24.75 2.31      -4.50 5.34 2.31 -4.53 4.53 Accept 0.05  
Potential 
Unwholesome, low 
health effect 0.18 16.83 0.33      -3.06 0.11 0.33 -0.65 0.65 Reject 0.05 
RWU do 
better than SN 
Loss of supply 0.09 11.88 0.00      -1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05  
               
 
 
Note                 
SN F is the national frequency for this category incident scaled down with 
the percentage of customers served by this utility.  
           
Legend                 
SN National standard               
RWU 
Regional 
Water 
Utility 
               
F Frequency               
H Hazard Impact factor for respective category            
SE Standard error               
CI Confidence Interval 95%              
Table 17 Significance test comparing incidents in Regional Water Utility against incidents in England and Wales in 2004 
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         H0: RWU H*RWU F = SN H*SN F     
2005 
Baseline (National standard 
(SN) for RWU  
Regional Water Utility 
(RWU) Incident Impact  H1: RWUH*RWU F<>SN H*SN F     
Hazard category SN F SN H SE  RWU F 
RWU 
H SE  mean Var SE  
CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max H0 
SL in 
% Result 
Aesthetics 4.19 29.07 7.12  5.00 17.85 4.20  -32.69 68.37 8.27 -16.21 16.21 Reject 0.05 
RWU do 
better than SN 
Biological pathogens 
present 1.57 20.33 9.09      -31.98 82.70 9.09 -17.82 17.82 Reject 0.05 
RWU do 
better than SN 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 1.31 46.42 12.24  3.00 41.18 11.32  62.69 277.94 16.67 -32.68 32.68 Reject 0.05 
RWU do 
worse than SN 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 0.35 38.96 17.87  0.00 0.00   -13.62 319.40 17.87 -35.03 35.03 Accept 0.05  
Chemical present, 
health effects 0.26 85.80 52.07  0.00 0.00   -22.49 2711.25 52.07 -102.06 102.06 Accept 0.05  
Unwholesome 0.17 10.32 5.66  1.00 4.66 0.00  2.86 32.05 5.66 -11.10 11.10 Accept 0.05  
Loss of supply 0.17 19.31 7.99      -3.38 63.87 7.99 -15.66 15.66 Accept 0.05  
         
 
  
     
Note                 
SN F is the national frequency for this category incident scaled down with 
the percentage of customers served by this utility.             
Legend                 
SN National standard               
RWU 
Regional 
Water 
Utility 
               
F Frequency               
H Hazard Impact factor for respective category            
SE Standard error               
CI Confidence Interval 95%              
Table 18 Significance tests comparing incidents in Regional Water Utility against incidents in England and Wales in 2005 
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         H0: RWU H*RWU F = SN H*SN F     
2006 
Baseline (National standard 
(SN) for RWU  
Regional Water Utility 
(RWU) Incident Impact  H1: RWUH*RWU F<>SN H*SN F     
Hazard category SN F SN H SE  RWU F 
RWU 
H SE  mean Var  SE  
CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max H0 
SL in 
% Result 
Aesthetics 3.76 43.72 11.50  5.00 81.12 65.83  241.32 4465.74 66.83 -130.98 130.98 Reject 0.05 
RWU do 
worse than SN 
Biological pathogens 
present 1.92 20.46 7.57  3.00 23.87 10.21  32.25 161.55 12.71 -24.91 24.91 Reject 0.05 
RWU do 
worse than SN 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 0.96 33.66 7.27      -32.36 52.87 7.27 -14.25 14.25 Reject 0.05 
RWU do 
better than SN 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 0.96 18.16 3.48  2.00 11.99 2.66  6.52 19.23 4.39 -8.60 8.60 Accept 0.05  
Chemical present, 
health effects 0.35 96.07 82.75      -33.58 6847.87 82.75 -162.19 162.19 Accept 0.05  
Loss of supply 0.52 8.66 0.99      -4.54 0.98 0.99 -1.94 1.94 Reject 0.05 
RWU do 
better than SN 
         
 
  
     
Note                 
SN F is the national frequency for this category incident scaled down with 
the percentage of customers served by this utility.  
           
Legend                 
SN National standard               
RWU 
Regional 
Water 
Utility                
F Frequency               
H Hazard Impact factor for respective category            
SE Standard error               
CI Confidence Interval 95%              
Table 19 Significance test comparing incidents in Regional Water Utility against incidents in England and Wales in 2006 
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3.2.2 Incidents in the Regional Water Utility  
3.2.2.1 Cause and effect relationships 
Cause Effect 
Aesthetics 
above 
guidelines 
Biological 
pathogens 
present 
Biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 
envisaged 
Chemicals 
present 
above 
guidelines 
Chemicals present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
envisaged 
Loss 
of 
supply 
Potential 
biological 
pathogens 
present 
Potential biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 
envisaged Sum 
3rd party incl. illegal 
connection 9 0     1 5   2 17 
Adverse weather 1 0   1       1 3 
Asset contamination 2 0 6   1   2 4 15 
Asset damage 1 0       1   2 4 
Asset failure 8 0   10   14 1 1 34 
Burst main 35 2 2 1   79 2 4 125 
Chlorination failure 0 0         18   18 
Design failure 1 0             1 
High Demand 2 0             2 
IT, M&C, Telemetry fail 0 1       8     9 
Maintenance work 26 2 7 1   8   1 45 
Operational intervention 17 0   1   4     22 
Power failure 4 0   2   13 1 1 21 
Treatment failure 5 1   5         11 
Raw Water quality 10 4 2       2   18 
Sum 121 10 17 21 2 132 26 16 345 
Table 20 Primary cause and effect matrix for incidents with impact on safety and reliability of drinking water for customers 
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Power failure, 5.95%
Burst main, 31.67%
Chemical supply 
contamination, 0.24%
Water quality, 0.24%
Treatment failure, 2.86%
Raw water quality, 1.90%
Asset damage, 0.95%
High Demand, 0.48%
Telemetry failure, 0.24%
Illegal connection, 0.24%
Design failure, 0.24%
Chemical spillage, 0.24%Adverse weather, 0.24%Security, 0.48%
Severe weather, 0.71%
M & C failure, 0.71%
Asset contamination, 3.57%
Unknown, 3.10%
IT failure, 11.19%
Maintenance work, 10.71%
Asset failure, 9.76%
3rd party, 4.52%
Operational intervention, 5.48%
Chlorination failure, 4.29%
 
Figure 5 Primary incident causes between 1997 and 2006 in the Regional Water Utility 
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low pressure, 0.71%
3rd party impact (Gas), 0.95%
Loss of asset, 1.90%
Damage to asset, 1.19%
Biological pathogens present, 
2.86%
Potential biological pathogens 
present, health effects envisaged, 
3.10%
Empty Service Reservoir, 2.62%
Aestetics above guidelines, 0.95%
Environmental , 0.95%
3rd part 
damage, 0.48%
Risk of 
cross contamination, 
0.48%
3rd party accident, 0.24%
Human safety, 0.24%
Statutory monitoring failure, 0.24%
Treatment failure, 0.24%
Disruption To 
Normal
 Processing 
Of Work, 0.48%
Chemicals present 
above guidelines,
 health effects envisaged, 0.71%
Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged, 4.29%
Chemicals present above guidelines, 
5.48%
Potential biological pathogens 
present, 5.71%
loss of M & C, 10.00%
Discolouration, 27.38%
Supply of unchlorinated water, 
0.24%
Interruption to supply, 28.57%
 
Figure 6 Primary incident effects between 1997 and 2006 in the Regional Water Utility 
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In the following section, the annual distribution of incident causes are presented. The 
rationale of this analysis is to identify patterns for specific primary incident causes over 
the years between 1997 and 2006. In the following figures the annual number for 
primary incident causes are shown which led to an incident. The figures are grouped in 
themes. 
In Figure 7, the number of primary incident causes for IT failure, power failure and 
monitoring, control & telemetry failure that caused an incident is plotted for the years 
between 1997 and 2006.  
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Figure 7 IT, power, monitoring, control and telemetry failures between 1997 and 2006 
 
With respect to IT failure, a significant trend can be observed of increasing numbers of 
incidents between 1999 and 2005. This can be attributed to an increasing use of IT to 
manage business processes in the organisation. Since 2004, the number of IT related 
incidents reduces from 14 to four in 2006. According to one reporter, the “teething 
problems of introducing new technologies were initially having a huge impact on the 
business but have now been ironed out”. Similarly, the number of power failures with 
the effect of an incident has significantly increased since 2001 to 2005. On enquiry, a 
number of factors were reported to explain this trend: Firstly, the supply of electricity 
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by the electricity company is seen as less reliable nowadays than it was a few years ago. 
One reporter suggested that severe weather events have contributed to the overall 
reduction in the reliability of electrical supply. Secondly, according to one asset 
manager, the water utility has increased its use of water pumping stations in favour over 
water towers and reduced its capacity of gravity-fed water supply systems. In his view, 
increasing numbers of power-supply dependent water pumping stations correlates with 
the increasing number of incidents due to power supply failures. This trend is, however, 
overshadowed by investments in un-interruptible power supply systems. The 
organisation has increased its investments in un-interruptible power supply based on 
risk assessments and reliability studies from the power supply company.  
In 2006, three incidents were specifically attributed to failures of monitoring and control 
equipment. This represents a significant increase compared to previous years. Similarly, 
to the use of IT, a trend can be observed in the organisation for increased use of 
monitoring and control equipment. This is related to an operational philosophy that 
requires all water treatment works to be operated from a regional operations and control 
centre without an operator on-site. This operational philosophy can also be observed for 
other assets owned by the water utility.  
In Figure 8 incident causes are shown which relate to asset failures. The incident causes 
are classed as asset failures denoting failure of assets, equipment and components other 
than burst mains and failure of chlorination asset, equipment and components. Due to 
the high rate of occurrence, burst mains form a distinct group. Similarly, the failure of 
chlorination was recorded separably. The remaining category “Asset damage” denotes a 
severe impact on an asset that limited the ability to provide a service. In Figure 8, the 
number of primary incident causes for asset failures, burst mains, chlorination asset 
failure and asset damage is plotted for the years between 1997 and 2006.  
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Figure 8 Asset damage, asset failure, burst mains and chlorination equipment failure between 1997 
and 2006 
 
The return period for incidents causes relating to burst mains can be represented as 
annual mean time between failures. In Figure 9, the annual mean time between burst 
main incidents is shown.  
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Figure 9 Mean time between failure in days for burst water mains causing an incident 
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A notable trend can be identified of increasing numbers of burst mains to cause an 
incident. This trend peaked in 2004 at 24 incidents and, since, the number of burst main 
incidents reduced to 14 in 2006. According to one reporter, the reduction of burst main 
incidents coincides with targeted mains refurbishment and replacement programmes.  
A trend of increasing asset failures can also be identified. Throughout the 10 years, on 
average four asset failures per led to an incident. Since 2004, the number of asset 
failures increased to 6 and 11 for the years 2005 and 2006, respectively.  
Failure of chlorination assets, equipment and components resulting in an incident 
averages at 1.8 failures per year. In 2004, the frequency of chlorination asset and 
equipment failure peaked at six incidents per year. Since then, the number has reduced 
to zero and one incident in the years 2004 and 2005, respectively. In a later section of 
this chapter, a case study will further investigate incidents surrounding the failure of 
chlorination assets and policies and strategies to reduce their risk.  
 
In Figure 10 incident causes are shown which relate to operational activities on assets. 
The incident causes are classed as incidents that occurred during maintenance work and 
due to an operational intervention by utility staff.  In addition, the figure shows 
incidents caused by chemical spillages on site. The figure shows the number of 
incidents causes in these categories leading to an incident in the years 1997 to 2006. 
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Figure 10 Incidents relating to operational activities on assets between 1997 and 2006 
On average 4.5 incidents per year occur during maintenance work on assets. Although a 
trend can be identified of reducing numbers of incident causes in this category, the main 
observation suggests some form of periodical increase and decline of incidents in this 
category. 1999 and 2005 represent peaks in the number of incidents occurring. It 
appears that this periodical trend coincides with capital investment and maintenance 
spending during the subsequent asset management programmes (AMP). According to 
one asset manager, 1999 and 2004 are the final years of asset management programmes 
in which, historically, a considerable amount of investment and maintenance projects 
are implemented. These implementation phases are “busy” periods with many 
scheduled construction activities being carried out on or near water utility assets.  
It appears that operational interventions resulting in an incident has a similar periodic 
pattern, which almost corresponds with incidents due to maintenance work on assets. 
There may be a correlation to increased construction activity. However, there was no 
data available to suggest this hypothesis. Providing evidence for this hypothesis would 
require an assessment of overall operational activity, in particular interventions into the 
water supply system, as a baseline to compare operational interventions causing an 
incident. The assessment would further require a measure for construction related 
activity on or near water supply system assets.  
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In Figure 11, incident causes are shown which are related to external factors to the 
organisation. They are impact from third parties on the utilities assets, breaches of site 
security, illegal connections onto the distribution network and contamination of 
chemicals from suppliers. The figure shows the number of incidents causes in these 
categories leading to an incident in the years 1997 to 2006. No significant trends can be 
identified other than the volatility of third party impacts leading to no and three 
incidents per year.  
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Figure 11 3rd party impact on water utility assets and operations between 1997 and 2006 
 
In Figure 12, incident causes relating to the resilience of treatment process in context of 
their operating environment are shown. The categories include adverse weather, raw 
water quality, treatment process failure and asset contamination. The figure shows the 
number of incidents causes in these categories leading to an incident in the years 1997 
to 2006. 
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Figure 12 Process related incident causes between 1997 and 2006 
Two distinct trends can be identified. Firstly, treatment process failures significantly 
increased between 2001 and 2004 and, since, reduced below the 10 year average of 1.2 
incidents per year. Secondly, the trend of incidents that were primarily attributed to poor 
raw water quality has significantly reduced over the 10 years. 
The number of incidents attributed to asset contamination can only be characterised as 
volatile with significant peaks in 2000 and 2003. The majority of these incidents relate 
to asset contaminations during planned and unplanned repair of leaking distribution 
network assets that were characterised as ingress of groundwater or sewage.  
The primary causes of failure can be related to the impact assessment of failure. In the 
following analysis, the primary causes to incidents with a significantly low impact on 
customers are compared to the primary incident causes with a significantly high impact. 
For this purpose, a confidence interval at 95% for the incident impacts between 1997 
and 2006 was constructed. Based on this confidence interval, those incidents were 
selected with significantly low and significantly high incident impacts. The primary 
causes leading to an incident in both categories were recorded in a histogram. This is 
presented in Table 21. 
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Primary incident causes 
Incident impact 
< CI 95% min 
Percentage 
of 
incidents 
Incident impact 
> CI 95 max 
Percentage 
of 
incidents 
3rd party 4 2.47% 11 7.43% 
Asset contamination 3 1.85% 12 8.11% 
Asset damage 2 1.23% 2 1.35% 
Asset failure 17 10.49% 10 6.76% 
Burst main 79 48.77% 41 27.70% 
Chemical supply 
contamination  0.00% 1 0.68% 
Chlorination failure 12 7.41% 1 0.68% 
Design failure  0.00% 1 0.68% 
High Demand 1 0.62% 1 0.68% 
Illegal connection  0.00% 1 0.68% 
IT failure 6 3.70%  0.00% 
M & C failure 1 0.62% 1 0.68% 
Maintenance work 10 6.17% 31 20.95% 
Operational intervention 5 3.09% 16 10.81% 
Power failure 10 6.17% 6 4.05% 
Raw water quality 4 2.47% 4 2.70% 
Security  0.00%  0.00% 
Severe weather 1 0.62% 3 2.03% 
Telemetry failure 1 0.62%  0.00% 
Treatment failure 3 1.85%  0.00% 
Unknown 3 1.85% 6 4.05% 
Total 162 100.00% 148 100.00% 
Table 21Histogram of primary incident causes for significantly high and low incident impacts on 
customers for incidents between 1997 and 2006 
 
The majority of incidents with a significantly low impact on customers can be identified 
as ‘burst mains (48.77%)’, ‘asset failure (10.49%)’, ‘chlorination failure (7.41%)’, 
‘maintenance work (6.17%)’ and ‘power failure (6.17%)’. On the other hand, the 
majority of incidents with a significantly high impact on customers can be identified as 
‘burst main (27.70%)’, ‘maintenance work (20.95%)’, ‘operational intervention 
(10.81%), ‘asset contamination (8.11%), ‘3rd party impact (7.43%)’ and ‘asset failure 
(7.67%).  
In both groups, ‘burst mains’ constitute the largest number of incident causes. A distinct 
difference can be identified, in particular relating to the increased number of high 
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incident impacts due to maintenance works and operational intervention. On the other 
hand, chlorination systems failures constitute significantly low incident impact types.   
A graphic representation of this histogram is presented in Figure 13 and Figure 14. 
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Figure 13 Primary causes for incidents with a significantly low impact on customers (1997-2006) 
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Figure 14 Primary causes for incidents with a significantly high impact on customers (1997-2006) 
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3.2.2.2 Chi Square analysis of asset type and asset life cycle phase 
 
For incident root causes, does a relationship exist between the categories of asset classes and asset life cycle phases? 
H0= In the distribution of most probable incident root causes asset type and asset life cycle are randomly distributed  
H1= In the distribution of most probable incident root causes asset type and asset life cycle are not randomly distributed  
SL 0.05     
SL 0.001     
Observation based on RWU incidents between 1997 and 2006      
  
Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum 
Design 2 38 4 24 68 
Construction 0 1 2 54 57 
Operations 2 14 8 33 57 
Maintenance  0 18 4 165 187 
Sum 4 71 18 276 369 
      
Expected values       
  
Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum 
Design 0.74 13.08 3.32 50.86 68.00 
Construction 0.62 10.97 2.78 42.63 57.00 
Operations 0.62 10.97 2.78 42.63 57.00 
Maintenance  2.03 35.98 9.12 139.87 187.00 
Sum 4.00 71.00 18.00 276.00 369.00 
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Chi Squared      
  
Catchment WTW SR Distribution Sum X2 
Design 2.16 47.45 0.14 14.19   
Construction 0.62 9.06 0.22 3.03   
Operations 3.09 0.84 9.80 2.18   
Maintenance  2.03 8.99 2.88 4.52   
Sum 7.90 66.33 13.03 23.91 111.17 
      
Degrees of freedom  9    
X2 (Chi square table) 
 16.92 for SL 0.05  
111.17 > 16.92      
H0 is rejected at a SL of 5%      
There exists a dependency between asset type and asset life cycle phase to explain root causes to incidents.  
Variations between expected distribution of root causes to failure and actual distribution of failure root causes is sizeable.  
      
Degrees of freedom  9    
X2 (Chi square table) 
 27.88 for SL 0.001  
111.17 > 27.88      
H0 is rejected at a SL of 0.1%      
There exists a dependency between asset type and asset life cycle phase to explain root causes to incidents.  
Table 22 Chi Square testing for independence between asset types and asset life cycle 
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3.2.2.3 Incident impact for incidents in the Regional Water Utility 
 
 
 
 
    Hazard score Hazard score Hazard score 
    0.333 0.333 0.333  
Date of 
Incident 
Population 
(actual affected) 
Duration 
(hr) Hazard category P H D Sum  
01/01/2004 100 24 Loss of supply 2 16 8 8.658 
25/01/2004 1100 12 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
25/01/2004 7600 12 Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 4 13.32 
10/02/2004 8595 9 Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 2 12.654 
10/02/2004 1400 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
17/02/2004 22 10 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
03/03/2004 3000 27 Loss of supply 2 16 8 8.658 
19/03/2004 2574 4 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
19/03/2004 2574 4 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
31/03/2004 4129 3 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
01/04/2004 2776 48 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 16 16.65 
09/04/2004 1697 48 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 16 16.65 
16/04/2004 200 48 Loss of supply 2 16 16 11.322 
16/04/2004 200 48 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 16 16.65 
20/04/2004 0 1 Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 2 3.33 
24/04/2004 2530 2 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
11/05/2004 250 48 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 64 16 27.306 
16/05/2004 0 1 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
19/05/2004 600 12 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
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28/05/2004 0 8 Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 2 3.33 
02/06/2004 1900 24 Loss of supply 2 16 8 8.658 
03/06/2004 75 72 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 64 16 27.306 
08/06/2004 4226 3 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
13/06/2004 86 16 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
14/06/2004 5200 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
20/07/2004 6000 11 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
27/07/2004 975 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
29/07/2004 5000 4 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
30/07/2004 4 8 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 64 2 22.644 
05/08/2004 85 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 48 2 17.316 
07/08/2004 80 10 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
13/08/2004 0 1 Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 2 3.33 
14/08/2004 10 48 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 64 16 27.306 
20/08/2004 3207 6 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
22/08/2004 4661 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
27/08/2004 500 25 Loss of supply 2 16 8 8.658 
03/09/2004 213 15 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 4 12.654 
07/09/2004 0 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
15/09/2004 985 2 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
18/09/2004 2800 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 8 13.986 
25/09/2004 30000 11 Loss of supply 16 16 2 11.322 
25/09/2004 30000 11 Aesthetics above guidelines 16 32 2 16.65 
28/09/2004 1079 5 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
28/09/2004 1079 5 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
01/10/2004 246 12 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
16/10/2004 1430 12 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
27/10/2004 300 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
11/11/2004 1402 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
20/11/2004 500 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
01/12/2004 3500 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
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07/12/2004 11669 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 8 14.652 
18/12/2004 7743 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 8 14.652 
23/12/2004 20 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
30/12/2004 974 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
Average 3061.037 15.33333333  2.666667 25.07407 4.851852 10.85333 
SD 5913.346 15.84714723  2.691706 14.66976 4.783649 5.819917 
SE 804.7045 2.156523589  0.366295 1.996302 0.650972 0.79199 
CI 95% min 1483.816 11.1065471  1.948729 21.16132 3.575946 9.301032 
CI 95% max 4638.258 19.56011957  3.384605 28.98683 6.127757 12.40563 
Table 23 Incident impact in 2004 
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Hazard 
score 
Hazard 
score Hazard score 
    0.333 0.333 0.333  
Date of Incident Population (actual affected) Duration (hr) Hazard category P H D Sum  
01/01/2005 500 10 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
08/01/2005 6014 4 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
08/01/2005 4679000 48 Loss of supply 500 16 16 177.156 
09/01/2005 6852 2 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
10/01/2005 122 3 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 48 2 17.316 
10/01/2005 122 3 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
18/01/2005 250 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
19/01/2005 10 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
03/03/2005 100 12 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
10/03/2005 4150 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
16/03/2005 80 15 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
18/03/2005 10000 24 Loss of supply 4 16 8 9.324 
18/03/2005 10000 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 8 14.652 
05/04/2005 0 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
25/04/2005 6 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 48 2 17.316 
05/05/2005 28 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 48 2 17.316 
23/05/2005 5300 24 Loss of supply 2 16 8 8.658 
23/05/2005 5300 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 8 13.986 
24/05/2005 1800 6 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
25/05/2005 2590 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
17/06/2005 6 8 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 64 2 22.644 
19/06/2005 15278 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 8 32 2 13.986 
20/06/2005 21 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 48 2 17.316 
29/06/2005 100 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 48 2 17.316 
12/07/2005 700 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
16/07/2005 1200 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
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05/08/2005 2 8 Biological pathogens present 2 8 2 3.996 
25/08/2005 76 48 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 64 16 27.306 
06/09/2005 600 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 8 13.986 
12/09/2005 67 8 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 64 2 22.644 
17/09/2005 2100 48 Biological pathogens present 2 8 16 8.658 
20/09/2005 26 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
08/10/2005 7000 5 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
18/10/2005 1 0.5 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
26/10/2005 3500 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
17/11/2005 0 3 Potential biological pathogens present 2 6 2 3.33 
17/11/2005 0 4 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
18/11/2005 97 11 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
28/11/2005 2700 12 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 4 12.654 
28/11/2005 500 12 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
11/12/2005 0 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
22/12/2005 0 4 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
30/12/2005 1600 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
        
Average 110879.02 11.97  13.81 25.63 3.86 14.42 
SD 713226.58 11.71  75.91 16.48 3.89 26.04 
SE 108766.03 1.79  11.58 2.51 0.59 3.97 
CI 95% min -102302.40 8.47  -8.88 20.70 2.70 6.64 
CI 95% max 324060.45 15.46  36.50 30.55 5.02 22.20 
Table 24 Incident impact for 2005 
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Hazard 
score 
Hazard 
score Hazard score 
    0.333 0.333 0.333  
Date of Incident Population (actual affected) Duration (hr) Hazard category P H D Sum  
04/01/2006 0 24 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 8 5.994 
17/01/2006 0 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
29/01/2006 3832 48 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 16 8.658 
05/02/2006 15150 2.5 Loss of supply 8 16 2 8.658 
05/02/2006 9453 2.5 Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 2 12.654 
10/02/2006 8000 4 Loss of supply 4 16 2 7.326 
25/02/2006 7 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
28/02/2006 1300 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
14/03/2006 175 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
28/03/2006 5439 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
01/04/2006 2685 6 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
21/04/2006 420 10 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
14/05/2006 10 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
14/05/2006 2500 6 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 2 11.988 
22/05/2006 0 6 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
30/05/2006 0 12 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
04/06/2006 7500 6 Loss of supply 4 16 2 7.326 
09/06/2006 80 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
11/06/2006 340 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
13/06/2006 300 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
17/06/2006 9700 6 Aesthetics above guidelines 4 32 2 12.654 
17/06/2006 50 8 Biological pathogens present 2 8 2 3.996 
16/07/2006 250 6 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
18/07/2006 500 18 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
18/07/2006 7000 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 2 32 8 13.986 
06/08/2006 400 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
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10/08/2006 80 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2 48 2 17.316 
14/08/2006 60000 48 Chemicals present above guidelines 32 8 16 18.648 
25/08/2006 24500 12 Potential biological pathogens present 8 6 4 5.994 
03/09/2006 6 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2 8 2 3.996 
06/09/2006 1248 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
16/09/2006 1300 8 Biological pathogens present 2 8 2 3.996 
20/09/2006 37000 4 Loss of supply 16 16 2 11.322 
24/09/2006 37600 1 Loss of supply 16 16 2 11.322 
10/10/2006 1000 8 Loss of supply 2 16 2 6.66 
02/12/2006 70 18 Loss of supply 2 16 4 7.326 
        
Average 6608.19 10.83  4.17 17.94 3.33 8.47 
SD 13155.93 10.46  5.88 9.70 3.45 3.66 
SE 2192.65 1.74  0.98 1.62 0.57 0.61 
CI 95% min 2310.59 7.42  2.25 14.78 2.21 7.28 
CI 95% max 10905.80 14.25  6.09 21.11 4.46 9.67 
Table 25 Incident impact in 2006 
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 Aesthetics  Biological pathogens 
present 
 Biological pathogens present, health 
effects 
 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
 Chemical present above guidelines, 
health effects 
Loss of supply 
No P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum  
1.00 4 32 4 13.32  2 6 2 3.33  2 64 16 27.306  2 8 2 3.996       2 16 8 8.658 
2.00 4 32 2 12.654  2 6 2 3.33  2 64 16 27.306  2 8 2 3.996       2 16 4 7.326 
3.00 2 32 2 11.988  2 6 2 3.33  2 64 2 22.644  2 8 2 3.996       2 16 2 6.66 
4.00 2 32 2 11.988       2 64 16 27.306            2 16 8 8.658 
5.00 2 32 2 11.988       2 48 2 17.316            2 16 2 6.66 
6.00 2 32 16 16.65                      2 16 16 11.322 
7.00 2 32 16 16.65                      2 16 4 7.326 
8.00 2 32 16 16.65                      2 16 8 8.658 
9.00 2 32 2 11.988                      2 16 4 7.326 
10.00 2 32 2 11.988                      2 16 2 6.66 
11.00 2 32 2 11.988                      2 16 2 6.66 
12.00 2 32 2 11.988                      2 16 2 6.66 
13.00 2 32 2 11.988                      2 16 8 8.658 
14.00 2 32 4 12.654                      16 16 2 11.322 
15.00 2 32 2 11.988                      2 16 2 6.66 
16.00 2 32 8 13.986                      2 16 4 7.326 
17.00 16 32 2 16.65                      2 16 4 7.326 
18.00 2 32 2 11.988                      2 16 2 6.66 
19.00 4 32 8 14.652                      2 16 2 6.66 
20.00 4 32 8 14.652                      2 16 2 6.66 
21.00                          2 16 2 6.66 
22.00                          2 16 2 6.66 
23.00                          2 16 2 6.66 
Average 3.10 32.00 5.20 13.42  2.00 6.00 2.00 3.33  2.00 60.80 10.40 24.38  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  2.61 16.00 4.09 7.56 
SE 0.70 0.00 1.15 0.42  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 3.20 3.43 1.98  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.61 0.00 0.72 0.29 
CI 95% min 1.72 32.00 2.95 12.60  2.00 6.00 2.00 3.33  2.00 54.53 3.68 20.49  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.42 16.00 2.68 6.99 
CI 95% max 4.48 32.00 7.45 14.24  2.00 6.00 2.00 3.33  2.00 67.07 17.12 28.26  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  3.80 16.00 5.49 8.13 
Table 26 Incident impact by hazard categories in 2004 
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 Aesthetics  Biological pathogens 
present 
  Biological pathogens present, 
health effects 
 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
 Chemical present above guidelines, 
health effects 
Loss of supply 
No P H D Sum   P H D Sum  P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum  
1.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  2.00 64.00 2.00 22.64  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00       2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
2.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99  2.00 8.00 16.00 8.66  2.00 64.00 16.00 27.31  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00       500.00 16.00 16.00 177.16 
3.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99  2.00 6.00 2.00 3.33  2.00 64.00 2.00 22.64  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00       2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
4.00 4.00 32.00 8.00 14.65       2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00       2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
5.00 2.00 32.00 8.00 13.99       2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00       2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
6.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99       2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32            2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
7.00 8.00 32.00 2.00 13.99       2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32            4.00 16.00 8.00 9.32 
8.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99       2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32            2.00 16.00 8.00 8.66 
9.00 2.00 32.00 8.00 13.99                      2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
10.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99                      2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
11.00 2.00 32.00 4.00 12.65                      2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
12.00                          2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
13.00                          2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
14.00                          2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
15.00                          2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
16.00                          2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
Count 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00  3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00  8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00  5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  16.00 16.00 16.00 16.00 
Average  2.73 32.00 3.82 12.84  2.00 7.33 6.67 5.33  2.00 54.00 3.75 19.90  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  33.25 16.00 4.00 17.73 
SD 1.85 0.00 2.75 1.08  0.00 1.15 8.08 2.90  0.00 8.28 4.95 3.84  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  124.47 0.00 3.79 42.52 
SE 0.56 0.00 0.83 0.32  0.00 0.67 4.67 1.68  0.00 2.93 1.75 1.36  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  31.12 0.00 0.95 10.63 
CI 95% min 1.63 32.00 2.19 12.20  2.00 6.03 -2.48 2.04  2.00 48.26 0.32 17.23  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -27.74 16.00 2.14 -3.10 
CI 95% max 3.82 32.00 5.44 13.47  2.00 8.64 15.81 8.61  2.00 59.74 7.18 22.56  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  94.24 16.00 5.86 38.57 
Table 27 Incident impact by hazard type in 2005 
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 Aesthetics  Biological pathogens present   Biological pathogens present, health effects  Chemical present above guidelines  Loss of supply 
No P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum   P H D Sum  
1.00 4.00 32.00 2.00 12.65  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32  2.00 8.00 8.00 5.99  8.00 16.00 2.00 8.66 
2.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99  2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00       2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  4.00 16.00 2.00 7.33 
3.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99  8.00 6.00 4.00 5.99       2.00 8.00 16.00 8.66  2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
4.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99            2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
5.00 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99            32.00 8.00 16.00 18.65  2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
6.00 4.00 32.00 2.00 12.65            2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00  2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
7.00 2.00 32.00 8.00 13.99                 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
8.00                     4.00 16.00 2.00 7.33 
9.00                     2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
10.00                     2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
11.00                     2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
12.00                     2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
13.00                     2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
14.00                     2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
15.00                     2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
16.00                     16.00 16.00 2.00 11.32 
17.00                     16.00 16.00 2.00 11.32 
18.00                     2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
19.00                     2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
20.00                         
Count 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00  3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00  19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 
Av 2.57 32.00 2.86 12.46  4.00 7.33 2.67 4.66  2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32  7.00 8.00 7.67 7.55  4.00 16.00 2.32 7.43 
SD 0.98 0.00 2.27 0.74  3.46 1.15 1.15 1.15  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  12.25 0.00 6.86 5.74  4.47 0.00 0.75 1.46 
SE 0.37 0.00 0.86 0.28  2.00 0.67 0.67 0.67  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  5.00 0.00 2.80 2.34  1.03 0.00 0.17 0.33 
CI 95% min 1.85 32.00 1.18 11.91  0.08 6.03 1.36 3.36  2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32  -2.80 8.00 2.18 2.96  1.99 16.00 1.98 6.77 
CI 95% max 3.29 32.00 4.54 13.01  7.92 8.64 3.97 5.97  2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32  16.80 8.00 13.16 12.14  6.01 16.00 2.65 8.09 
Table 28 Incident impact by hazard category in 2006 
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In the following tables, significance tests compare the incident impact in specified hazard categories for subsequent years.  
 
 
        Significance testing     Legend   
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  1997.00   F   
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 1998.00   H  
Year    Year    SL: 5%         
1997.00    1998.00             
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance X1-
X2 
SE CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max 
H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 5.00 17.58 2.43 Aesthetics 8.00 12.40 0.18 -11.32 5.96 2.44 -4.78 4.78 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared to 
previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present 
2.00 24.81 20.15 Biological pathogens 
present 
2.00 4.00 0.67 41.63 406.33 20.16 -39.51 39.51 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared to 
previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
4.00 33.30 3.83 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
3.00 28.19 4.44 48.62 34.35 5.86 -11.49 11.49 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared to 
previous year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 
1.00 4.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared to 
previous year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Loss of supply 11.00 8.78 0.57 Loss of supply 2.00 6.99 0.33 82.58 0.43 0.66 -1.29 1.29 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared to 
previous year 
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        Significance testing        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  1998.00     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 1999.00     
Year    Year    SL: 5%         
1998.00    1999.00             
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance X1-
X2 
SE CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max 
H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 8.00 12.40 0.18 Aesthetics 22.00 13.99 0.96 -208.46 0.95 0.97 -1.91 1.91 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared to 
previous year 
Biological pathogens present 2.00 4.00 0.67 Biological pathogens 
present 
4.00 4.33 0.58 -9.32 0.78 0.88 -1.73 1.73 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared to 
previous year 
Biological pathogens present, 
health effects 
3.00 28.19 4.44 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
2.00 25.97 6.66 32.63 64.07 8.00 -15.69 15.69 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared to 
previous year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
1.00 13.99 0.00 -13.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared to 
previous year 
Loss of supply 2.00 6.99 0.33 Loss of supply 11.00 7.27 0.23 -65.93 0.16 0.40 -0.79 0.79 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared to 
previous year 
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        Significance testing        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  1999.00     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 2000.00     
Year    Year    SL: 5%         
1999.00    2000.00             
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance X1-
X2 
SE CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max 
H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 22.00 13.99 0.96 Aesthetics 16.00 13.24 0.48 95.90 1.15 1.07 -2.10 2.10 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared to 
previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present 
4.00 4.33 0.58 Biological pathogens 
present 
4.00 7.16 2.44 -11.32 6.27 2.50 -4.91 4.91 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared to 
previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
2.00 25.97 6.66 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
2.00 25.97 1.33 0.00 46.13 6.79 -13.31 13.31 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
1.00 13.99 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines, health 
effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 13.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared to 
previous year 
Loss of supply 11.00 7.27 0.23 Loss of supply 12.00 7.49 0.39 -9.99 0.20 0.45 -0.88 0.88 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared to 
previous year 
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        Significance testing        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  2000.00     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 2001.00     
Year    Year    SL: 5%         
2000.00    2001.00             
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 
SE CI 95% min CI 95% max H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 16.00 13.24 0.48 Aesthetics 9.00 12.58 0.21 98.57 0.27 0.52 -1.03 1.03 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared 
to previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present 
4.00 7.16 2.44 Biological pathogens 
present 
4.00 4.66 1.33 9.99 7.72 2.78 -5.44 5.44 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared 
to previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
2.00 25.97 1.33 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
2.00 22.31 0.33 7.33 1.89 1.37 -2.69 2.69 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared 
to previous year 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
1.00 5.99 0.00 -5.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous year 
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Loss of supply 12.00 7.49 0.39 Loss of supply 13.00 8.86 1.55 -25.31 2.54 1.60 -3.13 3.13 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous year 
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        Significance testing        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  2001.00     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 2002.00     
Year    Year    SL: 5%         
2001.00    2002.00             
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - mean X2 Variance X1-X2 SE CI 95% min CI 95% max H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 9.00 12.58 0.21 Aesthetics 17.00 13.91 0.74 -123.21 0.59 0.77 -1.50 1.50 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present 
4.00 4.66 1.33 Biological pathogens 
present 
4.00 5.33 0.94 -2.66 2.66 1.63 -3.20 3.20 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
2.00 22.31 0.33 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
1.00 17.32 0.00 27.31 0.11 0.33 -0.65 0.65 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared 
to previous year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 
1.00 5.99 0.00 Chemical present 
above guidelines 
0.00 0.00 0.00 5.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared 
to previous year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Loss of supply 13.00 8.86 1.55 Loss of supply 9.00 8.58 0.79 37.96 3.02 1.74 -3.40 3.40 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared 
to previous year 
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        Significance testing        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  2002.00     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 2003.00     
Year    Year    SL: 5%         
2002.00    2003.00             
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 
SE CI 95% min CI 95% max H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 17.00 13.91 0.74 Aesthetics 16.00 12.65 0.30 33.97 0.64 0.80 -1.56 1.56 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared 
to previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present 
4.00 5.33 0.94 Biological pathogens 
present 
0.00 0.00 0.00 21.31 0.89 0.94 -1.85 1.85 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared 
to previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
1.00 17.32 0.00 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
5.00 20.11 0.97 -83.25 0.95 0.97 -1.91 1.91 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
1.00 4.00 0.00 -4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
1.00 11.99 0.00 -11.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous year 
Loss of supply 9.00 8.58 0.79 Loss of supply 9.00 7.62 0.51 8.66 0.88 0.94 -1.84 1.84 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared 
to previous year 
 
 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw Page A139 Appendices 
 
        Significance testing        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  2003.00     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 2004.00     
Year    Year    SL: 5%         
2003.00    2004.00             
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 
SE CI 95% min CI 95% max H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 16.00 12.65 0.30 Aesthetics 20.00 13.42 0.42 -65.93 0.27 0.52 -1.01 1.01 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared 
to previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Biological pathogens 
present 
3.00 3.33 0.00 -9.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared 
to previous year 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
5.00 20.11 0.97 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
5.00 24.38 1.98 -21.31 4.88 2.21 -4.33 4.33 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared 
to previous year 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 
1.00 4.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
3.00 4.00 0.00 -7.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared 
to previous year 
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
1.00 11.99 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 11.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact compared to 
previous year 
Loss of supply 9.00 7.62 0.51 Loss of supply 23.00 7.56 0.29 -105.23 0.35 0.59 -1.15 1.15 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact compared 
to previous year 
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        Significance testing        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  2004.00     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 2005.00     
Year    Year    SL: 5%         
2004.00    2005.00             
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 
SE CI 95% min CI 95% max H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 20.00 13.42 0.42 Aesthetics 11.00 12.84 0.32 127.21 0.28 0.53 -1.04 1.04 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Biological pathogens 
present 
3.00 3.33 0.00 Biological pathogens 
present 
3.00 5.33 1.68 -5.99 2.81 1.68 -3.29 3.29 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
5.00 24.38 1.98 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
8.00 19.90 1.36 -37.30 5.77 2.40 -4.71 4.71 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 
3.00 4.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines 
5.00 4.00 0.00 -7.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Loss of supply 23.00 7.56 0.29 Loss of supply 16.00 17.73 10.63 -109.89 113.08 10.63 -20.84 20.84 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous 
year 
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        Significance testing        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  2005.00     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 2006.00     
Year    Year    SL: 5%         
2005.00    2006.00             
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 
SE CI 95% min CI 95% max H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 11.00 12.84 0.32 Aesthetics 7.00 12.46 0.28 53.95 0.18 0.43 -0.84 0.84 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Biological pathogens 
present 
3.00 5.33 1.68 Biological pathogens 
present 
3.00 4.66 0.67 2.00 3.25 1.80 -3.53 3.53 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
8.00 19.90 1.36 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
1.00 17.32 0.00 141.86 1.84 1.36 -2.66 2.66 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 
5.00 4.00 0.00 Chemical present 
above guidelines 
6.00 7.55 2.34 -25.31 5.49 2.34 -4.59 4.59 Reject 0.05 X2>>X1 Increase of impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X2 = X1 Equal impact 
Loss of supply 16.00 17.73 10.63 Loss of supply 19.00 7.43 0.33 142.52 113.11 10.64 -20.85 20.85 Reject 0.05 X1>>X2 Reduced impact 
compared to previous 
year 
Table 29 significance testing for incident in hazard categories 
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The following tables summarise the impact of incidents on customers for subsequent 
years.  
 Population (actual) Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident 
impact on 
customers 
1997       
Number of 
incidents  23.00 23.00 23.00 23.00 23.00 23.00 
Average 23,867.52 41.09 11.09 26.78 10.61 16.14 
SD 68,997.47 59.41 25.93 19.09 14.26 12.10 
SE 14,386.97 12.39 5.41 3.98 2.97 2.52 
CI 95 min -4,330.94 16.81 0.49 18.98 4.78 11.20 
CI 95 max 52,065.98 65.37 21.68 34.58 16.44 21.09 
 
      
1998       
Number of 
incidents  15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 
Average 2,323.47 26.67 2.27 31.87 7.07 13.72 
SD 3,851.84 39.85 0.70 17.05 10.25 8.63 
SE 994.54 10.29 0.18 4.40 2.65 2.23 
CI 95 min 374.17 6.50 1.91 23.24 1.88 9.35 
CI 95 max 4,272.76 46.83 2.62 40.49 12.25 18.09 
 
      
1999       
Number of 
incidents  40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 
Average 7,694.85 14.00 4.45 26.30 4.60 11.77 
SD 20,096.58 17.13 9.99 11.66 5.68 6.17 
SE 3,177.55 2.71 1.58 1.84 0.90 0.98 
CI 95 min 1,466.86 8.69 1.35 22.69 2.84 9.86 
CI 95 max 13,922.84 19.31 7.55 29.91 6.36 13.68 
 
      
2000       
Number of 
incidents  34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 
Average 5,231.06 18.44 3.06 25.24 5.47 11.24 
SD 7,668.90 20.64 2.75 13.67 6.25 5.17 
SE 1,315.20 3.54 0.47 2.34 1.07 0.89 
CI 95 min 2,653.26 11.50 2.13 20.64 3.37 9.50 
CI 95 max 7,808.86 25.38 3.98 29.83 7.57 12.98 
 
      
2001       
Number of 
incidents  29.00 29.00 29.00 29.00 29.00 29.00 
Average 1,898.17 21.86 2.14 22.14 6.55 10.27 
SD 2,641.73 36.11 0.52 13.32 11.67 5.69 
SE 490.56 6.71 0.10 2.47 2.17 1.06 
CI 95 min 936.68 8.72 1.95 17.29 2.30 8.20 
CI 95 max 2,859.66 35.01 2.33 26.99 10.80 12.34 
       
Table 30 Summary of annual incident impacts 
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 Population (actual) Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident 
impact on 
customers 
2002       
Number of 
incidents  31.00 31.00 31.00 31.00 31.00 31.00 
Average 8,381.26 17.03 4.32 24.52 5.29 11.36 
SD 19,140.03 16.30 6.33 10.84 4.69 4.34 
SE 3,437.65 2.93 1.14 1.95 0.84 0.78 
CI 95 min 1,643.46 11.29 2.10 20.70 3.64 9.84 
CI 95 max 15,119.05 22.77 6.55 28.33 6.94 12.89 
 
      
2003       
Number of 
incidents  32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 
Average 3,575.91 13.41 2.63 29.75 4.00 12.11 
SD 6,462.20 11.69 2.51 12.40 3.73 4.52 
SE 1,142.37 2.07 0.44 2.19 0.66 0.80 
CI 95 min 1,336.87 9.36 1.75 25.45 2.71 10.55 
CI 95 max 5,814.94 17.46 3.50 34.05 5.29 13.68 
 
      
2004       
Number of 
incidents  54.00 54.00 54.00 54.00 54.00 54.00 
Average 3,061.04 15.33 2.67 25.07 4.85 10.85 
SD 5,913.35 15.85 2.69 14.67 4.78 5.82 
SE 804.70 2.16 0.37 2.00 0.65 0.79 
CI 95 min 1,483.82 11.11 1.95 21.16 3.58 9.30 
CI 95 max 4,638.26 19.56 3.38 28.99 6.13 12.41 
 
      
2005       
Number of 
incidents  43.00 43.00 43.00 43.00 43.00 43.00 
Average 110,879.02 11.97 13.81 25.63 3.86 14.42 
SD 713,226.58 11.71 75.91 16.48 3.89 26.04 
SE 108,766.03 1.79 11.58 2.51 0.59 3.97 
CI 95 min -102,302.40 8.47 -8.88 20.70 2.70 6.64 
CI 95 max 324,060.45 15.46 36.50 30.55 5.02 22.20 
 
      
2006       
Number of 
incidents  36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 
Average 6,608.19 10.83 4.17 17.94 3.33 8.47 
SD 13,155.93 10.46 5.88 9.70 3.45 3.66 
SE 2,192.65 1.74 0.98 1.62 0.57 0.61 
CI 95 min 2,310.59 7.42 2.25 14.78 2.21 7.28 
CI 95 max 10,905.80 14.25 6.09 21.11 4.46 9.67 
Table 31 Summary of annual incident impacts 
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The following tables summarise the significance tests that compares the incident impact 
on customers for subsequent years (1997 -2006). 
 
Significance testing H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5%  X1: 1997   
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2: 1998   
 Population Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident impact on 
customers 
mean X1 - mean X2 21,544.06 14.42 8.82 -5.08 3.54 2.42 
Variance X1-X2 207,973,949.64 259.29 29.27 35.21 15.85 11.34 
SE 14,421.30 16.10 5.41 5.93 3.98 3.37 
CI 95% min -28,265.75 -31.56 -10.60 -11.63 -7.80 -6.60 
CI 95% max 28,265.75 31.56 10.60 11.63 7.80 6.60 
H0 Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
SL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 
 
      
Significance testing H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5%  X1: 1998   
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2: 1999   
 Population Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident impact on 
customers 
mean X1 - mean X2 -5,371.38 12.67 -2.18 5.57 2.47 1.95 
Variance X1-X2 11,085,921.80 113.18 2.53 22.77 7.81 5.92 
SE 3,329.55 10.64 1.59 4.77 2.79 2.43 
CI 95% min -6,525.92 -20.85 -3.12 -9.35 -5.48 -4.77 
CI 95% max 6,525.92 20.85 3.12 9.35 5.48 4.77 
H0 Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
SL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 
 
      
Significance testing H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5%  X1: 1999   
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2: 2000   
 Population Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident impact on 
customers 
mean X1 - mean X2 2,463.79 -4.44 1.39 1.06 -0.87 0.53 
Variance X1-X2 11,826,576.33 19.87 2.72 8.90 1.96 1.74 
SE 3,438.98 4.46 1.65 2.98 1.40 1.32 
CI 95% min -6,740.40 -8.74 -3.23 -5.85 -2.74 -2.58 
CI 95% max 6,740.40 8.74 3.23 5.85 2.74 2.58 
H0 Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
SL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 
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Significance testing H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5%  X1: 2000   
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2: 2001   
 Population Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident impact on 
customers 
mean X1 - mean X2 3,332.89 -3.42 0.92 3.10 -1.08 0.98 
Variance X1-X2 1,970,409.98 57.51 0.23 11.61 5.85 1.90 
SE 1,403.71 7.58 0.48 3.41 2.42 1.38 
CI 95% min -2,751.28 -14.86 -0.94 -6.68 -4.74 -2.70 
CI 95% max 2,751.28 14.86 0.94 6.68 4.74 2.70 
H0 Reject Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
SL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  X2 << X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 
 
Significance testing H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5%  X1: 2001   
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2: 2002   
 Population Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident impact on 
customers 
mean X1 - mean 
X2 -6,483.09 4.83 -2.18 -2.38 1.26 -1.10 
Variance X1-X2 12,058,087.94 53.54 1.30 9.91 5.41 1.72 
SE 3,472.48 7.32 1.14 3.15 2.33 1.31 
CI 95% min -6,806.05 -14.34 -2.24 -6.17 -4.56 -2.57 
CI 95% max 6,806.05 14.34 2.24 6.17 4.56 2.57 
H0 Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
SL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 
 
      
Significance testing H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5%  X1: 2002   
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2: 2003   
 Population Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident impact on 
customers 
mean X1 - mean 
X2 4,805.35 3.63 1.70 -5.23 1.29 -0.75 
Variance X1-X2 13,122,441.63 12.84 1.49 8.60 1.15 1.24 
SE 3,622.49 3.58 1.22 2.93 1.07 1.12 
CI 95% min -7,100.08 -7.02 -2.39 -5.75 -2.10 -2.19 
CI 95% max 7,100.08 7.02 2.39 5.75 2.10 2.19 
H0 Accept  Accept Accept Accept Accept 
SL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 X2 = X1  X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 
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Significance testing H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5%  X1: 2003   
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2: 2004   
 Population Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident impact on 
customers 
mean X1 - mean 
X2 514.87 -1.93 -0.04 4.68 -0.85 1.26 
Variance X1-X2 1,952,549.25 8.92 0.33 8.79 0.86 1.26 
SE 1,397.34 2.99 0.58 2.96 0.93 1.12 
CI 95% min -2,738.78 -5.85 -1.13 -5.81 -1.82 -2.20 
CI 95% max 2,738.78 5.85 1.13 5.81 1.82 2.20 
H0 Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
SL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 
 
Significance testing H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5%  X1: 2004   
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2: 2005   
 Population Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident impact 
on customers 
mean X1 - mean 
X2 -107,817.99 3.37 -11.15 -0.55 0.99 -3.57 
Variance X1-X2 11,830,697,682.87 7.84 134.16 10.30 0.78 16.40 
SE 108,769.01 2.80 11.58 3.21 0.88 4.05 
CI 95% min -213,187.26 -5.49 -22.70 -6.29 -1.73 -7.94 
CI 95% max 213,187.26 5.49 22.70 6.29 1.73 7.94 
H0 Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
SL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 
 
      
Significance testing H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5%  X1: 2005   
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2: 2006   
 Population Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident impact 
on customers 
mean X1 - mean 
X2 104,270.83 1.13 9.65 7.68 0.53 5.95 
Variance X1-X2 11,834,857,867.20 6.23 134.98 8.93 0.68 16.14 
SE 108,788.13 2.50 11.62 2.99 0.83 4.02 
CI 95% min -213,224.74 -4.89 -22.77 -5.86 -1.62 -7.88 
CI 95% max 213,224.74 4.89 22.77 5.86 1.62 7.88 
H0 Accept Accept Accept Reject Accept Accept 
SL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 X1>X2 X2 = X1 X2 = X1 
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Significance testing H0: X1 - X2  = 0 SL: 5%  X1: 1997   
 H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2: 2006   
 Population Duration in hrs P Score H Score D Score 
Incident impact 
on customers 
mean X1 - mean 
X2 17,259.33 30.25 6.92 8.84 7.28 7.67 
Variance X1-X2 211,792,574.08 156.49 30.20 18.45 9.17 6.74 
SE 14,553.10 12.51 5.50 4.30 3.03 2.60 
CI 95% min -28,524.07 -24.52 -10.77 -8.42 -5.94 -5.09 
CI 95% max 28,524.07 24.52 10.77 8.42 5.94 5.09 
H0 Accept Reject Accept Reject Reject Reject 
SL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 X2 = X1 X1 >> X2 X2 = X1 X1 >> X2 X1 >> X2 X1 >> X2 
Table 32 Significance testing for incident statistics between 1997 and 2006 
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3.2.2.4 Comparison of incidents in the Regional Water Utility with national incidents 
RWU Incident database 
  
  
  
National Standard (DWI) customised to 
RWU (Frequency adjusted over Population) 
Significance testing 
  
              
       H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  RWU      
          H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 SN      
RWU Incident 
database         SL: 5%          
2004.00                    
  F H SE   F  H SE 
mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 SE 
CI 
95% 
min 
CI 
95% 
max H0 SL  
Commen
t 
Aesthetics 20.00 13.42 0.42 Aesthetics 4.18 21.63 2.24 177.99 5.20 2.28 -4.47 4.47 Reject 0.05 
X1 >> 
X2 
RWU do 
worse 
Biological 
pathogens present 3.00 3.33 0.00 
Biological 
pathogens present 1.45 16.38 5.06 -13.82 25.57 5.06 -9.91 9.91 Reject 0.05 
X2 >> 
X1 
RWU do 
better 
Biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 5.00 24.38 1.98 
Biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 1.36 29.90 2.51 81.13 10.23 3.20 -6.27 6.27 Reject 0.05 
X1 >> 
X2 
RWU do 
worse 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 3.00 4.00 0.00 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 0.55 19.64 6.29 1.28 39.61 6.29 -12.34 12.34 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2 
  
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 0.00 0.00 0.00      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2 
  
Loss of supply 23.00 7.56 0.29 Loss of supply 0.09 11.88 0.00 172.75 0.09 0.29 -0.57 0.57 Reject 0.05 
X1 >> 
X2 
TW do 
worse 
     
Potential 
unwholesome 
medium health 
effect 0.18 24.75 2.31 -4.50 5.34 2.31 -4.53 4.53 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2 
  
     
Potential 
Unwholesome, low 
health effect 0.18 16.83 0.33 -3.06 0.11 0.33 -0.65 0.65 Reject 0.05 
X2 >> 
X1 
RWU do 
better 
Table 33 Comparison of incident impact at regional level (Regional Water Utility) with national incident (DWI) for 2004 
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RWU Incident database 
  
  
  
National Standard (DWI) customised to 
RWU (Frequency adjusted over 
Population) 
Significance testing 
  
              
          H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  RWU      
          H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 SN      
RWU Incident 
database         SL: 5%          
2005.00                    
  F H SE   F  H SE 
mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 SE 
CI 
95% 
min 
CI 
95% 
max H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 11.00 12.84 0.32 Aesthetics 4.19 29.07 7.12 19.26 50.80 7.13 -13.97 13.97 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 
RWU do 
worse 
Biological 
pathogens present 3.00 5.33 1.68 
Biological 
pathogens present 1.57 20.33 9.09 -16.00 85.51 9.25 -18.12 18.12 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2 
  
Biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 8.00 19.90 1.36 
Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 1.31 46.42 
12.2
4 98.33 151.73 
12.3
2 -24.14 24.14 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 
RWU do 
worse 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 5.00 4.00 0.00 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 0.35 38.96 
17.8
7 6.36 319.40 
17.8
7 -35.03 35.03 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2 
  
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chemical present, 
health effects 0.26 85.80 
52.0
7 -22.49 2711.25 
52.0
7 
-
102.06 102.06 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2 
  
Loss of supply 16.00 17.73 
10.6
3 Loss of supply 0.17 19.31 7.99 280.34 176.87 
13.3
0 -26.07 26.07 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 
RWU do 
worse 
     Unwholesome 0.17 10.32 5.66 -1.80 32.05 5.66 -11.10 11.10 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2   
Table 34 Comparison of incident impact at regional level (Regional Water Utility) with national incidents (DWI) for 2005 
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RWU Incident database 
  
  
  
National Standard (DWI) customised to 
RWU (Frequency adjusted over 
Population) 
Significance testing 
  
              
          H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  RWU      
          H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 SN      
RWU Incident 
database         SL: 5%          
2006.00                    
  F H SE   F H SE 
mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 SE 
CI 
95% 
min 
CI 
95% 
max H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 7.00 12.46 0.28 Aesthetics 3.76 43.72 
11.5
0 -77.02 132.40 
11.5
1 -22.55 22.55 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 
RWU do 
better 
Biological 
pathogens present 3.00 4.66 0.67 
Biological 
pathogens present 1.92 20.46 7.57 -25.36 57.67 7.59 -14.88 14.88 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 
RWU do 
better 
Biological 
pathogens present, 
health effects 1.00 17.32 0.00 
Biological 
pathogens 
present, health 
effects 0.96 33.66 7.27 -15.04 52.87 7.27 -14.25 14.25 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 
RWU do 
better 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 6.00 7.55 2.34 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 0.96 18.16 3.48 27.83 17.63 4.20 -8.23 8.23 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 
RWU do 
worse 
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chemical present, 
health effects 0.35 96.07 
82.7
5 -33.58 6847.87 
82.7
5 
-
162.19 162.19 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2 
  
Loss of supply 19.00 7.43 0.33 Loss of supply 0.52 8.66 0.99 136.65 1.09 1.04 -2.04 2.04 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 
RWU do 
worse 
Table 35 Comparison of incident impacts at regional level (Regional Water Utility) with national incidents (DWI) for 2006 
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3.2.2.5 Comparison of incidents in the Regional Water Utility with incidents reported to the DWI 
RWU Incident 
database 
   RWU reported to 
DWI 
   Significance 
testing 
        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0   X1  RWU     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2 DWI     
        SL: 5%         
2004.00                 
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - mean 
X2 
Variance X1-
X2 
SE CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max 
H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 20.00 13.42 0.42 Aesthetics 12.00 18.98 1.41 40.70 2.16 1.47 -2.88 2.88 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Biological pathogens 
present 
3.00 3.33 0.00 Biological pathogens 
present 
2.00 8.58 5.28 -7.17 27.88 5.28 -10.35 10.35 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2  
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
5.00 24.38 1.98 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
3.00 30.58 1.76 30.14 7.03 2.65 -5.20 5.20 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Chemical present 
above guidelines 
3.00 4.00 0.00 Chemical present 
above guidelines 
1.00 9.24 0.00 2.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Chemical present 
above guidelines, 
health effects 
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2  
Loss of supply 23.00 7.56 0.29 Loss of supply    173.83 0.09 0.29 -0.57 0.57 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Table 36 Comparison between actual and reported incidents in 2004 
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RWU Incident database    RWU reported to 
DWI 
   Significance 
testing 
        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0   X1 RWU     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2 DWI     
        SL: 5%         
2005.00                 
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - mean 
X2 
Variance X1-
X2 
SE CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max 
H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 11.00 12.84 0.32 Aesthetics 5.00 17.85 4.20 51.95 17.78 4.22 -8.26 8.26 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Biological pathogens 
present 
3.00 5.33 1.68     15.98 2.81 1.68 -3.29 3.29 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
8.00 19.90 1.36 Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
3.00 41.18 11.32 35.63 129.90 11.40 -22.34 22.34 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 
5.00 4.00 0.00     19.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2  
Loss of supply 16.00 17.73 10.63     283.72 113.00 10.63 -20.84 20.84 Reject 0.05 X1 >> X2 The actual incident impact 
is higher than reported 
    Unwholesome 1.00 4.66 0.00 -4.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X2 >> X1 The actual incident impact 
is lower than reported 
Table 37 Comparison between actual and reported incidents in 2005 
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RWU Incident database    RWU reported to 
DWI 
   Significance 
testing 
        
        H0: X1 - X2  = 0   X1 RWU     
        H1: X1 - X2 <>0   X2 DWI     
        SL: 5%         
2006.00                 
 F H SE  F H SE mean X1 - mean 
X2 
Variance X1-
X2 
SE CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max 
H0 SL  Comment 
Aesthetics 7.00 12.46 0.28 Aesthetics 5.00 81.12 65.83 -318.35 4333.51 65.83 -129.03 129.03 Reject 0.05 X2 >> 
X1 
The actual incident 
impact is lower than 
reported 
Biological pathogens 
present 
3.00 4.66 0.67 Biological pathogens 
present 
3.00 23.87 10.21 -57.61 104.77 10.24 -20.06 20.06 Reject 0.05 X2 >> 
X1 
The actual incident 
impact is lower than 
reported 
Biological pathogens 
present, health effects 
1.00 17.32 0.00     17.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 X1 >> 
X2 
The actual incident 
impact is higher than 
reported 
Chemical present above 
guidelines 
6.00 7.55 2.34 Chemicals present 
above guidelines 
2.00 11.99 2.66 21.31 12.59 3.55 -6.95 6.95 Reject 0.05 X1 >> 
X2 
The actual incident 
impact is higher than 
reported 
Chemical present above 
guidelines, health effects 
0.00 0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 X1 = X2  
Loss of supply 19.00 7.43 0.33     141.19 0.11 0.33 -0.66 0.66 Reject 0.05 X1 >> 
X2 
The actual incident 
impact is higher than 
reported 
Table 38 Comparison between actual and reported incidents in 2006 
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3.2.3 Correlating the capacity of assets with the incident impact on 
customers 
In this analysis, the capacity of an asset that failed during an incident is correlated with 
the incident impact on customers. The capacity of the asset relates to the production rate 
of process facilities, the volume of storage facilities or the flow rate or diameter of water 
mains.  
In a previous analysis, 324 incidents between 1997 and 2006 had an incident impact 
calculated using the methodology advanced by (Deere et al., 2001). Out of these, 158 
incidents identified the capacity of the asset that had failed during the incident. All these 
incidents were burst water or trunk mains for which the incident documentation 
identifies the diameter of the failed asset.  
The design capacity of a water main is a function of the water main diameter and the 
designed velocity of flow. This is shown in Equation 11.  
vdQ *
4
2Π
=  
with 
Q flow in 
s
m3
 
Π Pie = 3.14159 
d diameter in m 
v velocity in 
s
m
 
Equation 11 Design rationale for water mains 
According to one reporter it is common practice to design water mains with a self-
cleansing velocity of at least v= 0.9 m/s. In the design of hydraulic systems, other 
aspects have to be taken into account (e.g. ordnance datum and the required headloss to 
reduce pressure for specific geographic locations). For calculating the capacity of water 
mains a velocity v = 1m/s is assumed.  
In the following analyses the diameter and the capacity of the failed asset is correlated 
with the calculated incident impact factor. Diameter and asset capacity are also 
correlated with the duration of the incident and the size of the population affected 
during the incident.  
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In this analysis, the incident impact factors that had been calculated for the above 
incidents are used to identify any correlation with the capacity of the asset that failed 
and caused an incident.  
In Figure 15 the diameter of failed water mains is correlated with the incident impact 
scores calculated for the incidents that arose through the water main failures. Although 
the correlation trend line with y=0.0019x+9.97 suggests a marginally positive 
correlation between the two factors, the coefficient of determination R2=0.0068 is too 
low to explain the incident impact score as a function of water main diameters. It can be 
identified that the incident impact scores for identical water main diameters commonly 
range between an incident impact score of 5 and 25.  
y = 0.0019x + 9.9786
R2 = 0.0068
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Figure 15 Correlating the incident impact and the diameter of water mains that caused the incident 
 
Similarly, the incident impact score is correlated with the calculated flow rate of the 
asset that failed as a precursor for the incident impact. The calculated capacity of the 
water main uses the diameter and assumes a designed flow velocity of 1 m/s. In this 
Figure 16, the coefficient of determination R2=0.0158 explains only 1.58% of the 
variation in the incident impact score as a function of the water main capacities. 
However, the gradient of the trend line with y=4.176x+10.123 suggests that an increase 
in the capacity of the water main marginally correlates with the consequential impact of 
its failure.  
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Figure 16 Correlating the incident impact with the assumed capacity of the water main that caused 
the incident 
 
In the above analyses, the correlation between the diameter and capacity of water mains 
and the incident impact were investigated. In these analyses, the type of hazard 
exposure was not differentiated according to hazard categories, e.g. incidents affecting 
customers with aesthetical problems associated to the drinking water, loss of supply or 
pathogens present in the drinking water.   
In the following Figure 17, the incident impact scores were calculated for specific 
hazard categories. The figure differentiates between incident impact scores for ‘loss of 
supply’, ‘biological pathogens present’, ‘potential biological pathogens present’ and 
‘aesthetics’. The incident impact scores for the respective hazard categories are 
correlated with the capacity of the water main that caused the incident.  
Incident impacts relating to aesthetical unpleasing drinking water quality correlate 
positively with the capacity of the failed water main at a gradient of y=0.0781x + 
12.651. The coefficient of determination of R2=0.1324 explains 13.24% of the variation 
in incident impact as a function of the capacity.  
Similarly, incident impacts relating to loss of supply correlate positively with the 
capacity of the failed water main at a gradient of y=0.0493x + 7.419. The coefficient of 
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determination of R2=0.0479 explains 4.79% of the variation in incident impact as a 
function of the capacity.  
Interestingly, the presence of pathogens and the potential for the presence of pathogens 
in the drinking water for customers correlate negatively with the capacity of failed water 
mains. Incident impacts relating to pathogens present in the drinking water negatively 
correlate with the capacity of the failed water main at a gradient of y=- 0.7834x + 
19.295. The coefficient of determination of R2=0.4956 explains 49.56% of the variation 
in incident impact as a function of the capacity.  
Similarly, incident impacts relating to the potential of pathogens present in the drinking 
water negatively correlate with the capacity of the failed water main at a gradient of  
y= - 0.8882x + 18.831. The coefficient of determination of R2=0.767 explains 76.7% of 
the variation in incident impact as a function of the capacity.  
This is an interesting finding because a positive trend between incident impact scores 
and the capacity of water supply system was anticipated. I.e., the larger the scale of 
water supplies systems, the larger the impact from an incident would be on customers.  
In appears that the knowledge or anticipation of bacteriological contamination inverts 
this relationship. Following the initial symptoms of an incident, the water utility usually 
allocates resources to reduce the impact of the incident and to re-instate normal 
operations. It was hypothesised that the anticipation of potential pathogens present in 
the drinking water supply in combination with the knowledge of the capacity of the 
systems prioritises the incident management efforts so that bacteriological 
contamination on large scale water supply systems receive disproportionate measures to 
reduce the incident impact.  
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Figure 17 correlating the incident impact with the assumed capacity of water mains that caused the 
incident, by hazard categories 
 
In the following Figure 18, the diameter of the failed water main is correlated with the 
actual size of population affected by the incident caused by its failure. A positive 
correlation with y=22.57x - 2034.8 suggests a positive, marginal correlation between 
the two factors. The coefficient of determination R2=0.173 explains 17.3% of the 
variation in incident impact scores as a function of the capacity.  
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Figure 18 Correlating the size of population affected by incidents with the diameter of the water 
main that caused the incident 
 
In Figure 19, a similar gradient for a best fit trend line is obtained in correlating the 
capacities of the failed water mains with the respective sizes of the affected population 
during the incidents. A positive trend between the water mains capacity and the size of 
affected population can be identified in the gradient of y=31339x. The coefficient of 
determination explains 15.49% of the variation in actual population size as a function of 
the water mains capacity.  
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Figure 19 Correlating the size of population affected by an incident and the assumed capacity of the 
water main that caused the incident 
 
In Figure 20, the diameter of failed water mains is correlated with the actual duration of 
the subsequent incidents. In this analysis, no correlation could be identified.  
y = -0.001x + 16.041
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Figure 20 Correlating the duration of incidents with the diameter of the water mains that caused 
the incidents 
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In the above analysis, no conclusive evidence was found that the incident impact 
directly correlates with the capacity of the failed asset that caused the incident. Only 
limited evidence was found that a correlation between incident impact for specific 
hazard categories and the capacity of the failed asset that caused the incident exist. 
These results have to be seen in perspective of the governing multiple stages of an 
incident: Following an asset failure, the water utility directs resources towards reducing 
the impact on customers and to re-instate normal operations. It is stipulated that the 
incident management procedures significantly reduce the impact on customers and, 
therefore, overshadow the ultimate impact of incidents on customers.  
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3.3 Research tools 
3.3.1 Incident assessment template 
 
Incident Assessment Tool Reference to 
selection  menu 
 In Table 40 and 
Table 41 
At which installation type did the failure occur? 1 
Asset reference  
At which process did the failure occur? 2 
N/A  
At which element did the failure occur? 22 
Asset reference  
At which component did the failure occur? 3 
At which type of IT/IS asset did the failure occur? 4 
Asset reference  
In which phase did the incident occur? 24 
What happened (Symptom or effect)? 5 
Why did it happen (cause of failure)? 5 
Why did it happen (cause of failure)?  
Why did it happen? 5 
What was the immediate incident response? 41 
What happened next (Symptom or effect)?  
Why did it happen (cause of failure)? 5 
What happened next? 5 
Why did it happen (cause of failure)? 5 
What was the response? 41 
It can also be attributed to…. 7 
It can also be attributed to…. 7 
It can also be attributed to…. 7 
Did Human factor play a role in causing the failure? 8 
Did any aspects of organisational culture contribute? 9 
What type of probability assessment for the equipment was used? 10 
Assessed probability/frequency of equipment to trip or failure per year?  
Exposure time or how long does it take to reset/repair/replace asset in days? Max repair 
time is the lower of the following : 365 or  
 
Did the component have immediate redundancy (e.g. duty standby)? 11 
N/A  
N/A  
Assessed non-availability of element in days  
Assessed non-availability of element as percentage (probability)  
What was the assessed probability that other, alternative or parallel processes will 
compensate for the loss of one process? 
13 
Assessed non-availability of installation in days  
Assessed non-availability of installation as percentage (probability)  
Were there any installations between the failed installation and the customer which 
reduced the impact?  
15 
Not applicable, reset field to N/A 16 
Not applicable, reset field to N/A  
Customer impact in days  
Assessed probability of customer impact  
Is the incident frequency/probability reflected in the risk assessment?  
Can you characterise the impact on customers? 17 
Boil notice?  
How many people were affected? 24 
How long in hrs?  
Can you characterise other impact on customers? 17 
How many people were affected?  
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How long in hrs?  
Can you characterise other impact on customers? 17 
How many people were affected?  
How long in hrs?  
How was the failure of the component noticed? 18 
What other method was used to mitigate against the impact (e.g. alternative plant, 
system)? 
20 
Incident impact  
Incident impact  
Incident impact  
Total incident impact  
Assessed risk score  
What type of management intervention might effectively reduce the risk?  
Did the incident management procedure provide guidance to assess the impact of the incident?  27 
Did the incident management procedure provide guidance to reduce the impact of the incident? 27 
Did the incident management procedure provide guidance to re-instate a safe system? 27 
How would you rate the effectiveness of communication during the incident? 28 
How would you rate the effectiveness of communication between operations and asset 
management? 
28 
How do you rate your decision making capacity during the incident? 29 
How would you rate the ability of the organisation to adapt its organisational structure 
to the needs of an incident? 
30 
How would you rate the availability and use of system redundancy during an incident? 31 
  
How would you rate the procedures to learning from this incident? 30 
How would you rate your organisations ability to learn from this and other previous incidents to 
anticipate similar risks? 
31 
How would you rate the state of your assets? 32 
How do you rate the ability of your organisation to manage infrastructure investment and 
maintenance effectively? 
32 
How would you rate the need for funding in order to invest in new assets and 
maintain/refurbish/replace existing assets?  
32 
Table 39 Detailed incident analysis questionnaire 
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24 5 1 2 22 4 3 18 7 8 9  10 11 
Asset life cycle What happened first? Which physical 
asset type is the 
source of the 
incident? 
Process 
group 
Building Was an IT/IS 
asset the 
source of the 
incident? 
Can the incident be attributed to a specific 
component? 
How was it 
notified? 
The failure scenario 
can be attributed to …. 
Did Human factor 
play a role in 
causing the 
incident? 
Culture Was this 
type of 
incident 
previously 
assessed 
for this 
type of 
risk? 
Type of 
prob 
assess
ment 
Standby 
Design 
Construction 
Commissioning 
Operation 
Pro-active 
maintenance  
Reactive 
maintenance 
Decommissioni
ng 
Asset failure 
Component failure 
Civil failure 
Water main failure 
Mechanical failure 
Electrical failure 
Treatment process failure 
Water quality failure 
ICA failure 
Power failure 
Scheduled repair work 
Out of commission 
Pollution 
Raw water quality 
Adverse weather 
Pollution 
3rd party impact 
Fire 
Accident/injury 
3rd party accident 
Ingress of contamination 
security failure 
Asset does not meet 
requirement to meet 
demand 
Asset does not meet 
water quality objectives 
Asset failed to deliver 
service/product 
Hydraulic effect 
Insufficient capacity 
Change in demand 
No water 
Main scouring 
Too much water 
Unfit for purpose 
Re-suspended solids 
Water quality deterioration 
Overflow 
Operational requirement 
IT failure 
N/A 
Asset type 
Aquifer 
BH 
Catchment 
IRE 
River abstraction  
Raw water pumping 
station 
Raw water 
main/Aqueduct 
WTW 
WPS 
SRE 
Water tower 
Distribution system 
customer installation 
Power 
generation/power 
supply 
IT Infra 
Other supply 
sources 
Affected site was 
isolated 
N/A 
Intake 
Sedimentatio
n 
coagulation 
Flocculation 
DAF 
Primary 
filtration 
Secondary 
filtration 
Chlorination 
Chemical 
storage & 
treatment 
equipment 
N/A 
Civil 
Water main 
Mechanical  
Electrical 
Process 
Environment 
Monitors 
control 
Chemicals 
IT Infra 
Power 
Information 
assets 
Monitoring 
equipment 
Control 
equipment 
(e.g. MCC) 
SCADA 
PLC 
Telemetry 
IT 
architecture 
N/A 
Component type 
N/A 
Dam 
Reservoir intake 
Reservoir embankment 
BH/River - Structure (Well/Bore) 
BH/River - Pump & motor 
BH/River - water main 
BH/River - valve 
BH/River - Flow meter 
BH/River - monitoring equipment 
BH/river - control equipment 
Environment 
Catchment - Structures 
Raw water trunk main 
Structure 
Inlet 
Screening 
Coagulation 
Flocculation Distribution - control 
equipment 
Pump & motor 
Valve 
water main 
monitoring equipment 
Control equipment 
Generator 
Bund 
Power supply 
WTW - Sedimentation 
WTW - Filtration 
WTW - Chem. Removal 
WTW - Contact tank 
WTW - Pump & motor 
WTW - Valve 
WTW - Flow meter 
WTW - Monitoring equipment 
WTW - control equipment 
Chemical storage 
Chemical dosing equipment 
Chemical dosing pumps 
Intermediate trunk main 
 
customer 
contact 
3rd party 
Contractor 
Member of 
public 
Operator 
Manager 
Emergency 
services 
PLC 
SCADA 
Laboratory 
results 
Anticipated 
impact 
Regulator 
Material fatigue 
Corrosion 
Wear&Tear 
operating environment 
(climate, soil condition) 
3 rd part impact 
Accidental damage to 
asset 
Unfit for purpose 
Lack of information 
Lack of maintenance 
Lack of standby 
Poor design 
Poor operational use 
Poor access 
Poor lifting facilities 
Poor maintainability 
Poor ability to isolate 
Poor SOP 
Poor work methods 
Poor planning 
Poor condition 
Age 
Inappropriate use 
Scheduled repair work 
Adverse weather 
Water 
hammer/Transient 
pressure 
Differential settlement 
Quality of chemicals 
Draught 
flooding 
Main scouring 
Contamination 
Asset does not meet 
requirement to meet 
demand 
Asset does not meet 
water quality objectives 
Asset failed to deliver 
service/product 
Poor capacity 
Solids deposition 
N/A 
N/A 
Operator error 
lack of experience 
Lack of knowledge 
Lack of information 
Lack of training 
Lack of instructions 
Lack of supervision 
Poor planning 
Poor outage 
planning 
Poor design 
Unauthorised use 
Unanticipated effect 
N/A 
Poor attitude 
Poor 
behaviour 
Carelessness 
Poor work 
processes 
Poor training 
Poor decision 
making 
Poor 
communicatio
n 
Acted in good 
faith 
Risk had to 
be taken 
Risk of 
experienced 
effect was 
considered 
Unpredicte
d failure 
Predicted 
failure 
Predicted 
failure, but 
unanticipat
ed impact 
Operate to 
fail policy 
Low risk 
Medium 
risk 
High risk 
Asset 
failure 
predicted 
but not 
impact on 
customer 
Manual 
decision 
tree 
Weibull 
Network 
analysis 
Duty only 
Duty/Stan
dby 
Duty/Duty/ 
Standby 
No 
redundanc
y 
Common 
cause 
failure 
N/A 
Table 40 Multiple choice menu to characterise incidents 
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12 15 19 20 17 13 16 27 28 29 30 31 41 
Redundancy Other installations Other installations Other 
redundancy 
Can you characterise the impact on 
customers? 
Alternative 
processes 
Customer 
impact 
Guidan
ce 
Communicati
on 
Decision making Org. Structure Redundanc
y 
 
No 
redundancy 
Common 
cause failure 
VH 
H 
M 
L 
VL 
Failsafe 
No other 
installations 
available 
WTW 
SRE 
Water tower 
WPS 
Distribution rezoning 
capability 
No other installations 
available 
Aquifer 
BH 
Catchment 
IRE 
River abstraction  
Raw water pumping station 
Raw water main/Aqueduct 
WTW 
SRE 
Water tower 
Drinking water trunk main 
(>300mm) 
Water main (distribution) 
Power generation/power 
supply 
WPS 
Water tankering 
Bottled water 
Overland main 
N/A 
Biological pathogens present, Public 
health effect. Illness through drinking 
water 
Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged, Boil order as risk of 
illness through drinking water 
Biological pathogens present, PCV 
failure leading to an undertaking 
Biological pathogens present, Trivial 
sample failure 
Potential biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged 
Potential biological pathogens present 
Chemicals present above guidelines, 
health effects envisaged, PCV failure 
leading to an undertaking 
Chemicals present above guidelines, 
Trivial sample failure 
Aesthetics above guidelines, >200ug/l 
Iron or DWI reportable incident. Highly 
discoloured, resembles beer or Guinness 
Aesthetics, >150 ug/l or notable events. 
Opaque and discoloured resembles 
weak milky tea. 
Aesthetics, 100-150ug/l Iron or minor 
events. Translucent and discoloured 
resembles orange juice or lager. 
Aesthetics, 50-100 ug/l Iron and no events. 
Particulate material visible in clear water 
Aesthetics, < 50ug/l Iron and no events - 
Slight discolouration noticed in customer 
bath, Compliance but customer 
complaint 
Loss of supply 
Potential contaminant ingress 
Pressure <15m pressure 
Pressure - No flow upstairs at peak 
demand period (<10m pressure) 
Pressure  - No flow at peak demand 
period (<5m pressure) 
Accident (Staff) 
Accident (3rd party) 
Injury (Staff) 
Injury (3rd party) 
Pollution 
N/A 
None available 
Asset failed 
Common cause 
failure 
VL 
L 
M 
H 
VH 
Yes, they 
operated 
effectively - no 
impact 
A customer 
impact could 
not be 
avoided 
VL 
L 
M 
H 
VH 
customer 
impact was 
avoided 
Installation 
failed 
N/A 
Not 
explicit
ly 
stated 
Appro
priate 
Not 
requir
ed 
Yes 
but too 
high 
level 
Very 
detaile
d 
Poor 
communicatio
n Areas of 
improvement 
were 
identified 
Effective 
communicatio
n 
Excellent 
communicatio
n 
Good decision 
making 
Responsive to 
needs 
Bureaucratic 
decision making 
non-adaptive to 
situation 
Poor judgment 
Poor decision 
making 
Adaptable to 
situation 
Inflexible 
Adequate 
considering 
the 
circumstance
s 
Redundanc
y available 
Good use 
of 
redundancy 
No 
redundancy 
was 
available 
Redundanc
y could not 
avoid 
customer 
impact 
Re-zoning 
Isolation 
Restart 
Flushing 
Manual 
operation 
Bypass 
Installation 
UPS 
Operate 
Standby 
Replace asset 
Repair 
Chlorination 
N/A 
Table 41 Multiple choice menu to characterise incidents (Part 2) 
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4 Appendix – Incident management 
4.1 Case studies  
4.1.1 Detection of faecal coliforms and clostridia in water supply 
Date 11.05.04 
Background 
The Company’s Contractor was carrying out mains rehabilitation in the area as part of 
ongoing Section 19 (Water Industries Act, 1991) work.  
Work commenced on site on the Day 1 and the first intervention occurred on the Day 3.  
Between the Day 3 and the Day 48, 4.2 km of water mains were scraped and lined. 
Water quality samples were taken as standard practice before each main was re-
commissioned and customers are advised to boil all water used for drinking and food 
preparation during the 48 hours following restoration of supplies. Prior to the event, 48 
bacteriological samples were taken by the Contractor between Day 3 and Day 48, all bar 
two of which were free from coliforms. Bowsers were provided to supply customers 
whilst their main was out of commission and were regularly sampled with all samples 
being free from coliforms.   
The contractors have experienced minor vandalism during work in this area and the 
teams carrying out the rehabilitation regularly have had to deal with excavations being 
filled with debris by local residents overnight.  Rain prior to the event lead to difficult 
working conditions with excavations containing standing water. 
On Day 47, Rehabilitation work was ongoing in the area where the incident occurred.  
Following completion of the relining work, samples were taken at the hydrants prior to 
restoration of supplies under the standard 48 hour precautionary boil water advice. 
Both hydrant samples taken that day were reported as containing three E.Coli colonies 
per 100 ml. Further samples were taken at ten locations in the surrounding area 
including the upstream service reservoir and source water.   
The results of the samples taken on Day 48 were reported with the repeat sample from 
the customers tap containing 1 E.Coli /100 ml. and 9 Clostridium perfringens/100 ml. 
Three of other ten investigatory samples also contained low counts of clostridia, but no 
coliforms. All construction on site was stopped and a chlorination and flushing 
programme was implemented. Further samples were then taken. 
On Day 49, no faecal indicators were found in samples following the work carried 
out the previous day. However, a higher than expected chlorine demand was noted 
and the main was swabbed and chlorinated. The swabs used were sampled for 
clostridia.  
The 48-hour precautionary boil advice ready in place was extended. 
A larger area was also chlorinated and flushed as a precaution due to a risk of it 
being subject to reduced pressures or interruptions to supply due to valving required 
as part of the swabbing exercise and customers in a further 250 properties were also 
advised, as a precautionary measure to boil due to these risks. 
On day 50, Clostridia were found in the swabs used the previous day. 
The flushing and chlorination operations were widened to take account of the swab 
samples.  
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Clostridia was subsequently reported in two samples from the previous day and further 
flushing carried out at the extremities of the system. 
Nine further samples were taken. 
On day 51, all sample results were reported as satisfactory and the boil notice was lifted 
on the morning of Day 52.  
 
Potential Causes of the Incident 
There was no indication of contamination during the refurbishment itself, and 
procedures appear to have been followed, but the possibility of contamination of fittings 
stored on site cannot be eliminated. Two valves and a hydrant had been fitted. It was 
apparent from an inspection on Day 48 that such fittings were being stored on a stretch 
of recreational grass in advance of the work. These fittings were not being stored on 
pallets as required by company procedures. This therefore left them exposed and 
vulnerable to potential contamination.  It is acknowledged by the Contractors that this 
practice contravenes water quality procedures on site and steps were immediately taken 
to ensure that this practice will not occur on site in the future. 
The set of circumstances above is the only known deviation from company procedures; 
however, it should not be assumed that contamination of the fittings was the definitive 
cause of the incident. Whilst there is no evidence of any other possible cause, 
contamination during other piecing up activities cannot be eliminated and it should be 
noted that the excavation outside No.25 was left open for approximately one week prior 
to replacing the tee and could have contained bacteriologically contaminated material. 
The ground conditions within the excavations were heavily saturated and although the 
standard 150 mm clearance between the base of the main and the bottom of the 
excavation was adhered to, it is possible that standing water within the excavation could 
have been transferred into the pipework whilst connections were made.    
This additional potential cause of contamination has lead to a thorough review of site 
working practices, detailed in section 5. In addition, Interviews with Contractors 
operatives were undertaken and training reviewed from which it was concluded that all 
disinfection procedures had been followed. 
 
Actions taken to prevent a recurrence. 
At a meeting with the contractor, it was agreed and established that: company 
procedures required any fittings to be dispatched immediately before use and any 
limited on-site storage should be on pallets, and that there was general awareness of this 
and that appropriate training had been given. The contractor was strongly reminded of 
the importance of these procedures. Further meetings have taken place to establish why 
these procedures were being ignored and action considered.  
The Company and its Contractor has established a working group to investigate the 
conditions surrounding this event and highlight any further potential sources of 
contamination. Outputs from this group will be fed back into the Company’s procedures 
to reduce the risk of future potential incidents. 
 
The following actions have been reviewed and remedial action taken: 
The policies and procedures in place for the storage and use of fittings were considered 
robust; however, these have been reviewed and reinforced throughout the Contractor’s 
organisation.  Procedures will ensure that fittings delivered to site are sufficient for the 
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job, are delivered in shrink-wrap and are placed on palates. A store of fittings must not 
be maintained on site. 
Training has been reviewed and refresher training given to all of the Contractors 
operational teams. 
The Contractor is re-training the whole site workforce (200 operatives) using water 
quality training provided by the Company.  Fifty percent of the gang involved in this 
event received re-training on Day 49 and the remainder received training on the Day 65.  
The length of time that access pits remain open has been reviewed and 
recommendations to keep this to the absolute minimum possible have been made. 
The partnership between the Company and its Contractor does not demand supervision 
of all work the work undertaken, but is reliant on an audit function provided by the 
Solution Assistants. Water Quality also provides training and an independent Audit role.  
It is intended that site audits will be reinforced and that Water Quality will closely 
monitor the effectiveness of these. 
 
Assessment of Actions taken  
In accordance with standing procedures, an extensive sampling exercise was 
immediately carried out following the reports of the initial failed samples.  
An immediate decision to flush and chlorinate was taken and was this successful in 
preventing further coliform failures. Low levels of Clostridia were also subsequently 
reported increasing the concern that some faecal contamination may have occurred. 
Chlorination of the main was carried out and this process indicated a chlorine demand 
within the main and a decision was taken to swab, flush and chlorinate. 
The precautionary boil advice already extant in this area was extended and it was felt 
prudent to extend the advice to a further 250 properties which may be affected by 
reduced pressures generated because of the swabbing. The mitigation plans also 
included pulling chlorinated water throughout all of the area covered by the 
precautionary advice as a further safeguard. These plans were fully discussed with the 
Health Protection Agency and the Metropolitan Council. 
Results from the twenty samples taken were all free from coliforms but two contained 
low levels of presumptive clostridia (one of which did not subsequently confirm).  
Further flushing was undertaken and samples were taken throughout the area. All of 
these samples were satisfactory and free from Coliforms and Clostridia and following 
consultation with the HPA, the boil advice was lifted. 
The company was possibly over cautious in extending both the period and area of boil 
advice; however, advice from the Health Protection Agency suggested that this was 
appropriate. 
In conclusion, the incident management response was swift and aimed to minimise the 
public health impact of the directly affected population but also populations in 
surrounding areas. The decision to extent the boil notice and superchlorinate the water 
mains in the area was directly targeted to eliminate the hazard. Without these 
procedures, the impact of this incident could have been significantly worse and public 
health could have been jeopardised for a significantly large population.  
A review of the incident leading to enforcement of existing procedures and re-training 
of contractor staff demonstrates the organisation’s willingness to learn from failure.  
 
Actual impact: High  
Potential impact: Significantly higher (high hazard, large population, extended duration) 
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Incident detection: Water quality sample with incubation period 
Incident management response: Very effective 
Incident impact reduction: Medium 
 
 
4.1.2 Microbiological contamination following water mains 
rehabilitation  
Date 14 08 04 
Background 
The 8” cast iron main was being scraped & lined with rapid setting poly-urethane (PU) 
resin in approximately 125m sections. Following completion of each section samples 
were taken and analysed for microbiological parameters. All samples had been free of 
indicator organisms. Following completion of the length of main, similarly clear results 
were obtained from the sample taken at the end of the lined section of 8” main. 
However on restoration of supplies one property reported no water. To resolve this 
problem the ferrule connecting the service to the main was dug-out, cleaned and re-
connected. Because of this activity, and because the main had been de-pressurised, a 
sample was taken following restoration of supplies.  
All appropriate precautions are believed to have been followed in carrying out this 
activity. Following re-connection of the ferrule a sample was taken from the hydrant; it 
is this sample which contained indicator organisms.  
The samples taken were reported to contain significant numbers of E Coli and total 
coliforms. This was reported to the Water Quality Standby scientist who discussed the 
matter with the Duty Manager.  
Discussions were held identifying options to protect customers as the 48hr 
precautionary advice to boil water would expire shortly. Sampling would be undertaken 
from properties supplied via the affected main. Boil notices are to be hand delivered 
to10 affected properties  
Plans were developed to chlorinate the main to 20ppm; this will require the installation 
of fittings on the main to facilitate the injection of solution. 
The DWI, Health Protection Agency and the City Council have been contacted.  
The Duty Manager and Water Quality Scientist agreed that the Distribution Asset 
Manager would go to site and manage chlorination of the main as follows:- 
 Vigorous flush of main to end hydrant 
 Chlorinate and pull 20ppm to taps in property 
 Take pressure off main and stand for one hour 
 Flush again to clear chlorine solution from main 
 Draw water in properties to obtain normal Chlorine levels 
 Ensure customers know boil order is still in place 
 
The samples obtained after chlorination were again confirmed to have failed with low 
numbers of coliforms & E Coli and it was requested that the main would be re-
chlorinated. Two of four samples taken still contained low numbers of bacteria. The 4” 
main was re-chlorinated to 20mg/l up to customers taps. 
The following day, one of seven Samples taken the previous day contained low 
numbers of bacteria. Further samples were taken from customers properties. These were 
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confirmed to be free of bacteria with the exception of one property that failed with 
E.coli. Subsequently it was established that this property had a DIY-installed, under-
sink filtration unit that may explain why positive counts lingered. 
Two days later, all samples taken the previous days were confirmed to be free of 
bacteria and the advice to Boil lifted by hand delivery of leaflets. 
 
Cause 
No confirmed cause of the contamination could be established; however, the digging 
out of the blocked ferrule is considered a possible explanation, although all appropriate 
precautions are stated to have been followed. It is possible that debris entered the main 
whilst de-pressurised to renew the ferrule. 
The sampling hydrant was found to be in poor condition and leaking into a chamber full 
of debris.  
Contamination of the lined main is considered unlikely as the post-lining sample was 
free from bacteria. 
The extended nature of the detection of bacteria in the main is considered to be due to 
the poor condition of the main with pronounced tuberculation.  
 
Assessment of Actions Taken 
Once contamination had been confirmed in the main the company acted to protect 
public health by issue of Advice to Boil Water to affected properties; up to that time 
those properties were covered by the 48 precautionary advice to boil water issued as 
part of the mains rehabilitation process. The boil notice that was in place during the 
rehabilitation work of the main was a precautionary measure that anticipated the risk of 
microbiological contamination during the construction work.  
 
The Company confirmed that no other properties served by the 8” main had been 
affected as a result of subsequent de-pressurisations. 
Although it is probable that lining the main earlier would have shortened the period for 
which customers were affected, the Company had expected that flushing followed by 
chlorination would remove the contamination.  
Customers were kept informed personally by a Public Health Scientist, and were 
provided with bottled water supplies for the duration of the event. 
In conclusion, the incident management response was swift and aimed to minimise the 
public health impact of the directly affected population. The decision to extend the boil 
notice and superchlorinate the water mains in the area was directly targeted to eliminate 
the hazard. The incident management response was effective, although the first attempt 
to super-chlorinate the main failed to kill all microbiological contaminants and the 
procedure was repeated.  
Although the cause of the incident could not be established, it is possible that the DIY-
installation on a customer’s premises masked the original microbiological 
contamination.  
Without the effective incident management response, the impact of this incident could 
have been significantly worse and public health could have been jeopardised for the 
population supplied by the water supply system. 
 
Actual impact: High  
Potential impact: Significantly higher (high hazard, large population, extended duration) 
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Incident detection: Water quality sample with incubation period 
Incident management response: Mostly effective 
Incident impact reduction: Medium 
 
 
4.1.3 Power failure leading to chlorination failure  
Date 28/05/04 
Background 
A regional power failure caused plant failures at three Water Treatment Works. One of 
them (WTW 1) experienced the most severe problems leading to a failure of dosing 
systems. The failure of the normal dosing systems and “fail safe disinfection system” at 
this WTW resulted in the supply of unchlorinated water for approximately two hours.  
05:38  Alarms received in control room.  
 a) From WTW 1, dosing pump failure alarms for all of the major dosing 
systems. 
 b) From WTW 2, final chlorine failure alarm. 
 c) From WTW 3, power failure alarms 
06:07  Plant Engineer (1) made aware of alarms at three Water Treatment works. Plant 
Engineer (1) will be visiting WTW 2 first. 
06:35  Pre contact chlorine dose at WTW 1 at zero   
07:00  Plant Engineer (1) passes chlorination dosing failure alarms to Plant Engineer 
(2). 
07:40  Plant Engineer (2) on site at WTW 1 
07:40  Final chlorine residual at WTW 1 at zero 
08:05 Chlorination restarted and “fail safe” disinfection equipment started 
08:35  Plant Engineer (2) reports that unchlorinated water has entered supply, 6 
properties are supplied from trunk main feeding a service reservoir. 
08:40  Water quality department informed immediately by Plant Engineer (2) to 
arrange sampling. 
09:00 Plant Engineer (2) doses Service Reservoirs as required in the site manual. 
09:15  Final chlorine residual still at zero 
09:55  Final chlorine residual at 0.77 mg/l 
11:15 Quality Assurance Scientist contacted DWI 
11:40  Sampler notes that chlorine detected at customers’ taps on direct feed properties.  
 
Incident causes 
The power supplier has confirmed that the power in the area was subject to brief 
interruption at 05:37. They note that the interruption was reset by their automatic 
systems but were unable to quantify its length. 
Power failure at WTW 1 will have been experienced as either a total loss of power or a 
drop in voltage. The pump starters appear to have failed and had no auto recovery 
systems associated with them.  
The emergency dosing pump failed to operate due to a fault condition arising from a 
manually initiated test-run of the dosing pump (following changing the chemical 
carboy). The fault condition that prevented auto-operation happened because the control 
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system saw the pump running but had not requested it to run. This conflict in logic 
prevented auto operation. 
The battery-powered Emergency Dosing Pump is supposed to be automatically initiated 
when: 
 Pre-Contact Tank chlorine residual falls below 0.3mg/l, for 15 minutes. 
 A multi-cell Triple validation error occurs on the chlorine monitoring for the 
Pre-Contact Tank. 
 Both Hypochlorite storage tanks (for the main site dosing) at low level. 
 The pump operates for 5 minutes daily (to ensure availability, and to avoid 
possibility of pump air locking). 
 
Assessment of action taken 
Plant Engineer (1) assessed the initial notification of alarms correctly and attended the 
site at Richmond Water Treatment Works that appeared to have the most serious fault. 
On realising that he would be unable to attend [Name of] Water Treatment Works 
within a reasonable timescale, he contacted Plant Engineer (2). Plant Engineer (2) 
attended site promptly assessed the condition of the plant and re-set the systems, this 
appears to have been done within a reasonable timescale. Plant Engineer (2) has also 
gone on to dose the reservoir at as required within the ISO manual. 
Unfortunately, the fault condition leading to the problems was not configured to raise an 
alarm on SCADA nor was it reset-able from SCADA. These have now been modified, 
and now both generate an alarm and can be reset from SCADA. 
 
The previous distribution configuration for WTW 1 would not allow for the plant to 
auto-shutdown when chlorine failed as some properties were directly fed. This position 
will be reviewed in light of the new distribution configuration.  
The incident will be used in scenario training exercises to indicate the difficulty in 
dealing with multiple events. 
 
Actual impact: Low  
Potential impact: Significantly higher  
 High hazard due to treatment process, 
  failure and potential for micro-bacteriological growth in distribution, and 
 potentially large population. 
Incident detection: Instant, multiple alarms on SCADA 
Incident management response: Very effective, however lack of prioritisation for 
multiple failure scenarios; critical alarms not raised on SCADA but identified by proxy 
alarms.  
Incident impact reduction: High 
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4.1.4 Coagulation failure leading to micro-biological contamination 
risk  
Date 07 09 04 
Background 
The WTW uses a three stage process (dissolved air flotation followed by two stages of 
rapid gravity filtration) to treat upland raw water which flows to the works under 
gravity.  
Incoming raw water to the WTW is dosed, at the primary flash mixer, with ferric 
sulphate and the coagulation pH is adjusted to set point automatically, if required, by 
the addition of lime. A facility to carbon dose exists should it be necessary. 
Dosed raw water enters the flocculators via a splitter arrangement where the water is 
slowly stirred to encourage floc formation before passing into a bank of eight flotation 
units. Floated water is given a further dose of lime dose ahead of primary filtration 
through six rapid gravity filters.  
Following filtration, the water is chlorinated ahead of the contact tank where it receives 
approximately 30-60 minutes contact time whereupon further lime is added for final pH 
control before second stage filtration. Water from the WTW supplies approximately 
58,900 people. 
A leak on the coagulant dosing system caused a reduction in coagulant flow which 
adversely affected the primary flotation treatment stage resulting in a slight 
deterioration in final water quality. Reduced coagulation efficiency could have resulted 
in incomplete disinfection and or the passage of cryptosporidium into supply, but all 
samples taken confirmed that this did not occur. Reduced coagulation efficiency may 
have resulted in incomplete treatment, but in the event there was little or no impact 
upon the quality of water at the customers’ tap. 
The coagulant dosing system including pipework is duplicated giving duty and standby 
operation and the lines are fitted with flow meters that are set to alarm on low coagulant 
flow and to change to standby operation on dose failure. At the time of the event, the 
works was receiving exceptionally poor quality raw water requiring coagulant dose 
rates well in excess of the “normal” 130 litres/hour 
On arrival at site the Plant Engineer restored coagulant flow, increased the chlorine 
dose rate and arranged for a scientist to attend. Samples were taken from the works 
outlet for Cryptosporidium and Giardia analysis and sampling exercises were 
carried out within the distribution system. 
 
Incident cause 
The data from the SCADA has been interrogated and shows the following: 
a) The coagulant flow begins to drop below the target flow of approximately 200 
litres/hour and continues to fall reaching a minimum of 83 litres / hour two hours later 
prior to the Plant Engineer restoring flow. This minimum flow was insufficient to 
trigger the low flow alarm (set at 60 litres per hour) or the auto pump changeover. 
b) The in-process turbidity monitors shows floated water turbidity beginning to 
deteriorate before rapidly increasing to trigger an alarm. Floated water turbidity peaks at 
around 16 NTU before falling rapidly on restoration of the coagulant flow. Turbidity at 
the outlet of the primary filters peaks with a maximum value of approximately 2.9 
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NTU. The effect on the final water is much less marked with a slow deterioration being 
observed with maximum values between 0.8 and 0.9 NTU being observed. 
c) The in-process chlorine monitor data shows the second stage inlet controller being 
overridden, which allowed the Plant Engineer to increase the applied dose. This arrested 
the reduction in chlorine at the works outlet. As an additional precaution, the splitter 
box was also slug dosed with sodium hypochlorite, which can be seen as a peak on the 
final water chlorine trace. Chlorine levels leaving the service reservoir were unaffected. 
 
All samples taken from the final water complied with the relevant PCVs, however, it is 
likely that the iron content of the water leaving the treatment works would have been in 
excess of 200 ug/l for a period during the final water turbidity peak and that this was 
“diluted out” in the distribution and service reservoir network. No discoloured water 
complaints were received from customers. 
 
Actions to prevent re-occurrence 
The setting of the low coagulant flow has been raised to 120 litres/hour in light of the 
current high coagulant demands being experienced. 
 
Assessment of Actions taken 
The Controller and Standby Plant Engineer responded promptly to the alarms such that 
the Plant Engineer was able to attend site and restore full coagulant dosing in around 1 
hour of the initial alarm. Subsequent actions to wash filters and increase chlorine were 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
Internal communication procedures were followed and all appropriate staff were made 
aware of the difficulties and the need for water quality sampling including analysis for 
cryptosporidium. 
 
Actual impact: Low  
Potential impact: Significantly higher  
 High hazard due to treatment process failure, 
  Potential carry over of Cryptosporidium oocycsts, 
 Potential of zero free chlorine in distribution,  
 potential for micro-bacteriological growth in distribution, and 
 potentially large population. 
Incident detection: Instant alarms on SCADA 
Incident management response: Very effective, however, direct alarms not raised on 
SCADA but identified by proxy alarms.  
Incident impact reduction: Very high 
 
 
4.1.5 Micro-biological contamination during mains rehabilitation  
Date 25 08 05 
Background 
As part of the progressive mains improvements in the area, the contractor had re-laid a 
110m section of 4" main and commissioned it back into service under usual business 
procedures on Day 1. The subsequent water quality sample taken at that time was 
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reported on Day 2 to have failed. A second subsequent sample taken on Day 2 was also 
reported to have failed on Day 3.  
Immediate action was taken on Day 3 to serve a Precautionary Boil Advice leaflet to 76 
residential properties a school affected by the normal circulation supply area from this 
new main. A decision was taken to re-chlorinate the affected mains to 1.5 mg/l using the 
contractor’s team of mains chlorinator experts; however, it was subsequently found that 
the main was subjected to residuals of chlorine at 3.0 mg/l instead of 1.5 mg/l as set on 
the chlorinator dosing unit, before it was flushed & re-sampled. The DWI and the water 
customer representative body were formally notified of the incident on Day 3. 
Following two subsequent sets of clear bacti samples on Day 4 and Day 5, the 
customers were issued with Boil Advice Lifted leaflets, and the main was returned to 
normal operation. 
 
Cause 
The cause of the incident was not identified. 
 
Actions taken to prevent re-occurrence  
Not identified 
 
Assessment of Action taken 
This incident was identified through repeat water quality sample failures. On Day 3 of 
the incident, action was taken to super-chlorinate the water main. During super-
chlorination, a wrong setting led to an excessive chlorination. Simultaneously on Day 3, 
a Boil Advice was issued to customers and the affected school.  
In summary, the response to the initial water quality failure was slow and during the 
super-chlorination process, a failure occurred that led to excessive chlorine residual in 
the drinking water.  
 
Actual impact: High  
Potential impact: Insignificantly higher  
Incident detection: Water quality sample with incubation period 
Incident management response: Slow response  
Incident impact reduction: Medium to low 
 
 
4.1.6 Micro-biological contamination during mains rehabilitation  
 
Date 17 06 05 
Background 
On Day 1 a burst occurred on a 3” Cast Iron Supply main.  The burst was repaired 
during the evening using standard techniques. In line with normal procedure a 
sample was taken after reinstatement of the main. Results from this sample indicated 
both Coliform and faecal coliforms to be present. Clostridia were also reported.  As 
a result a precautionary boil advice was placed on the 6 properties supplied by the 
main, whilst the additional steps of swabbing and super chlorinating the main were 
undertaken.  
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As a result of the swab becoming lodged in the main, temporary overland supplies 
were provided during the early hours on the Day 2 and customers fed via this route. 
This method of supply remains in place whilst the main is scraped and lined prior to 
reinstatement.  
Samples were taken from properties supplied by this arrangement on Day 2 and Day 
3 whilst still under precautionary boil advice. 
The mains repair sample, which was taken from a Hydrant following its repair, 
contained 490 coliforms 90 Faecal Coliforms and 20 Clostridia.  All investigatory and 
follow up samples taken from properties supplied by the main and from the bypass 
arrangement have been fully compliant and free from any indicator organisms with the 
exception of a single faecal streptococcus isolated from a follow up sample taken on 
Day 3 which was reported on Day 5.  
This sample was from the first property supplied by one of the two bypass 
arrangements. All samples below this point and from the other properties on bypass 
were clear.  
 
Incident cause  
It is possible that the contamination arose during the repair of the main or - more 
likely – that the standpipe from which sample was taken was contaminated.  
Given the level of contamination reported on the afternoon of Day 1, it was decided that 
precautionary boil water advice should be issued whilst remedial action was carried out. 
Investigation has identified that the main is in poor condition and has had a recent 
history of bursts. Some of these may be attributable to third party activity as the mains 
location is on an active building site, where recent gas services connections have been 
also been made.  
 
Assessment of actions taken 
A precautionary boil advice was put on the properties supplied by the main, 
following the laboratory reporting the bacteriological results of the contractor’s 
sample on Day 1. 
Advice was initially provided verbally and confirmed by the delivery of notices. 
Bottled water was made available and supplied to the affected properties. 
The main was swabbed with a swab soaked in a 1000 mg/l solution of chlorine and 
supplies isolated at the customers stop taps.  It was intended that the main would 
then be super chlorinated to 50mg/l following and allowed to stand for 2 hours 
before being flushed and returned to supply under the existing precautionary boil 
advice. Sampling would then be undertaken and the boil advice lifted following 
satisfactory results in accordance with standard procedures.    
In accordance with standard procedures, the boil water advice was lifted on the 
afternoon of Day 4 following receipt of satisfactory results from samples taken on 
the previous two days. It should be noted that the Company’s procedures do not 
require that boil water advice be extended for a further 24 hours whilst the final 
faecal streptococci results are reported (provided that all other results are 
satisfactory). 
 
Actual impact: High  
Potential impact: Significantly higher  
Incident detection: Water quality sample with incubation period 
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Incident management response: Good response  
Incident impact reduction: High 
 
4.1.7 Power failure leading to treatment failure  
Date 17 11 2005  
Background 
Following a power dip, a large WTW suffered serious treatment problems, i.e. the 
coagulant dosing reduced and the chlorine dosing equipment failed. This resulted in the 
plant producing water that was not fully treated. It is estimated that unchlorinated water 
was entering the contact water tank for approx. 4 hours.  The works could not be shut 
down on over SCADA and telemetry, therefore the Process Engineer had to attend site.  
The DWI was notified and strategic service reservoirs in the area were slug dosed.  
Extensive water quality samples were also obtained. All samples were clear from 
microbiological contaminants in particular Cryptosporidium.  
The extent of the incident management is best demonstrated with the logbook entries:  
At 20:45 on Day 1, Engineer (1) rang in to report on the impact of a power cut. 
The engineer (1) called in again around 21:30 to advise he had reset some system 
alarms. At 21:55, the Duty Manager was advised of a communications failure for the 
WTW. However, according to the service provider, there was no fault on the 
communication lines. 
Engineer (2) called in at 22:09 reporting that he had managed correct Ferric dosing rate 
and reported that chlorine dosing seized at ca. 18:30. This was only identified after he 
arrived on site.  
Informed by Engineer (3) that the power dip at the WTW has taken out the entire 
treatment process. Subsequently the WTW was shut down.  
23.15 Duty manager called engineer (1) to ask for turbidity reading to be obtained 
from the service reservoir outlet and that the site reservoir is to be slug dosed. 
Duty Manager called distribution managers to reduce water demand on the WTW  
23.30 Duty Manager formulating plan to reduce demand on the WTW supply system 
On day 2, 00.30, the initial slug dosing of the site service reservoir was completed  
01.20 Decision made to restart plant, there is confidence that there will be good water 
quality as front end of the treatment process was kept going.  
04.16 Water going back into contact water tank 
05:30 Service reservoir slug dosed again  
07:15 Service reservoir slug dosed again 
08:00 Laboratory confirmed the grab samples of WTW were clear of Cryptosporidium. 
During the day, a team worked on the times of Travel for the water from the WTW 
reaching distribution points and service reservoirs.  This was so sampling times could 
be derived to check the water quality corresponding to the water leaving the WTW 
during the time of the problems.     
17:45 Laboratory confirmed that the sample of the WTW obtained earlier today did not 
contain any Cryptosporidium. 
20:05 Engineer (3) called Duty Manager with update on plan of action for tonight and 
tomorrow- 
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Engineer (4) will be doing the slug dosing with assistance from a team. Residuals to be 
raised by 0.2mg/l, Disinfection Manager is available for assistance with working out 
chloros volumes. 
22:58 Confirmation received from laboratory that emergency bacti samples taken 
yesterday have passed. 
On day 3, at 16:35, the laboratory confirmed that all distribution samples obtained 
yesterday had passed. 
17:19 Laboratory confirmed all samples from yesterday had passed. 
In total, the incident recovery phase lasted 44 hours – a long time considering that the 
incident was triggered by a power dip.  
 
Action taken to prevent re-occurrence 
This WTW should have a failsafe chlorination system and a shutdown system for 
critical alarms. For this specific site, it is to be investigated why this system was not 
fitted or did not operate.  
 
Assessment of Action taken 
Between the actual power failure that marks the initial incident moment and awareness 
of the incident, ca. 3 hours elapsed. During that time, the control centre was unaware 
that a large scale WTW was operating beyond their control. In effect, the treatment 
process collapsed that partially treated and un-chlorinated water passed into distribution.  
On awareness of a treatment process failure, the organisation excelled in effectively 
reducing the impact of the incident on customers. In the following 44 hours, a concerted 
programme of activities was implemented to reduce the impact of the incident and to re-
instate normal operations.  
 
Actual impact: Low  
Potential impact: Significantly higher  
 Use of systems redundancy significantly reduced the potential impact. 
Incident detection: SCADA failure alarm, however critical alarms relating to this 
incident were not relayed to control centre due to communication line failure (common 
incident cause: power failure) 
Incident management response: Excellent incident response as soon as the incident 
became known to the control centre 
Incident impact reduction: High 
 
 
4.1.8 Micro-biological contamination coinciding with mains repair 
Date 05 08 2005 
Background 
Following the repair of a 12” burst main on Day 1 a sample was taken from a 
downstream hydrant after the mains return to service.  
The sample subsequently failed with a count of 94 coliforms and 22 faecal coliforms. It 
was suspected that the failures related to the method of sampling but as a precaution, 
this leg of main was chlorinated.  
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During chlorination, it was evident that there was a variation in residuals obtained, at 
several locations it being higher than expected.   
As such, it was decided to provide alternative supplies to the three properties connected 
to this main. This would allow sufficient time to flush and sample the main and allow a 
return to service after satisfactory bacteriological results. 
All samples taken during the event were free from coliforms and other indicator 
organisms, although one sample taken on Day 3 from an end hydrant contained two 
Clostridia. This result is not considered to pose any risk to health. The main is a short 
length of 3” asbestos cement main feeding a single property at its start and an 
apparently disused cemetery at its end. Samples taken following flushing of this main 
on Day 4 was free from any indicator organisms. 
 
Incident causes 
The burst occurred at the location of a reinstated access pit. This had previously been 
used to gain access during earlier mains rehabilitation. The leak occurred on a dowel 
piece and was repaired using standard techniques.  
The presence of bacteria in the burst main sample could indicate potential 
contamination of the main during repair, or, more likely of the standpipe by which the 
sample was taken. 
It is possible that the initial hydrant sample was contaminated as it was taken, 
nevertheless, given the level of contamination reported, on the afternoon of Day 1 it was 
decided that precautionary flushing and chlorination should be undertaken. 
Difficulties achieving target residual during chlorination were experienced. Samples 
taken indicated streaming and it is felt that the large size and flushing velocities may 
have resulted in improper mixing and streaming. 
In the event, residuals were higher than anticipated 0.5 mg/l but will have served to 
further aid disinfection.  
The cause of over-dosing with chlorine is still being investigated as the rig appears to be 
in good working order and is covered by a valid certificate. 
The main was left isolated from the properties until the main had been flushed to 
background residuals and two days of satisfactory results had been obtained from 
hydrants on this main. 
A further sample taken from an end Hydrant contained two Clostridia. The main 
feeding this is a short section of 3” AC main with no significant demand, and following 
this result, was flushed during the afternoon and resampled. The results were 
satisfactory with no detection of Clostridia. Because of the discovery that this is 
effectively little used, a review of its condition and future need is planned. 
 
Actions taken to prevent re-occurrence 
The burst had been repaired using standard techniques and there were no potential 
sources of contamination reported during the course of the repair. The main was fully 
chlorinated and disinfected as a precaution in light of the number of coliforms obtained 
and the presence of E Coli.  
 
Assessment of action taken  
Bottled water and alternative supplies were made available to the affected properties. 
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The main was isolated and chlorinated on Day 1. It was intended that the main would be 
chlorinated to 0.5mg/l and flushed, but difficulties in chlorination resulted in higher 
than expected residuals being obtained.  
As a precaution the main was taken out of supply and customers supplied via temporary 
overland supplies and with bottled water whilst further flushing was undertaken and 
satisfactory bacteriological results were obtained.  
Temporary bypass arrangements were removed on the Afternoon of Day 3 following 
two sets of satisfactory results being obtained.  
 
Actual impact: Low  
Potential impact: Insignificantly higher  
Incident detection: Water quality sample with incubation period 
Incident management response: standardised response  
Incident impact reduction: Medium to low 
 
 
4.1.9 Discolouration following trunk main failure 
Date 17 06 06 
Background  
A burst on a 600mm diameter main led to an increase of velocity within the trunk 
main, and in turn disturbance of historic sediments in the trunk main network.  
 
Incident cause 
Failure of a 600mm water trunk main: The burst occurred on the 600mm main 
which forms part of the trunk main system. The burst deteriorated rapidly and 
proceeded to a significant failure of the main. At the time of the burst the main was 
operating from one service reservoir towards another service reservoir. As a result 
the rate of flow had significantly increased, and it became clear that an emergency 
repair would be required.  
In order to isolate the burst one distribution management area was supplied in an 
alternative direction by opening a normally closed valve. The source of the 
discolouration was disturbance of historic sediments within the 600mm trunk main. 
The water quality samples data showed higher concentrations of aesthetic 
parameters fed from this section of trunk main. 
Customer contacts for discolouration were received from nine distribution 
management areas. Customer contacts were received from distribution management 
areas at various points along the trunk main.  
A number of other distribution management area from which no discolouration 
contacts have been received are also fed by the same section of the 600mm main. It 
seems likely the discolouration in the trunk main was of relatively short duration 
which was then drawn into a subset of the distribution management area fed from 
this section of the trunk main. 
Four of the distribution management areas from which contacts were received have 
undergone rehabilitation within the last 10 years: at this time trunk main cleaning 
was not supported as part of the S19 Distribution Undertaking. 
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There was no significant difference in the number of discolouration contacts 
received between zones that have been rehabilitated and those which will be 
rehabilitated in the future. 
The cause of the burst has been identified as external corrosion.  
 
 
Assessment of action taken 
Distribution management areas supplied via the damaged section of 600mm main 
were rezoned to maintain supplies from alternative sources, and the burst was 
isolated. The main was repaired using standard techniques.   
Overall, the water utility acted in accordance with standard operating procedures to 
contain the incident. Communication, decision making and use of systems 
redundancy was effective. However, it was not anticipated that the water mains 
failure would rapidly deteriorate and, hence, aggravate the incident effect.  
There has been only one previous failure of this main in the last five years. A similar 
failure on this water main occurred 4 years previous to this incident and was also due to 
external corrosion. This would not fail our normal criteria for mains replacement. 
However, options are investigated for an investigation into the condition of the main to 
better understand the risk of future failure occurring. 
 
Actual impact: High  
Potential impact: Insignificantly higher  
Incident detection: Reported observation 
Incident management response: Standardised response  
Incident impact reduction: Medium to low 
 
 
4.1.10 Flow meter failure leads to system out of control  
Date 01 04 06 
Background 
A flow meter controlling a water pumping station 1 failed causing a major increase in 
flows to service reservoir 1. This in turn resulted in loss of supply to water pumping 
station 2 and these pumps tripped out on low suction pressure. A significant length of 
24" main between service reservoir 2 and water pumping station 2 was depressurised. 
This main was recharged in around 30 minutes but the velocity changes were expected 
to have disturbed a large amount of mains deposits as this length of main has not been 
cleaned. Flushing and monitoring of water quality was started and bottled water was 
mobilised as a precaution. 
Nine hours later, the first discoloration contact was logged followed by a rapid build up 
of contacts from three distribution management areas. Vulnerable customers were 
proactively contacted. 
Flushing of the trunk main continued at water pumping station 2 and turbidity 
monitored; bottled water was deployed to the three affected distribution management 
areas. Flushing of the trunk main was successful in removing the discolouration and 
water pumping station 2 was put back into service to support levels in service reservoir 
3 that was rapidly falling. It was decided that local flushing within the distribution 
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management areas would not be beneficial and customers reported that water was clear 
by mid-afternoon. 
 Notifications to external agencies were made 12 hours after the initial event. 
Investigative samples were taken from the three distribution management areas and 
from the service reservoirs. 
 
Cause of the incident 
Failure of a flow meter causing failure of the gravity flow control.   
 
Assessment of Action taken 
During the management of the incident, a plan was devised and everyone who was 
involved adhered to this plan. The risk of discolouration was recognised early on during 
the incident and the organisation put measures in place to manage its impact. This led to 
an effective mitigation of discolouration as far as possible. Mobilisation of bottled water 
was swift and reached affected customers.  
The interaction with vulnerable customers was effective. 
Communication and decision making was effective. 
The means of incident detection were criticised in hindsight: The telemetry information 
to support staff in diagnosis of water supply system faults did not indicate a flow meter 
failure and, hence, prolonged the incident management response or, even, preventative 
measures. It was felt that the reliability of site controls needed to be reviewed from the 
asset management department. In particular, the Maintenance record for the flow meter 
needed to be studied and an investigation launched into what caused the flowmeter 
failure.  
Furthermore, a need to identify the source for discoloured water and an investigation 
into solutions to prevent future discolouration were identified.  
 
Actual impact: High  
Potential impact: Insignificantly higher  
Incident detection: Indirect SCADA and telemetry reports of system abnormality 
Incident management response: Good response  
Incident impact reduction: Medium to low 
 
 
4.1.11 Chlorination failure 
Date 25 08 06 
Background 
Low level in the service water tank at the water treatment works led to the loss of 
motive water to all the chlorinators. This resulted in the loss of all chlorine dosing for 
approximately twelve hours. Over this period, chlorine levels in the contact water tank 
decayed slowly, eventually resulting in potentially un-disinfected water going into 
supply for 2 hours 40 minutes. 
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Cause 
Motive Water Supply 
Motive water is supplied to the chlorinators via a system of tanks. 
Water from the works outlet main gravitates into the old service reservoir that is located 
outside the plant. The old service reservoir contains a 3” submersible pump that is 
controlled on high and low level probes in the service water tank and is used to transfer 
water when the tank level drops below the probe. At the time of the event, there was no 
analogue signal back to the SCADA giving actual level in the tank.  
Water from the service water tank supplies 6 motive water chlorinator pumps and two 
service water pumps which in turn supply the lime makeup system, de-alkalisation plant 
for lime carrier water makeup and the activated carbon dosing plant makeup water. The 
duty and standby wash water pumps for washing the rapid gravity filters are also fed out 
of this tank. 
The service water tank supplies the lime makeup system directly via the service water 
pumps. Carrier and flushing water however is supplied indirectly from this tank via a 
connection to the service water pump main via two booster pumps. As there have been 
historical problems with calcium precipitation in the dosing lines causing blockages, the 
carrier and flushing water is supplied via the de-alk plant where the water is de-alkalised 
by acidification to pH 4.5 with sulphuric acid, followed by air bubbling and de-gassing 
to remove bicarbonate alkalinity as free CO2. Under normal circumstances, the six lime 
dosing lines would automatically flush on a weekly basis on automatic duty pump 
changeover.  
Prior to the incident the de-alkalisation plant had been out of service from 27th June to 
21st August due to a problem which was eventually tracked down to the acid dosing 
flow-meter. As the de-alkalisation plant had been out of service for an extended period 
of time, blockage of the dosing lines was becoming an increasing problem. Manual 
flushing of all the lines had been done in the days leading up to the event in an attempt 
to improve the blockage situation.  
On the evening of the 24th August, the standby process engineer was on site dealing 
with problems with the lime system and changed the duty on two of the lime pumps by 
pressing the emergency stops on both. This changed the duty and automatically set the 
now standby pumps to flush for the allotted period of time (1 hour). Due to a PLC 
software problem the lime pumps flushing did not automatically switch off as it should, 
which meant that all three standby dosing pumps were flushing overnight prior to the 
event. Further investigation highlighted that this situation only occurs when the 
emergency stops are used to change over the pump duties. It does not happen when the 
duties are rotated in the normal way by the SCADA. 
With the absence of any flow measurement or level indication on either the old service 
reservoir, service water or de-alkalisation tanks and the absence of any filter washing 
around the time of the event, the reasonable assumption has been made that the loss of 
water in the service water tank was solely due to the constant flushing of the lime 
dosing lines instigated beforehand. This can be further corroborated by de-alkalisation 
plant sulphuric acid use that was double its normal level in the days leading up to the 
event indicating an elevated flow through the de-alkalisation plant 
The dosing line flushing was stopped and there have been no further problems with the 
level in the service water tank since this time. 
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Failsafe Disinfection 
Failsafe disinfection was provided at this Water treatment works in 2000 in the form of 
a system providing dual redundancy on contact tank and final water chlorinators, motive 
water pumps, and dosing pipe-work. Dual redundancy was the preferred option in 
providing failsafe at this time due to hydraulic concerns in shutting down the raw water 
mains in a controlled manner.  
Dual redundancy was provided in all the dosing equipment and motive water pumps, 
but did not extent to the service water tanks from which the water was drawn. The 
Company considers this a reasonable approach to have adopted at the time. As the 
incident was caused by low level in the service water tank causing loss of motive water 
to the chlorinators, it is reasonable to suggest that the mode of failure could not have 
been anticipated 
 
Alarm Handling in the control centre 
In normal working hours, RTS alarms are acknowledged by the shift controllers at the 
ROCC who then pass the alarms verbally to the production coordinator for that area. 
He/she will then interrogate the SCADA via reachout and decide whether corrective 
action can be taken or if they need to call someone on site or to site if it is unmanned.  
Out of working hours, on receipt of an RTS alarm the shift controller will interrogate 
the SCADA of the alarming site and decide if any corrective action can be taken. If 
there is any uncertainty about which course of action to take, the standby process 
engineer will be called. 
Alarms that appear on the shift controllers’ screens are magenta but turn yellow when 
they are “noted” by the controllers. At this point, the alarms are passed verbally to the 
production coordinator in working hours or to the standby process engineer if out of 
hours. If the alarm happens to clear before it is noted it will turn blue, but if it clears 
after it has been noted it turns green. Only alarms that have turned either blue or green 
are accepted by the controllers, who clear the alarm from the screen because the alarm 
state has already cleared. Once the alarm has been noted and passed verbally to the 
production coordinator, it will only be passed to the production coordinator or standby 
process engineer again if the alarm occurs again.  
On the day of the event the systems controller passed a series of pH alarms to the 
production coordinator verbally. Although the alarm would have stayed on the screen, 
the shift controller was under the impression he had passed the alarm onto the 
production coordinator and that he was dealing with it. As a result, it was not 
specifically passed again. 
Later on, the shift controller and production coordinator had a further conversation 
about alarms. According to the production coordinator, assumed the conversation was 
about pH alarms only as no mention was made of chlorine alarms. According to the 
shift controller, all alarms were passed to the production coordinator. It would appear on 
this occasion that there was a misunderstanding between the two regarding what type of 
alarms had been passed on. During this conversation, the production coordinator 
indicated that someone was on site dealing with the problems. 10 hours later, the 
production coordinator had a further conversation with the shift controller on leaving 
for home when he indicated that someone was still on site waiting for the pH’s to settle 
following the problems with the lime system.  
The contact water tank low free chlorine alarm and the total chlorine alarm came in at 
that time. The contact water tank low low free chlorine alarm came in two hours later. 
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The shift controller acknowledged the alarms but did not pass them on to anyone 
because they assumed that someone was still on site, as the production coordinator had 
indicated earlier. Both process engineers had actually left site at 16:15 without letting 
the shift controller know they had done so. 
 
Alarm handling at the water treatment works 
There are audible enunciator panels in various parts of the works, including the control 
room and lime areas, which sound a common alarm that does not differentiate between 
types of alarm. They do not give any visual indication as to the type of alarm, or indeed, 
what part of the process it is from. To differentiate, the process engineers must 
interrogate the SCADA in the control room to view what type of alarm has been raised.  
On the day of the event, the local alarm was on reset all day due to the high number of 
pH and lime alarms caused by the problems with the lime system. As a result, there 
were no audible alarms on site for chlorination system failure, but there would have 
been a visual indication on certain SCADA pages.  
The process engineers on site were dealing with a number of problems with the lime 
system and were working in the lime area for a substantial part of the day. The lime 
system is in an area remote from the control room and has no separate access to the 
SCADA or RTS. Whilst the process engineers viewed the SCADA in the control room 
on a number of occasions throughout the day, they were unaware of any problems with 
the chlorine system, so only viewed SCADA pages pertaining to the lime system. 
Prior to leaving site at 16:15 the process engineers checked the SCADA pages 
pertaining to the lime system and ascertained that all was well. They did not check any 
pages pertaining to the chlorine system, as they had no reason to suspect there was any 
problem due to the lack of local alarms or telephone calls from the production 
coordinator to indicate this. They left site without speaking to the shift controller. 
 
Communications 
The WTW has no mobile phone signal on the telecommunications network used by the 
company therefore all communications with the site have to be via one dedicated 
landline. This can, and has caused difficulty in contacting the site on occasions in the 
past. 
 
Actions taken to prevent a recurrence 
Failsafe Shutdown 
A site audit has been carried out on the current system and it has been decided that full 
failsafe shutdown should be installed. As a result, the scope of works has already been 
identified and full failsafe, with auto shutdown will be delivered during the remainder 
of this financial year.  
 
Motive Water Supply 
It is clear from the investigations that the loss of motive water to the chlorinators was 
caused by low level in the service water tank, which in turn was caused by constant 
flushing of the lime dosing lines leading up to the event.  
The existing ultrasonic level detector in the service water tank which only gave start and 
stop signals for the 3” pump in the old service reservoir has now been cabled to give an 
analogue level signal which has been brought back to the SCADA for control purposes. 
This analogue signal will be used to inhibit filter washing and de-alkalisation plant 
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makeup on a predetermined low and low low level, and will generate a priority alarm 
should either of these conditions occur.  
Feedback signals from the 3” transfer pump in the old service reservoir will be installed 
to demonstrate that the pump is actually working when called for, and the information 
will be displayed and alarmed on the SCADA. 
 
Lime dosing system 
Constant manual flushing of the lime dosing lines was stopped on the day following the 
incident when it became clear this was the cause. The PLC fault causing the pumps to 
constantly flush when the emergency stops are pressed is under investigation by an 
external contractor.  
The problem does not occur when the pump duties are rotated in the normal manner via 
the changeover panel so the process engineers have been instructed not to use the 
emergency stops to shut off pumps and change duties until a solution is found. 
 
Alarm Handling in the control centre 
The verbal alarm handling procedure adopted between the shift and production 
controllers has now been modified and a written confirmation has been adopted. On 
receipt of the alarm, the shift controller copies the alarms into a proforma and two 
copies are printed. The alarms are subsequently signed for, and dated by, the production 
coordinator as proof of receipt. The shift controller and production coordinator keep 
separate copies of this receipt. The appropriate response to the alarm is, as before, 
determined by the production coordinator.  
Process engineers in certain areas of Water Production have been trialling toughbook 
notebook computers for a number of months and the pilot has proved successful. As a 
result, rollout to all process engineers will take place. This system will include alarm-
handling functionality and will give the benefit of wider visibility of alarms and the 
requirement for feedback response in the form of actions taken, and by whom. 
The appearance of “pop ups” on the coordinators screen to alert them to anomalies on 
sites in their region of interest is also being investigated, and in future all coordinators 
workstations  will have dual screens to allow easier visibility of alarms. 
 
Alarm handling at the water treatment works 
The SCADA has been modified so that a “Chlorine System Failure” banner is now 
displayed clearly on every SCADA page. This banner will highlight any problems 
associated with the chlorine dosing system or chlorine residual, irrespective of which 
page is being viewed. 
 
Communications 
Non-existent or poor mobile phone coverage at the site and a number of other sites have 
been identified and passed to the Company’s telecommunications department for 
investigation.  
 
Assessment of Actions taken 
A number of technical glitches, misunderstandings and poor communication between 
staff led to the extent of the incident. The availability of system redundancy reduced the 
incident impact on customers considerably: the chlorinated drinking water in the contact 
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water tank was diluted by the unchlorinated water produced in the water treatment 
works.  
Company staff responded promptly once the implications and extent of the chlorination 
failure were understood. The final chlorine dose was re-set via SCADA reach-out and 
the process engineer immediately attended site when it was found that the contact tank 
chlorine could not be reset. Once on site all the chlorine residuals in the works were re-
established within a matter of minutes. 
The contact water tank on site was slug dosed with sodium hypochlorite at the earliest 
opportunity to try to achieve a level of 1.0 mg/l free chlorine going into supply. The 
reservoir was further slug dosed 2 hours later when it became apparent that the chlorine 
residual on the outlet had dropped again and a 3rd slug dose was considered 1.5 hrs later. 
This was subsequently decided against, as the chlorine had stabilised at an appropriate 
residual by this time.  
Time of travel calculations were used to asses the potential time of arrival of any 
possible poor quality water at key points along the system and the appropriate service 
reservoirs on the system were sampled and slug dosed with sodium hypochlorite at 
appropriate times over a 3-day period. 
Water Quality samples were taken at the earliest opportunity with those on the treatment 
works and service reservoirs being taken on the night of the event and those in 
distribution as early as possible the following day owing to the late hour of sampling 
restricting access to customer properties. Sampling at fixed points other than customer 
properties was considered on the night of the event but only one property (an all night 
garage) was known to be open at this time of night. 
 
Actual impact: Low  
Potential impact: Medium  
Incident detection: Direct SCADA and telemetry reports of system abnormality. These 
were ignored due to human error. 
Incident management response: Poor response, however, in-built system redundancy 
reduced the incident considerably 
Incident impact reduction: Medium to low 
 
 
4.1.12 Coliforms in supply after water mains failure 
Date 17 06 06 
Background 
The presence of a burst main was notified to the water utility and a job raised with the 
company’s repair and maintenance contractor to effect a repair. The nature of the burst 
prevented an under pressure repair, and assistance in performing a shut-off was 
required. In total 77 properties downstream of the burst as well as 32 properties were 
shut off for a short period whilst the burst was repaired in line with standard procedure. 
The burst was not associated with the previous mains rehabilitation activity as this 
length of main was not included in the scheme.  
Following the repair of a burst main low numbers of coliform bacteria were experienced 
at a number of properties on a road in the area. A number of actions, including flushing, 
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chlorination, and swabbing were carried out over a period of days to restore normal 
water quality. DWI and other relevant bodies were notified. 
 
Cause  
Sampling at a hydrant following the repair of the burst main indicated the presence of 
coliform and E. coli bacteria. Further investigations at customer installations indicated 
the presence of coliform and Clostridia bacteria but no faecal indicator organisms. 
The only Hydrant available to obtain a sample was subsequently found to be in a poor 
condition repair. However, this was the only representative location at which sample 
could be taken following the return of supplies. 
A physical inspection of the hydrant further suggested that this was the cause of 
contamination of the post repair sample. The hydrant has now been replaced 
It is possible that when the burst was isolated groundwater was drawn into the isolated 
section. It is believed actions taken to repair the burst mains, as well as chlorination, 
caused disturbance in sections of unlined cast iron main (this is backed by the findings 
of the camera investigation). This disturbance may have lead to the resuspension of 
historic sediments with the mains network. 
The presence of a clear bacteriological sample from a neighbouring property indicated 
the source of the positive sample was likely to be related to domestic fittings and was 
supported by a positive swab result. A further sampling programme was undertaken on 
the failing property and neighbouring properties.  
Following the event, the section of cast iron main (presumed to be asbestos cement), 
was replaced by 90mm HDPE. All coils used had certificates of sterilisation. 
The members of the gang carrying out the main rehabilitation had undergone 
appropriate training in disinfection and the use of chlorine. The gang had been 
previously audited and have been further audited subsequent to the event. No issues 
have been found. 
 
Assessment of action taken 
The water utility responded swiftly to repair the reported water mains failure. Due to the 
nature of the water main, a repair under pressure could not be performed and the water 
main was depressurised.  
On confirmation of positive bacteriological samples, flushing, chlorination and 
swabbing were carried out. Repeated sample failures were responded to by investigative 
work to trace the source of contamination. Corrective actions were instigated and a safe 
water supply was re-instated.  
During this incident, normal operating procedures were used to manage the incident. On 
confirmation of sample failures, the organisation responded with appropriate measures. 
Communication between the incident control centre and site staff was effective. 
Decision making, relating to non-routine actions were problem focussed and 
significantly contributed to a speedy re-instatement of normal operating conditions. 
 
Actual impact: Low  
Potential impact: Significantly higher  
Incident detection: Reported water mains failure and laboratory results  
Incident management response: Effective response in line with standard operating 
procedures 
Incident impact reduction: High 
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4.2 HRO surveys 
4.2.1 HRO survey with international contributors 
 
Table 42 Combined results from 14 participants in the HRO survey 
Ref Description  1) Observations in the 
organisations 
2) Cost – beneficial 
to implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics 
by all survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for HRO 
characteristics by all survey participants 
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Organisational culture of reliability 
        
A1 In my organisation, staff in operations have a strong 
sense for the primary mission of the organisation and 
share a common system of beliefs and perceptions. 
5 6 2 0 8 3 0  
A2 In my organisation, the water supply system is 
continuously monitoring so that failure events are 
foreseen and understood.  
2 9 1 0 8 4 0  
A3 In my organisation, our staff in operations have a highly 
developed understanding of their contribution to water 
safety and their role in the system.  
3 8 1 0 7 5 0  
A4 In a water quality incident, our staff in operations act in 
a collaborative and collegiate manner and the group 
interaction can be described as collective intelligent 
interaction. 
6 5 1 0 9 3 0  
A5 Our staff in operations are sensitive towards all events 
where water supply reliability is concerned. Staff know 
that a very small initial moment of inattention or 
misperception can lead to an escalation of failure which 
can result in a water quality incident.  
5 6 1 0 7 5 0  
A6 All our employees take responsibility where problems 
are identified and immediate corrective action 
programmes are required. 
1 7 4 0 3 8 1  
A7 Our staff in operations are obliged to report their 
mistakes without fear of punishment. 
2 8 2 0 2 7 1  
A8 In our organisation, individual behaviours, which 
jeopardise the primary mission of reliability, are 
labelled as disgrace.  
0 0 10 2 1 2 5  
A8a Our senior management is committed to the reliability 
of the organisation. This is communicated to all levels 
in the organisation and demonstrated with investments 
in technology, processes and personnel. 
2 10 0 0 7 6 0  
A9 In our organisation, individuals “monitor, advise, 
criticize and support” each other, in particular in 
situations where mistakes are more likely to occur. 
1 5 6 0 3 4 2  
A10 In general, our staff are attentive, alert and act with 
care. 
5 7 0 0 7 4 0  
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Table 43 Combined results from 14 participants in the HRO survey (continued) 
Ref. Description 1) Observations in the 
organisations 
2) Cost – beneficial 
to implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics 
by all survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for HRO 
characteristics by all survey participants S
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Continuous learning and intensive training 
        
B1 In order to facilitate continuous learning and intensive 
training, our organisation constantly reviews their 
processes and ways of operating.  
3 8 1 0 6 5 0  
B2 In preparation for a job, our staff in operations and 
maintenance staff receive training on the requirements 
of maintaining a safe system. These are embedded in 
formal rules, general guidelines and standardised 
frameworks. 
2 8 5 0 6 5 1  
B3 Our staff in operations must adhere to standard 
operating procedures but also pro-actively identify 
potential sources of failure and actions to stop faults 
from escalating.  
2 8 4 0 3 9 1  
X1 Our staff question procedures when in doubt about 
their appropriateness. 
1 7 3 1 3 4 3  
X2 In unforeseen situations, staff in operations don’t follow 
rules blindly, but negotiate the course of action in a 
collegial manner with more experienced staff and 
supervisors.  
1 7 4 0 4 5 2  
X3 During a water quality incident, staff in operations 
establish an emergency response team for joint 
decision making in order to avoid overlooking complex 
circumstances.  
7 4 1 0 6 5 1  
B4 All our staff maintain a commitment to continuous 
learning and seek the acquisition and improvement of 
skills.  
0 7 4 1 3 6 1  
B5 In our organisation we learn from failures, near misses 
and mistakes by other utilities and use these as a 
means to study the failure susceptibility of the own 
organisation. 
3 5 3 1 7 4 1  
B6 In our organisation, even minor errors and incidents 
provide a source for learning which are assessed 
through root cause analysis. 
0 4 6 2 4 5 2  
B7 Our organisation develops a collective memory for 
failures, incidents and root causes for failure, which 
helps the organisation to anticipate future problems. 
0 6 7 1 3 7 1  
B8 In our organisation, we share a sense that learning 
from trial and error is not feasible to understand our 
water supply system. For staff training, we use offline 
methods of learning which consist of realistic drills, 
simulations and exercises to replicate potential failure 
scenarios. 
0 7 4 1 3 7 1  
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Table 44 Combined results from 14 participants in the HRO survey (continued) 
Ref.  
1) Observations in 
the organisations 
2) Cost – 
beneficial to 
implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics by 
all survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for HRO 
characteristics by all survey participants 
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Effective and varied patterns of communication 
        
C1 Our communication system makes our water supply 
system better understandable, predictable and 
controllable.  
1 7 4 0 3 8 0  
C2 Our organisation operates in an information rich 
environment. All processes are measured and 
understood. Data are transparent and made available to 
all.   
1 7 5 0 3 5 3  
C3 Our staff in operations are encouraged to share their 
experiences relating to the reliability of the system. 
Communication is designed as bottom up and top down 
to ensure rapid flow of information through the hierarchy 
of the system. Rapid dissemination of information helps 
the organisation to respond to water quality incidents 
with corrective action aiming to prevent the escalation of 
failure. 
1 9 3 0 5 7 0  
X1 During a water quality incident, the response team 
maintains “closed loop” communication with all 
stakeholders within the organisation 
1 7 6 0 5 5 2  
X2 During a water quality incident, the organisation 
maintains “closed loop” communication with the public, 
regulators and government authorities 
1 7 3 0 3 6 2  
C4 In our organisation, communicating information shapes 
the ‘big picture’ of our organisational vision, mission and 
responsibility of individuals towards reliability. 
1 6 5 0 5 7 0  
C5 Our organisation uses various channels to transmit 
different types data and information relating to monitoring 
and control of our assets (and ultimately water safety).  
Direct and complementary information enhance 
information reliability and provides a form of redundancy. 
0 11 1 0 4 7 2  
C6 Multiple monitoring and control data from a variety of 
sources provide information density which allows 
individual signals to be scrutinised for fitting into the 
whole information pattern. Abnormal signals are treated 
as an indication for latent errors to unfold into failures. 
0 8 5 1 4 4 3  
C7 In our organisation, interpersonal communications are 
formalised in a precise, unambiguous, impersonal and 
efficient structure, which denies individuals to 
communicate in their idiosyncratic communication style. 
0 0 10 2 0 4 5  
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Table 45 Combined results from 14 participants in the HRO survey (continued) 
Ref. Description 
1) Observations in 
the organisations 
2) Cost – 
beneficial to 
implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics by all 
survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for HRO 
characteristics by all survey participants 
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Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible 
organisational structures 
        
D1 Our organisation can only prevent outbreaks with a high 
level of centralisation, because low-level decision makers 
have insufficient understanding of the inter-relationship 
between their action and consequences on other 
elements of the water supply system.  During an 
emergency, control has to be maintained highly 
centralised in order to maintain overview of the entire 
system response to action on all sub-units. 
0 3 10 0 1 7 4  
D2 In our organisation, decentralisation is required to 
respond rapidly to unfolding failures.  An emergency can 
be confined to one sub-unit, which is subsequently 
isolated from the entire system. The control over an 
emergency is decentralised to this subunit until the 
emergency is cleared. 
0 5 8 0 3 5 3  
D1/2a In our organisation, centralisation at collective level 
coexists with decentralisation at individual level. The 
organisation exhibits an adaptive, flexible or organic 
nature. 
4 6 3 0 6 4 0  
D3 Our organisation enforces the stringent adherence to 
standard operating procedures aiming for repeatability of 
action and routines. 
0 8 6 0 5 6 1  
D4 Our standard operating procedures are constantly 
updated and incorporate lessons learnt. Formal rules and 
procedures are effective elements to identify and control 
risk. 
2 5 3 2 5 6 1  
D5 In our organisation, activities which are not defined in 
standard operating procedures are based on decisions a 
most senior individual makes, as they should have the 
best knowledge of the system. 
0 4 8 0 3 5 1  
D6 Our organisation has a hierarchical structure for decision 
making which reflects expertise, know-how and seniority. 
Each level has controls and regulating mechanisms.  
0 10 4 0 3 7 0  
D7 Our organisation requires staff to conform to 
organisational norms and avoids innovative, autonomous 
or creative behaviours. 
0 1 7 4 3 2 5  
D8 Our decision-making processes have slack in-built in 
order to assess and challenge decisions to avoid faulty 
decisions to escalate into failure.  
1 5 4 1 4 5 2  
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw Page A195 Appendices 
 
Table 46 Combined results from 14 participants in the HRO survey (continued) 
 
 
Ref Description 1) Observations in the 
organisations 
2) Cost – beneficial 
to implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics 
by all survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for HRO 
characteristics by all survey participants 
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System and human redundancy 
        
E1 Our organisation maintains reserve capacity in the 
system. This includes back-up functions, overlapping 
tasks and responsibilities. 
3 3 4 2 5 2 5  
E2 In our organisation, we are aware that redundancy can 
be counterproductive. Back-up functions can increase 
technical complexity, conceal errors and can lead 
individuals into not performing their required tasks 
under the assumptions that someone else takes care of 
his task. 
1 4 6 1 1 4 6  
          
Precise procedures in managing technology 
        
F1 Our organisation does not use state of the art 
equipment to ensure that our technology does not add 
unnecessary complexity to the organisation. 
0 4 8 1 1 6 3  
F2 In water supply systems design, our organisation aims 
to simplify complex technical systems and avoid 
unnecessary automation. 
1 6 5 0 5 6 0  
F3 New technology acquisition is only justified if existing 
equipment does not perform to required specification. 
3 2 7 0 4 6 3  
F4 In our organisation, existing technology is maintained to 
exceptionally high standards, as we do not tolerate 
defective, substandard or malfunctioning equipment. 
1 3 8 0 4 3 6  
F5 In our organisation, maintenance activity and protocols 
as well as performance data are used to monitor the 
healthy operation of the system. 
2 9 2 0 8 4 0  
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Table 47 Combined results from 14 participants from the HRO survey (continued) 
 
The following table contains the statistical analysis of the above survey data. 
 
 
 
Ref. Description 1) Observations in the 
organisations 
2) Cost – beneficial 
to implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics 
by all survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for 
HRO characteristics by all survey participants 
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Human resource management practices that support 
reliability 
        
G1 In recruitment and selection, our organisation 
acquires suitable and skilled candidates for the jobs 
aiming to match the complexity of the environment 
with an equally complex set of people to understand 
the system. Diverging backgrounds for staff offer 
different ways of looking at systems.  
3 8 3 0 9 3 0  
G2 Since most people do what is rewarded, our 
organisation remunerates reliability with incentives, 
recognition and career opportunities.  
2 5 5 1 4 4 3  
G3 In our organisation, job rotation increases networking 
between teams and helps the organisation to transfer 
and diffuse knowledge and lessons learnt. 
0 6 5 1 3 6 3  
G4 Our organisation has systems in place to monitor the 
behaviour of staff. 
1 6 3 2 5 6 1  
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  Statistical analysis for observed HRO principles  Statistical analysis for Cost Benefit analysis  
Observation  CBA 
Total 
count Av SD SE CI 95 min  CI 95 max  
Total 
count Av SD SE CI 95 min  CI 95 max  
100  80  20  0  10  0  -10              
 
Reference to 
HRO principle 
SA A D SD P B N             
A1 5  6  2  0  8  3  0  13.00  78.46  27.64  7.67  63.43  93.49  11.00  7.27  4.67  1.41  4.51  10.03  
A2 2  9  1  0  8  4  0  12.00  78.33  19.92  5.75  67.06  89.61  12.00  6.67  4.92  1.42  3.88  9.45  
A3 3  8  1  0  7  5  0  12.00  80.00  20.89  6.03  68.18  91.82  12.00  5.83  5.15  1.49  2.92  8.75  
A4 6  5  1  0  9  3  0  12.00  85.00  22.76  6.57  72.12  97.88  12.00  7.50  4.52  1.31  4.94  10.06  
A5 5  6  1  0  7  5  0  12.00  83.33  22.29  6.44  70.72  95.95  12.00  5.83  5.15  1.49  2.92  8.75  
A6 1  7  4  0  3  8  1  12.00  61.67  31.29  9.03  43.97  79.37  12.00  1.67  5.77  1.67  -1.60  4.93  
A7 2  8  2  0  2  7  1  12.00  73.33  26.05  7.52  58.59  88.07  10.00  1.00  5.68  1.80  -2.52  4.52  
A8 0  0  10  2  1  2  5  12.00  16.67  7.78  2.25  12.26  21.07  8.00  -5.00  7.56  2.67  -10.24  0.24  
A8a 2  10  0  0  7  6  0  12.00  83.33  7.78  2.25  78.93  87.74  13.00  5.38  5.19  1.44  2.56  8.21  
A9 1  5  6  0  3  4  2  12.00  51.67  33.53  9.68  32.70  70.64  9.00  1.11  7.82  2.61  -4.00  6.22  
A10 5  7  0  0  7  4  0  12.00  88.33  10.30  2.97  82.51  94.16  11.00  6.36  5.05  1.52  3.38  9.35  
B1 3  8  1  0  6  5  0  12.00  80.00  20.89  6.03  68.18  91.82  11.00  5.45  5.22  1.57  2.37  8.54  
B2 2  8  5  0  6  5  1  15.00  62.67  31.95  8.25  46.50  78.84  12.00  4.17  6.69  1.93  0.38  7.95  
B3 2  8  4  0  3  9  1  14.00  65.71  30.81  8.24  49.57  81.86  13.00  1.54  5.55  1.54  -1.48  4.55  
X1 1  7  3  1  3  4  3  12.00  60.00  34.11  9.85  40.70  79.30  10.00  0.00  8.16  2.58  -5.06  5.06  
X2 1  7  4  0  4  5  2  12.00  61.67  31.29  9.03  43.97  79.37  11.00  1.82  7.51  2.26  -2.62  6.25  
X3 7  4  1  0  6  5  1  12.00  86.67  23.09  6.67  73.60  99.73  12.00  4.17  6.69  1.93  0.38  7.95  
B4 0  7  4  1  3  6  1  12.00  53.33  33.39  9.64  34.44  72.23  10.00  2.00  6.32  2.00  -1.92  5.92  
B5 3  5  3  1  7  4  1  12.00  63.33  37.01  10.68  42.39  84.27  12.00  5.00  6.74  1.95  1.19  8.81  
B6 0  4  6  2  4  5  2  12.00  36.67  32.84  9.48  18.08  55.25  11.00  1.82  7.51  2.26  -2.62  6.25  
B7 0  6  7  1  3  7  1  14.00  44.29  32.51  8.69  27.25  61.32  11.00  1.82  6.03  1.82  -1.75  5.38  
B8 0  7  4  1  3  7  1  12.00  53.33  33.39  9.64  34.44  72.23  11.00  1.82  6.03  1.82  -1.75  5.38  
C1 1  7  4  0  3  8  0  12.00  61.67  31.29  9.03  43.97  79.37  11.00  2.73  4.67  1.41  -0.03  5.49  
C2 1  7  5  0  3  5  3  13.00  58.46  32.11  8.90  41.01  75.91  11.00  0.00  7.75  2.34  -4.58  4.58  
C3 1  9  3  0  5  7  0  13.00  67.69  27.74  7.69  52.62  82.77  12.00  4.17  5.15  1.49  1.25  7.08  
X1 1  7  6  0  5  5  2  14.00  55.71  32.51  8.69  38.68  72.75  12.00  2.50  7.54  2.18  -1.76  6.76  
X2 1  7  3  0  3  6  2  11.00  65.45  29.79  8.98  47.85  83.06  11.00  0.91  7.01  2.11  -3.23  5.05  
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C4 1  6  5  0  5  7  0  12.00  56.67  32.84  9.48  38.08  75.25  12.00  4.17  5.15  1.49  1.25  7.08  
C5 0  11  1  0  4  7  2  12.00  75.00  17.32  5.00  65.20  84.80  13.00  1.54  6.89  1.91  -2.21  5.28  
C6 0  8  5  1  4  4  3  14.00  52.86  32.92  8.80  35.61  70.10  11.00  0.91  8.31  2.51  -4.00  5.82  
C7 0  0  10  2  0  4  5  12.00  16.67  7.78  2.25  12.26  21.07  9.00  -5.56  5.27  1.76  -9.00  -2.11  
D1 0  3  10  0  1  7  4  13.00  33.85  26.31  7.30  19.54  48.15  12.00  -2.50  6.22  1.79  -6.02  1.02  
D2 0  5  8  0  3  5  3  13.00  43.08  30.38  8.43  26.56  59.59  11.00  0.00  7.75  2.34  -4.58  4.58  
D1/2/a 4  6  3  0  6  4  0  13.00  72.31  31.13  8.63  55.38  89.23  10.00  6.00  5.16  1.63  2.80  9.20  
D3 0  8  6  0  5  6  1  14.00  54.29  30.81  8.24  38.14  70.43  12.00  3.33  6.51  1.88  -0.35  7.02  
D4 2  5  3  2  5  6  1  12.00  55.00  39.20  11.32  32.82  77.18  12.00  3.33  6.51  1.88  -0.35  7.02  
D5 0  4  8  0  3  5  1  12.00  40.00  29.54  8.53  23.29  56.71  9.00  2.22  6.67  2.22  -2.13  6.58  
D6 0  10  4  0  3  7  0  14.00  62.86  28.13  7.52  48.12  77.59  10.00  3.00  4.83  1.53  0.01  5.99  
D7 0  1  7  4  3  2  5  12.00  18.33  21.67  6.26  6.07  30.60  10.00  -2.00  9.19  2.91  -7.70  3.70  
D8 1  5  4  1  4  5  2  11.00  52.73  36.08  10.88  31.40  74.05  11.00  1.82  7.51  2.26  -2.62  6.25  
E1 3  3  4  2  5  2  5  12.00  51.67  41.30  11.92  28.30  75.04  12.00  0.00  9.53  2.75  -5.39  5.39  
E2 1  4  6  1  1  4  6  12.00  45.00  35.29  10.19  25.03  64.97  11.00  -4.55  6.88  2.07  -8.61  -0.48  
F1 0  4  8  1  1  6  3  13.00  36.92  30.38  8.43  20.41  53.44  10.00  -2.00  6.32  2.00  -5.92  1.92  
F2 1  6  5  0  5  6  0  12.00  56.67  32.84  9.48  38.08  75.25  11.00  4.55  5.22  1.57  1.46  7.63  
F3 3  2  7  0  4  6  3  12.00  50.00  37.66  10.87  28.69  71.31  13.00  0.77  7.60  2.11  -3.36  4.90  
F4 1  3  8  0  4  3  6  12.00  41.67  32.43  9.36  23.32  60.01  13.00  -1.54  8.99  2.49  -6.42  3.35  
F5 2  9  2  0  8  4  0  13.00  73.85  25.01  6.94  60.25  87.44  12.00  6.67  4.92  1.42  3.88  9.45  
G1 3  8  3  0  9  3  0  14.00  71.43  29.05  7.76  56.21  86.65  12.00  7.50  4.52  1.31  4.94  10.06  
G2 2  5  5  1  4  4  3  13.00  53.85  36.86  10.22  33.81  73.89  11.00  0.91  8.31  2.51  -4.00  5.82  
G3 0  6  5  1  3  6  3  12.00  48.33  33.53  9.68  29.36  67.30  12.00  0.00  7.39  2.13  -4.18  4.18  
G4 1  6  3  2  5  6  1  12.00  53.33  37.50  10.82  32.12  74.55  12.00  3.33  6.51  1.88  -0.35  7.02  
All HRO 81  307  221  27  224  263  87  636  58.30  33.23  1.32  55.72  60.88  574.00  2.39  6.97  0.29  1.82  2.96  
CBA AV>0 79  292  162  17  213  235  53  550  62.73  31.92  1.36  60.06  65.40  501.00  3.19  6.56  0.29  2.62  3.77  
CBA 
CI95%min>0 55  130  41  1 119  87  3  227  73.66  27.17  1.80  70.12  77.19  209.00  5.55  5.26  0.36  4.84  6.26  
Table 48 Statistical analysis of HRO survey data  
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4.2.1.1 Cost Benefit analysis of HRO from an international perspective 
In the statistical analysis of the cost benefit data a 95% confidence interval was 
constructed. In addition to the HRO principles identified with an average positive for 
the cost benefit, those HRO principles were identified for which the minimum 
confidence interval exceeds zero. In other words, those HRO principles have a 97.5% 
chance to have a positive cost beneficial effect for the management of safe and reliable 
drinking water. 
In Table 49 and Table 51, those HRO indicators are presented were the minimum 
confidence interval for cost benefit analysis exceeds the value zero. For these HRO 
indicators, the combined observations by the survey participants for their utilities are 
presented. The aggregated observation of these HRO principles in the table reflect 
whether the participants observed these principles being implemented or maintain in 
their organisations.   
 
Table 49 HRO principles with a significantly positive cost benefit 
Ref Description  Observable in the  
organisations 
Cost Beneficial at CI 95% min >0 
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Organisational culture of reliability     
A1 In my organisation, staff in operations have a strong sense for 
the primary mission of the organisation and share a common 
system of beliefs and perceptions. 
5 6 2 0 
A2 In my organisation, the water supply system is continuously 
monitoring so that failure events are foreseen and understood.  
2 9 1 0 
A3 In my organisation, our staff in operations have a highly 
developed understanding of their contribution to water safety 
and their role in the system.  
3 8 1 0 
A4 In a water quality incident, our staff in operations act in a 
collaborative and collegiate manner and the group interaction 
can be described as collective intelligent interaction. 
6 5 1 0 
A5 Our staff in operations are sensitive towards all events where 
water supply reliability is concerned. Staff know that a very small 
initial moment of inattention or misperception can lead to an 
escalation of failure, which can result in a water quality incident.  
5 6 1 0 
A8a Our senior management is committed to the reliability of the 
organisation. This is communicated to all levels in the 
organisation and demonstrated with investments in technology, 
processes and personnel. 
2 10 0 0 
A10 In general, our staff are attentive, alert and act with care. 5 7 0 0 
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Table 50 HRO principles with a significantly positive cost benefit (continued) 
 
 
 
Ref. Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 Cost Beneficial at CI 95% min >0 
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Continuous learning and intensive training     
B1 In order to facilitate continuous learning and intensive training, 
our organisation constantly reviews their processes and ways of 
operating.  
3 8 1 0 
B2 In preparation for a job, our staff in operations and maintenance 
staff receive training on the requirements of maintaining a safe 
system. These are embedded in formal rules, general guidelines 
and standardised frameworks. 
2 8 5 0 
X3 During a water quality incident, staff in operations establish an 
emergency response team for joint decision making in order to 
avoid overlooking complex circumstances.  
7 4 1 0 
B5 In our organisation we learn from failures, near misses and 
mistakes by other utilities and use these as a means to study the 
failure susceptibility of the own organisation. 
3 5 3 1 
      
Effective and varied patterns of communication     
C3 Our staff in operations are encouraged to share their experiences 
relating to the reliability of the system. Communication is 
designed as bottom up and top down to ensure rapid flow of 
information through the hierarchy of the system. Rapid 
dissemination of information helps the organisation to respond to 
water quality incidents with corrective action aiming to prevent the 
escalation of failure. 
1 9 3 0 
C4 In our organisation, communicating information shapes the ‘big 
picture’ of our organisational vision, mission and responsibility of 
individuals towards reliability. 
1 6 5 0 
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Table 51 HRO principles with a significantly positive cost benefit (continued) 
 
It can be seen that the number of HRO principles that are considered to have a 97.5% 
chance of being cost beneficial has significantly reduced to 18 in comparison to the 
initial HRO framework of 51 HRO indicators. It should also be noted that HRO 
principles relating to ‘Organisational culture of reliability’ now forms the largest group 
of relevant indicators.  
For all indicators (18 out of 18), it can be identified that the majority of responses 
‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ to having observed the stated HRO principle in their 
organisation. This is a significant improvement compared to the entire HRO framework 
or the HRO principles with an average positive cost benefit.  
Ref. Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 Cost Beneficial at CI 95% min >0 
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Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible organisational 
structures 
    
D1/2a In our organisation, centralisation at collective level coexists 
with decentralisation at individual level. The organisation 
exhibits an adaptive, flexible or organic nature. 
4 6 3 0 
D6 Our organisation has a hierarchical structure for decision 
making which reflects expertise, know-how and seniority. Each 
level has controls and regulating mechanisms.  
0 10 4 0 
      
System and human redundancy     
 None     
      
Precise procedures in managing technology     
F2 In water supply systems design, our organisation aims to 
simplify complex technical systems and avoid unnecessary 
automation. 
1 6 5 0 
F5 In our organisation, maintenance activity and protocols as well 
as performance data are used to monitor the healthy operation 
of the system. 
2 9 2 0 
      
Human resource management practices that support reliability     
G1 In recruitment and selection, our organisation acquires suitable 
and skilled candidates for the jobs aiming to match the 
complexity of the environment with an equally complex set of 
people to understand the system. Diverging backgrounds for 
staff offer different ways of looking at systems. 
3 8 3 0 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw Page A202 Appendices 
4.2.1.2 Detailed analysis of HRO survey for individual participants in an 
international perspective 
Based on this scoring mechanism, individual returns of the survey questionnaire were 
analysed and summarised. 
In Table 52 to Table 54, the survey returns from 12 participants are presented. The 
horizontal axis represents the 7 categories of HRO principles ‘Organisational culture of 
reliability (A)’, ‘Continuous learning and intensive training (B)’, ‘Effective and varied 
patterns of communication (C)’, ‘Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible 
organisational structures (D)’, ‘System and human redundancy (E)’, ‘Precise procedures 
in managing technology (F)’ and ‘Human resource management practices that support 
reliability (G)’.  
The individual responses are anonymised. However, in tables the organisational type, 
size and country of operation are identified. The organisational type differentiates 
between private and public ownership as well as the corporate structure. ‘Public’ 
denotes public ownership and operated within government administration, ‘Public 
corporate’ denotes public ownership operated within financially accountable corporate 
structures and ‘private’ denotes private/shareholder ownership with a corporate 
structure. The utility size indicates the number of customers supplied by the utility. 
Small denotes less than 100,000 customers, ‘Medium’ represents a customer base 
between 100,000 and 1,000,000 and ‘Large’ denotes a water utility with more than 
1,000,000 customers.  
 
In Table 52, all HRO principles are taken into account regardless of their benefit in the 
context of cost for implementing or maintenance. The scores in the matrix columns 
represent the sum of scores for the HRO principles in those seven groups from A to G.  
Table 52 is ranked in descending order of the total sum of observed HRO principles in 
the participating water utilities.  
The ‘#’ symbol denotes a survey participant from the Regional Water Utility in the 
main study. The figures in italics exceed the 95% confidence interval based on the 
results from all survey participants for the respective group of HRO principles (A-G). 
In Table 52 a whole range of observations or familiarity with HRO principles can be 
identified. The highest score for observed HRO principles has been obtained by a large, 
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privatized water utility in the UK (Regional Water Utility). This is followed by a 
medium-sized, publicly owned Canadian water utility. Their HRO scores of 3780 and 
3720, respectively, are more than double of the HRO score for the medium-sized, 
publicly operated US water utility at the bottom of Table 52. 
On scrutiny of the results in Table 52, no clear trend or correlation between the sizes of 
the water utility, the ownerships model, the country of operation and the HRO score can 
be identified. Even the HRO scores for water utilities operating under a common 
regulatory regime in England and Wales vary considerably.  
 
Company Size Country A B C D E F G Sum 
Private # Large England 980 1000 700 500 160 160 280 3780 
Public Medium Canada 880 920 540 580 100 320 380 3720 
Private # Large England 960 1000 520 560 160 160 320 3680 
Public Small Canada 840 680 580 600 120 300 340 3460 
Public 
corporate Large Scotland 820 660 540 480 40 300 260 3100 
Public Medium Canada 800 700 600 400 100 280 140 3020 
Public  Medium USA 720 660 600 600 40 160 200 2980 
Public 
corporate Medium USA 820 700 420 220 100 340 260 2860 
Private  Medium England 780 420 160 360 200 360 220 2500 
Public 
corporate Large Australia 720 280 280 180 20 280 180 1940 
Private  Large England 520 340 320 320 80 280 20 1880 
Public Medium USA 480 440 320 260 20 140 20 1680 
           
Average   776.67 650.00 465.00 421.67 95.00 256.67 218.33 2883.33 
SD   152.04 243.83 162.51 152.90 58.54 79.01 114.88 740.90 
SE   43.89 70.39 46.91 44.14 16.90 22.81 33.16 213.88 
CI95 min   690.64 512.04 373.05 335.15 61.88 211.96 153.33 2464.13 
CI95 max   862.69 787.96 556.95 508.18 128.12 301.37 283.33 3302.54 
           
Results exceeding the confidence interval at 95% of the peer group are presented in italics  
# denotes a staff member of the Regional Water Utility in the main study 
Table 52 HRO performance of 12 participating water utilities considering all HRO principles 
 
In Table 53, only scores of HRO principles were included that were perceived to have 
an average, positive cost benefit by the survey group.  
In Table 52 a whole range of observations or familiarity with HRO principles can be 
identified. The highest score for observed HRO principles has been obtained by a large, 
privatized water utility in the UK (Regional Water Utility). This is followed by a 
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medium-sized, publicly owned Canadian water utility. Their HRO scores of 3780 and 
3720, respectively, are more than double of the HRO score for the medium-sized, 
publicly operated US water utility at the bottom of Table 52. 
On scrutiny of the results in Table 52, no clear trend or correlation between the sizes of 
the water utility, the ownerships model, the country of operation and the HRO score can 
be identified. Even the HRO scores for water utilities operating under a common 
regulatory regime in England and Wales vary considerably.  
 
Company Size Country A B C D E F G Sum 
Private # Large England 960 1000 680 480 80 120 280 3600 
Public Medium Canada 860 920 520 540 100 220 380 3540 
Private # Large England 940 1000 500 540 80 120 320 3500 
Public Small Canada 820 680 560 560 100 200 340 3260 
Public 
corporate Large Scotland 800 660 520 440 20 260 260 2960 
Public Medium Canada 780 700 580 380 80 180 140 2840 
Public  Medium USA 700 660 580 500 20 120 200 2780 
Public 
corporate Medium USA 800 700 420 200 20 240 260 2640 
Private  Medium England 780 420 140 320 100 260 220 2240 
Public 
corporate Large Australia 700 280 260 140 0 240 180 1800 
Private  Large England 500 340 300 300 0 200 20 1660 
Public Medium USA 480 440 320 160 0 40 20 1460 
           
Average   760.00 650.00 448.33 380.00 50.00 183.33 218.33 2690.00 
SD   148.69 243.83 160.56 153.74 43.06 69.19 114.88 751.12 
SE   42.92 70.39 46.35 44.38 12.43 19.97 33.16 216.83 
CI95 min   675.87 512.04 357.49 293.01 25.63 144.18 153.33 2265.01 
CI95 max   844.13 787.96 539.18 466.99 74.37 222.48 283.33 3114.99 
           
Results exceeding the confidence interval at 95% of the peer group are presented in italics  
# denotes a staff member of the Regional Water Utility in the main study 
Table 53 HRO performance of 12 participating water utilities considering all HRO principles with 
an average, positive cost benefit 
 
In Table 54, only those HRO principles are taken into account that were perceived to 
have a 97.5% chance to have a positive cost beneficial effect for the management of 
safe and reliable drinking water. In other words, those HRO principles whose minimum 
confidence interval for the cost benefit analysis exceeds the value of zero were used to 
calculate the sum of observed HRO principles.  
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In Table 54 a whole range of observations or familiarity with HRO principles can be 
identified. The highest score for observed HRO principles has been obtained by 
medium-sized, publicly owned Canadian water utility and a large, privatized water 
utility in the UK (Regional Water Utility). On scrutiny of the results in Table 54, no 
clear trend or correlation between the sizes of the water utility, the ownerships model, 
the country of operation and the HRO score can be identified. Even the HRO scores for 
water utilities operating under a common regulatory regime in England and Wales vary 
considerably.  
 
Company Size Country A B C D E F G Sum 
Public Medium Canada 620 360 160 180  200 100 1620 
Private # Large England 680 400 180 180  100 80 1620 
Private # Large England 680 400 160 180  100 80 1600 
Public Small Canada 640 300 180 160  180 100 1560 
Public 
corporate Large Scotland 560 280 160 160  160 80 1400 
Public  Medium USA 580 280 160 160  100 80 1360 
Public Medium Canada 580 320 100 160  160 20 1340 
Public 
corporate Medium USA 560 320 80 100  160 80 1300 
Private  Medium England 600 240 40 120  160 100 1260 
Private  Large England 440 260 20 160  100 0 980 
Public Medium USA 420 260 100 100  20 0 900 
Public 
corporate Large Australia 520 60 40 0  160 80 860 
           
Average   573.33 290.00 115.00 138.33  133.33 66.67 1316.67 
SD   82.39 89.65 59.16 52.19  49.97 37.50 275.00 
SE   23.78 25.88 17.08 15.07  14.43 10.82 79.39 
CI95 min   526.72 239.28 81.53 108.80  105.06 45.45 1161.07 
CI95 max   619.95 340.72 148.47 167.87  161.61 87.88 1472.26 
           
Results exceeding the confidence interval at 95% of the peer group are presented in italics  
# denotes a staff member of the Regional Water Utility in the main study 
Table 54 HRO performance of 12 participating water utilities considering all HRO principles with 
a 97.5% chance of being cost beneficial  
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4.2.2 HRO survey in Regional Water Utility 
Table 55 Results for HRO baseline survey in the Regional Water Utility 
Ref Description  1) Observations in the 
organisation 
2) Cost – beneficial 
to implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics by 
all survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for HRO 
characteristics by all survey participants 
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Organisational culture of reliability 
        
A1 In my organisation, staff in operations have a strong 
sense for the primary mission of the organisation and 
share a common system of beliefs and perceptions. 
6 6 0 0 7 4 1  
A2 In my organisation, the water supply system is 
continuously monitoring so that failure events are 
foreseen and understood.  
2 6 4 0 6 3 3  
A3 In my organisation, our staff in operations have a highly 
developed understanding of their contribution to water 
safety and their role in the system.  
7 4 0 0 5 5 0  
A4 In a water quality incident, our staff in operations act in a 
collaborative and collegiate manner and the group 
interaction can be described as collective intelligent 
interaction. 
8 4 0 0 6 6 0  
A5 Our staff in operations are sensitive towards all events 
where water supply reliability is concerned. Staff know 
that a very small initial moment of inattention or 
misperception can lead to an escalation of failure, which 
can result in a water quality incident.  
5 7 0 0 7 5 0  
A6 All our employees take responsibility where problems are 
identified and immediate corrective action programmes 
are required. 
1 7 4 0 3 7 2  
A7 Our staff in operations are obliged to report their mistakes 
without fear of punishment. 
1 4 5 2 2 8 2  
A8 In our organisation, individual behaviours, which 
jeopardise the primary mission of reliability, are labelled 
as disgrace.  
0 3 4 5 0 8 5  
A8a Our senior management is committed to the reliability of 
the organisation. This is communicated to all levels in the 
organisation and demonstrated with investments in 
technology, processes and personnel. 
3 6 3 0 6 6 0  
A9 In our organisation, individuals “monitor, advise, criticize 
and support” each other, in particular in situations where 
mistakes are more likely to occur. 
1 4 6 1 2 8 2  
A10 In general, our staff are attentive, alert and act with care. 4 4 4 0 4 5 2  
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Table 56 Results for HRO baseline survey in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
Ref. Description 1) Observations in the 
organisation 
2) Cost – beneficial 
to implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics by all 
survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for HRO 
characteristics by all survey participants S
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Continuous learning and intensive training 
        
B1 In order to facilitate continuous learning and intensive 
training, our organisation constantly reviews their 
processes and ways of operating.  
4 4 4 0 4 6 2  
B2 In preparation for a job, our staff in operations and 
maintenance staff receive training on the requirements of 
maintaining a safe system. These are embedded in formal 
rules, general guidelines and standardised frameworks. 
3 6 3 0 8 5 0  
B3 Our staff in operations must adhere to standard operating 
procedures but also pro-actively identify potential sources 
of failure and actions to stop faults from escalating.  
4 5 3 0 7 4 1  
X1 Our staff question procedures when in doubt about their 
appropriateness. 
0 5 5 2 3 4 5  
X2 In unforeseen situations, staff in operations don’t follow 
rules blindly, but negotiate the course of action in a 
collegial manner with more experienced staff and 
supervisors.  
1 6 5 0 4 5 3  
X3 During a water quality incident, staff in operations establish 
an emergency response team for joint decision making in 
order to avoid overlooking complex circumstances.  
7 4 1 0 7 5 0  
B4 All our staff maintain a commitment to continuous learning 
and seek the acquisition and improvement of skills.  
3 4 5 0 3 6 3  
B5 In our organisation we learn from failures, near misses and 
mistakes by other utilities and use these as a means to 
study the failure susceptibility of the own organisation. 
2 3 7 0 2 7 3  
B6 In our organisation, even minor errors and incidents 
provide a source for learning which are assessed through 
root cause analysis. 
1 5 7 0 5 7 0  
B7 Our organisation develops a collective memory for failures, 
incidents and root causes for failure, which helps the 
organisation to anticipate future problems. 
0 2 7 2 2 5 5  
B8 In our organisation, we share a sense that learning from 
trial and error is not feasible to understand our water 
supply system. For staff training, we use offline methods of 
learning which consist of realistic drills, simulations and 
exercises to replicate potential failure scenarios. 
0 4 6 2 2 5 5  
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Table 57 Results for HRO baseline survey in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
Ref.  
1) Observations in 
the organisation 
2) Cost – 
beneficial to 
implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics by all 
survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for HRO 
characteristics by all survey participants 
St
ro
n
gl
y 
ag
re
e 
Ag
re
e
 
D
isa
gr
e
e
 
St
ro
n
gl
y 
di
sa
gr
e
e
 
Po
sit
ive
 
 
co
st
 
be
n
ef
it 
Ba
la
n
ce
d 
co
st
 
be
n
ef
it 
N
eg
a
tiv
e
 
co
st
 
be
n
ef
it 
 
Effective and varied patterns of communication 
        
C1 Our communication system makes our water supply system 
better understandable, predictable and controllable.  
4 7 1 0 4 5 3  
C2 Our organisation operates in an information rich 
environment. All processes are measured and understood. 
Data are transparent and made available to all.   
2 6 4 0 3 6 3  
C3 Our staff in operations are encouraged to share their 
experiences relating to the reliability of the system. 
Communication is designed as bottom up and top down to 
ensure rapid flow of information through the hierarchy of the 
system. Rapid dissemination of information helps the 
organisation to respond to water quality incidents with 
corrective action aiming to prevent the escalation of failure. 
1 5 5 1 4 6 2  
X1 During a water quality incident, the response team maintains 
“closed loop” communication with all stakeholders within the 
organisation 
1 7 4 0 6 6 0  
X2 During a water quality incident, the organisation maintains 
“closed loop” communication with the public, regulators and 
government authorities 
0 4 6 2 3 5 4  
C4 In our organisation, communicating information shapes the 
‘big picture’ of our organisational vision, mission and 
responsibility of individuals towards reliability. 
3 5 4 0 5 6 1  
C5 Our organisation uses various channels to transmit different 
types data and information relating to monitoring and control 
of our assets (and ultimately water safety).  
Direct and complementary information enhance information 
reliability and provides a form of redundancy. 
0 3 8 1 3 5 3  
C6 Multiple monitoring and control data from a variety of sources 
provide information density which allows individual signals to 
be scrutinised for fitting into the whole information pattern. 
Abnormal signals are treated as an indication for latent errors 
to unfold into failures. 
1 2 5 4 0 8 4  
C7 In our organisation, interpersonal communications are 
formalised in a precise, unambiguous, impersonal and 
efficient structure, which denies individuals to communicate 
in their idiosyncratic communication style. 
0 1 6 5 0 6 6  
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Table 58 Results for HRO baseline survey in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
Ref. Description 
1) Observations in 
the organisation 
2) Cost – 
beneficial to 
implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics by all 
survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for HRO 
characteristics by all survey participants 
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Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible 
organisational structures 
        
D1 Our organisation can only prevent outbreaks with a high 
level of centralisation, because low-level decision makers 
have insufficient understanding of the inter-relationship 
between their action and consequences on other elements 
of the water supply system.  During an emergency, control 
has to be maintained highly centralised in order to maintain 
overview of the entire system response to action on all sub-
units. 
1 5 5 1 3 3 6  
D2 In our organisation, decentralisation is required to respond 
rapidly to unfolding failures.  An emergency can be confined 
to one sub-unit, which is subsequently isolated from the 
entire system. The control over an emergency is 
decentralised to this subunit until the emergency is cleared. 
2 5 5 0 2 5 5  
D1/2a In our organisation, centralisation at collective level coexists 
with decentralisation at individual level. The organisation 
exhibits an adaptive, flexible or organic nature. 
7 5 0 0 8 4 0  
D3 Our organisation enforces the stringent adherence to 
standard operating procedures aiming for repeatability of 
action and routines. 
5 5 2 0 5 5 1  
D4 Our standard operating procedures are constantly updated 
and incorporate lessons learnt. Formal rules and 
procedures are effective elements to identify and control 
risk. 
2 7 3 0 5 5 2  
D5 In our organisation, activities, which are not defined in 
standard operating procedures, are based on decisions a 
most senior individual makes, as they should have the best 
knowledge of the system. 
3 5 4 0 4 6 2  
D6 Our organisation has a hierarchical structure for decision 
making which reflects expertise, know-how and seniority. 
Each level has controls and regulating mechanisms.  
1 4 5 2 7 5 0  
D7 Our organisation requires staff to conform to organisational 
norms and avoids innovative, autonomous or creative 
behaviours. 
0 4 7 1 0 5 7  
D8 Our decision-making processes have slack in-built in order 
to assess and challenge decisions to avoid faulty decisions 
to escalate into failure.  
4 6 2 0 6 6 0  
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Table 59 Results for HRO baseline survey in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
 
Ref Description 1) Observations in 
the organisation 
2) Cost – beneficial 
to implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics 
by all survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for HRO 
characteristics by all survey participants 
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System and human redundancy 
        
E1 Our organisation maintains reserve capacity in the 
system. This includes back-up functions, overlapping 
tasks and responsibilities. 
4 6 2 0 6 6 0  
E2 In our organisation, we are aware that redundancy can 
be counterproductive. Back-up functions can increase 
technical complexity, conceal errors and can lead 
individuals into not performing their required tasks 
under the assumptions that someone else takes care of 
his task. 
0 2 4 6 0 4 8  
          
Precise procedures in managing technology 
        
F1 Our organisation does not use state of the art 
equipment to ensure that our technology does not add 
unnecessary complexity to the organisation. 
2 2 6 2 0 6 6  
F2 In water supply systems design, our organisation aims 
to simplify complex technical systems and avoid 
unnecessary automation. 
0 4 7 1 8 4 0  
F3 New technology acquisition is only justified if existing 
equipment does not perform to required specification. 
3 5 4 0 3 7 2  
F4 In our organisation, existing technology is maintained to 
exceptionally high standards, as we do not tolerate 
defective, substandard or malfunctioning equipment. 
0 1 5 6 0 3 9  
F5 In our organisation, maintenance activity and protocols 
as well as performance data are used to monitor the 
healthy operation of the system. 
3 7 2 0 7 5 0  
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Table 60 Results for HRO baseline survey in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
 
In the following table, the survey data is statistically analysed.  
 
 
 
 
Ref. Description 1) Observations in the 
organisation 
2) Cost – beneficial 
to implement and 
maintain 
1) Aggregated number of observed HRO characteristics 
by all survey participants 
2) Aggregated number of cost benefit evaluations for 
HRO characteristics by all survey participants 
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Human resource management practices that support 
reliability 
        
G1 In recruitment and selection, our organisation acquires 
suitable and skilled candidates for the jobs aiming to 
match the complexity of the environment with an 
equally complex set of people to understand the 
system. Diverging backgrounds for staff offer different 
ways of looking at systems.  
2 7 2 0 10 2 0  
G2 Since most people do what is rewarded, our 
organisation remunerates reliability with incentives, 
recognition and career opportunities.  
0 6 6 0 6 5 1  
G3 In our organisation, job rotation increases networking 
between teams and helps the organisation to transfer 
and diffuse knowledge and lessons learnt. 
1 4 5 2 2 6 4  
G4 Our organisation has systems in place to monitor the 
behaviour of staff. 
2 4 4 2 4 6 2  
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Statistical analysis for observed HRO principles Statistical analysis for Cost Benefit analysis 
Observation  CBA 
Total 
counts  Average  SD SE 
CI 95 
min  
CI 95 
max  
Total 
counts  Average  SD SE 
CI 95 
min  
CI 95 
max  
100.00  80.00  20.00  0.00  10.00  0.00  -10.00               Reference to HRO 
principle SA A D SD P B N              
A1 6  6  0  0  7  4  1  12.00  90.00  10.44  3.02  84.09  95.91  12.00  5.00  6.74  1.95  1.19  8.81  
A2 2  6  4  0  6  3  3  12.00  63.33  32.84  9.48  44.75  81.92  12.00  2.50  8.66  2.50  -2.40  7.40  
A3 7  4  0  0  5  5  0  11.00  92.73  10.09  3.04  86.76  98.69  10.00  5.00  5.27  1.67  1.73  8.27  
A4 8  4  0  0  6  6  0  12.00  93.33  9.85  2.84  87.76  98.90  12.00  5.00  5.22  1.51  2.05  7.95  
A5 5  7  0  0  7  5  0  12.00  88.33  10.30  2.97  82.51  94.16  12.00  5.83  5.15  1.49  2.92  8.75  
A6 1  7  4  0  3  7  2  12.00  61.67  31.29  9.03  43.97  79.37  12.00  0.83  6.69  1.93  -2.95  4.62  
A7 1  4  5  2  2  8  2  12.00  43.33  37.01  10.68  22.39  64.27  12.00  0.00  6.03  1.74  -3.41  3.41  
A8 0  3  4  5  0  8  5  12.00  26.67  33.39  9.64  7.77  45.56  13.00  -3.85  5.06  1.40  -6.60  -1.09  
A8a 3  6  3  0  6  6  0  12.00  70.00  31.33  9.05  52.27  87.73  12.00  5.00  5.22  1.51  2.05  7.95  
A9 1  4  6  1  2  8  2  12.00  45.00  35.29  10.19  25.03  64.97  12.00  0.00  6.03  1.74  -3.41  3.41  
A10 4  4  4  0  4  5  2  12.00  66.67  35.51  10.25  46.58  86.76  11.00  1.82  7.51  2.26  -2.62  6.25  
B1 4  4  4  0  4  6  2  12.00  66.67  35.51  10.25  46.58  86.76  12.00  1.67  7.18  2.07  -2.39  5.73  
B2 3  6  3  0  8  5  0  12.00  70.00  31.33  9.05  52.27  87.73  13.00  6.15  5.06  1.40  3.40  8.91  
B3 4  5  3  0  7  4  1  12.00  71.67  32.43  9.36  53.32  90.01  12.00  5.00  6.74  1.95  1.19  8.81  
X1 0  5  5  2  3  4  5  12.00  41.67  34.60  9.99  22.09  61.24  12.00  -1.67  8.35  2.41  -6.39  3.06  
X2 1  6  5  0  4  5  3  12.00  56.67  32.84  9.48  38.08  75.25  12.00  0.83  7.93  2.29  -3.65  5.32  
X3 7  4  1  0  7  5  0  12.00  86.67  23.09  6.67  73.60  99.73  12.00  5.83  5.15  1.49  2.92  8.75  
B4 3  4  5  0  3  6  3  12.00  60.00  36.18  10.44  39.53  80.47  12.00  0.00  7.39  2.13  -4.18  4.18  
B5 2  3  7  0  2  7  3  12.00  48.33  35.63  10.29  28.17  68.49  12.00  -0.83  6.69  1.93  -4.62  2.95  
B6 1  5  7  0  5  7  0  13.00  49.23  33.28  9.23  31.14  67.32  12.00  4.17  5.15  1.49  1.25  7.08  
B7 0  2  7  2  2  5  5  11.00  27.27  27.24  8.21  11.18  43.37  12.00  -2.50  7.54  2.18  -6.76  1.76  
B8 0  4  6  2  2  5  5  12.00  36.67  32.84  9.48  18.08  55.25  12.00  -2.50  7.54  2.18  -6.76  1.76  
C1 4  7  1  0  4  5  3  12.00  81.67  21.67  6.26  69.40  93.93  12.00  0.83  7.93  2.29  -3.65  5.32  
C2 2  6  4  0  3  6  3  12.00  63.33  32.84  9.48  44.75  81.92  12.00  0.00  7.39  2.13  -4.18  4.18  
C3 1  5  5  1  4  6  2  12.00  50.00  35.68  10.30  29.81  70.19  12.00  1.67  7.18  2.07  -2.39  5.73  
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X1 1  7  4  0  6  6  0  12.00  61.67  31.29  9.03  43.97  79.37  12.00  5.00  5.22  1.51  2.05  7.95  
X2 0  4  6  2  3  5  4  12.00  36.67  32.84  9.48  18.08  55.25  12.00  -0.83  7.93  2.29  -5.32  3.65  
C4 3  5  4  0  5  6  1  12.00  65.00  34.25  9.89  45.62  84.38  12.00  3.33  6.51  1.88  -0.35  7.02  
C5 0  3  8  1  3  5  3  12.00  33.33  28.71  8.29  17.09  49.58  11.00  0.00  7.75  2.34  -4.58  4.58  
C6 1  2  5  4  0  8  4  12.00  30.00  35.68  10.30  9.81  50.19  12.00  -3.33  4.92  1.42  -6.12  -0.55  
C7 0  1  6  5  0  6  6  12.00  16.67  22.29  6.44  4.05  29.28  12.00  -5.00  5.22  1.51  -7.95  -2.05  
D1 1  5  5  1  3  3  6  12.00  50.00  35.68  10.30  29.81  70.19  12.00  -2.50  8.66  2.50  -7.40  2.40  
D2 2  5  5  0  2  5  5  12.00  58.33  34.60  9.99  38.76  77.91  12.00  -2.50  7.54  2.18  -6.76  1.76  
D1/2/a 7  5  0  0  8  4  0  12.00  91.67  10.30  2.97  85.84  97.49  12.00  6.67  4.92  1.42  3.88  9.45  
D3 5  5  2  0  5  5  1  12.00  78.33  28.87  8.33  62.00  94.67  11.00  3.64  6.74  2.03  -0.35  7.62  
D4 2  7  3  0  5  5  2  12.00  68.33  30.10  8.69  51.30  85.36  12.00  2.50  7.54  2.18  -1.76  6.76  
D5 3  5  4  0  4  6  2  12.00  65.00  34.25  9.89  45.62  84.38  12.00  1.67  7.18  2.07  -2.39  5.73  
D6 1  4  5  2  7  5  0  12.00  43.33  37.01  10.68  22.39  64.27  12.00  5.83  5.15  1.49  2.92  8.75  
D7 0  4  7  1  0  5  7  12.00  38.33  31.29  9.03  20.63  56.03  12.00  -5.83  5.15  1.49  -8.75  -2.92  
D8 4  6  2  0  6  6  0  12.00  76.67  28.07  8.10  60.79  92.55  12.00  5.00  5.22  1.51  2.05  7.95  
E1 4  6  2  0  6  6  0  12.00  76.67  28.07  8.10  60.79  92.55  12.00  5.00  5.22  1.51  2.05  7.95  
E2 0  2  4  6  0  4  8  12.00  20.00  29.54  8.53  3.29  36.71  12.00  -6.67  4.92  1.42  -9.45  -3.88  
F1 2  2  6  2  0  6  6  12.00  40.00  38.14  11.01  18.42  61.58  12.00  -5.00  5.22  1.51  -7.95  -2.05  
F2 0  4  7  1  8  4  0  12.00  38.33  31.29  9.03  20.63  56.03  12.00  6.67  4.92  1.42  3.88  9.45  
F3 3  5  4  0  3  7  2  12.00  65.00  34.25  9.89  45.62  84.38  12.00  0.83  6.69  1.93  -2.95  4.62  
F4 0  1  5  6  0  3  9  12.00  15.00  22.76  6.57  2.12  27.88  12.00  -7.50  4.52  1.31  
-
10.06  -4.94  
F5 3  7  2  0  10  2  0  12.00  75.00  27.14  7.83  59.65  90.35  12.00  8.33  3.89  1.12  6.13  10.54  
G1 2  7  3  0  7  5  0  12.00  68.33  30.10  8.69  51.30  85.36  12.00  5.83  5.15  1.49  2.92  8.75  
G2 0  6  6  0  6  5  1  12.00  50.00  31.33  9.05  32.27  67.73  12.00  4.17  6.69  1.93  0.38  7.95  
G3 1  4  5  2  2  6  4  12.00  43.33  37.01  10.68  22.39  64.27  12.00  -1.67  7.18  2.07  -5.73  2.39  
G4 2  4  4  2  4  6  2  12.00  50.00  39.54  11.42  27.63  72.37  12.00  1.67  7.18  2.07  -2.39  5.73  
All HRO 117.00  237.00  207.00  50.00     611.00  56.96  35.93  1.45  54.11  59.80        
CBA Av>0 108.00  190.00  124.00  10.00     432.00  65.93  32.95  1.59  62.82  69.03        
CI95%min>0 66.00  99.00  48.00  3.00     216.00  71.67  30.76  2.09  67.56  75.77        
Table 61 Statistical analysis of HRO baseline survey in the Regional Water Utility 
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4.2.2.1 Comparison between HRO survey in the Regional Water Utility and HRO survey with international participants 
 
Statistical analysis for observed HRO 
principles in the RWU  
Statistical analysis for observed HRO 
principles in international survey Significance testing for observed HRO principles  
Ref. Average  SD SE 
CI 95% 
min  
CI 95% 
max  Average  SD SE 
CI 95% 
min  
CI 95 % 
max  
H0: X1-X2=0 at SL=5% 
H1: X1-X2 ≠ 0  
 X1     X2     X1-X2 Var SE 
CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max H0 Comment 
A1 90.00  10.44  3.02  84.09  95.91  78.46  27.64  7.67  63.43  93.49  11.54  67.87  8.24  -16.15  16.15  Accept  
A2 63.33  32.84  9.48  44.75  81.92  78.33  19.92  5.75  67.06  89.61  -15.00  122.98  11.09  -21.74  21.74  Accept  
A3 92.73  10.09  3.04  86.76  98.69  80.00  20.89  6.03  68.18  91.82  12.73  45.62  6.75  -13.24  13.24  Accept  
A4 93.33  9.85  2.84  87.76  98.90  85.00  22.76  6.57  72.12  97.88  8.33  51.26  7.16  -14.03  14.03  Accept  
A5 88.33  10.30  2.97  82.51  94.16  83.33  22.29  6.44  70.72  95.95  5.00  50.25  7.09  -13.89  13.89  Accept  
A6 61.67  31.29  9.03  43.97  79.37  61.67  31.29  9.03  43.97  79.37  0.00  163.13  12.77  -25.03  25.03  Accept  
A7 43.33  37.01  10.68  22.39  64.27  73.33  26.05  7.52  58.59  88.07  -30.00  170.71  13.07  -25.61  25.61  Reject X1<<X2 
A8 26.67  33.39  9.64  7.77  45.56  16.67  7.78  2.25  12.26  21.07  10.00  97.98  9.90  -19.40  19.40  Accept  
A8a 70.00  31.33  9.05  52.27  87.73  83.33  7.78  2.25  78.93  87.74  -13.33  86.87  9.32  -18.27  18.27  Accept  
A9 45.00  35.29  10.19  25.03  64.97  51.67  33.53  9.68  32.70  70.64  -6.67  197.47  14.05  -27.54  27.54  Accept  
A10 66.67  35.51  10.25  46.58  86.76  88.33  10.30  2.97  82.51  94.16  -21.67  113.89  10.67  -20.92  20.92  Reject X1<<X2 
B1 66.67  35.51  10.25  46.58  86.76  80.00  20.89  6.03  68.18  91.82  -13.33  141.41  11.89  -23.31  23.31  Accept  
B2 70.00  31.33  9.05  52.27  87.73  62.67  31.95  8.25  46.50  78.84  7.33  149.88  12.24  -24.00  24.00  Accept  
B3 71.67  32.43  9.36  53.32  90.01  65.71  30.81  8.24  49.57  81.86  5.95  155.44  12.47  -24.44  24.44  Accept  
X1 41.67  34.60  9.99  22.09  61.24  60.00  34.11  9.85  40.70  79.30  -18.33  196.72  14.03  -27.49  27.49  Accept  
X2 56.67  32.84  9.48  38.08  75.25  61.67  31.29  9.03  43.97  79.37  -5.00  171.46  13.09  -25.67  25.67  Accept  
X3 86.67  23.09  6.67  73.60  99.73  86.67  23.09  6.67  73.60  99.73  0.00  88.89  9.43  -18.48  18.48  Accept  
B4 60.00  36.18  10.44  39.53  80.47  53.33  33.39  9.64  34.44  72.23  6.67  202.02  14.21  -27.86  27.86  Accept  
B5 48.33  35.63  10.29  28.17  68.49  63.33  37.01  10.68  42.39  84.27  -15.00  219.95  14.83  -29.07  29.07  Accept  
B6 49.23  33.28  9.23  31.14  67.32  36.67  32.84  9.48  18.08  55.25  12.56  175.11  13.23  -25.94  25.94  Accept  
B7 27.27  27.24  8.21  11.18  43.37  44.29  32.51  8.69  27.25  61.32  -17.01  142.95  11.96  -23.43  23.43  Accept  
B8 36.67  32.84  9.48  18.08  55.25  53.33  33.39  9.64  34.44  72.23  -16.67  182.83  13.52  -26.50  26.50  Accept  
C1 81.67  21.67  6.26  69.40  93.93  61.67  31.29  9.03  43.97  79.37  20.00  120.71  10.99  -21.53  21.53  Accept  
C2 63.33  32.84  9.48  44.75  81.92  58.46  32.11  8.90  41.01  75.91  4.87  169.19  13.01  -25.49  25.49  Accept  
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C3 50.00  35.68  10.30  29.81  70.19  67.69  27.74  7.69  52.62  82.77  -17.69  165.23  12.85  -25.19  25.19  Accept  
X1 61.67  31.29  9.03  43.97  79.37  55.71  32.51  8.69  38.68  72.75  5.95  157.08  12.53  -24.56  24.56  Accept  
X2 36.67  32.84  9.48  18.08  55.25  65.45  29.79  8.98  47.85  83.06  -28.79  170.56  13.06  -25.60  25.60  Reject X1<<X2 
C4 65.00  34.25  9.89  45.62  84.38  56.67  32.84  9.48  38.08  75.25  8.33  187.63  13.70  -26.85  26.85  Accept  
C5 33.33  28.71  8.29  17.09  49.58  75.00  17.32  5.00  65.20  84.80  -41.67  93.69  9.68  -18.97  18.97  Reject X1<<X2 
C6 30.00  35.68  10.30  9.81  50.19  52.86  32.92  8.80  35.61  70.10  -22.86  183.45  13.54  -26.55  26.55  Accept  
C7 16.67  22.29  6.44  4.05  29.28  16.67  7.78  2.25  12.26  21.07  0.00  46.46  6.82  -13.36  13.36  Accept  
D1 50.00  35.68  10.30  29.81  70.19  33.85  26.31  7.30  19.54  48.15  16.15  159.32  12.62  -24.74  24.74  Accept  
D2 58.33  34.60  9.99  38.76  77.91  43.08  30.38  8.43  26.56  59.59  15.26  170.75  13.07  -25.61  25.61  Accept  
D1/2/a 91.67  10.30  2.97  85.84  97.49  72.31  31.13  8.63  55.38  89.23  19.36  83.39  9.13  -17.90  17.90  Reject X1>>X2 
D3 78.33  28.87  8.33  62.00  94.67  54.29  30.81  8.24  38.14  70.43  24.05  137.26  11.72  -22.96  22.96  Reject X1>>X2 
D4 68.33  30.10  8.69  51.30  85.36  55.00  39.20  11.32  32.82  77.18  13.33  203.54  14.27  -27.96  27.96  Accept  
D5 65.00  34.25  9.89  45.62  84.38  40.00  29.54  8.53  23.29  56.71  25.00  170.45  13.06  -25.59  25.59  Accept  
D6 43.33  37.01  10.68  22.39  64.27  62.86  28.13  7.52  48.12  77.59  -19.52  170.66  13.06  -25.60  25.60  Accept  
D7 38.33  31.29  9.03  20.63  56.03  18.33  21.67  6.26  6.07  30.60  20.00  120.71  10.99  -21.53  21.53  Accept  
D8 76.67  28.07  8.10  60.79  92.55  52.73  36.08  10.88  31.40  74.05  23.94  184.00  13.56  -26.59  26.59  Accept  
E1 76.67  28.07  8.10  60.79  92.55  51.67  41.30  11.92  28.30  75.04  25.00  207.83  14.42  -28.26  28.26  Accept  
E2 20.00  29.54  8.53  3.29  36.71  45.00  35.29  10.19  25.03  64.97  -25.00  176.52  13.29  -26.04  26.04  Accept  
F1 40.00  38.14  11.01  18.42  61.58  36.92  30.38  8.43  20.41  53.44  3.08  192.22  13.86  -27.17  27.17  Accept  
F2 38.33  31.29  9.03  20.63  56.03  56.67  32.84  9.48  38.08  75.25  -18.33  171.46  13.09  -25.67  25.67  Accept  
F3 65.00  34.25  9.89  45.62  84.38  50.00  37.66  10.87  28.69  71.31  15.00  215.91  14.69  -28.80  28.80  Accept  
F4 15.00  22.76  6.57  2.12  27.88  41.67  32.43  9.36  23.32  60.01  -26.67  130.81  11.44  -22.42  22.42  Reject X1<<X2 
F5 75.00  27.14  7.83  59.65  90.35  73.85  25.01  6.94  60.25  87.44  1.15  109.49  10.46  -20.51  20.51  Accept  
G1 68.33  30.10  8.69  51.30  85.36  71.43  29.05  7.76  56.21  86.65  -3.10  135.79  11.65  -22.84  22.84  Accept  
G2 50.00  31.33  9.05  32.27  67.73  53.85  36.86  10.22  33.81  73.89  -3.85  186.35  13.65  -26.76  26.76  Accept  
G3 43.33  37.01  10.68  22.39  64.27  48.33  33.53  9.68  29.36  67.30  -5.00  207.83  14.42  -28.26  28.26  Accept  
G4 50.00  39.54  11.42  27.63  72.37  53.33  37.50  10.82  32.12  74.55  -3.33  247.47  15.73  -30.83  30.83  Accept  
Table 62 Significance test for observed HRO principles comparing the Regional Water Utility with the HRO survey in the pilot study 
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4.2.2.2 Cost benefit analysis for HRO principles in the Regional Water Utility 
In the following Table 63 to Table 68 those HRO principles are presented for which the 
average of the cost benefit analysis exceeding the value zero. In other words, the 
participants in the survey evaluated these particular HRO indicators to have an average 
positive cost benefit for effectively contributing to the safety and reliability of drinking 
water supply. For these HRO indicators, the combined observations by the survey 
participants for their utilities are presented. The aggregated observation of these HRO 
principles in the table reflect whether the participants observed these principles being 
implemented or maintain in their organisations.   
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Table 63 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit in the Regional Water Utility 
Ref Description  Observable in the 
organisation 
CBA: Av>=0 
St
ro
n
gl
y 
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gr
e
e
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e
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e
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Organisational culture of reliability     
A1 In my organisation, staff in operations have a strong sense 
for the primary mission of the organisation and share a 
common system of beliefs and perceptions. 
6 6 0 0 
A2 In my organisation, the water supply system is continuously 
monitoring so that failure events are foreseen and 
understood.  
2 6 4 0 
A3 In my organisation, our staff in operations have a highly 
developed understanding of their contribution to water 
safety and their role in the system.  
7 4 0 0 
A4 In a water quality incident, our staff in operations act in a 
collaborative and collegiate manner and the group 
interaction can be described as collective intelligent 
interaction. 
8 4 0 0 
A5 Our staff in operations are sensitive towards all events 
where water supply reliability is concerned. Staff know that 
a very small initial moment of inattention or misperception 
can lead to an escalation of failure, which can result in a 
water quality incident.  
5 7 0 0 
A6 All our employees take responsibility where problems are 
identified and immediate corrective action programmes are 
required. 
1 7 4 0 
A7 Our staff in operations are obliged to report their mistakes 
without fear of punishment. 
1 4 5 2 
A8a Our senior management is committed to the reliability of 
the organisation. This is communicated to all levels in the 
organisation and demonstrated with investments in 
technology, processes and personnel. 
3 6 3 0 
A9 In our organisation, individuals “monitor, advise, criticize 
and support” each other, in particular in situations where 
mistakes are more likely to occur. 
1 4 6 1 
A10 In general, our staff are attentive, alert and act with care. 4 4 4 0 
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Table 64 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
Ref. Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 
Average CBA >0 
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Continuous learning and intensive training     
B1 In order to facilitate continuous learning and intensive 
training, our organisation constantly reviews their 
processes and ways of operating.  
4 4 4 0 
B2 In preparation for a job, our staff in operations and 
maintenance staff receive training on the requirements of 
maintaining a safe system. These are embedded in formal 
rules, general guidelines and standardised frameworks. 
3 6 3 0 
B3 Our staff in operations must adhere to standard operating 
procedures but also pro-actively identify potential sources 
of failure and actions to stop faults from escalating.  
4 5 3 0 
X2 In unforeseen situations, staff in operations don’t follow 
rules blindly, but negotiate the course of action in a 
collegial manner with more experienced staff and 
supervisors.  
1 6 5 0 
X3 During a water quality incident, staff in operations 
establish an emergency response team for joint decision 
making in order to avoid overlooking complex 
circumstances.  
7 4 1 0 
B4 All our staff maintain a commitment to continuous learning 
and seek the acquisition and improvement of skills.  
3 4 5 0 
B6 In our organisation, even minor errors and incidents 
provide a source for learning which are assessed through 
root cause analysis. 
1 5 7 0 
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Table 65 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
Ref.  Observable in 
the  
organisations 
 
Average CBA >0 
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Effective and varied patterns of communication     
C1 Our communication system makes our water supply system 
better understandable, predictable and controllable.  
4 7 1 0 
C2 Our organisation operates in an information rich 
environment. All processes are measured and understood. 
Data are transparent and made available to all.   
2 6 4 0 
C3 Our staff in operations are encouraged to share their 
experiences relating to the reliability of the system. 
Communication is designed as bottom up and top down to 
ensure rapid flow of information through the hierarchy of the 
system. Rapid dissemination of information helps the 
organisation to respond to water quality incidents with 
corrective action aiming to prevent the escalation of failure. 
1 5 5 1 
X1 During a water quality incident, the response team 
maintains “closed loop” communication with all 
stakeholders within the organisation 
1 7 4 0 
C4 In our organisation, communicating information shapes the 
‘big picture’ of our organisational vision, mission and 
responsibility of individuals towards reliability. 
3 5 4 0 
C5 Our organisation uses various channels to transmit different 
types data and information relating to monitoring and 
control of our assets (and ultimately water safety).  
Direct and complementary information enhance information 
reliability and provides a form of redundancy. 
0 3 8 1 
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Table 66 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
Ref. Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 
Average CBA >0 
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Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible 
organisational structures 
    
      
D1/2a In our organisation, centralisation at collective level 
coexists with decentralisation at individual level. The 
organisation exhibits an adaptive, flexible or organic 
nature. 
7 5 0 0 
D3 Our organisation enforces the stringent adherence to 
standard operating procedures aiming for repeatability 
of action and routines. 
5 5 2 0 
D4 Our standard operating procedures are constantly 
updated and incorporate lessons learnt. Formal rules 
and procedures are effective elements to identify and 
control risk. 
2 7 3 0 
D5 In our organisation, activities, which are not defined in 
standard operating procedures, are based on decisions 
a most senior individual makes, as they should have the 
best knowledge of the system. 
3 5 4 0 
D6 Our organisation has a hierarchical structure for 
decision making which reflects expertise, know-how and 
seniority. Each level has controls and regulating 
mechanisms.  
1 4 5 2 
D8 Our decision-making processes have slack in-built in 
order to assess and challenge decisions to avoid faulty 
decisions to escalate into failure.  
4 6 2 0 
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Table 67 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
 
Table 68 HRO principles with a positive cost benefit in the Regional Water Utility (continued) 
 
Ref Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 
Average CBA >0 
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System and human redundancy     
E1 Our organisation maintains reserve capacity in the 
system. This includes back-up functions, overlapping 
tasks and responsibilities. 
4 6 2 0 
      
Precise procedures in managing technology     
      
F2 In water supply systems design, our organisation aims to 
simplify complex technical systems and avoid 
unnecessary automation. 
0 4 7 1 
F3 New technology acquisition is only justified if existing 
equipment does not perform to required specification. 
3 5 4 0 
F5 In our organisation, maintenance activity and protocols 
as well as performance data are used to monitor the 
healthy operation of the system. 
3 7 2 0 
Ref. Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 
Average CBA >0 
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Human resource management practices that support 
reliability 
    
G1 In recruitment and selection, our organisation acquires 
suitable and skilled candidates for the jobs aiming to match 
the complexity of the environment with an equally complex 
set of people to understand the system. Diverging 
backgrounds for staff offer different ways of looking at 
systems.  
2 7 3 0 
G2 Since most people do what is rewarded, our organisation 
remunerates reliability with incentives, recognition and 
career opportunities.  
0 6 6 0 
G4 Our organisation has systems in place to monitor the 
behaviour of staff. 
2 4 4 2 
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It can be identified that the number of HRO principles has reduced from 51 HRO 
principles in the HRO framework to 36 HRO principles with an average, positive cost 
benefit. In 27 of the 36 HRO principles, i.e. 75%, the majority of respondents ‘strongly 
agree’ or ‘agree’ to having observed the stated HRO principle in their organisation 
In the statistical analysis of the cost benefit data a 95% confidence interval was 
constructed. In addition to the HRO principles identified with an average positive for 
the cost benefit, those HRO principles were identified for which the minimum 
confidence interval exceeds zero. In other words, those HRO principles have a 97.5% 
chance to have a positive cost beneficial effect for the management of safe and reliable 
drinking water. 
Here, HRO indicators are presented were the minimum confidence interval for cost 
benefit analysis exceeds the value zero. For these HRO indicators, the combined 
observations by the survey participants for their utilities are presented. The aggregated 
observation of these HRO principles in the table reflect whether the participants 
observed these principles being implemented or maintain in their organisation.   
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Table 69 HRO principles with a significantly positive cost benefit in the Regional Water Utility 
Ref Description  Observable in the 
organisation 
Cost Beneficial at CI 95% min >0 
St
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Organisational culture of reliability     
A1 In my organisation, staff in operations have a strong 
sense for the primary mission of the organisation and 
share a common system of beliefs and perceptions. 
6 6 0 0 
A3 In my organisation, our staff in operations have a highly 
developed understanding of their contribution to water 
safety and their role in the system.  
7 4 0 0 
A4 In a water quality incident, our staff in operations act in a 
collaborative and collegiate manner and the group 
interaction can be described as collective intelligent 
interaction. 
8 4 0 0 
A5 Our staff in operations are sensitive towards all events 
where water supply reliability is concerned. Staff know 
that a very small initial moment of inattention or 
misperception can lead to an escalation of failure, which 
can result in a water quality incident.  
5 7 0 0 
A8a Our senior management is committed to the reliability of 
the organisation. This is communicated to all levels in the 
organisation and demonstrated with investments in 
technology, processes and personnel. 
3 6 3 0 
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Table 70 HRO principles with a significantly positive cost benefit in the Regional Water Utility 
(continued) 
Ref. Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 
Cost Beneficial at CI 95% min >0 
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Continuous learning and intensive training     
B2 In preparation for a job, our staff in operations and 
maintenance staff receive training on the requirements 
of maintaining a safe system. These are embedded in 
formal rules, general guidelines and standardised 
frameworks. 
3 6 3 0 
B3 Our staff in operations must adhere to standard 
operating procedures but also pro-actively identify 
potential sources of failure and actions to stop faults 
from escalating.  
4 5 3 0 
X3 During a water quality incident, staff in operations 
establish an emergency response team for joint decision 
making in order to avoid overlooking complex 
circumstances.  
7 4 1 0 
B6 In our organisation, even minor errors and incidents 
provide a source for learning which are assessed 
through root cause analysis. 
1 5 7 0 
      
Effective and varied patterns of communication     
X1 During a water quality incident, the response team 
maintains “closed loop” communication with all 
stakeholders within the organisation 
1 7 4 0 
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Table 71 HRO principles with a significantly positive cost benefit in the Regional Water Utility 
(continued) 
 
Ref. Description Observable in the  
organisations 
 
Cost Beneficial at CI 95% min >0 
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Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible 
organisational structures 
    
D1/2a In our organisation, centralisation at collective level 
coexists with decentralisation at individual level. The 
organisation exhibits an adaptive, flexible or organic 
nature. 
7 5 0 0 
D6 Our organisation has a hierarchical structure for 
decision making which reflects expertise, know-how and 
seniority. Each level has controls and regulating 
mechanisms.  
1 4 5 2 
D8 Our decision-making processes have slack in-built in 
order to assess and challenge decisions to avoid faulty 
decisions to escalate into failure.  
4 6 2 0 
      
System and human redundancy     
E1 Our organisation maintains reserve capacity in the 
system. This includes back-up functions, overlapping 
tasks and responsibilities. 
4 6 2 0 
      
Precise procedures in managing technology     
F2 In water supply systems design, our organisation aims 
to simplify complex technical systems and avoid 
unnecessary automation. 
0 4 7 1 
F5 In our organisation, maintenance activity and protocols 
as well as performance data are used to monitor the 
healthy operation of the system. 
3 7 2 0 
      
Human resource management practices that support 
reliability 
    
G1 In recruitment and selection, our organisation acquires 
suitable and skilled candidates for the jobs aiming to 
match the complexity of the environment with an equally 
complex set of people to understand the system. 
Diverging backgrounds for staff offer different ways of 
looking at systems. 
2 7 3 0 
G2 Since most people do what is rewarded, our 
organisation remunerates reliability with incentives, 
recognition and career opportunities.  
0 6 6 0 
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It can be seen that the number of HRO principles that are considered to have a 97.5% 
chance of being cost beneficial has significantly reduced to 18 in comparison to the 
initial HRO framework of 51 HRO principles.  
For 14 out of 18 HRO principles, i.e. 77%, it can be identified that the majority of 
responses ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ to having observed the stated HRO principle in 
their organisation. This is higher in comparison to the entire HRO framework or the 
HRO principles with an average positive cost benefit.  
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4.2.3 Correlating the impact of incidents in the Regional Water Utility with 
documented HRO principles  
In this study, documented incidents were investigated and evidence for HRO principles 
sought. For each incident, a HRO survey form was completed (Appendix 5.3.2) In the 
following figures, the individual groups of HRO principles are correlated with the 
impact of incidents. These HRO groups were previously identified as  
 ‘Organisational culture of reliability (A)’, 
 ‘Continuous learning and intensive training (B)’, 
 ‘Effective and varied patterns of communication (C)’, 
 ‘Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible organisational structures 
(D)’, 
 ‘System and human redundancy (E)’,  
 ‘Precise procedures in managing technology (F)’, and 
 ‘Human resource management practices that support reliability (G)’. 
 
The case studies were drawn from the documented incidents identified in Table 72 to 
Table 74.  
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   Score 
Date of 
Incident 
HRO 
study 
Population 
(actual 
affected) 
Duration 
(hr) Hazard category P H D Sum  
11/05/2004 Y 250 48 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 64.00 16.00 27.31 
03/06/2004  75 72 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 64.00 16.00 27.31 
14/08/2004 Y 10 48 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 64.00 16.00 27.31 
30/07/2004  4 8 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 64.00 2.00 22.64 
05/08/2004 Y 85 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32 
01/04/2004  2776 48 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 16.00 16.65 
09/04/2004  1697 48 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 16.00 16.65 
16/04/2004  200 48 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 16.00 16.65 
25/09/2004  30,000 11 Aesthetics above guidelines 16.00 32.00 2.00 16.65 
07/12/2004 Y 11669 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 4.00 32.00 8.00 14.65 
18/12/2004 Y 7743 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 4.00 32.00 8.00 14.65 
18/09/2004  2800 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 8.00 13.99 
25/01/2004  7600 12 Aesthetics above guidelines 4.00 32.00 4.00 13.32 
10/02/2004  8595 9 Aesthetics above guidelines 4.00 32.00 2.00 12.65 
03/09/2004  213 15 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 4.00 12.65 
10/02/2004 Y 1400 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
19/03/2004  2574 4 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
31/03/2004  4129 3 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
24/04/2004  2530 2 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
08/06/2004  4226 3 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
14/06/2004  5200 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
20/08/2004  3207 6 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
22/08/2004 Y 4661 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
15/09/2004 Y 985 2 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
28/09/2004  1,079 5 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
16/04/2004  200 48 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 16.00 11.32 
25/09/2004  30000 11 Loss of supply 16.00 16.00 2.00 11.32 
01/01/2004  100 24 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 8.00 8.66 
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03/03/2004  3000 27 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 8.00 8.66 
02/06/2004  1900 24 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 8.00 8.66 
27/08/2004  500 25 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 8.00 8.66 
25/01/2004  1100 12 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
19/05/2004  600 12 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
13/06/2004  86 16 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
01/10/2004  246 12 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
16/10/2004  1430 12 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
17/02/2004  22 10 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
19/03/2004  2574 4 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
20/07/2004  6000 11 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
27/07/2004  975 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
07/08/2004  80 10 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
28/09/2004  1079 5 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
27/10/2004  300 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
11/11/2004  1402 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
20/11/2004  500 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
01/12/2004  3500 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
23/12/2004  20 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
30/12/2004  974 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
16/05/2004 Y 0 1 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
29/07/2004 Y 5000 4 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
07/09/2004 Y 0 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
20/04/2004  0 1 Potential biological pathogens present 2.00 6.00 2.00 3.33 
28/05/2004 Y 0 8 Potential biological pathogens present 2.00 6.00 2.00 3.33 
13/08/2004  0 1 Potential biological pathogens present 2.00 6.00 2.00 3.33 
Average  
      
10.85 
SD  
      
5.82 
SE  
      
0.79 
CI95%min  
      
9.30 
CI95%max  
      
12.41 
Table 72 Selected, documented incidents in 2004 for HRO study 
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     Score 
Date of 
Incident 
HRO 
study 
Population 
(actual 
affected) 
Duration 
(hr) Hazard category P H D Sum  
08/01/2005  4679000 48 Loss of supply 500.00 16.00 16.00 177.16 
25/08/2005 Y 76 48 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 64.00 16.00 27.31 
17/06/2005 Y 6 8 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 64.00 2.00 22.64 
12/09/2005 Y 67 8 Biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 64.00 2.00 22.64 
10/01/2005 Y 122 3 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32 
25/04/2005  6 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32 
05/05/2005 Y 28 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32 
20/06/2005  21 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32 
29/06/2005 Y 100 8 Potential biological pathogens present, health effects envisaged 2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32 
18/03/2005  10,000 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 4.00 32.00 8.00 14.65 
23/05/2005  5,300 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 8.00 13.99 
19/06/2005 Y 15278 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 8.00 32.00 2.00 13.99 
06/09/2005  600 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 8.00 13.99 
28/11/2005  2700 12 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 4.00 12.65 
08/01/2005  6014 4 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
09/01/2005 Y 6852 2 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
18/01/2005  250 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
24/05/2005  1800 6 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
12/07/2005  700 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
08/10/2005  7000 5 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
18/03/2005  10000 24 Loss of supply 4.00 16.00 8.00 9.32 
23/05/2005  5300 24 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 8.00 8.66 
17/09/2005  2100 48 Biological pathogens present 2.00 8.00 16.00 8.66 
03/03/2005  100 12 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
16/03/2005  80 15 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
28/11/2005  500 12 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
01/01/2005  500 10 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
10/01/2005  122 3 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
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10/03/2005  4150 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
25/05/2005  2590 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
16/07/2005  1200 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
20/09/2005  26 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
18/10/2005  1 0.5 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
26/10/2005  3500 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
18/11/2005  97 11 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
30/12/2005  1600 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
19/01/2005  10 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
05/04/2005 Y 0 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
05/08/2005 Y 2 8 Biological pathogens present 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
17/11/2005 Y 0 4 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
11/12/2005  0 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
22/12/2005  0 4 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
17/11/2005 Y 0 3 Potential biological pathogens present 2.00 6.00 2.00 3.33 
         
Average 
       
14.42 
SD 
       
26.04 
Count 
       
43.00 
SE 
       
3.97 
CI95%min 
       
6.6355 
CI95%max 
       
22.2038 
Table 73 Selected, documented incidents in 2005 for HRO study 
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     Score 
Date of 
Incident 
HRO 
review 
Population 
(actual 
affected) 
Duration 
(hr) Hazard category P H D Sum  
14/08/2006  60000 48 Chemicals present above guidelines 32.00 8.00 16.00 18.65 
10/08/2006  80 8 
Potential biological pathogens present, health effects 
envisaged 2.00 48.00 2.00 17.32 
18/07/2006  7000 24 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 8.00 13.99 
05/02/2006  9453 2.5 Aesthetics above guidelines 4.00 32.00 2.00 12.65 
17/06/2006 Y 9700 6 Aesthetics above guidelines 4.00 32.00 2.00 12.65 
28/02/2006 Y 1300 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
28/03/2006  5439 8 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
01/04/2006 Y 2685 6 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
14/05/2006  2500 6 Aesthetics above guidelines 2.00 32.00 2.00 11.99 
20/09/2006 Y 37000 4 Loss of supply 16.00 16.00 2.00 11.32 
24/09/2006  37600 1 Loss of supply 16.00 16.00 2.00 11.32 
29/01/2006  3832 48 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 16.00 8.66 
05/02/2006  15150 2.5 Loss of supply 8.00 16.00 2.00 8.66 
10/02/2006 Y 8000 4 Loss of supply 4.00 16.00 2.00 7.33 
30/05/2006 Y 0 12 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
04/06/2006  7500 6 Loss of supply 4.00 16.00 2.00 7.33 
18/07/2006  500 18 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
02/12/2006  70 18 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 4.00 7.33 
25/02/2006  7 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
14/03/2006  175 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
21/04/2006  420 10 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
14/05/2006  10 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
09/06/2006  80 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
11/06/2006  340 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
13/06/2006  300 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
16/07/2006  250 6 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
06/08/2006  400 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
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06/09/2006  1248 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
10/10/2006 Y 1000 8 Loss of supply 2.00 16.00 2.00 6.66 
25/08/2006 Y 24500 12 Potential biological pathogens present 8.00 6.00 4.00 5.99 
04/01/2006 Y 0 24 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 8.00 5.99 
17/01/2006 Y 0 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
22/05/2006 Y 0 6 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
17/06/2006 Y 50 8 Biological pathogens present 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
03/09/2006  6 8 Chemicals present above guidelines 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
16/09/2006  1300 8 Biological pathogens present 2.00 8.00 2.00 4.00 
         
Average        8.47 
SD        3.66 
Count        36.00 
SE        0.61 
CI95%min        7.2784 
CI95%max        9.6676 
Table 74 Selected, documented incidents in 2006 for HRO study 
 
Table 75 to Table 77 summarise the incidents, i.e. the incident impact on customers and the documented HRO principles adhered to prior to 
and during the incident.  
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Incident Date 05/08/2004 07/09/2004 07/12/2004 10/02/2004 11/05/2004 14/08/2004 15/09/2004 16/05/2004 18/12/2004 19/03/2004 22/08/2004 28/05/2004 29/07/2004 
Population 85.00 0.00 11669.00 1400.00 250.00 10.00 985.00 0.00 7743.00 2574.00 4661.00 0.00 5000.00 
Duration 8.00 8.00 24.00 8.00 48.00 48.00 2.00 1.00 24.00 4.00 8.00 8.00 4.00 
Pop score 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Duration score 2.00 2.00 8.00 2.00 16.00 16.00 2.00 2.00 8.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Hazard score 48.00 8.00 32.00 32.00 64.00 64.00 32.00 8.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 6.00 8.00 
Impact score 17.32 4.00 14.65 11.99 27.31 27.31 11.99 4.00 14.65 11.99 11.99 3.33 4.00 
Comment                           
Group A              
Total 800.00 780.00 680.00 700.00 900.00 900.00 800.00 760.00 760.00 800.00 700.00 780.00 780.00 
Count 8.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
Average 100.00 97.50 97.14 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 95.00 95.00 100.00 87.50 97.50 97.50 
Total Av>0 800.00 780.00 680.00 700.00 900.00 800.00 800.00 760.00 760.00 800.00 700.00 780.00 780.00 
Count 8.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
Average 100.00 97.50 97.14 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 95.00 95.00 100.00 87.50 97.50 97.50 
Total CIMIN>0 500.00 480.00 380.00 400.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 460.00 480.00 500.00 460.00 500.00 480.00 
Count 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Average 100 96 95 100 100 100 100 92 96 100 92 100 96 
Group B              
Total 560.00 420.00 420.00 520.00 560.00 640.00 640.00 600.00 460.00 540.00 600.00 500.00 680.00 
Count 6.00 8.00 6.00 7.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 7.00 9.00 7.00 7.00 
Average 93.33 52.50 70.00 74.29 93.33 91.43 80.00 85.71 76.67 77.14 66.67 71.43 97.14 
Total Av>0 480.00 380.00 400.00 500.00 560.00 560.00 480.00 500.00 440.00 460.00 500.00 480.00 580.00 
Count 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
Average 96.00 63.33 80.00 83.33 93.33 93.33 80.00 100.00 88.00 76.67 83.33 80.00 96.67 
Total CIMIN>0 300.00 280.00 220.00 340.00 380.00 380.00 360.00 300.00 260.00 360.00 340.00 300.00 380.00 
Count 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 
Average 100 70 73.33 85 95 95 90 100 86.66 90 85 75 95 
Group C              
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Total 480.00 460.00 600.00 600.00 520.00 500.00 500.00 600.00 500.00 800.00 440.00 600.00 540.00 
Count 5.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 8.00 
Average 96.00 65.71 85.71 85.71 86.67 100.00 100.00 100.00 71.43 100.00 62.86 100.00 67.50 
Total Av>0 380.00 420.00 400.00 440.00 340.00 400.00 400.00 500.00 400.00 600.00 340.00 400.00 500.00 
Count 4.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 6.00 
Average 95.00 84.00 100.00 88.00 85.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 100.00 68.00 100.00 83.33 
Total CIMIN>0 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 100.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 100.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 
Group D                 
Total 460.00 380.00 360.00 440.00 700.00 580.00 500.00 440.00 480.00 520.00 440.00 520.00 620.00 
Count 5.00 7.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 7.00 6.00 7.00 9.00 
Average 92.00 54.29 72.00 73.33 100.00 82.86 71.43 62.86 80.00 74.29 73.33 74.29 68.89 
Total Av>0 460.00 360.00 360.00 440.00 600.00 500.00 480.00 400.00 460.00 500.00 340.00 440.00 440.00 
Count 5.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 
Average 92.00 60.00 72.00 88.00 100.00 83.33 80.00 80.00 92.00 83.33 85.00 73.33 73.33 
Total CIMIN>0 260.00 180.00 260.00 200.00 300.00 300.00 280.00 200.00 280.00 300.00 180.00 220.00 180.00 
Count 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 
Average 86.67 60.00 86.67 100.00 100.00 100.00 93.33 100.00 93.33 100.00 90.00 73.33 60.00 
Group E              
Total 80.00 100.00 120.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 120.00 120.00 160.00 80.00 100.00 
Count 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 
Average 40.00 50.00 60.00 100.00 20.00 20.00 40.00 40.00 60.00 60.00 80.00 80.00 50.00 
Total Av>0 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 
Total CIMIN>0 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 
Group F              
Total 80.00 260.00 140.00 280.00 140.00 180.00 200.00 260.00 200.00 180.00 200.00 180.00 260.00 
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Count 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 
Average 26.67 65.00 35.00 70.00 46.67 45.00 66.67 86.67 50.00 60.00 50.00 90.00 65.00 
Total Av>0 80.00 160.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 160.00 100.00 100.00 160.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 160.00 
Count 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 
Average 40.00 80.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 80.00 50.00 100.00 80.00 
Total CIMIN>0 0.00 80.00 80.00 20.00 100.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 80.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.00 80.00 80.00 20.00 100.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 80.00 
Group G              
Total 360.00 280.00 280.00 260.00 300.00 280.00 220.00 320.00 200.00 320.00 180.00 300.00 260.00 
Count 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 
Average 90.00 70.00 93.33 86.67 100.00 93.33 73.33 80.00 66.67 80.00 60.00 75.00 65.00 
Total Av>0 280.00 260.00 180.00 260.00 300.00 200.00 200.00 300.00 180.00 300.00 160.00 280.00 240.00 
Count 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 
Average 93.33 86.67 90.00 86.67 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 90.00 100.00 80.00 93.33 80.00 
Total CIMIN>0 200.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 180.00 200.00 160.00 200.00 160.00 
Count 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Average 100.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 90.00 100.00 80.00 100.00 80.00 
Total Group 
score 
             
Total 2820.00 2680.00 2600.00 2880.00 3140.00 3100.00 2940.00 3060.00 2720.00 3280.00 2720.00 2960.00 3240.00 
Count 33.00 40.00 34.00 36.00 35.00 36.00 36.00 37.00 36.00 39.00 39.00 35.00 42.00 
Average 85.45 67.00 76.47 80.00 89.71 86.11 81.67 82.70 75.56 84.10 69.74 84.57 77.14 
Total Av>0 2560.00 2440.00 2220.00 2540.00 2820.00 2640.00 2540.00 2640.00 2500.00 2840.00 2220.00 2560.00 2780.00 
Count 28.00 31.00 26.00 29.00 30.00 29.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 31.00 28.00 29.00 32.00 
Average 91.43 78.71 85.38 87.59 94.00 91.03 90.71 94.29 89.29 91.61 79.29 88.28 86.88 
Total CIMIN>0 1440.00 1380.00 1320.00 1340.00 1600.00 1580.00 1620.00 1440.00 1460.00 1640.00 1380.00 1500.00 1460.00 
Count 16.00 17.00 15.00 15.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 15.00 16.00 17.00 16.00 17.00 17.00 
Average 90.00 81.18 88.00 89.33 94.12 92.94 95.29 96.00 91.25 96.47 86.25 88.24 85.88 
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Date 05/04/2005 05/05/2005 05/08/2005 09/01/2005 10/01/2005 12/09/2005 17/06/2005 17/11/2005 17/11/2005 19/06/2005 25/08/2005 29/06/2005 
Pop 0.00 28.00 2.00 6852.00 122.00 67.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 15278.00 76.00 100.00 
Duration 8.00 8.00 8.00 2.00 3.00 8.00 8.00 3.00 4.00 8.00 48.00 8.00 
Pop score 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 8.00 2.00 2.00 
Duration score 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 16.00 2.00 
Hazard score 8.00 48.00 8.00 32.00 48.00 64.00 64.00 6.00 8.00 32.00 64.00 48.00 
Impact score 4.00 17.32 4.00 11.99 17.32 22.64 22.64 3.33 4.00 13.99 27.31 17.32 
Comment         Holm    
Group A             
Total 760.00 700.00 620.00 460.00 400.00 500.00 680.00 860.00 860.00 740.00 820.00 740.00 
Count 8.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 
Average 95.00 87.50 68.89 57.50 50.00 71.43 75.56 95.56 95.56 92.50 91.11 92.50 
Total Av>0 760.00 700.00 620.00 460.00 400.00 500.00 680.00 860.00 860.00 740.00 820.00 740.00 
Count 8.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 
Average 95.00 87.50 68.89 57.50 50.00 71.43 75.56 95.56 95.56 92.50 91.11 92.50 
Total CIMIN>0 480.00 480.00 420.00 340.00 280.00 320.00 460.00 500.00 500.00 460.00 400.00 460.00 
Count 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 
Average 96.00 96.00 84.00 68.00 56.00 80.00 92.00 100.00 100.00 92.00 100.00 92.00 
Group B             
Total 800.00 620.00 560.00 520.00 620.00 420.00 580.00 860.00 860.00 520.00 600.00 740.00 
Count 10.00 7.00 8.00 7.00 9.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 6.00 7.00 9.00 
Average 80.00 88.57 70.00 74.29 68.89 52.50 64.44 95.56 95.56 86.67 85.71 82.22 
Total Av>0 660.00 540.00 520.00 440.00 440.00 400.00 440.00 680.00 680.00 360.00 440.00 640.00 
Count 7.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 
Average 94.29 90.00 86.67 73.33 73.33 57.14 73.33 97.14 97.14 90.00 88.00 91.43 
Total CIMIN>0 380.00 380.00 340.00 280.00 280.00 280.00 280.00 380.00 380.00 180.00 260.00 360.00 
Count 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Average 95.00 95.00 85.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 95.00 95.00 90.00 86.67 90.00 
Group C             
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Total 500.00 500.00 460.00 140.00 400.00 340.00 440.00 600.00 600.00 540.00 300.00 520.00 
Count 9.00 7.00 8.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 9.00 8.00 
Average 55.56 71.43 57.50 20.00 50.00 42.50 62.86 75.00 75.00 77.14 33.33 65.00 
Total Av>0 440.00 400.00 360.00 100.00 240.00 240.00 340.00 500.00 500.00 440.00 240.00 420.00 
Count 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 
Average 73.33 80.00 60.00 20.00 40.00 40.00 68.00 83.33 83.33 88.00 40.00 70.00 
Total CIMIN>0 80.00 80.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 20.00 80.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 80.00 80.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 20.00 80.00 
Group D             
Total 580.00 620.00 620.00 420.00 460.00 560.00 620.00 620.00 620.00 660.00 680.00 540.00 
Count 9.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 
Average 64.44 77.50 68.89 52.50 57.50 62.22 68.89 77.50 77.50 73.33 75.56 67.50 
Total Av>0 460.00 520.00 440.00 320.00 360.00 380.00 440.00 520.00 520.00 480.00 480.00 380.00 
Count 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
Average 76.67 86.67 73.33 53.33 60.00 63.33 73.33 86.67 86.67 80.00 80.00 63.33 
Total CIMIN>0 260.00 260.00 260.00 140.00 180.00 200.00 240.00 260.00 260.00 240.00 280.00 120.00 
Count 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Average 86.67 86.67 86.67 46.67 60.00 66.67 80.00 86.67 86.67 80.00 93.33 40.00 
Group E             
Total 80.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 80.00 180.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 40.00 20.00 
Count 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Average 40.00 10.00 40.00 10.00 40.00 90.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 20.00 10.00 
Total Av>0 80.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 80.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 
Total CIMIN>0 80.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 80.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 
Group F             
Total 200.00 120.00 260.00 140.00 200.00 100.00 100.00 140.00 140.00 340.00 260.00 80.00 
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Count 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 
Average 50.00 40.00 65.00 35.00 50.00 50.00 33.33 35.00 35.00 68.00 65.00 80.00 
Total Av>0 160.00 20.00 160.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 20.00 100.00 100.00 240.00 160.00 0.00 
Count 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 0.00 
Average 80.00 20.00 80.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 20.00 50.00 50.00 80.00 80.00 0.00 
Total CIMIN>0 80.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 160.00 80.00 0.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 
Average 80.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 0.00 
Group G             
Total 260.00 280.00 140.00 140.00 200.00 260.00 260.00 280.00 280.00 260.00 200.00 260.00 
Count 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Average 65.00 70.00 35.00 35.00 50.00 65.00 65.00 70.00 70.00 65.00 50.00 65.00 
Total Av>0 240.00 260.00 120.00 120.00 180.00 240.00 240.00 260.00 260.00 240.00 180.00 240.00 
Count 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Average 80.00 86.67 40.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 80.00 86.67 86.67 80.00 60.00 80.00 
Total CIMIN>0 160.00 180.00 100.00 100.00 160.00 160.00 160.00 180.00 180.00 160.00 160.00 160.00 
Count 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Average 80.00 90.00 50.00 50.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 90.00 90.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 
Total Group 
score 
            
Total 3180.00 2860.00 2740.00 1840.00 2360.00 2360.00 2780.00 3460.00 3460.00 3160.00 2900.00 2900.00 
Count 46.00 39.00 44.00 40.00 43.00 40.00 43.00 44.00 44.00 41.00 44.00 40.00 
Average 69.13 73.33 62.27 46.00 54.88 59.00 64.65 78.64 78.64 77.07 65.91 72.50 
Total Av>0 2800.00 2460.00 2300.00 1560.00 1800.00 1840.00 2240.00 3020.00 3020.00 2580.00 2340.00 2440.00 
Count 33.00 30.00 33.00 31.00 32.00 30.00 31.00 34.00 34.00 30.00 32.00 31.00 
Average 84.85 82.00 69.70 50.32 56.25 61.33 72.26 88.82 88.82 86.00 73.13 78.71 
Total CIMIN>0 1520.00 1420.00 1360.00 920.00 1020.00 1060.00 1320.00 1600.00 1600.00 1380.00 1220.00 1200.00 
Count 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 15.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 16.00 15.00 16.00 
Average 89.41 83.53 80.00 54.12 60.00 70.67 77.65 94.12 94.12 86.25 81.33 75.00 
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Date of 
Incident 01/04/2006 04/01/2006 10/02/2006 10/10/2006 17/01/2006 17/06/2006 17/06/2006 20/09/2006 22/05/2006 25/08/2006 28/02/2006 30/05/2006 
Population 2685.00 0.00 8000.00 1000.00 0.00 9700.00 50.00 37000.00 0.00 24500.00 1300.00 0.00 
Duration 6.00 24.00 4.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 4.00 6.00 12.00 8.00 12.00 
Pop score 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 16.00 2.00 8.00 2.00 2.00 
Duration score 2.00 8.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 
Hazard score 32.00 8.00 16.00 16.00 8.00 32.00 8.00 16.00 8.00 6.00 32.00 16.00 
Impact score 11.99 5.99 7.33 6.66 4.00 12.65 4.00 11.32 4.00 5.99 11.99 7.33 
Group A 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 
Total 580.00 660.00 680.00 640.00 660.00 620.00 640.00 580.00 420.00 520.00 420.00 480.00 
Count 8.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 9.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 11.00 11.00 10.00 10.00 
Average 72.50 73.33 75.56 80.00 73.33 88.57 80.00 72.50 38.18 47.27 42.00 48.00 
Total Av>0 580.00 660.00 680.00 640.00 660.00 620.00 640.00 580.00 320.00 500.00 320.00 460.00 
Count 8.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 9.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 9.00 9.00 
Average 72.50 73.33 75.56 80.00 73.33 88.57 80.00 72.50 32.00 50.00 35.56 51.11 
Total CIMIN>0 400.00 400.00 360.00 400.00 400.00 380.00 400.00 340.00 100.00 340.00 220.00 340.00 
Count 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Average 80.00 80.00 72.00 80.00 80.00 95.00 80.00 68.00 20.00 68.00 44.00 68.00 
Group B 20.00 20.00 0.00  20.00   20.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 
Total 540.00 520.00 660.00 480.00 520.00 720.00 560.00 660.00 260.00 500.00 360.00 600.00 
Count 8.00 8.00 10.00 6.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 9.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 9.00 
Average 67.50 65.00 66.00 80.00 65.00 90.00 80.00 73.33 32.50 50.00 36.00 66.67 
Total Av>0 500.00 480.00 500.00 400.00 480.00 560.00 480.00 480.00 220.00 360.00 320.00 420.00 
Count 6.00 6.00 7.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 6.00 
Average 83.33 80.00 71.43 80.00 80.00 93.33 80.00 80.00 36.67 60.00 45.71 70.00 
Total CIMIN>0 340.00 320.00 260.00 240.00 320.00 280.00 320.00 240.00 120.00 260.00 200.00 260.00 
Count 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Average 85.00 80.00 65.00 80.00 80.00 93.33 80.00 80.00 30.00 65.00 50.00 65.00 
Group C      20.00       
Total 200.00 400.00 380.00 400.00 400.00 420.00 400.00 580.00 220.00 180.00 280.00 240.00 
Count 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 8.00 7.00 
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Average 25.00 50.00 47.50 50.00 50.00 46.67 50.00 72.50 27.50 25.71 35.00 34.29 
Total Av>0 180.00 300.00 360.00 360.00 300.00 360.00 360.00 480.00 180.00 80.00 240.00 240.00 
Count 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 
Average 30.00 50.00 60.00 60.00 50.00 60.00 60.00 80.00 30.00 16.00 40.00 40.00 
Total CIMIN>0 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 80.00 
Group D             
Total 600.00 520.00 620.00 580.00 520.00 540.00 580.00 520.00 360.00 560.00 360.00 520.00 
Count 9.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 
Average 66.67 65.00 68.89 72.50 65.00 60.00 72.50 65.00 40.00 62.22 40.00 65.00 
Total Av>0 420.00 420.00 500.00 480.00 420.00 360.00 400.00 420.00 180.00 380.00 180.00 420.00 
Count 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
Average 70.00 70.00 83.33 80.00 70.00 60.00 80.00 70.00 30.00 63.33 30.00 70.00 
Total CIMIN>0 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 180.00 240.00 240.00 60.00 180.00 60.00 240.00 
Count 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Average 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 60.00 80.00 80.00 20.00 60.00 20.00 80.00 
Group E             
Total 0.00 40.00 20.00 20.00 40.00 80.00 20.00 0.00 100.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 
Count 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Average 0.00 20.00 10.00 20.00 20.00 40.00 20.00 0.00 50.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Total Av>0 0.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 0.00 80.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 0.00 80.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 
Total CIMIN>0 0.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 0.00 80.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 0.00 80.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 
Group F             
Total 100.00 140.00 120.00 120.00 140.00 120.00 240.00 80.00 200.00 140.00 100.00 60.00 
Count 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
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Average 25.00 35.00 30.00 30.00 35.00 30.00 60.00 20.00 50.00 35.00 25.00 15.00 
Total Av>0 80.00 40.00 80.00 100.00 40.00 40.00 160.00 40.00 100.00 100.00 80.00 20.00 
Count 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Average 40.00 20.00 40.00 50.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 50.00 50.00 40.00 10.00 
Total CIMIN>0 0.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 
Count 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 
Group G             
Total 260.00 260.00 260.00 260.00 260.00 260.00 260.00 260.00 80.00 140.00 140.00 260.00 
Count 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Average 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 20.00 35.00 35.00 65.00 
Total Av>0 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 60.00 120.00 120.00 240.00 
Count 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Average 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 20.00 40.00 40.00 80.00 
Total CIMIN>0 160.00 160.00 160.00 160.00 160.00 160.00 160.00 160.00 40.00 100.00 100.00 160.00 
Count 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Average 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 20.00 50.00 50.00 80.00 
Total Group 
score             
Total 2280.00 2540.00 2740.00 2500.00 2540.00 2760.00 2700.00 2680.00 1640.00 2060.00 1680.00 2180.00 
Count 43.00 43.00 46.00 39.00 43.00 43.00 40.00 43.00 46.00 47.00 47.00 44.00 
Average 53.02 59.07 59.57 64.10 59.07 64.19 67.50 62.33 35.65 43.83 35.74 49.55 
Total Av>0 2000.00 2160.00 2380.00 2240.00 2160.00 2260.00 2300.00 2240.00 1140.00 1540.00 1280.00 1800.00 
Count 32.00 33.00 34.00 31.00 33.00 31.00 31.00 32.00 34.00 33.00 34.00 33.00 
Average 62.50 65.45 70.00 72.26 65.45 72.90 74.19 70.00 33.53 46.67 37.65 54.55 
Total CIMIN>0 1220.00 1240.00 1120.00 1160.00 1240.00 1180.00 1300.00 1080.00 440.00 920.00 680.00 1080.00 
Count 17.00 17.00 17.00 16.00 17.00 15.00 17.00 16.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 
Average 71.76 72.94 65.88 72.50 72.94 78.67 76.47 67.50 25.88 54.12 40.00 63.53 
Table 77 Incident statistics for HRO survey of incident management, selected incidents in 2006 
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In Figure 21, three data sets are presented: firstly, the incident impact of 36 selected 
incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles using all 
indicators in Group A. The average score is calculated from the 11 HRO principles if 
sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. Secondly, the incident impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the 
average score for observed HRO principles in Group A using those principles that were 
previously identified to have an average, positive cost benefit. The average score is 
calculated from the 10 HRO principles if sufficient data in the incident documentation 
was available to score individual HRO principles. Thirdly, the incident impact of 36 
selected incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles in 
Group A using those principles that were previously identified to have a significant cost 
benefit, i.e. indicators with the minimum confidence interval of 95% exceeding zero. 
The average score is calculated from the five HRO principles if sufficient data in the 
incident documentation was available to score individual HRO principles. 
 
It can be identified that all datasets have a positive correlationship between the incident 
impact on customers and the average score for observed HRO principles.  
Considering all HRO principles regardless of their cost benefit, a positive correlation 
described with y=0.4215x + 77.106 between the incident impact and the average score 
for observed HRO principles in Group A can be identified. The coefficient of 
determination R2=0.0276 explains 2.76% of the variation in the average score for 
observed HRO principle as a function of the impact scores.  
Considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with an average, 
positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.4293x + 76.834 between 
the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles in Group A can 
be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0269 explains 2.69% of the 
variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of the impact 
scores.  
Finally, considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with a 
significant positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.5379x + 
79.194 between the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles 
in Group A can be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0483 explains 
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4.83% of the variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of 
the impact scores.  
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Figure 21 Correlating the incident impact on customers with the average score for observed HRO 
principles in Group A 
 
In Figure 22, three data sets are presented: firstly, the incident impact of 36 selected 
incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles using all 
indicators in Group B. The average score is calculated from the 11 HRO principles if 
sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. Secondly, the incident impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the 
average score for observed HRO principles in Group B using those principles that were 
previously identified to have an average, positive cost benefit. The average score is 
calculated from the seven HRO principles if sufficient data in the incident 
documentation was available to score individual HRO principles. Thirdly, the incident 
impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO 
principles in Group B using those principles that were previously identified to have a 
significant cost benefit, i.e. indicators with the minimum confidence interval of 95% 
exceeding zero. The average score is calculated from the four HRO principles if 
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sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. 
 
It can be identified that all datasets have a positive correlationship between the incident 
impact on customers and the average score for observed HRO principles.  
Considering all HRO principles regardless of their cost benefit, a positive correlation 
described with y=0.4059x + 69.571 between the incident impact and the average score 
for observed HRO principles in Group B can be identified. The coefficient of 
determination R2=0.0358 explains 3.58% of the variation in the average score for 
observed HRO principle as a function of the impact scores.  
Considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with an average, 
positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.2003x + 78.417 between 
the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles in Group B can 
be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0105 explains 1.05% of the 
variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of the impact 
scores.  
Finally, considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with a 
significant positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.3391x + 
77.334 between the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles 
in Group B can be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0286 explains 
2.86% of the variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of 
the impact scores.  
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Figure 22 Correlating the incident impact on customers with the average score for observed HRO 
principles in Group B 
 
In Figure 23, three data sets are presented: firstly, the incident impact of 36 selected 
incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles using all 
indicators in Group C. The average score is calculated from the nine HRO principles if 
sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. Secondly, the incident impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the 
average score for observed HRO principles in Group C using those principles that were 
previously identified to have an average, positive cost benefit. The average score is 
calculated from the six HRO principles if sufficient data in the incident documentation 
was available to score individual HRO principles. Thirdly, the incident impact of 36 
selected incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles in 
Group C using those principles that were previously identified to have a significant cost 
benefit, i.e. indicators with the minimum confidence interval of 95% exceeding zero. 
The score from the one HRO principles is used if sufficient data in the incident 
documentation was available to score that individual HRO principle. 
It can be identified that all but one dataset have a positive correlationship between the 
incident impact on customers and the average score for observed HRO principles.  
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Considering all HRO principles regardless of their cost benefit, a positive correlation 
described with y=0.4185x + 57.941 between the incident impact and the average score 
for observed HRO principles in Group C can be identified. The coefficient of 
determination R2=0.0164 explains 1.64% of the variation in the average score for 
observed HRO principle as a function of the impact scores.  
Considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with an average, 
positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.1848x + 65.596 between 
the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles in Group C can 
be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.003 explains 0.3% of the variation 
in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of the impact scores.  
Finally, considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with a 
significant positive cost benefit, a negative correlation described with y=-0.6533x + 
85.317 between the incident impact and the score for the observed HRO principle in 
Group C can be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.00303 explains 
0.303% of the variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function 
of the impact scores.  
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Figure 23 Correlating the incident impact on customers with the average score for observed HRO 
principles in Group C 
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In Figure 24, three data sets are presented: firstly, the incident impact of 36 selected 
incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles using all 
indicators in Group D. The average score is calculated from the nine HRO principles if 
sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. Secondly, the incident impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the 
average score for observed HRO principles in Group D using those principles that were 
previously identified to have an average, positive cost benefit. The average score is 
calculated from the six HRO principles if sufficient data in the incident documentation 
was available to score individual HRO principles. Thirdly, the incident impact of 36 
selected incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles in 
Group D using those principles that were previously identified to have a significant cost 
benefit, i.e. indicators with the minimum confidence interval of 95% exceeding zero. 
The average score is calculated from the three HRO principles if sufficient data in the 
incident documentation was available to score individual HRO principles. 
It can be identified that all datasets have a positive correlationship between the incident 
impact on customers and the average score for observed HRO principles.  
Considering all HRO principles regardless of their cost benefit, a positive correlation 
described with y=0.6089x + 61.831 between the incident impact and the average score 
for observed HRO principles in Group D can be identified. The coefficient of 
determination R2=0.1478 explains 14.78% of the variation in the average score for 
observed HRO principle as a function of the impact scores.  
Considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with an average, 
positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.4158x + 68.816 between 
the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles in Group D can 
be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.042 explains 4.2% of the variation 
in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of the impact scores.  
Finally, considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with a 
significant positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.5219x + 
70.872 between the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles 
in Group D can be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0356 explains 
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3.56% of the variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of 
the impact scores.  
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Figure 24 Correlating the incident impact on customers with the average score for observed HRO 
principles in Group D 
 
In Figure 25, three data sets are presented: firstly, the incident impact of 36 selected 
incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles using all 
indicators in Group E. The average score is calculated from the two HRO principles if 
sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. Secondly, the incident impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the 
score for the observed HRO principle in Group E using the principle that was 
previously identified to have an average, positive cost benefit. The score of the one 
HRO principle is used if sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to 
score the HRO principle. The third dataset is identical to the former and reflects the 
HRO principle that was previously identified to have a significant cost benefit, i.e. 
indicators with the minimum confidence interval of 95% exceeding zero 
It can be identified that all datasets have a negative correlationship between the incident 
impact on customers and the average score for observed HRO principles.  
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Considering all HRO principles regardless of their cost benefit, a negative correlation 
described with y=0.1314x + 38.532 between the incident impact and the average score 
for observed HRO principles in Group E can be identified. The coefficient of 
determination R2=0.0014 explains 0.14% of the variation in the average score for 
observed HRO principle as a function of the impact scores.  
Considering the HRO principle that was previously evaluated with an average, positive 
cost benefit, a negative correlation described with y=-0.6745x + 62.857 between the 
incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles in Group E can be 
identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0181explains 1.81% of the variation in 
the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of the impact scores.  
Finally, the third data set for the HRO principle that was previously evaluated with a 
significant positive cost benefit is identical to the previous dataset with the HRO 
principle that was evaluated with an average, positive cost benefit. 
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Figure 25 Correlating the incident impact on customers with the average score for observed HRO 
principles in Group E 
 
In Figure 26, three data sets are presented: firstly, the incident impact of 36 selected 
incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles using all 
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indicators in Group F. The average score is calculated from the five HRO principles if 
sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. Secondly, the incident impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the 
average score for observed HRO principles in Group F using those principles that were 
previously identified to have an average, positive cost benefit. The average score is 
calculated from the three HRO principles if sufficient data in the incident 
documentation was available to score individual HRO principles. Thirdly, the incident 
impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO 
principles in Group F using those principles that were previously identified to have a 
significant cost benefit, i.e. indicators with the minimum confidence interval of 95% 
exceeding zero. The average score is calculated from the two HRO principles if 
sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. 
It can be identified that all datasets have a negative correlationship between the incident 
impact on customers and the average score for observed HRO principles.  
Considering all HRO principles regardless of their cost benefit, a negative correlation 
described with y=-0.1611x + 49.222 between the incident impact and the average score 
for observed HRO principles in Group F can be identified. The coefficient of 
determination R2=0.0039 explains 0.39% of the variation in the average score for 
observed HRO principle as a function of the impact scores.  
Considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with an average, 
positive cost benefit, a negative correlation described with y=-0.4216x + 58.611 
between the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles in 
Group F can be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0111 explains 1.11% 
of the variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of the 
impact scores.  
Finally, considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with a 
significant positive cost benefit, a negative correlation described with y=-0.4758x + 
53.014 between the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles 
in Group F can be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0086 explains 
0.86% of the variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of 
the impact scores.  
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw Page A252 Appendices 
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00
Incident impact
Av
e
ra
ge
 
sc
o
re
 
fo
r 
o
bs
e
rv
e
d 
H
R
O
 
pr
in
ci
pl
e
s
All HRO principles HRO principles with CBA: Av > 0
HRO principles with CBA: min. CI 95% > 0 All HRO principles
HRO principles with CBA: Av > 0 HRO principles with CBA: min. CI 95% > 0
 
Figure 26 Correlating the incident impact on customers with the average score for observed HRO 
principles in Group F 
 
In Figure 27, three data sets are presented: firstly, the incident impact of 36 selected 
incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO principles using all 
indicators in Group G. The average score is calculated from the four HRO principles if 
sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. Secondly, the incident impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the 
average score for observed HRO principles in Group G using those principles that were 
previously identified to have an average, positive cost benefit. The average score is 
calculated from the three HRO principles if sufficient data in the incident 
documentation was available to score individual HRO principles. Thirdly, the incident 
impact of 36 selected incidents is correlated with the average score for observed HRO 
principles in Group G using those principles that were previously identified to have a 
significant cost benefit, i.e. indicators with the minimum confidence interval of 95% 
exceeding zero. The average score is calculated from the two HRO principles if 
sufficient data in the incident documentation was available to score individual HRO 
principles. 
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It can be identified that all datasets have a positive correlationship between the incident 
impact on customers and the average score for observed HRO principles.  
Considering all HRO principles regardless of their cost benefit, a positive correlation 
described with y=0.7049x + 57.155 between the incident impact and the average score 
for observed HRO principles in Group G can be identified. The coefficient of 
determination R2=0.0888 explains 8.88% of the variation in the average score for 
observed HRO principle as a function of the impact scores.  
Considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with an average, 
positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.4767x + 72.38 between 
the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles in Group G can 
be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0326 explains 3.26% of the 
variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of the impact 
scores.  
Finally, considering those HRO principles that were previously evaluated with a 
significant positive cost benefit, a positive correlation described with y=0.6047x + 
73.888 between the incident impact and the average score for observed HRO principles 
in Group G can be identified. The coefficient of determination R2=0.0658 explains 
6.58% of the variation in the average score for observed HRO principles as a function of 
the impact scores.  
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Figure 27 Correlating the incident impact on customers with the average score for observed HRO 
principles in Group G 
 
Throughout the analysis, the coefficient of determination did not exceed 15% and in 
most instances does not exceed 1%. This suggests that variation in the average score for 
observed HRO principles can hardly be explained as a function of the incident impact 
scores.  
In the following section, a significance tests are presented that compare the average 
score of observed HRO principles during incidents with a significantly high incident 
impact on customers to the average score of observed HRO principles during incidents 
with a significantly low incident impact on customers.  
The significance tests for the years 2004 to 2006 are presented in Table 78, Table 79 
and Table 80, respectively.  
In 2004, the overall, average score for observed HRO principles for significantly high 
and low incident impacts is not significantly different.  
Within the individual groups (A-G), it was found that  
 Group D considering those HRO principles with an average, positive cost 
benefit, 
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 Group D considering those HRO principles with a 97.5% chance of being cost 
beneficial, and  
 Group G for all HRO principles 
had a significantly higher average HRO score for high incident impacts.  
Within the individual groups (A-G), it was found that  
 Group C considering those HRO principles with an average, positive cost 
benefit, and 
 Group F for all HRO principles  
had a significantly higher average HRO score for low incident impacts.  
In 2004, the individual HRO principles A8, B4, C3, CX2, C7, D1, D8 and G3 had a 
significantly higher average score for high incident impacts. The individual HRO 
principles B5, B8 and F1 had a significantly higher average score for low impact 
incidents.  
In 2005, the overall, average score for observed HRO principles for significantly high 
and low incident impacts is significantly different and a significantly high average score 
for HRO principles were determined for incidents with a significantly low incident 
impact.   
Within the individual groups (A-G), it was found that  
 Group C considering those HRO principles with an average, positive cost 
benefit, 
 Group C considering those HRO principles with a 97.5% chance of being cost 
beneficial,  
 Group B considering those HRO principles with an average, positive cost 
benefit, and 
 Group B considering those HRO principles with a 97.5% chance of being cost 
beneficial 
had a significantly higher average HRO score for low incident impacts.  
In 2005, the individual HRO principles A8a, A9, B1, B3, B4, B6, B8, C2 and CX1 had 
a significantly higher average score for low incident impacts. The individual HRO 
principle F1 had a significantly higher average HRO score for high impact incidents.  
 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw Page A256 Appendices 
In 2006, the overall, average score for observed HRO principles for significantly high 
and low incident impacts is not significantly different.  
Within the individual groups (A-G), it was found that Group F considering all HRO 
principles had a significantly higher average HRO score for low incident impacts.  
In 2006, the individual HRO principles A7, A9, CX2, D4 and E2 had a significantly 
higher average score for low incident impacts. The individual HRO principles B4 and 
C7 had a significantly higher average HRO score for high impact incidents.  
 
4.2.3.1 Comparing the adherence to HRO principles for incidents with 
significantly high customer impact with adherence to HRO principles for 
incidents with significantly low customer impact 
Significance test were conducted comparing the average score of observed HRO 
principles during incidents with a significantly high incident impact on customers to the 
average score of observed HRO principles during incidents with a significantly low 
incident impact on customers. The significance tests for the years 2004 to 2006 are 
presented in Table 78, Table 79 and Table 80, respectively.  
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           Significance testing       
           H0: X1 - X2  = 0  X1  high    
           H1: X1 - X2 <>0  X2 low    
           SL: 5%        
 
Incidents with significantly high 
incident impact in 2004  
Incidents with significantly low 
incident impact in 2004          
Date Av Count SD SE  Av Count SD SE  
mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 SE 
CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max H0 SL Comment 
Pop 3951.40 5.00 5434.19 2430.24  1250.00 4.00 2500.00 1250.00  2701.40 7468581.26 2732.87 
-
5356.43 5356.43 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Duration 30.40 5.00 17.34 7.76  5.25 4.00 3.40 1.70  25.15 63.06 7.94 -15.56 15.56 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Pop score 2.80 5.00 1.10 0.49  2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.80 0.24 0.49 -0.96 0.96 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Duration 
score 10.00 5.00 6.00 2.68  2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  8.00 7.20 2.68 -5.26 5.26 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Hazard 
score 48.00 5.00 16.00 7.16  7.50 4.00 1.00 0.50  40.50 51.45 7.17 -14.06 14.06 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Impact 
score 20.25 5.00 6.54 2.92  3.83 4.00 0.33 0.17  16.42 8.57 2.93 -5.74 5.74 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Comment 
                  
A1 96.00 5.00 8.94 4.00  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  1.00 41.00 6.40 -12.55 12.55 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A2 100.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A3 100.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A4 100.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A5 100.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A6 96.00 5.00 8.94 4.00  100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -4.00 16.00 4.00 -7.84 7.84 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A7 
 0.00     0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A8 100.00 1.00 0.00 0.00   0.00    100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 Significant 
A8a 95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  85.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  10.00 50.00 7.07 -13.86 13.86 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A9 100.00 1.00 0.00 0.00   0.00    100.00        
A10 100.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  5.00 25.00 5.00 -9.80 9.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 808.00 5.00 94.45 42.24  775.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  33.00 1809.00 42.53 -83.36 83.36 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 8.20 5.00 0.84 0.37  8.00 4.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 98.43 5.00 2.28 1.02  96.88 4.00 1.25 0.63  1.55 1.43 1.20 -2.35 2.35 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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Total Av>0 788.00 5.00 79.50 35.55  775.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  13.00 1289.00 35.90 -70.37 70.37 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 8.00 5.00 0.71 0.32  8.00 4.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 98.43 5.00 2.28 1.02  96.88 4.00 1.25 0.63  1.55 1.43 1.20 -2.35 2.35 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total 
CIMIN>0 472.00 5.00 52.15 23.32  480.00 4.00 16.33 8.16  -8.00 610.67 24.71 -48.43 48.43 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 4.80 5.00 0.45 0.20  5.00 4.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 98.20 5.00 2.49 1.11  96.00 4.00 3.27 1.63  2.20 3.91 1.98 -3.87 3.87 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
B1 88.00 5.00 10.95 4.90  75.00 4.00 37.86 18.93  13.00 382.33 19.55 -38.32 38.32 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B2 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B3 100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  5.00 25.00 5.00 -9.80 9.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X1 
 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X2 95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  0.00 50.00 7.07 -13.86 13.86 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X3 100.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B4 80.00 1.00 0.00 0.00   0.00    80.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 Significant 
B5 
 0.00    20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  -20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 Significant 
B6 80.00 5.00 34.64 15.49  60.00 4.00 46.19 23.09  20.00 773.33 27.81 -54.51 54.51 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B7 50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  55.00 4.00 41.23 20.62  -5.00 725.00 26.93 -52.77 52.77 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B8 
 0.00    20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  -20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Total 528.00 5.00 87.86 39.29  550.00 4.00 113.72 56.86  -22.00 4777.33 69.12 -135.47 135.47 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 6.20 5.00 0.45 0.20  7.25 4.00 0.50 0.25          
Average 84.95 5.00 10.89 4.87  76.70 4.00 19.26 9.63  8.26 116.45 10.79 -21.15 21.15 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total Av>0 488.00 5.00 71.55 32.00  485.00 4.00 82.26 41.13  3.00 2715.67 52.11 -102.14 102.14 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 5.40 5.00 0.55 0.24  5.75 4.00 0.50 0.25          
Average 90.13 5.00 6.37 2.85  85.00 4.00 16.89 8.44  5.13 79.40 8.91 -17.47 17.47 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total 
CIMIN>0 308.00 5.00 71.55 32.00  315.00 4.00 44.35 22.17  -7.00 1515.67 38.93 -76.31 76.31 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 3.40 5.00 0.55 0.24  3.75 4.00 0.50 0.25          
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Average 90.00 5.00 10.47 4.68  85.00 4.00 14.72 7.36  5.00 76.11 8.72 -17.10 17.10 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
C1 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -3.33 77.78 8.82 -17.29 17.29 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C2 92.00 5.00 10.95 4.90  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  2.00 57.33 7.57 -14.84 14.84 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C3 93.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  80.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  13.33 44.44 6.67 -13.07 13.07 Reject 0.05 Significant 
X1 96.00 5.00 8.94 4.00  100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -4.00 16.00 4.00 -7.84 7.84 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X2 100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  46.67 3.00 46.19 26.67  53.33 711.11 26.67 -52.27 52.27 Reject 0.05 Significant 
C4 90.00 2.00 14.14 10.00  86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  3.33 144.44 12.02 -23.56 23.56 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C5 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -3.33 77.78 8.82 -17.29 17.29 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C6 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  60.00 4.00 46.19 23.09  20.00 533.33 23.09 -45.26 45.26 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C7 20.00 2.00 0.00 0.00   0.00    20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Total 520.00 5.00 46.90 20.98  550.00 4.00 66.33 33.17  -30.00 1540.00 39.24 -76.92 76.92 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 6.00 5.00 1.00 0.45  6.75 4.00 0.96 0.48          
Average 87.96 5.00 11.06 4.95  83.30 4.00 19.29 9.65  4.66 117.54 10.84 -21.25 21.25 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total Av>0 384.00 5.00 26.08 11.66  455.00 4.00 52.60 26.30  -71.00 827.67 28.77 -56.39 56.39 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Count 4.20 5.00 0.45 0.20  5.00 4.00 0.82 0.41          
Average 92.00 5.00 9.08 4.06  91.83 4.00 9.43 4.72  0.17 38.75 6.22 -12.20 12.20 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total 
CIMIN>0 96.00 5.00 8.94 4.00  100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -4.00 16.00 4.00 -7.84 7.84 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 96.00 5.00 8.94 4.00  100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -4.00 16.00 4.00 -7.84 7.84 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
D1 100.00 1.00  0.00  40.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  60.00 400.00 20.00 -39.20 39.20 Reject 0.05 Significant 
D2 20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  40.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  -20.00 400.00 20.00 -39.20 39.20 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D1/2/a 92.00 5.00 10.95 4.90  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  2.00 57.33 7.57 -14.84 14.84 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D3 92.00 5.00 10.95 4.90  85.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  7.00 49.00 7.00 -13.72 13.72 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D4 46.67 3.00 46.19 26.67  35.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  11.67 936.11 30.60 -59.97 59.97 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D5 95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  0.00 50.00 7.07 -13.86 13.86 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D6 96.00 5.00 8.94 4.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  6.00 49.33 7.02 -13.77 13.77 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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D7 80.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  80.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D8 92.00 5.00 10.95 4.90  20.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  72.00 24.00 4.90 -9.60 9.60 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Total 516.00 5.00 129.15 57.76  490.00 4.00 103.92 51.96  26.00 6036.00 77.69 -152.28 152.28  0.05 Significant 
Count 6.00 5.00 1.00 0.45  7.50 4.00 1.00 0.50          
Average 85.37 5.00 10.86 4.86  65.08 4.00 8.58 4.29  20.29 41.99 6.48 -12.70 12.70 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total Av>0 476.00 5.00 86.49 38.68  410.00 4.00 38.30 19.15  66.00 1862.67 43.16 -84.59 84.59 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 5.40 5.00 0.55 0.24  5.75 4.00 0.50 0.25          
Average 87.87 5.00 10.65 4.76  71.67 4.00 8.39 4.19  16.20 40.28 6.35 -12.44 12.44 Reject 0.05 Significant 
 
                  
Total 
CIMIN>0 280.00 5.00 20.00 8.94  195.00 4.00 19.15 9.57  85.00 171.67 13.10 -25.68 25.68 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Count 3.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  2.75 4.00 0.50 0.25          
Average 93.33 5.00 6.67 2.98  73.33 4.00 18.86 9.43  20.00 97.78 9.89 -19.38 19.38 Reject 0.05 Significant 
 
                  
E1 64.00 5.00 40.99 18.33  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -16.00 336.00 18.33 -35.93 35.93 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
E2 13.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  13.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  0.00 88.89 9.43 -18.48 18.48 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 72.00 5.00 50.20 22.45  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -18.00 537.33 23.18 -45.43 45.43 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.60 5.00 0.55 0.24  1.75 4.00 0.50 0.25          
Average 40.00 5.00 20.00 8.94  55.00 4.00 17.32 8.66  -15.00 155.00 12.45 -24.40 24.40 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total Av>0 64.00 5.00 40.99 18.33  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -16.00 336.00 18.33 -35.93 35.93 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 64.00 5.00 40.99 18.33  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -16.00 336.00 18.33 -35.93 35.93 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total 
CIMIN>0 64.00 5.00 40.99 18.33  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -16.00 336.00 18.33 -35.93 35.93 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 64.00 5.00 40.99 18.33  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -16.00 336.00 18.33 -35.93 35.93 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
F1 16.00 5.00 8.94 4.00  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -64.00 16.00 4.00 -7.84 7.84 Reject 0.05 Significant 
F2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00   0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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F3 65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  80.00 2.00 0.00 0.00  -15.00 225.00 15.00 -29.40 29.40 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
F4 15.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  40.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  -25.00 425.00 20.62 -40.41 40.41 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
F5 85.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -5.00 58.33 7.64 -14.97 14.97 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 148.00 5.00 46.04 20.59  240.00 4.00 40.00 20.00  -92.00 824.00 28.71 -56.26 56.26 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Count 3.60 5.00 0.55 0.24  3.25 4.00 0.96 0.48          
Average 40.67 5.00 9.62 4.30  76.67 4.00 13.54 6.77  -36.00 64.33 8.02 -15.72 15.72 Reject 0.05 Significant 
 
                  
Total Av>0 120.00 5.00 37.42 16.73  130.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  -10.00 580.00 24.08 -47.20 47.20 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.80 5.00 0.45 0.20  1.50 4.00 0.58 0.29          
Average 70.00 5.00 24.49 10.95  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -20.00 153.33 12.38 -24.27 24.27 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total 
CIMIN>0 68.00 5.00 38.99 17.44  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -22.00 337.33 18.37 -36.00 36.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 68.00 5.00 38.99 17.44  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -22.00 337.33 18.37 -36.00 36.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
G1 96.00 5.00 8.94 4.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  6.00 49.33 7.02 -13.77 13.77 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
G2 96.00 5.00 8.94 4.00  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  1.00 41.00 6.40 -12.55 12.55 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
G3 70.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  20.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  50.00 300.00 17.32 -33.95 33.95 Reject 0.05 Significant 
G4 90.00 2.00 14.14 10.00  85.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  5.00 125.00 11.18 -21.91 21.91 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 284.00 5.00 57.27 25.61  290.00 4.00 25.82 12.91  -6.00 822.67 28.68 -56.22 56.22 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 3.20 5.00 0.45 0.20  4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 88.67 5.00 12.82 5.73  72.50 4.00 6.45 3.23  16.17 43.31 6.58 -12.90 12.90 Reject 0.05 Significant 
 
                  
Total Av>0 228.00 5.00 57.62 25.77  270.00 4.00 25.82 12.91  -42.00 830.67 28.82 -56.49 56.49 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 2.40 5.00 0.55 0.24  3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 94.67 5.00 5.06 2.26  90.00 4.00 8.61 4.30  4.67 23.63 4.86 -9.53 9.53 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total 
CIMIN>0 192.00 5.00 10.95 4.90  185.00 4.00 19.15 9.57  7.00 115.67 10.75 -21.08 21.08 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 2.00 5.00 0.00 0.00  2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 96.00 5.00 5.48 2.45  92.50 4.00 9.57 4.79  3.50 28.92 5.38 -10.54 10.54 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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Total Group 
score 
                  
Total 2876.00 5.00 236.39 105.72  2985.00 4.00 234.02 117.01  -109.00 24867.67 157.69 -309.08 309.08 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 34.80 5.00 1.30 0.58  38.50 4.00 3.11 1.55          
Average 82.66 5.00 6.29 2.81  77.85 4.00 7.89 3.95  4.81 23.49 4.85 -9.50 9.50 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total Av>0 2548.00 5.00 219.36 98.10  2605.00 4.00 142.71 71.36  -57.00 14715.67 121.31 -237.76 237.76 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 28.20 5.00 1.48 0.66  30.00 4.00 1.83 0.91          
Average 90.23 5.00 3.19 1.43  87.04 4.00 6.41 3.21  3.19 12.32 3.51 -6.88 6.88 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
 
                  
Total 
CIMIN>0 1480.00 5.00 114.02 50.99  1445.00 4.00 50.00 25.00  35.00 3225.00 56.79 -111.31 111.31 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 16.20 5.00 0.84 0.37  16.50 4.00 1.00 0.50          
Average 91.26 5.00 2.41 1.08  87.82 4.00 6.19 3.10  3.44 10.74 3.28 -6.42 6.42 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Table 78 Significance test for HRO observations comparing incidents with significantly low impact to incidents with significantly high impact for 2004 
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           Significance testing      
           H0: X1 - X2  = 0 X1  high    
           H1: X1 - X2 <>0 X2 low    
           SL: 5%        
 
Incidents with significantly high incident 
impact in 2005 
Incidents with significantly low incident 
impact in 2005         
Date Av Count SD SE  Av Count SD SE  
mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 SE 
CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max H0 SL Comment 
Pop 49.67 3.00 38.08 21.99  0.50 4.00 1.00 0.50  49.17 483.69 21.99 -43.11 43.11 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Duration 21.33 3.00 23.09 13.33  5.75 4.00 2.63 1.31  15.58 179.51 13.40 -26.26 26.26 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Pop 
score 2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Duration 
score 6.67 3.00 8.08 4.67  2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  4.67 21.78 4.67 -9.15 9.15 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Hazard 
score 64.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  7.50 4.00 1.00 0.50  56.50 0.25 0.50 -0.98 0.98 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Impact 
score 24.20 3.00 2.69 1.55  3.83 4.00 0.33 0.17  20.37 2.44 1.56 -3.06 3.06 Reject 0.05 Significant 
                   
A1 93.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  -1.67 69.44 8.33 -16.33 16.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A2 40.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  -25.00 625.00 25.00 -49.00 49.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A3 93.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  -1.67 69.44 8.33 -16.33 16.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A4 93.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  -1.67 69.44 8.33 -16.33 16.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A5 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  -8.33 69.44 8.33 -16.33 16.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A6 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  85.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  1.67 69.44 8.33 -16.33 16.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A7 50.00 2.00 42.43 30.00  80.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  -30.00 900.00 30.00 -58.80 58.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A8  0.00     0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A8a 80.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  -15.00 25.00 5.00 -9.80 9.80 Reject 0.05 Significant 
A9 80.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  100.00 2.00 0.00 0.00  -20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 Significant 
A10 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  80.00 4.00 40.00 20.00  6.67 444.44 21.08 -41.32 41.32 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 666.67 3.00 160.42 92.62  775.00 4.00 113.58 56.79  -108.33 11802.78 108.64 -212.94 212.94 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 8.33 3.00 1.15 0.67  8.75 4.00 0.50 0.25          
Average 79.37 3.00 10.38 5.99  88.75 4.00 13.24 6.62  -9.38 79.76 8.93 -17.50 17.50 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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Total 
Av>0 666.67 3.00 160.42 92.62  775.00 4.00 113.58 56.79  -108.33 11802.78 108.64 -212.94 212.94 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 8.33 3.00 1.15 0.67  8.75 4.00 0.50 0.25        0.05  
Average 79.37 3.00 10.38 5.99  88.75 4.00 13.24 6.62  -9.38 79.76 8.93 -17.50 17.50 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>
0 393.33 3.00 70.24 40.55  475.00 4.00 37.86 18.93  -81.67 2002.78 44.75 -87.71 87.71 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 4.33 3.00 0.58 0.33  5.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 90.67 3.00 10.07 5.81  95.00 4.00 7.57 3.79  -4.33 48.11 6.94 -13.59 13.59 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
B1 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  100.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -40.00 400.00 20.00 -39.20 39.20 Reject 0.05 Significant 
B2 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -10.00 33.33 5.77 -11.32 11.32 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B3 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  -15.00 25.00 5.00 -9.80 9.80 Reject 0.05 Significant 
X1 100.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  100.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X2 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  -8.33 69.44 8.33 -16.33 16.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X3 100.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  5.00 25.00 5.00 -9.80 9.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B4 20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  93.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  -73.33 44.44 6.67 -13.07 13.07 Reject 0.05 Significant 
B5 50.00 2.00 42.43 30.00  20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  30.00 900.00 30.00 -58.80 58.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B6 20.00 2.00 0.00 0.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -70.00 33.33 5.77 -11.32 11.32 Reject 0.05 Significant 
B7 40.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  -10.00 700.00 26.46 -51.86 51.86 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B8  0.00    20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  -20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Total 533.33 3.00 98.66 56.96  770.00 4.00 142.83 71.41  -236.67 8344.44 91.35 -179.04 179.04 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 8.00 3.00 1.00 0.58  9.00 4.00 0.82 0.41  -1.00 0.50 0.71 -1.39 1.39 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Average 67.55 3.00 16.82 9.71  85.28 4.00 12.55 6.28  -17.72 133.73 11.56 -22.67 22.67 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
Av>0 426.67 3.00 23.09 13.33  635.00 4.00 77.24 38.62  -208.33 1669.44 40.86 -80.08 80.08 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Count 6.00 3.00 1.00 0.58  6.75 4.00 0.50 0.25        0.05  
Average 72.83 3.00 15.43 8.91  93.81 4.00 4.95 2.47  -20.98 85.53 9.25 -18.13 18.13 Reject 0.05 Significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN> 273.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  370.00 4.00 20.00 10.00  -96.67 144.44 12.02 -23.56 23.56 Reject 0.05 Significant 
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0 
Count 3.67 3.00 0.58 0.33  4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 75.56 3.00 9.62 5.56  92.50 4.00 5.00 2.50  -16.94 37.11 6.09 -11.94 11.94 Reject 0.05 Significant 
                   
C1 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  70.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  -10.00 700.00 26.46 -51.86 51.86 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C2 40.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -40.00 400.00 20.00 -39.20 39.20 Reject 0.05 Significant 
C3 50.00 2.00 42.43 30.00  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -30.00 900.00 30.00 -58.80 58.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X1 40.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -50.00 433.33 20.82 -40.80 40.80 Reject 0.05 Significant 
X2 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  35.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  25.00 625.00 25.00 -49.00 49.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C4 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C5 20.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  -30.00 300.00 17.32 -33.95 33.95 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C6 20.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  -30.00 300.00 17.32 -33.95 33.95 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C7 20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 360.00 3.00 72.11 41.63  540.00 4.00 71.18 35.59  -180.00 3000.00 54.77 -107.35 107.35 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Count 8.00 3.00 1.00 0.58  8.25 4.00 0.50 0.25          
Average 46.23 3.00 15.11 8.72  65.76 4.00 10.69 5.35  -19.53 104.71 10.23 -20.06 20.06 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
Av>0 273.33 3.00 57.74 33.33  450.00 4.00 66.33 33.17  -176.67 2211.11 47.02 -92.16 92.16 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 5.67 3.00 0.58 0.33  6.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 49.33 3.00 16.17 9.33  75.00 4.00 11.06 5.53  -25.67 117.67 10.85 -21.26 21.26 Reject 0.05 Significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>
0 40.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -50.00 433.33 20.82 -40.80 40.80 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Count 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 40.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -50.00 433.33 20.82 -40.80 40.80 Reject 0.05 Significant 
                   
D1 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D2 20.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  20.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D1/2/a 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -3.33 77.78 8.82 -17.29 17.29 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D3 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  6.67 44.44 6.67 -13.07 13.07 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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D4 20.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  -30.00 300.00 17.32 -33.95 33.95 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D5 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  95.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  -8.33 69.44 8.33 -16.33 16.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D6 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -3.33 77.78 8.82 -17.29 17.29 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D7 86.67 3.00 11.55 6.67  50.00 2.00 42.43 30.00  36.67 944.44 30.73 -60.23 60.23 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D8 66.67 3.00 41.63 24.04  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -13.33 577.78 24.04 -47.11 47.11 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 620.00 3.00 60.00 34.64  610.00 4.00 20.00 10.00  10.00 1300.00 36.06 -70.67 70.67 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 9.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  8.50 4.00 0.58 0.29        0.05  
Average 68.89 3.00 6.67 3.85  72.08 4.00 6.51 3.26  -3.19 25.42 5.04 -9.88 9.88 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
Av>0 433.33 3.00 50.33 29.06  485.00 4.00 41.23 20.62  -51.67 1269.44 35.63 -69.83 69.83 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 6.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  6.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 72.22 3.00 8.39 4.84  80.83 4.00 6.87 3.44  -8.61 35.26 5.94 -11.64 11.64 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>
0 240.00 3.00 40.00 23.09  260.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -20.00 533.33 23.09 -45.26 45.26 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 80.00 3.00 13.33 7.70  86.67 4.00 0.00 0.00  -6.67 59.26 7.70 -15.09 15.09 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
E1 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -30.00 433.33 20.82 -40.80 40.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
E2 46.67 3.00 46.19 26.67  0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  46.67 711.11 26.67 -52.27 52.27 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 106.67 3.00 70.24 40.55  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  16.67 1677.78 40.96 -80.28 80.28 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 53.33 3.00 35.12 20.28  45.00 4.00 5.77 2.89  8.33 419.44 20.48 -40.14 40.14 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
Av>0 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -30.00 433.33 20.82 -40.80 40.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -30.00 433.33 20.82 -40.80 40.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>
0 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -30.00 433.33 20.82 -40.80 40.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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Count 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -30.00 433.33 20.82 -40.80 40.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
F1 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  35.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  45.00 225.00 15.00 -29.40 29.40 Reject 0.05 Significant 
F2  0.00     0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
F3 80.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  30.00 300.00 17.32 -33.95 33.95 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
F4 13.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  20.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -6.67 44.44 6.67 -13.07 13.07 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
F5 50.00 2.00 42.43 30.00  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -30.00 900.00 30.00 -58.80 58.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 153.33 3.00 92.38 53.33  185.00 4.00 57.45 28.72  -31.67 3669.44 60.58 -118.73 118.73 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 3.00 3.00 1.00 0.58  4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 49.44 3.00 15.84 9.15  46.25 4.00 14.36 7.18  3.19 135.20 11.63 -22.79 22.79 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
Av>0 60.00 3.00 87.18 50.33  130.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  -70.00 2833.33 53.23 -104.33 104.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.00 3.00 1.00 0.58  2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 33.33 3.00 41.63 24.04  65.00 4.00 17.32 8.66  -31.67 652.78 25.55 -50.08 50.08 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>
0 33.33 3.00 41.63 24.04  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -46.67 577.78 24.04 -47.11 47.11 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 0.67 3.00 0.58 0.33  1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 33.33 3.00 41.63 24.04  80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -46.67 577.78 24.04 -47.11 47.11 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
G1 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  -10.00 33.33 5.77 -11.32 11.32 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
G2 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  15.00 225.00 15.00 -29.40 29.40 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
G3 20.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  20.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
G4 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  -5.00 625.00 25.00 -49.00 49.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 240.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  240.00 4.00 67.33 33.67  0.00 1533.33 39.16 -76.75 76.75 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 4.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 60.00 3.00 8.66 5.00  60.00 4.00 16.83 8.42  0.00 95.83 9.79 -19.19 19.19 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
Av>0 220.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  220.00 4.00 67.33 33.67  0.00 1533.33 39.16 -76.75 76.75 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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Count 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 73.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  73.33 4.00 22.44 11.22  0.00 170.37 13.05 -25.58 25.58 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>
0 160.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  155.00 4.00 37.86 18.93  5.00 358.33 18.93 -37.10 37.10 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  77.50 4.00 18.93 9.46  2.50 89.58 9.46 -18.55 18.55 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                 0.05  
Total 
Group 
score                 0.05  
Total 2680.00 3.00 283.55 
163.7
1  
3210.0
0 4.00 340.00 170.00  -530.00 55700.00 236.01 -462.58 462.58 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Count 42.33 3.00 2.08 1.20  44.50 4.00 1.00 0.50        0.05  
Average 63.19 3.00 3.68 2.12  72.17 4.00 7.98 3.99  -8.98 20.42 4.52 -8.86 8.86 Reject 0.05 Significant 
                   
Total 
Av>0 2140.00 3.00 264.58 
152.7
5  
2785.0
0 4.00 339.56 169.78  -645.00 52158.33 228.38 -447.63 447.63 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Count 31.00 3.00 1.00 0.58  33.50 4.00 0.58 0.29        0.05  
Average 68.91 3.00 6.57 3.79  83.05 4.00 9.10 4.55  -14.14 35.08 5.92 -11.61 11.61 Reject 0.05 Significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>
0 1200.00 3.00 131.15 75.72  
1520.0
0 4.00 113.14 56.57  -320.00 8933.33 94.52 -185.25 185.25 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Count 15.67 3.00 1.15 0.67  17.00 4.00 0.00 0.00        0.05  
Average 76.55 3.00 5.42 3.13  89.41 4.00 6.66 3.33  -12.86 20.86 4.57 -8.95 8.95 Reject 0.05 Significant 
 
Table 79 Significance test for HRO observations comparing incidents with significantly low impact to incidents with significantly high impact for 2005 
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           Significance testing      
           H0: X1 - X2  = 0 X1  high    
           H1: X1 - X2 <>0 X2 low    
           SL: 5%        
 
Incidents with significantly high incident 
impact in 2006  
Incidents with significantly low incident 
impact in 2006          
Date Av Count SD SE  Av Count SD SE  
mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 SE 
CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max H0 SL Comment 
Pop 12671.25 4.00 16630.76 8315  4258.33 6.00 9924.23 4051.55  8412.92 85560646 9249.90 -18129.80 18129.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Duration 6.00 4.00 1.63 0.82  11.00 6.00 6.66 2.72  -5.00 8.07 2.84 -5.57 5.57 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Pop score 6.00 4.00 6.73 3.37  3.00 6.00 2.45 1.00  3.00 12.33 3.51 -6.88 6.88 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Duration 
score 2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  3.33 6.00 2.42 0.99  -1.33 0.98 0.99 -1.94 1.94 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Hazard 
score 28.00 4.00 8.00 4.00  9.00 6.00 3.52 1.44  19.00 18.07 4.25 -8.33 8.33 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Impact 
score 11.99 4.00 0.54 0.27  5.11 6.00 1.24 0.51  6.88 0.33 0.57 -1.13 1.13 Reject 0.05 Significant 
                   
A1 85.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  70.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  15.00 125.00 11.18 -21.91 21.91 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A2 50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  50.00 6.00 32.86 13.42  0.00 480.00 21.91 -42.94 42.94 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A3 70.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  70.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  0.00 400.00 20.00 -39.20 39.20 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A4 70.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  70.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  0.00 400.00 20.00 -39.20 39.20 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A5 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  0.00 560.00 23.66 -46.38 46.38 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A6 80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  80.00 6.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A7  0.00    20.00 2.00 0.00 0.00  -20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 Significant 
A8 100.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  60.00 2.00 56.57 40.00  40.00 1600.00 40.00 -78.40 78.40 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A8a 65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  70.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  -5.00 325.00 18.03 -35.33 35.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
A9 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  -50.00 300.00 17.32 -33.95 33.95 Reject 0.05 Significant 
A10 60.00 4.00 40.00 20.00  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  0.00 560.00 23.66 -46.38 46.38 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 550.00 4.00 88.69 44.35  590.00 6.00 98.59 40.25  -40.00 3586.67 59.89 -117.38 117.38 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 8.25 4.00 1.26 0.63  9.33 6.00 1.37 0.56          
Average 68.89 4.00 19.46 9.73  65.35 6.00 18.01 7.35  3.54 148.76 12.20 -23.91 23.91 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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Total Av>0 525.00 4.00 137.96 68.98  570.00 6.00 136.67 55.80  -45.00 7871.67 88.72 -173.90 173.90 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 8.00 4.00 0.82 0.41  9.00 6.00 0.89 0.37          
Average 67.28 4.00 22.47 11.23  64.78 6.00 19.51 7.96  2.50 189.61 13.77 -26.99 26.99 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>0 335.00 4.00 80.62 40.31  340.00 6.00 120.00 48.99  -5.00 4025.00 63.44 -124.35 124.35 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 4.75 4.00 0.50 0.25  5.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 71.75 4.00 21.55 10.77  68.00 6.00 24.00 9.80  3.75 212.06 14.56 -28.54 28.54 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
B1 85.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  80.00 6.00 0.00 0.00  5.00 25.00 5.00 -9.80 9.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B2 80.00 2.00 0.00 0.00  68.00 5.00 26.83 12.00  12.00 144.00 12.00 -23.52 23.52 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B3 65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  5.00 385.00 19.62 -38.46 38.46 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X1 50.00 2.00 42.43 30.00  20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  30.00 900.00 30.00 -58.80 58.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X2 70.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  68.00 5.00 26.83 12.00  2.00 444.00 21.07 -41.30 41.30 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X3 90.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  66.67 6.00 32.66 13.33  23.33 211.11 14.53 -28.48 28.48 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B4 60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  40.00 400.00 20.00 -39.20 39.20 Reject 0.05 Significant 
B5 80.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  80.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B6 70.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  80.00 6.00 0.00 0.00  -10.00 300.00 17.32 -33.95 33.95 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B7 50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  40.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  10.00 460.00 21.45 -42.04 42.04 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
B8 13.33 3.00 11.55 6.67  20.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -6.67 44.44 6.67 -13.07 13.07 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 570.00 4.00 158.75 79.37  473.33 6.00 107.83 44.02  96.67 8237.78 90.76 -177.89 177.89 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 8.75 4.00 0.96 0.48  7.83 6.00 1.33 0.54          
Average 66.71 4.00 22.58 11.29  62.08 6.00 18.33 7.48  4.62 183.51 13.55 -26.55 26.55 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total Av>0 465.00 4.00 102.47 51.23  403.33 6.00 103.09 42.08  61.67 4396.11 66.30 -129.95 129.95 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 6.25 4.00 0.50 0.25  5.83 6.00 0.41 0.17          
Average 75.60 4.00 20.71 10.36  69.44 6.00 17.94 7.32  6.15 160.87 12.68 -24.86 24.86 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>0 265.00 4.00 59.72 29.86  263.33 6.00 78.40 32.01  1.67 1916.11 43.77 -85.80 85.80 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 3.50 4.00 0.58 0.29  3.83 6.00 0.41 0.17          
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Average 77.08 4.00 18.87 9.44  69.17 6.00 20.10 8.21  7.92 156.42 12.51 -24.51 24.51 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
C1 60.00 4.00 40.00 20.00  36.67 6.00 34.45 14.06  23.33 597.78 24.45 -47.92 47.92 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C2 30.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  20.00 6.00 0.00 0.00  10.00 300.00 17.32 -33.95 33.95 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C3 65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  68.00 5.00 26.83 12.00  -3.00 369.00 19.21 -37.65 37.65 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X1 80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  20.00 160.00 12.65 -24.79 24.79 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
X2 15.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  50.00 6.00 32.86 13.42  -35.00 205.00 14.32 -28.06 28.06 Reject 0.05 Significant 
C4 50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  -10.00 460.00 21.45 -42.04 42.04 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C5 30.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  30.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  0.00 400.00 20.00 -39.20 39.20 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C6 35.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  20.00 6.00 0.00 0.00  15.00 225.00 15.00 -29.40 29.40 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
C7 20.00 1.00 0.00 0.00   0.00    20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Total 370.00 4.00 166.93 83.47  333.33 6.00 104.05 42.48  36.67 8771.11 93.65 -183.56 183.56 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 8.25 4.00 0.50 0.25  7.83 6.00 0.41 0.17          
Average 44.79 4.00 20.48 10.24  42.20 6.00 12.09 4.94  2.59 129.28 11.37 -22.29 22.29 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total Av>0 315.00 4.00 133.04 66.52  263.33 6.00 111.30 45.44  51.67 6489.44 80.56 -157.89 157.89 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 6.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  5.83 6.00 0.41 0.17          
Average 52.50 4.00 22.17 11.09  44.33 6.00 17.68 7.22  8.17 175.03 13.23 -25.93 25.93 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>0 80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  20.00 160.00 12.65 -24.79 24.79 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  20.00 160.00 12.65 -24.79 24.79 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
D1 80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  80.00 6.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D2 20.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  30.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  -10.00 100.00 10.00 -19.60 19.60 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D1/2/a 65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  70.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  -5.00 325.00 18.03 -35.33 35.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D3 80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  70.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  10.00 100.00 10.00 -19.60 19.60 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D4 20.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  60.00 5.00 37.42 16.73  -40.00 280.00 16.73 -32.80 32.80 Reject 0.05 Significant 
D5 65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  5.00 385.00 19.62 -38.46 38.46 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D6 65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  70.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  -5.00 325.00 18.03 -35.33 35.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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D7 80.00 3.00 0.00 0.00  60.00 3.00 34.64 20.00  20.00 400.00 20.00 -39.20 39.20 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
D8 50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  -10.00 460.00 21.45 -42.04 42.04 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 505.00 4.00 102.47 51.23  520.00 6.00 82.95 33.86  -15.00 3771.67 61.41 -120.37 120.37 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 8.75 4.00 0.50 0.25  8.33 6.00 0.52 0.21          
Average 57.92 4.00 12.28 6.14  62.87 6.00 11.98 4.89  -4.95 61.61 7.85 -15.38 15.38 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total Av>0 345.00 4.00 113.58 56.79  380.00 6.00 103.54 42.27  -35.00 5011.67 70.79 -138.75 138.75 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 6.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  5.83 6.00 0.41 0.17         Significant 
Average 57.50 4.00 18.93 9.46  65.56 6.00 18.58 7.58  -8.06 147.11 12.13 -23.77 23.77 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>0 180.00 4.00 84.85 42.43  200.00 6.00 72.66 29.66  -20.00 2680.00 51.77 -101.47 101.47 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  3.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 60.00 4.00 28.28 14.14  66.67 6.00 24.22 9.89  -6.67 297.78 17.26 -33.82 33.82 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
E1 25.00 4.00 37.86 18.93  26.67 6.00 27.33 11.16  -1.67 482.78 21.97 -43.07 43.07 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
E2 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  20.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  -20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Total 25.00 4.00 37.86 18.93  40.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  -15.00 518.33 22.77 -44.62 44.62 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  1.67 6.00 0.52 0.21          
Average 12.50 4.00 18.93 9.46  23.33 6.00 13.66 5.58  -10.83 120.69 10.99 -21.53 21.53 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total Av>0 25.00 4.00 37.86 18.93  26.67 6.00 27.33 11.16  -1.67 482.78 21.97 -43.07 43.07 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 25.00 4.00 37.86 18.93  26.67 6.00 27.33 11.16  -1.67 482.78 21.97 -43.07 43.07 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>0 25.00 4.00 37.86 18.93  26.67 6.00 27.33 11.16  -1.67 482.78 21.97 -43.07 43.07 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 25.00 4.00 37.86 18.93  26.67 6.00 27.33 11.16  -1.67 482.78 21.97 -43.07 43.07 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
F1 35.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  -25.00 385.00 19.62 -38.46 38.46 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
F2  0.00     0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
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F3 50.00 4.00 34.64 17.32  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  -10.00 460.00 21.45 -42.04 42.04 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
F4 5.00 4.00 10.00 5.00  13.33 6.00 10.33 4.22  -8.33 42.78 6.54 -12.82 12.82 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
F5 10.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  30.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  -20.00 133.33 11.55 -22.63 22.63 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 100.00 4.00 16.33 8.16  163.33 6.00 46.33 18.92  -63.33 424.44 20.60 -40.38 40.38 Reject 0.05 Significant 
Count 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  4.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 25.00 4.00 4.08 2.04  40.83 6.00 11.58 4.73  -15.83 26.53 5.15 -10.10 10.10 Reject 0.05 Significant 
                   
Total Av>0 60.00 4.00 23.09 11.55  90.00 6.00 45.17 18.44  -30.00 473.33 21.76 -42.64 42.64 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  2.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 30.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  45.00 6.00 22.58 9.22  -15.00 118.33 10.88 -21.32 21.32 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>0 10.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  30.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  -20.00 133.33 11.55 -22.63 22.63 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 1.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 10.00 4.00 11.55 5.77  30.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  -20.00 133.33 11.55 -22.63 22.63 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
G1 80.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  70.00 6.00 24.49 10.00  10.00 100.00 10.00 -19.60 19.60 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
G2 65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  5.00 385.00 19.62 -38.46 38.46 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
G3 20.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  20.00 6.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
G4 65.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  60.00 6.00 30.98 12.65  5.00 385.00 19.62 -38.46 38.46 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 230.00 4.00 60.00 30.00  210.00 6.00 79.75 32.56  20.00 1960.00 44.27 -86.77 86.77 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  4.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 57.50 4.00 15.00 7.50  52.50 6.00 19.94 8.14  5.00 122.50 11.07 -21.69 21.69 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total Av>0 210.00 4.00 60.00 30.00  190.00 6.00 79.75 32.56  20.00 1960.00 44.27 -86.77 86.77 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  3.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 70.00 4.00 20.00 10.00  63.33 6.00 26.58 10.85  6.67 217.78 14.76 -28.92 28.92 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>0 145.00 4.00 30.00 15.00  130.00 6.00 50.20 20.49  15.00 645.00 25.40 -49.78 49.78 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00  2.00 6.00 0.00 0.00          
Average 72.50 4.00 15.00 7.50  65.00 6.00 25.10 10.25  7.50 161.25 12.70 -24.89 24.89 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw Page A274 Appendices 
                   
Total 
Group 
score           0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Total 2350.00 4.00 493.56 
246.7
8 
 2330.00 6.00 400.75 163.61  20.00 87666.67 296.09 -580.33 580.33 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 44.00 4.00 2.00 1.00  43.00 6.00 3.16 1.29          
Average 53.82 4.00 13.00 6.50  54.87 6.00 12.42 5.07  -1.05 67.97 8.24 -16.16 16.16 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total Av>0 1945.00 4.00 458.80 
229.4
0 
 1923.33 6.00 472.17 192.76  21.67 89782.78 299.64 -587.29 587.29 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 32.25 4.00 1.26 0.63  32.50 6.00 1.22 0.50          
Average 60.76 4.00 16.02 8.01  59.59 6.00 16.05 6.55  1.17 107.13 10.35 -20.29 20.29 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
                   
Total 
CIMIN>0 1040.00 4.00 247.12 
123.5
6 
 1050.00 6.00 327.35 133.64  -10.00 33126.67 182.01 -356.73 356.73 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Count 16.25 4.00 0.96 0.48  16.83 6.00 0.41 0.17          
Average 64.48 4.00 16.96 8.48  62.48 6.00 19.62 8.01  2.01 136.04 11.66 -22.86 22.86 Accept 0.05 Not significant 
Table 80 Significance test for HRO observations comparing incidents with significantly low impact to incidents with significantly high impact for 2006 
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In 2004, the overall, average score for observed HRO principles for significantly high 
and low incident impacts is not significantly different. Within the individual groups (A-
G), it was found that  
 Group D considering those HRO principles with an average, positive cost 
benefit, 
 Group D considering those HRO principles with a 97.5% chance of being cost 
beneficial, and  
 Group G for all HRO principles 
had a significantly higher average HRO score for high incident impacts. Within the 
individual groups (A-G), it was found that  
 Group C considering those HRO principles with an average, positive cost 
benefit, and 
 Group F for all HRO principles  
had a significantly higher average HRO score for low incident impacts. In 2004, the 
individual HRO principles A8, B4, C3, CX2, C7, D1, D8 and G3 had a significantly 
higher average score for high incident impacts. The individual HRO principles B5, B8 
and F1 had a significantly higher average score for low impact incidents.  
In 2005, the overall, average score for observed HRO principles for significantly high 
and low incident impacts is significantly different and a significantly high average score 
for HRO principles were determined for incidents with a significantly low incident 
impact. Within the individual groups (A-G), it was found that  
 Group C considering those HRO principles with an average, positive cost 
benefit, 
 Group C considering those HRO principles with a 97.5% chance of being cost 
beneficial,  
 Group B considering those HRO principles with an average, positive cost 
benefit, and 
 Group B considering those HRO principles with a 97.5% chance of being cost 
beneficial 
had a significantly higher average HRO score for low incident impacts. In 2005, the 
individual HRO principles A8a, A9, B1, B3, B4, B6, B8, C2 and CX1 had a 
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significantly higher average score for low incident impacts. The individual HRO 
principle F1 had a significantly higher average HRO score for high impact incidents.  
In 2006, the overall, average score for observed HRO principles for significantly high 
and low incident impacts is not significantly different. Within the individual groups (A-
G), it was found that Group F considering all HRO principles had a significantly higher 
average HRO score for low incident impacts. In 2006, the individual HRO principles 
A7, A9, CX2, D4 and E2 had a significantly higher average score for low incident 
impacts. The individual HRO principles B4 and C7 had a significantly higher average 
HRO score for high impact incidents.  
 
4.2.3.2 Comparison between HRO survey and documented adherence to HRO 
principles during incidents 
Finally, in the following analysis the HRO scores derived from studying HRO 
principles during incident management were compared to the responses of the 
participants in the HRO survey in the Regional Water Utility. A significance test was 
performed to compare the average score for observation of individual HRO principles 
under trying conditions (Weick, 1987) during incidents with the average score for HRO 
principles perceived and evaluated by survey participants. The statistical analysis is 
presented in Table 81 .  
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          Significance testing       
          H0: X1 - X2  = 0 X1  Incidents    
          H1: X1 - X2 <>0 X2 Baseline    
          SL: 5%        
 Incident data  Baseline survey data          
 Av. SE 
CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max  Av.  SD SE  
mean X1 - 
mean X2 
Variance 
X1-X2 SE 
CI 95% 
min 
CI 95% 
max H0 SL  Comment 
A1 89.73 2.53 84.78 94.68  90.00 10.44 3.02  -0.27 15.47 3.93 -7.71 7.71 Accept 0.05  
A2 67.03 5.81 55.64 78.42  63.33 32.84 9.48  3.69 123.66 11.12 -21.80 21.80 Accept 0.05  
A3 85.95 3.62 78.84 93.05  92.73 10.09 3.04  -6.78 22.39 4.73 -9.27 9.27 Accept 0.05  
A4 88.65 3.15 82.47 94.83  93.33 9.85 2.84  -4.68 18.02 4.24 -8.32 8.32 Accept 0.05  
A5 80.00 4.78 70.63 89.37  88.33 10.30 2.97  -8.33 31.70 5.63 -11.03 11.03 Accept 0.05  
A6 86.49 2.46 81.67 91.30  61.67 31.29 9.03  24.82 87.60 9.36 -18.35 18.35 Reject 0.05 Better performance during incidents 
A7 44.00 14.70 15.19 72.81  43.33 37.01 10.68  0.67 330.14 18.17 -35.61 35.61 Accept 0.05  
A8 68.00 19.60 29.59 106.41  26.67 33.39 9.64  41.33 476.93 21.84 -42.80 42.80 Accept 0.05  
A8a 80.61 3.74 73.27 87.94  70.00 31.33 9.05  10.61 95.82 9.79 -19.19 19.19 Accept 0.05  
A9 67.27 10.88 45.95 88.60  45.00 35.29 10.19  22.27 222.13 14.90 -29.21 29.21 Accept 0.05  
A10 77.84 5.13 67.79 87.89  66.67 35.51 10.25  11.17 131.35 11.46 -22.46 22.46 Accept 0.05  
B1 78.92 3.71 71.64 86.20  66.67 35.51 10.25  12.25 118.83 10.90 -21.37 21.37 Accept 0.05  
B2 78.00 3.09 71.95 84.05  70.00 31.33 9.05  8.00 91.34 9.56 -18.73 18.73 Accept 0.05  
B3 78.89 4.29 70.49 87.29  71.67 32.43 9.36  7.22 106.00 10.30 -20.18 20.18 Accept 0.05  
X1 75.00 12.39 50.71 99.29  41.67 34.60 9.99  33.33 253.32 15.92 -31.20 31.20 Reject 0.05 Better performance during incidents 
X2 84.57 3.18 78.33 90.81  56.67 32.84 9.48  27.90 100.04 10.00 -19.60 19.60 Reject 0.05 Better performance during incidents 
X3 91.89 2.95 86.12 97.67  86.67 23.09 6.67  5.23 53.13 7.29 -14.29 14.29 Accept 0.05  
B4 67.27 9.45 48.76 85.79  60.00 36.18 10.44  7.27 198.35 14.08 -27.60 27.60 Accept 0.05  
B5 63.64 8.45 47.07 80.20  48.33 35.63 10.29  15.30 177.21 13.31 -26.09 26.09 Accept 0.05  
B6 73.14 4.78 63.78 82.51  49.23 33.28 9.23  23.91 108.03 10.39 -20.37 20.37 Reject 0.05 Better performance during incidents 
B7 50.56 5.19 40.38 60.74  27.27 27.24 8.21  23.28 94.41 9.72 -19.04 19.04 Reject 0.05 Better performance during incidents 
B8 24.29 6.69 11.18 37.40  36.67 32.84 9.48  -12.38 134.64 11.60 -22.74 22.74 Accept 0.05  
C1 63.43 5.65 52.35 74.50  81.67 21.67 6.26  -18.24 71.06 8.43 -16.52 16.52 Reject 0.05 Better performance in baseline survey  
C2 60.00 5.85 48.53 71.47  63.33 32.84 9.48  -3.33 124.13 11.14 -21.84 21.84 Accept 0.05  
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C3 75.00 4.54 66.09 83.91  50.00 35.68 10.30  25.00 126.71 11.26 -22.06 22.06 Reject 0.05 Better performance during incidents 
X1 77.84 4.50 69.01 86.67  61.67 31.29 9.03  16.17 101.86 10.09 -19.78 19.78 Accept 0.05  
X2 53.53 6.19 41.40 65.66  36.67 32.84 9.48  16.86 128.20 11.32 -22.19 22.19 Accept 0.05  
C4 69.70 4.70 60.49 78.90  65.00 34.25 9.89  4.70 119.79 10.94 -21.45 21.45 Accept 0.05  
C5 51.76 5.86 40.28 63.25  33.33 28.71 8.29  18.43 103.00 10.15 -19.89 19.89 Accept 0.05  
C6 43.53 5.76 32.25 54.81  30.00 35.68 10.30  13.53 139.19 11.80 -23.12 23.12 Accept 0.05  
C7 20.00 0.00 20.00 20.00  16.67 22.29 6.44  3.33 41.41 6.44 -12.61 12.61 Accept 0.05  
D1 76.55 2.99 70.69 82.41  50.00 35.68 10.30  26.55 115.00 10.72 -21.02 21.02 Reject 0.05 Better performance during incidents 
D2 25.00 3.24 18.65 31.35  58.33 34.60 9.99  -33.33 110.23 10.50 -20.58 20.58 Reject 0.05 Better performance in baseline survey 
D1/2/a 82.70 3.48 75.88 89.52  91.67 10.30 2.97  -8.96 20.95 4.58 -8.97 8.97 Accept 0.05  
D3 82.16 2.16 77.92 86.40  78.33 28.87 8.33  3.83 74.12 8.61 -16.87 16.87 Accept 0.05  
D4 45.45 5.66 34.36 56.55  68.33 30.10 8.69  -22.88 107.53 10.37 -20.32 20.32 Reject 0.05 Better performance in baseline survey 
D5 80.00 3.90 72.35 87.65  65.00 34.25 9.89  15.00 112.97 10.63 -20.83 20.83 Accept 0.05  
D6 81.62 3.41 74.93 88.31  43.33 37.01 10.68  38.29 125.78 11.22 -21.98 21.98 Reject 0.05 Better performance during incidents 
D7 69.33 6.72 56.16 82.51  38.33 31.29 9.03  31.00 126.77 11.26 -22.07 22.07 Reject 0.05 Better performance during incidents 
D8 63.53 5.37 53.00 74.06  76.67 28.07 8.10  -13.14 94.51 9.72 -19.05 19.05 Accept 0.05  
E1 55.14 6.02 43.33 66.94  76.67 28.07 8.10  -21.53 101.94 10.10 -19.79 19.79 Reject 0.05 Better performance in baseline survey 
E2 16.88 4.76 7.54 26.21  20.00 29.54 8.53  -3.13 95.40 9.77 -19.14 19.14 Accept 0.05  
F1 49.19 5.23 38.93 59.45  40.00 38.14 11.01  9.19 148.60 12.19 -23.89 23.89 Accept 0.05  
F2 40.00 40.00 -38.40 118.40  38.33 31.29 9.03  1.67 1681.57 41.01 -80.37 80.37 Accept 0.05  
F3 60.71 5.39 50.14 71.28  65.00 34.25 9.89  -4.29 126.81 11.26 -22.07 22.07 Accept 0.05  
F4 24.71 4.23 16.42 32.99  15.00 22.76 6.57  9.71 61.05 7.81 -15.31 15.31 Accept 0.05  
F5 51.76 6.21 39.59 63.94  75.00 27.14 7.83  -23.24 99.95 10.00 -19.60 19.60 Reject 0.05 Better performance in baseline survey 
G1 84.86 2.38 80.21 89.52  68.33 30.10 8.69  16.53 81.15 9.01 -17.66 17.66 Accept 0.05  
G2 76.76 3.99 68.94 84.58  50.00 31.33 9.05  26.76 97.74 9.89 -19.38 19.38 Reject 0.05 Better performance during incidents 
G3 25.71 3.24 19.37 32.06  43.33 37.01 10.68  -17.62 124.61 11.16 -21.88 21.88 Accept 0.05  
G4 68.75 4.75 59.45 78.05  50.00 39.54 11.42  18.75 152.83 12.36 -24.23 24.23 Accept 0.05  
Table 81 Significance test of scores for HRO principles during incidents compared to HRO survey
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It was found that the majority of HRO principles are not significantly different for both 
datasets. Significant differences at a significance level of 5% were identified for the following 
HRO principles: In Table 82, the HRO principles are presented that were identified to 
perform significantly better under trying conditions during incidents compared to the HRO 
survey.  
 
Table 82 HRO principles that were identified to perform significantly better under trying conditions 
 
In Table 83, the HRO principles are presented that were identified to perform significantly 
worse under trying conditions during incidents compared to the baseline survey.  
Ref Description  
 
Organisational culture of reliability 
A6 All our employees take responsibility where problems are identified and immediate corrective action 
programmes are required. 
Continuous learning and intensive training 
X1 Our staff question procedures when in doubt about their appropriateness. 
X2 In unforeseen situations, staff in operations don’t follow rules blindly, but negotiate the course of action 
in a collegial manner with more experienced staff and supervisors.  
B6 In our organisation, even minor errors and incidents provide a source for learning which are assessed 
through root cause analysis. 
B7 Our organisation develops a collective memory for failures, incidents and root causes for failure, which 
helps the organisation to anticipate future problems. 
Effective and varied patterns of communication 
C3 Our staff in operations are encouraged to share their experiences relating to the reliability of the system. 
Communication is designed as bottom up and top down to ensure rapid flow of information through the 
hierarchy of the system. Rapid dissemination of information helps the organisation to respond to water 
quality incidents with corrective action aiming to prevent the escalation of failure. 
Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible organisational structures 
D1 Our organisation can only prevent outbreaks with a high level of centralisation, because low-level 
decision makers have insufficient understanding of the inter-relationship between their action and 
consequences on other elements of the water supply system.  During an emergency, control has to be 
maintained highly centralised in order to maintain overview of the entire system response to action on 
all sub-units. 
D6 Our organisation has a hierarchical structure for decision making which reflects expertise, know-how 
and seniority. Each level has controls and regulating mechanisms.  
D7 Our organisation requires staff to conform to organisational norms and avoids innovative, autonomous 
or creative behaviours. 
Human resource management practices that support reliability 
G1 In recruitment and selection, our organisation acquires suitable and skilled candidates for the jobs 
aiming to match the complexity of the environment with an equally complex set of people to 
understand the system. Diverging backgrounds for staff offer different ways of looking at systems.  
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Table 83 HRO principles that were identified to perform significantly worse under trying conditions 
 
Ref. Description 
 
Effective and varied patterns of communication 
C1 Our communication system makes our water supply system better understandable, predictable and 
controllable.  
Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible organisational structures 
D2 In our organisation, decentralisation is required to respond rapidly to unfolding failures.  An 
emergency can be confined to one sub-unit, which is subsequently isolated from the entire system. 
The control over an emergency is decentralised to this subunit until the emergency is cleared. 
D4 Our standard operating procedures are constantly updated and incorporate lessons learnt. Formal 
rules and procedures are effective elements to identify and control risk. 
System and human redundancy 
E1 Our organisation maintains reserve capacity in the system. This includes back-up functions, 
overlapping tasks and responsibilities. 
Precise procedures in managing technology 
F5 In our organisation, maintenance activity and protocols as well as performance data are used to 
monitor the healthy operation of the system. 
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4.2.4 Observational study in the incident control centre 
Organisational culture of reliability 
Ref HRO Indicator Johnson Asset 
type 
Type of evidence in addition to observation Example  
A1 During the incident, staff in the incident 
management team and operators 
involved had a strong sense for the 
company objectives of the organisation 
and shared a common system of beliefs 
and perceptions. 
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 Actions and event described in the root cause 
analysis for the incident indicating concern for 
the safety and reliability of drinking water 
prior to or during human intervention in the 
technical water supply system. Actions taken 
in response to the incident described in the 
incident report 
In this organisation incidents frequently occur. The organisation has 
a dedicated team of incident managers who take control over the 
situation and company resources at first sight of an incident. Due to 
the experience in incident management, the procedures to reduce 
the impact and re-instate normal operation are well tried and tested 
routines. During an incident, personnel in the incident management 
organisation are determined to protect customers from exposure to 
hazards, aim to reduce the impact of the incident by using all 
feasible resources and ensure that the supply system is re-instated 
to safe and reliable operation.   
The team of incident managers are highly skilled and problem 
orientated managers who are capable of managing personnel and 
resources in highly uncertain and trying conditions. 
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A2 During the incident, the water supply 
system was continuously monitored so 
that failure events were foreseen and 
understood.  
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 Monitoring data of the water supply system 
provided in the incident report, minutes of the 
incident review meeting and notification of 
incident to the regulator. 
The organisation defines failure as impact on customers and uses 
the classification of event, incident, significant incident and 
emergency.  
For physical assets, identification of failure at source of the problem 
is more likely associated to “assets above ground”. Here, asset 
failures can be detected early and, if appropriate action is taken, 
impact on customers can be eliminated. E.g., a WTW will have 
significant numbers of monitoring equipment, in particular for 
process control and operational status of the plant. These are tied 
into hardwired control loops, PLC, SCADA and – via telemetry – to 
the centralised control room.  
For “assets below ground” such as water mains, the monitoring of 
physical asset failure is only limited.  
In distribution, incident awareness is commonly generated by 
customer contact who call the organisation to report or complain 
about “no water” or discolouration. The organisation has a dedicated 
call centre to receive customer contacts. When commenting on 
water quality or supply reliability issues, customers are challenged to 
describe their observation. In discolouration events, a protocol is 
followed by call centre staff to identify the location of the customer, 
the severity of discolouration (in terms of colour or any other 
observation). Customer call and the type of observation are 
displayed on a visual display unit as a geo-referenced symbol of a 
regional map in the control room. With increasing customer call, the 
displayed symbol increases to indicate the magnitude of the 
exposure.   
Proxy indicators based on flow and pressure gauges can indicate 
abnormal flow patterns that may suggest physical asset failure of a 
water main. Only recently, a scheme was initiated in one area to fit 
sufficient numbers of flow meters and pressure gauges to monitor 
any abnormal operational patterns against expected system 
performance.  
Water quality failure in distribution assets can only be detected with 
monitoring and sampling regimes.  
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A3 During the incident, our staff in operations 
had a highly developed understanding of 
their contribution to water safety and their 
role in the system.  
R
i
t
u
a
l
s
 
&
 
R
o
u
t
i
n
e
s
,
 
C
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
H
u
m
a
n
,
 
 
I
n
t
a
n
g
i
b
l
e
 General observation in the Regional 
Operations & Control Centre; Description of 
chronological actions and event prior to or 
during the incident which contributed to or 
reduced the likelihood and severity of this 
incident;   
Considerable long periods between the actual failure or initial hazard 
exposure and the awareness of an incident can elapse. 
On incident awareness, the incident management team is pressed 
for time to devise an adequate incident response. In the following 
example, the response to an incident is demonstrated.  
This incident was made aware to the organisation by customer calls 
reporting “no water”. This was caused by the rupture of a large 
diameter ring main.  
The primary task for the incident management team was to isolate 
the ruptured pipe at the nearest isolation valves. A quick valving 
operation ensured that an additional 100.000’s of properties did not 
loose their water supply or experienced low pressure. Furthermore, it 
reduced the impact on the burst site: There was a potential impact of 
undermining the foundation of the adjacent road and overwhelming 
the surface drainage with potential to experience sewer collapses. 
Unfortunately, due to the burst and subsequent valving operation, 
flow patterns changed and re-suspended deposits so that 
discolouration was experienced by many customers.  
This case demonstrates that speedy intervention is required to limit 
the damage but also additional problems may arise whilst aiming to 
reduce the impact of the incident. In this case, the main was 
repaired, a sample of the pipe section for analysis by asset 
management was taken and the ring main was re-instated.  
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A4 During the incident, staff in the incident 
management team and operators 
involved acted in a collaborative and 
collegiate manner.  
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 Description of chronological events which 
highlights the key activities of personnel 
involved in the incident 
In areas with high population density, failures in the distribution 
network can affect a large numbers of stakeholders. Primarily, 
customers may experience the inconvenience of “loss of supply” and 
low pressure but also may be exposed to discolouration from re-
suspended deposits in the water mains or hazardous water quality 
from contamination due to ingress of surface water or the sewerage 
system. Customers reporting their observations are often the primary 
indicator for problems in the distribution network.  
From an incident management viewpoint, the reported hazard type 
determines the immediate action e.g. by issuing a “boil notice”, 
“advise to boil” or “do not drink”. Less hazardous incidents may be 
sufficiently managed by providing information and advice to 
customers.  
The incident management team needs to understand the geographic 
spread of the hazard and size of population. This will determine the 
“reach out” in issuing information, notices or boil orders.  
Whereas large-scale incidents require the involvement of regional 
media, localised incidents may be manageable by an operator 
providing information to customers by “knocking on doors”.  
Whereas a localised mains burst can be responded to by issuing a 
repair notice to a contractor (or in-house mains repair gang) a 
region-wide incident requires the collaboration of distribution 
management teams across the region. The incident procedure for a 
large-scale incident will also require some collaboration from water 
resource management teams and the production management 
teams if rezoning and alternative supplies are required to reduce the 
impact of an incident.  
Depending on the hazard type, alternative water supply needs to be 
made available, in particular for special needs customers (hospitals, 
health centres, etc).   
  
A6 During the incident, staff in the incident 
management team and operators 
involved took responsibility where 
problems were identified and immediate 
corrective action programmes were 
required. 
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 Description of chronological events and root 
cause of incident in the incident report how 
the awareness of the incident was generated 
and immediate actions taken 
The incident management team are well aware of the impact any 
failure has on organisational objectives. Yet, every incident is a test 
of competency. Although many incidents affecting the distribution of 
drinking water have similar patterns, e.g. a burst main resulting in 
loss of supply and possible discolouration, there are always unique 
features to accommodate. Some areas have vulnerable or special 
customers, which require special attention during an incident. In 
other incidents, the actual incident site is difficult to access. Other 
areas have historically grown, complex pipe and valving 
arrangements so that re-zoning efforts might not be fully understood 
until desired or undesired effects become visible.  
Although principle guideline – often implicit – exist to assess the 
situation of an incident, novel features or site specific circumstances 
have to be taken into account when devising an action plan to 
reduce the incident impact or re-instating the system.  
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A7 During the incident, staff in the incident 
management team and operators 
involved were obliged to report their 
mistakes without fear of punishment. C
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 During one incident, a number of alarms were received in the central 
control room due to a power failure at one WTW affecting chemical 
dosing systems. The power was reset and the attention of the called-
out operators was drawn to further problems at the lime batching 
plant used for pH correction in the treatment process. The amount of 
alarms raised in the control room and on the SCADA disguised 
additional problems with the chlorination equipment that too had 
been affected during the power outage. After the lime-batching unit 
had been restored, the operators were called to another site that 
also had been affected by the power outage and the WTW continued 
production of drinking water without chlorination.  
The problem with the chlorination equipment was discovered after a 
short while and operators were called out again to assess the 
problem.  
The WTW discharges into a water tank containing chlorinated water. 
Due to the dilution effect, free chlorine was always present in the 
water distributed to customers and posed no health risk.  
This incident demonstrates that immediate corrective action 
programmes can easily overlook problems, in particular when the 
incident management organisation is overwhelmed by multiple 
failures and alarms received in the control room. On detection of the 
chlorine failure, the system was restored and supply continued under 
normal conditions.  
The controller had not immediately detected the chlorine failure 
alarm or has not passed the alarm on to the field staff, the main 
problem of the alarm system was a lack of prioritising critical alarms. 
The organisation did not blame the controller but enhanced the 
alarm systems design to reduce the opportunity to oversee critical 
alarms. 
. 
A8 In our organisation, individual behaviours, 
which jeopardise the company objectives, 
are recognised as unacceptable.  
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 After an incident, personnel who were involved in the build-up or 
during the incident attend an incident review meeting. This meeting 
is primarily designed to learn from this incident and provide feedback 
to personnel involved. It is not designed to lay blame at individuals 
but encourages a critical perspective on actions and activities carried 
out prior and during the incident.   
A number of cases have been recorded where efforts to reduce 
incident impact and re-instating normal operations have resulted in 
secondary, knock-on effects. E.g., the re-zoning of supply zones 
generating disturbance of deposited material in pipe work causing 
unanticipated discolouration of drinking water.  Operators and the 
incident management team acted in good faith, under trying 
conditions and pressed for an immediate or timely incident response.  
Staff are aware that substitutional or additional risks exist in 
designing an incident response. The recent introduction of DOMS 
plans enables a qualified, explicit assessment of substitutional or 
additional risk for incidents management in the distribution network.  
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A8a During the incident, our senior 
management was (and still is) committed 
to the reliability of the organisation. This 
was communicated to all levels in the 
organisation and demonstrated with 
investments in technology, processes and 
personnel. 
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 Evidence of investments or maintenance 
spending at this site, training of operators 
and/or design and maintenance of incident 
detection and response procedures. 
Evidence for senior management involvement 
during the incident 
The organisation has invested resources into early detection and 
rapid response to abnormal operating conditions.  
The incident management organisation is significantly contributing to 
efficient minimisation of adverse impacts on customers. It uses the 
regulatory objectives and targets as a measure of its effectiveness.  
 
Increasingly, the organisation manages events that have no or very 
low impact on customers. The organisation has “learned” to react 
rapidly to forego significant impact on customers. It uses its physical 
assets to effectively minimise the impact of e.g. a burst main.  
In distribution management, the incident management team has an 
overview over its re-zoning capability and instructs distribution field 
operators to carry out revalving operations aimed at minimising the 
impact on customers. It has access to information relating to 
potential discolouration of individual distribution management zones. 
These are prepared in accordance with DOMS – a risk assessment 
for adverse effects relating to regulatory objectives.  
  
A9 During the incident, individuals “monitor, 
advise, criticize and support” each other, 
in particular in situations where mistakes 
were more likely to occur. 
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 Description of “what went well” and 
improvement areas in the minutes of the 
incident review meeting. 
During an incident in the distribution infrastructure, the incident 
management team has access to personnel most familiar with the 
particular distribution zone affected. These experts advise the 
incident manager who co-ordinates effort but is not necessarily the 
expert of this particular asset. The incident manager will investigate 
all resources available to reduce the impact of the incident or needs 
to re-instate normal operations, whereas the experts will identify 
possible means of achieving this with the resources available to the 
organisation. 
 
A10 During the incident, staff in the incident 
management team and operators 
involved were attentive, alert and acted 
with care. 
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 General evaluation based on actions and 
events described in the incident report, 
minutes of incident review meeting and 
notification of event to the regulator. 
The incident management team draws on highly experienced and 
“proven” personnel who advise on and devise an action plan for 
mitigating the impact of an incident. Water safety objectives and 
supply reliability considerations are the ultimate test for the due 
course of action. Acting with care does not, however, mitigate 
against unforeseen circumstances that do arise. These are a result 
of the diverse nature of physical asset arrangements, the many 
different needs of customers, 3rd party impacts an incident can have. 
Interdependency of incident effects may produce additional adverse 
circumstances to be monitored and controlled with adequate 
intervention. 
 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw Page A287 Appendices 
 
Continuous learning and intensive training 
Ref. HRO Indicator Johnson Asset type 
Type of evidence in addition to 
observation Example  
      
B1 After the incident, continuous learning and 
training were facilitated in a review of 
processes and ways of operating.  
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 Minutes of incident review meeting and 
incident report describing “what went 
well” and improvement areas. Actions 
raised on the Lotus notes “Action 
tracker” database.   
The incident log captures data and information on physical, information 
and human assets involved during the incident, in particular a measure 
for the incident impact on customers and 3rd parties with particular 
emphasis on the hazard types, the size of affected population and the 
timing between incident occurrence and incident awareness as well as 
the incident response times. It records data of the condition and 
performance of the drinking water supply system, the planning, 
implementation and operation of an incident response, actions taken to 
reduce the impact of the incident, monitoring data and information 
relating to the water supply systems response to any intervention but 
also any actions, behaviours by incident management team members, 
operators, field staff and 3rd parties.  
After an incident, a review meeting takes place to evaluate actions and 
activities prior to and during the incident. It identifies causes and 
contributing factors in the build-up to the incidents and, secondly, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of reducing the incident impact and re-
instating of normal supply.  
The agenda of the incident review meeting takes the form of identifying 
who is present, update and current situation of the incident, ongoing 
effect on the customer, a review of the log events, issues arising and 
further data/investigation requirements, issues that went well, what has 
occurred that could be done better, lessons learnt and 
recommendations arising, confirmation of next steps. 
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B2 Prior to the incident, staff in the incident 
management team and operators involved 
received training on the requirements of 
maintaining a safe system. These are 
embedded in formal rules, general 
guidelines and standardised frameworks. 
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 Professional qualification and 
experience of operators and incident 
management staff. BTEC qualification 
and “license to operate” plant and 
equipment for operators. Evidence of 
actions compliant with “Standard 
Operating Procedures” 
The organisation plans, implements and operates staff development 
programmes leading to appreciation, knowledge, experience and ability 
in the identification of abnormal operating conditions, events and 
incidents with potential impact on the safety and reliability of drinking 
water. Staff development emphasises the means of operating and 
maintaining a safe and reliability drinking water supply system using the 
physical, information and human asset base of the organisation. 
Risk assessments for operational activities are increasingly promoted to 
anticipate failure scenarios and their probability. They guide the 
planning of method statement and contingency planning. 
The organisation plans, implements and operates staff development 
programmes leading to appreciation, knowledge, experience and ability 
in managing abnormal operating conditions, events and incidents with 
potential impact on the safety and reliability of drinking water. Staff 
development emphasises the means of eliminating, reducing, isolating 
and controlling hazards during an incident using the physical, 
information and human asset base of the organisation. The 
organisation provides information, training, instructions and supervision. 
Staff development is monitored audited and reviewed. 
 
B3 During the incident, staff in the incident 
management team and operators involved 
adhered to standard operating procedures 
but also pro-actively identified potential 
sources of failure and actions to stop faults 
from escalating.  
R
o
u
t
i
n
e
s
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 Assessment of actions building up to or 
during the incident to be in compliance 
with policies and operating procedures 
of the organisation 
 
Standard Operating Procedures are highly modularised and can be 
applied to the appropriate incident scenario.  
In one incident, contractors were working on site following all formalities 
between the utility and 3rd parties. When digging, the contractor did not 
come across any warning tape or sand that is used to identify a power 
cable further below. As no warning was visible, the contractor continued 
and hit the power cable that caused a power failure and subsequently a 
chlorination failure.  
Power failure and chlorination failure were received in the control room 
and incident management procedures instigated.  
The incident manager followed procedures to call out personnel to 
investigate the causes of the incident, on confirmation of the problem a 
contractor was called out to repair the power supply. In the meantime, 
procedures were followed to assess the water quality implications of the 
chlorination failure on forward supply.  The advisors to the incident 
manager anticipated a dilution effect of the un-chlorinated water with 
the content of the forward SR, which deemed slug dosing unnecessary.  
The water quality monitoring data at the SR outlet were carefully 
monitored for the remainder of the day and confirmed that the dilution 
had not reduced free chlorine to zero.  
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X3 During the incident, staff in the incident 
management team and operators involved 
established an emergency response team 
for joint decision making in order to avoid 
overlooking complex circumstances.  
O
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
;
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
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y
s
t
e
m
s
;
 
 
P
o
w
e
r
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
H
u
m
a
n
 Evidence of timing and actions taken by 
the central incident response team 
In operations, personnel pre-plan their activities, in particular when 
interfacing with the physical asset system. SOP guide the work 
planning. Decision-making procedures are increasingly demanding risk 
assessments, risk mitigation and contingency planning for pre-planning 
work. These are tied into a review process by staff that are more expert.  
The water utility makes provisions for the organisation to establish an 
incident/emergency response team during abnormal operating 
conditions, events, incidents and emergencies.  
The incident response team is composed of an incident manager, 
operations resource managers, water quality scientists, operators, field 
staff, and representatives from asset management, liaison and press 
officer. These are tasked to evaluate the incident impact on customer 
and business, plan and implement an emergency response to reduce 
the incident impact and re-instate the safety and reliability of the 
drinking water supply. The emergency response team evaluates the 
incident impact and considers options to eliminate, reduce, isolate or 
control hazards, minimises the affected population whilst monitoring the 
hazard exposure time of the affected population. To this end, it deploys 
its resources so that critical incident impacts are minimised. The 
leadership during the incident is provided by the incident manager who 
is advised by an expert team.  
 
 
B4 Staff in the incident management team and 
operators maintain a commitment to 
continuous learning and seek the 
acquisition and improvement of skills.  
O
r
g
a
n
i
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a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
;
 
H
u
m
a
n
;
 
I
n
t
a
n
g
i
b
l
e
 Evidence of contributions to the incident 
review meeting, actions raised for 
improvement, assessment of the quality 
of root cause analysis. 
Incident review meeting provides a systematic facility of learning and 
understanding the failure modes the water supply system can 
experience.  
 
Learning from incidents can be used as a reminder to check other, 
similar systems and provides an audit facility for the accuracy of risk 
assessments (in particular for the severity of an assessed risk) 
In the organisation, incident review meetings aim to identify “issues 
arising and further data/investigation requirements, issues that went 
well, what has occurred that could be done better, lessons learnt and 
recommendations arising, confirmation of next steps”.  
  
B5 We learn from failures, near misses and 
mistakes by other utilities and use these as 
a means to study the failure susceptibility of 
the own organisation. S
t
o
r
i
e
s
;
 
 
R
i
t
u
a
l
s
 
&
 
R
o
u
t
i
n
e
s
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
 The outbreaks of cryptosporidium experienced by other water utilities 
triggered a large-scale risk assessment exercise for all catchments and 
water supply systems.  
These risk assessments were used to close down abstraction assets, 
initiating programmes to upgrade treatment processes and inform 
incident management procedures for incidents affecting the treatment 
process at these sites.  
 
B6 Even minor errors and incidents provide us 
with a source for learning.   
S
t
o
r
i
e
s
;
 
R
i
t
u
a
l
s
 
&
 
R
o
u
t
i
n
e
s
;
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 Evidence in the minutes of the incident 
review meeting and the root cause 
analysis 
Using impact data from mains bursts is also actively used for assessing 
the risk in distribution networks. Whilst the failure frequency or 
probability is a function of pipe age, material, soil condition, etc., the 
impact of failure is estimated from systems configurations, topography 
and hydraulic arrangements. On design completion, the prediction 
models are then audited against previously experienced failure. 
Predictability of failure exceeding 60 % of cases have been reported.  
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B7 Our organisation develops a collective 
memory for failures, incidents and root 
causes for failure, which helps the 
organisation to anticipate future problems. 
S
y
m
b
o
l
s
 
S
t
o
r
i
e
s
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 Recording of incidents in a centralised 
database which is used as a source of 
learning (e.g. via statistical analysis) 
The organisation uses a database for recording incidents; this database 
provides an opportunity to investigate incidents in a structured fashion.  
The organisation captures data in compliance with regulatory 
requirements. These data emphasise the exposure of population to 
hazards and measures taken to reduce the incident impact.  
  
B8 We share a sense that learning from trial 
and error is not feasible to understand our 
water supply system. For staff training, we 
use offline methods of learning which 
consist of realistic drills, simulations and 
exercises to replicate potential failure 
scenarios. 
R
i
t
u
a
l
s
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R
o
u
t
i
n
e
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I
n
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o
r
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n
;
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
 Evidence and assessment of incident 
impact on customers and the business 
(cost and reputation). Evidence of 
professional accreditation, training 
standards and “learning on the job” 
strategy 
The analysis of failure, root causes and contributing factors during 
incidents as well as minor errors and incidents provides a source for 
learning for different disciplines in the organisation. Directed data 
analysis enables to identify trends, patterns and correlations, if 
conceptual frameworks are used to analyse incidents. Patterns and 
trends relating to the safety and reliability of drinking water supply 
allows decision makers in operations management and asset 
management to assess the need for policy development and 
organisational amendments to plan and implement programmes to 
reduce the frequency and/or hazard impact.  
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Effective and varied patterns of communication 
Ref. HRO Indicator 
Johnson Asset type Type of evidence in addition to observation Examples  
C1 During the incident, our 
communication systems make our 
water supply system better 
understandable, predictable and 
controllable.  
R
i
t
u
a
l
s
 
&
 
R
o
u
t
i
n
e
s
;
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
;
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 Evidence reflecting the infrastructure of inter-personnel 
communication and IT systems for monitoring and control of 
assets, in particular incident detection and reporting 
mechanisms. E.g., P&I diagrams; PF diagrams; schematics of 
telemetry; control philosophy, in particular fail safe 
mechanisms; monitoring and control schedules for processes; 
SCADA, PLC and telemetry architecture; hardwired alarm 
monitoring and control loops; alarm schedules for on-site 
SCADA or PLC; schedule of clustered alarms for  off-site 
SCADA; 
This case study portrays the handling of alarms from 
production and distribution assets in the regional control 
centre. 
In normal working hours, telemetric alarms are acknowledged 
by the shift controllers in the control centre who then pass the 
alarms verbally to the production coordinator for that area. 
He/she will then interrogate the SCADA via a remote access 
to the site-SCADA and decide whether corrective action can 
be taken or if they need to call someone on site or to site if it 
is unmanned.  
Out of working hours, on receipt of a telemetric alarm the shift 
controller will interrogate the SCADA of the alarming site and 
decide if any corrective action can be taken. If there is any 
uncertainty about which course of action to take, the standby 
process engineer will be called. 
  
C2 During the incident, our 
organisation operated in an 
information rich environment. 
Processes were measured and 
understood. Data is transparent 
and made available to all.   
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 Evidence of data availability and quality for monitoring and 
control of assets. Redundancy strategy for data. Alarm 
schedules. Evidence that information systems design 
distinguishes between normal and abnormal operating 
conditions with a variety of different signals that allow fast 
identification of incident root cause. Monitoring of water safety 
and reliability (process monitoring) complemented by direct 
asset performance and condition monitoring. (Monitoring 
elevated pH is an observation of the effect of an asset or 
process failure e.g. asset dosing pump failure).  Early 
detection of incident potential and early warning systems of 
potential failure. Measured availability of redundancy. Failure 
prediction capability, measure of resilience and capacities to 
endure during trying conditions. Predictability of continued 
safe and reliable operation during incident (e.g. duty failure) 
Operating in an information rich environment is particularly 
important when critical assets fail. Although this case study is 
not representative, it demonstrates the criticality of information at 
the time in the right place. In this particular incident, a duty 
chlorinator of a WTW failed and the standby chlorinator did not 
start up. No alarms were raised by the failure on the local PLC, 
SCADA and central control room (although the system was 
designed to do so) and, hence, no WTW shutdown was initiated. 
In effect, water receiving no chlorine dose entered the contact 
tank and a low chlorine alarm at the inlet of the contact tank was 
raised in the control centre. The plant was shutdown.  
Although, this was primarily a technical problem, the 
availability of site information also had an impact on effective 
decision making during the incident management. The 
incident review meeting concluded that more detailed site 
schematics and drawings were required to enable informed 
decisions to be made. This has been put into a rolling 
programme to update or create site drawings on a regional 
basis. Furthermore, the knowledge of personnel on site was 
limited. This will be addressed by ensuring accurate data is 
held on site. 
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C5 During the incident, our 
organisation used various 
channels to transmit different 
types of data and information 
relating to monitoring and control 
of our assets (and ultimately water 
safety).  
Direct and complementary 
information enhanced information 
reliability. 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
;
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 Evidence of using a data redundancy strategy: e.g. duty 
standby monitoring of processes, different monitoring systems 
to measure same processes and assets; architecture of data 
reporting based on telemetry, SCADA and PLC. Evidence for 
data monitoring for abnormal operating conditions and 
redundancy and/or fail-safe data transmission infrastructure. 
The man machine interface requires critical signal to be 
prioritised and made aware to operators. In this case study, a 
critical alarm went undetected in a whole series of alarms 
“flooding” the site-SCADA.  
“There are audible enunciator panels in various parts of the 
works, including the control room and lime areas, which 
sound a common alarm that does not differentiate between 
types of alarm. They do not give any visual indication as to 
the type of alarm, or indeed, what part of the process it is 
from. To differentiate, the process engineers must interrogate 
the SCADA in the control room to view what type of alarm has 
been raised.  
The process engineers on site were dealing with a number of 
problems with the lime system and were working in the lime 
area for a substantial part of the day. The lime system is in an 
area remote from the control room and has no separate 
access to the SCADA. Whilst the process engineers viewed 
the SCADA in the control room on a number of occasions 
throughout the day, they were unaware of any problems with 
the chlorine system, so only viewed SCADA pages pertaining 
to the lime system. 
Prior to leaving site the process engineers checked the 
SCADA pages pertaining to the lime system and ascertained 
that all was well. They did not check any pages pertaining to 
the chlorine system, as they had no reason to suspect there 
was any problem due to the lack of local alarms or telephone 
calls from the production coordinator to indicate this. “ 
  
C6 During the incident, multiple 
monitoring and control data from a 
variety of sources provided 
information density, which allowed 
individual signals to be verified.  
C
o
n
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r
o
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s
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I
n
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r
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a
t
i
o
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P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
 Evidence of using a data redundancy strategy: e.g. duty 
standby monitoring of processes, different monitoring systems 
to measure same processes and assets; architecture of data 
reporting based on telemetry, SCADA and PLC. Evidence for 
data monitoring for abnormal operating conditions and 
redundancy and/or fail-safe data transmission infrastructure. 
Evidence for data and information systems infrastructure 
enabling the analysis of cause and effect relationships during 
incidents. 
In this case study, the need for accuracy of information is 
highlighted to prevent incidents from occurring. 
“Contractors working on a ring main rehabilitation project 
refurbishment deliberately damaged a live section of a 24” 
main resulting in a serious burst. Supplies were maintained 
by rezoning and the burst was repaired promptly but not 
before the increased flow rates had caused significant 
increases in velocity in the mains serving the area leading to 
re-suspension of historic mains deposits.  
Further detailed investigations have since found that two 
parallel mains are located in the area. However, their location 
on the drawing records was inaccurate. Both mains are ca. 3 
metres further north compared to the lines shown on the 
drawings. The main found in the excavation was mistaken for 
the other main and assumed to be de-commissioned for the 
construction work.  
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Dynamic decision making and flexible organisational structures 
Ref. HRO Indicator 
Johnson Asset type Type of evidence in addition to observation Examples  
D1/2a During the incident, centralisation at 
collective level coexists with 
decentralisation at individual level. 
The organisation exhibits an adaptive, 
flexible or organic nature. 
O
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a
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o
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u
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m
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u
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a
n
;
 
I
n
t
a
n
g
i
b
l
e
;
 Evidence depicting the organisational structure and hierarchy in 
operations, incident and emergency management.  Communication 
and reporting diagrams. Power, roles and responsibility of 
stakeholders during the incident in their job description.  Explicit 
description of reportable observations, events, incidents. Explicit 
description of human intervention following the detection of an 
abnormal observation, event or incident.  
Evaluation of leadership during the incident in the chronological 
incident management record. 
This case study demonstrates the need for 
central control during an incident that can have 
follow-n effects on many other business areas.  
Centralisation exists for incident co-ordination 
alongside with decentralised tasks to be 
completed by field staff.  
An unplanned shutdown of a WTW led to the 
discovery of water damage to the lime batching 
system.  
An incident support team was assembled in the 
incident control centre to co-ordinate the 
rezoning, prepare and implement contingency 
plans. 
Contractors were called to site and rezoning of 
the distribution system undertaken to protect 
supplies and service reservoir levels. The team 
co-ordinated and assisted with deployment of 
alternative supplies.  
Rezoning led to some low pressures and no 
waters in some areas. This was resolved by 
further rezoning. 
Following re-zoning, discolouration contacts 
started to be received from another area. The 
alternative supplies deployed as a contingency 
against loss of supplies from the WTW were 
used to respond to discolouration complaints.  
The contractors finished remedial work on the 
lime system over night and the works was 
restarted early next morning. 
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D4 After the incident, the standard 
operating procedures were updated 
and incorporated lessons learnt. 
These formal rules and procedures 
are effective elements to identify and 
control risk. 
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I
n
t
a
n
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i
b
l
e
;
 Review of the minutes of the incident review meeting, in particular 
sections relating to improvement areas and formulated 
recommendations. Review of the dissemination strategy to action 
personnel, in particular SOP for operations management, plant and 
equipment operation and asset management procedures, and track 
actions from review meeting. Identify the communication strategy to 
stakeholders and implementation of updated SOP. 
Following an incident, the incident review 
meeting will raise actions to be pursued by 
individual or teams in the organisation. One of 
these actions could be to review certain SOP.  
The organisation uses a database system to 
keep track on the pursuit of actions. Actions are 
assigned to a person with a specific date of 
completion. On the expected date, the system 
raises an alarm and a project manager will 
pursue the actionee for concluding his task or 
arranging a new deadline.   
Increasing experience with novel assets and 
technologies require the updating of SOP for a 
particular and similar assets. Changing 
conditions in the environment are also reviewed, 
assessed for additional risk and, if managed 
without capital investment, actions and activities 
prescribed in the SOP.  
  
D5 During the incident, activities, which 
were not defined in standard 
operating procedures, were based on 
decisions a most senior individual 
made, as they should have the best 
knowledge of the system. 
R
i
t
u
a
l
s
 
&
 
r
o
u
t
i
n
e
s
;
 
P
o
w
e
r
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
;
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e
;
 Review of SOP applicable for plant and equipment involved/affected, 
SOP for managing causes and effects of incidents on the safety and 
reliability of drinking water provided to customers. In particular, identify 
evidence for assessments of risk immediate during the incident but 
also the potential implications and risks arising from the options 
available to the incident management team to reinstate safe and 
reliable drinking water supplies. 
D6 During the incident, our organisation 
had a hierarchical structure for 
decision making which reflected 
expertise, know-how and seniority. 
Each level had controls and regulating 
mechanisms.  
O
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;
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l
e
;
 Identify the organisational structure and hierarchy in operations, 
incident and emergency management with particular emphasis on 
academic qualifications, professional experience and expertise, 
records of continuous professional development and performance 
reviews. Review of personality types for particular roles, in particular 
within the operations, incident and emergency management teams. 
Processes and procedures for monitoring, auditing and review of 
decision-making. Organisational structure and hierarchy for asset 
management capability. 
During an incident, decision-making is 
centralised with the incident manager having 
ultimate control over resources and personnel. 
The incident manager takes advice from experts 
and field staff to make decisions, design a 
contingency plan and direct resources at re-
instating normal operations. 
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System flexibility and redundancy 
Ref HRO Indicator 
Johnson Asset type Type of evidence in addition to observation Examples  
E1 Our organisation maintains reserve capacity in 
the system. This included back-up functions, 
overlapping tasks and responsibilities. 
C
o
n
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o
l
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t
e
m
s
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P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
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I
n
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o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
H
u
m
a
n
;
 Identify redundancies relating to physical, 
human and information assets. Identify 
deployment of stand-by technical 
equipment, plant, systems or strategies but 
also stand-by human capacities and 
information systems designed for 
abnormal operating conditions. 
This case study demonstrates the use of redundancy and the 
fallacy it can create when common cause failure inhibit its use 
The electricity supply to a Pumping Station failed resulting in low 
pressure or an interruption to supply to up to 32,700 properties.  
Electricity supplies were restored approximately 4 hours later and 
the system rapidly returned to normal operating pressure. 
The pumping station has its own electricity sub-station that is 
provided with two independent electrical feeds. An informal risk 
review carried out some years ago concluded that this provided 
sufficient security of supply and that the cost of standby 
generators could not be justified. The electricity supply company 
have confirmed that the pumping station is fed by two separate 
feeders as part of the High Voltage inter-connecting ring main 
and hence complies with the Companies current requirements for 
secondary power supplies.  
A feasibility study was undertaken as part of a contingency 
planning programme. The WPS does not have a permanent 
connection for a mobile generator because of size of connection 
required. However, it is possible to connect a generator direct on 
to the incoming busmain via a flexible cable.  
  
E2 Our organisation is aware that redundancy can 
also be counterproductive. Back-up functions 
can increase technical complexity, conceal 
errors and can lead individuals into not 
performing their required tasks under the 
assumptions that someone else takes care of his 
task. 
C
o
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t
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n
;
 
H
u
m
a
n
;
 
 
Evidence for using redundancy as duty 
equipment, plant systems in the incident 
report. Identify detrimental behaviours in 
contradiction to the interests of maintaining 
or re-instating the safety and reliability of 
drinking water supply. 
One incident manager reported that on occasion information 
systems provide too much detailed information without providing 
an overview of capacities and resources available to plan an 
incident response. He also mentioned that maintenance 
programmes sometimes have an adverse effect on planning an 
incident response. A maintenance programme will temporarily de-
commission assets until their refurbishment is completed. This, 
however, reduces the capacity and redundancy available for 
designing an incident response.   
In another case study, the duty pump of a WPS failed due to its 
high age. The stand-by pump started to operate but also failed 
due to the same reason. This is a good example for common 
cause failure.  
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Precise procedures in managing technology 
Ref HRO Indicator 
Johnson Asset type Type of evidence in addition to observation Examples  
F1 The technology employed to 
deliver service on this site/ within 
this system was not 
unnecessarily complex to 
operate and had no detrimental 
effect on the incident. 
C
o
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a
t
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o
n
;
 
H
u
m
a
n
;
 Evidence of equipment, plant and systems description in the 
incident report possibly depicted in a schematic process flow 
diagram, monitoring and control in process & instrumentation 
diagrams alongside with the control philosophy and boundary 
condition for asset operations (design rationale).  
Perceived understanding of the system by the incident 
management team described in the chronological incident 
description.  
Predictability of failure scenarios.  
Systems response to human intervention indicating the 
predictability of intervention outcomes. 
Here, we are revisiting an earlier incident, where the duty and 
standby chlorinator system failed at a WTW without to trigger an 
alarm or initiate a plant shutdown.  
After the incident, it was concluded, “that the understanding of 
the impact of remote SCADA on resetting systems for critical 
systems such as chlorination needs to be better understood 
and communicated. This is an implication of the new 
technology introduced through a new initiative although its 
limitations are probably not fully understood.” 
A similar problem occurred at another WTW.  The Process 
Engineer attended the WTW as part of his regular visiting 
programme. He found that the works was shutdown and that 
the Treated Water Reservoir was too low to allow the High Lift 
pumps to operate. At a similar time, the control centre received 
a Low Alarm for the downstream water tower.  
The SCADA system seems to have lost connection to the 
control centre and the works shut down. No alarms from this 
WTW were received.  
The problem was immediately rectified and had no impact on 
customers. The telemetry lines between SCADA and control 
centre are now fitted with watchdogs to monitor their ability to 
transmit data. 
  
F3 Prior to or after the incident, new 
technology acquisition was only 
justified if existing equipment did 
not perform to required 
specification. 
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 Identify asset investment and maintenance strategy for asset, 
site or system, in particular relating to risks or reliability 
information and potential severity of incidents whilst taking 
into account any systems redundancy. 
In one incident, a PLC on a WTW failed due to a UPS 
charging system fault. This affected the PLC and SCADA and 
shut down the treatment process. All chemical dosing was lost. 
In addition, un-chlorinated water continued to flow to the clear 
water tank on site causing reduction in free chlorine in the final 
water.  
During the investigation, a few problem areas were identified. 
E.g., a more robust monitoring of the PLC is required, in 
particular the impact of UPS fault on PLC and MCC systems 
needed to be investigated. After this incident, a PLC health 
watchdog was installed at this and other sites. 
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F4 Prior to or during the incident, 
the existing technology was 
maintained to exceptionally high 
standards, as we do not tolerate 
defective, substandard or 
malfunctioning equipment. 
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l
;
 Identify evidence for maintenance policy of asset taking into 
account the probability of asset failure and the consequence 
of asset failure and maintenance cost in a cost benefit 
relationship. Identify the causal relationship of asset condition 
deterioration, asset failures and consequences of failures on 
the safety and reliability of drinking water supply and 
considerations of asset maintenance, replacement or 
refurbishment needs. 
Assets are not maintained to exceptionally high standard but 
to balance maintenance cost with the benefit of risk reduction. 
The asset management organisation has designed a risk 
assessment model for assets to evaluate their potential of 
failure. Failure in this sense is defined as an impact on 
organisational objectives. At the highest level, they reflect 
safety and reliability of drinking water supply derived from 
indicators to monitor the performance of water companies set 
by the economic and water quality regulators. The 
organisation uses these indicators, amongst others, to define 
and assess risk. These are simplified cause and effect 
relationships in which the probability of asset failure and other 
“root “ causes are linked to the probability of impacting on 
regulatory objectives.  
The risk assessments are used to evaluate the cost and 
benefit of asset investment and maintenance.  
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Table 84 HRO observation in operations and incident management 
Human resource management practices that support reliability 
Ref. HRO indicator 
Johnson Asset type Type of evidence in addition to observation Examples  
G1 Prior to the incident, the 
recruitment and selection 
process acquired suitable and 
skilled candidates for the jobs 
aiming to match the complexity 
of the environment with an 
equally complex set of people 
who would understand the 
system.  
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 Identify the academic qualifications, professional 
accreditation, and professional experience, 
training and continuous professional development 
records of personnel in operations, incident and 
emergency management. Identify the personality 
profiles of personnel and compare to job 
descriptions. 
Operators require a BTEC qualification as an entry condition for “licence to 
operate”. This vocational training is specifically targeted for water utility operations 
and has been designed specifically for organisational requirements of the water 
utility. In this training programme, “students” are taught the fundamental concepts 
of public health relating to the water sector as well as treatment processes 
commonly used in the sector.  
This training requirement was introduced a few years ago and operators who 
were already in employment but without the qualification were financially 
sponsored to obtain their qualification.  
License to operate plant is warranted on candidates based on experience and 
ability. 
 
G2 During the incident, most people 
did what was rewarded. Our 
organisation remunerates 
reliability with incentives, 
recognition and career 
opportunities.  
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 Evidence of human intervention effectively 
contributing to re-instating the safety and reliability 
of the water supply system or reducing the impact 
of the incident. Evidence of considering the impact 
of the incident and assessing residual, additional 
or substitutional risks arising from the due course 
of action to re-instate a safe and reliable drinking 
water supply ( chronological incident record) 
After a significant mains burst, the incident review meeting notes “Network 
Technicians responded promptly to identify valves to isolate the section of 
damaged main and to rezone the two zones that would be affected by the 
isolation such that supplies were maintained throughout. The repair was 
straightforward and the fact that only three discoloured water contacts were 
received after the main was flushed and returned to supply would suggest that 
this operation was well planned and executed.” 
After an incident, positive contributions to the incident response are 
recognised and awards are available for distinguished service to the 
company. Careful consideration is given to avoid incentivising “heroism”. 
  
G3 After the incident, job rotation 
increased networking between 
teams and helped the 
organisation to transfer and 
diffuse knowledge and lessons 
learnt. 
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 Evidence for internal job markets and opportunities 
for staff to take up roles in different department. In 
particular, identify transfers between operations 
and asset management but also operators and 
operations management 
The organisation maintains an internal job market and suitable candidates can 
progress a career based on their experience within the organisation. 
Reputation for acting in the interest of the organisation is recognised by 
managers that are more senior and reflect positive on individuals. 
 
G4 During the incident, our 
organisation had systems in 
place to monitor the behaviour 
of staff. C
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 Identify mention of individual or group behaviour 
with detrimental/contributing effect on the objective 
of operating a safe and reliable water supply or the 
reinstatement thereof. 
Good as well as poor behaviour is monitored in instant assessments. Every 
office maintains a notice board where good practice is highlighted, 
alternatively where poor practice by an anonymised employee put a company 
objective at risk. Usually, the word spreads fast as to who that person is and 
nobody likes to feature in a bad light on the announcement board. 
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4.3 Research tools 
4.3.1 HRO survey template 
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Risk management culture in water utilities 
Name1: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Organisation1: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Responsibility and experience in the organisation2: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Instructions 
This questionnaire has contains 45 statements relating to risk management cultures in 
organisations. This questionnaire has twofold purposes:  
 
Firstly, we would like to identify if you can observe any of these attributes in your 
organisation. Please use the following key to make your choice: 
 
Choice of answer Criteria 
Strongly Agree “This attribute is observable throughout my organisation without 
any exception!” 
Agree “This attribute is observable throughout my organisation with some 
exceptions!” 
Disagree “This attribute is not observable throughout my organisation. There 
are, however, some exceptions!” 
Strongly Disagree “This attribute is not observable throughout my organisation.  
 
Secondly, we would like to understand the perceived value of the described organisational 
attribute and the associated cost you would anticipate to implement and maintain these 
attributes.  
Please use the following key to make your choice: 
 
Choice of answer Criteria 
Highly cost beneficial  The benefits significantly outweigh the costs incurred 
Balanced cost benefit Approximate parity between cost and benefits 
Negative cost benefit The costs significantly outweigh the benefits  
                                                
1
 The analysis of this questionnaire will treat your name, your organisation, role, responsibility and experience 
in the organisation as anonymous information and is classed as confidential. 
2
 Please briefly outline your roles and responsibilities in the various organisational departments.  
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When making your choice, please consider the benefit of the described attribute in 
contributing to the water safety objective.  
 
Your estimate (or knowledge) of the cost should consider capital and operational expenditure 
for physical assets, human resource management and information assets required to 
implement and/or maintain the attribute. In estimating the cost, the following framework 
might be of use:  
 
Change management model Criteria  
Policy Consider the policy required to implement and maintain the 
described attribute 
Organisation Consider the cost for providing an organisation structure 
required to plan, implement, monitor, audit and review a 
policy which facilitates the described attribute 
Planning and Implementation Consider the cost for planning and implementing a policy 
which facilitates the described attribute 
Monitoring Consider the cost for a monitoring programme required to 
measure the success of the policy 
Auditing Consider the cost for auditing requirements to verify the 
successful operation of the policy 
Review Consider the cost for review procedures to ascertain the 
effectiveness of the policy 
 
 
Figure 1 is a representation on how the research question relates to the column provided to 
state your answer. Please tick the relevant boxes in the columns provided. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Example 
 
In designing this questionnaire, we aimed to reduce ambiguity that often arises from the use 
of terminology. Since this is a pilot study, we welcome any feedback on the use and clarity of 
terminology that would then be clearly defined in the main study ahead.  
 
Thank you for participating in this survey! 
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Ref Description  1) Observable in my 
organisation 
2) Cost – beneficial to 
implement and maintain 
1) Can you observe the following aspects in your organisation? 
2) Can you evaluate the cost benefit for water safety to implement and maintain 
the described characteristic? 
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Organisational culture of reliability         
A1 In my organisation, staff in operations have a strong sense for the primary mission of the 
organisation and share a common system of beliefs and perceptions. 
        
A2 In my organisation, the water supply system is continuously monitoring so that failure 
events are foreseen and understood.  
        
A3 In my organisation, our staff in operations have a highly developed understanding of their 
contribution to water safety and their role in the system.  
        
A4 In a water quality incident, our staff in operations act in a collaborative and collegiate 
manner and the group interaction can be described as collective intelligent interaction. 
        
A5 Our staff in operations are sensitive towards all events where water supply reliability is 
concerned. Staff know that a very small initial moment of inattention or misperception 
can lead to an escalation of failure, which can result in a water quality incident.  
        
A6 All our employees take responsibility where problems are identified and immediate 
corrective action programmes are required. 
        
A7 Our staff in operations are obliged to report their mistakes without fear of punishment.         
A8 In our organisation, individual behaviours, which jeopardise the primary mission of 
reliability, are labelled as disgrace.  
        
A8a Our senior management is committed to the reliability of the organisation. This is 
communicated to all levels in the organisation and demonstrated with investments in 
technology, processes and personnel. 
        
A9 In our organisation, individuals “monitor, advise, criticize and support” each other, in 
particular in situations where mistakes are more likely to occur. 
        
A10 In general, our staff are attentive, alert and act with care.         
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Ref. Description 1) Observable in my 
organisation 
2) Cost – benefit to 
implement and maintain 
 
1) Can you observe the following aspects in your organisation?   
2) Can you evaluate the cost benefit for water safety to implement and 
maintain the described characteristic? 
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Continuous learning and intensive training         
B1 In order to facilitate continuous learning and intensive training, our organisation constantly 
reviews their processes and ways of operating.  
        
B2 In preparation for a job, our staff in operations and maintenance staff receive training on the 
requirements of maintaining a safe system. These are embedded in formal rules, general 
guidelines and standardised frameworks. 
        
B3 Our staff in operations must adhere to standard operating procedures but also pro-actively 
identify potential sources of failure and actions to stop faults from escalating.  
        
X1 Our staff question procedures when in doubt about their appropriateness.         
X2 In unforeseen situations, staff in operations don’t follow rules blindly, but negotiate the 
course of action in a collegial manner with more experienced staff and supervisors.  
        
X3 During a water quality incident, staff in operations establish an emergency response team 
for joint decision making in order to avoid overlooking complex circumstances.  
        
B4 All our staff maintain a commitment to continuous learning and seek the acquisition and 
improvement of skills.  
        
B5 In our organisation we learn from failures, near misses and mistakes by other utilities and 
use these as a means to study the failure susceptibility of the own organisation. 
        
B6 In our organisation, even minor errors and incidents provide a source for learning which are 
assessed through root cause analysis. 
        
B7 Our organisation develops a collective memory for failures, incidents and root causes for 
failure, which helps the organisation to anticipate future problems. 
        
B8 In our organisation, we share a sense that learning from trial and error is not feasible to 
understand our water supply system. For staff training, we use offline methods of learning 
which consist of realistic drills, simulations and exercises to replicate potential failure 
scenarios. 
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Ref.  1) Observable in my 
organisation 
2) Cost – benefit to 
implement and 
maintain 
 1) Can you observe the following aspects in your organisation?   
2) Can you evaluate the cost benefit for water safety to implement and maintain the 
described characteristic? 
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Effective and varied patterns of communication         
C1 Our communication system makes our water supply system better understandable, predictable and 
controllable.  
        
C2 Our organisation operates in an information rich environment. All processes are measured and 
understood. Data are transparent and made available to all.   
        
C3 Our staff in operations are encouraged to share their experiences relating to the reliability of the 
system. Communication is designed as bottom up and top down to ensure rapid flow of information 
through the hierarchy of the system. Rapid dissemination of information helps the organisation to 
respond to water quality incidents with corrective action aiming to prevent the escalation of failure. 
        
X1 During a water quality incident, the response team maintains “closed loop” communication with all 
stakeholders within the organisation 
        
X2 During a water quality incident, the organisation maintains “closed loop” communication with the 
public, regulators and government authorities 
        
C4 In our organisation, communicating information shapes the ‘big picture’ of our organisational vision, 
mission and responsibility of individuals towards reliability. 
        
C5 Our organisation uses various channels to transmit different types data and information relating to 
monitoring and control of our assets (and ultimately water safety).  
Direct and complementary information enhance information reliability and provides a form of 
redundancy. 
        
C6 Multiple monitoring and control data from a variety of sources provide information density which 
allows individual signals to be scrutinised for fitting into the whole information pattern. Abnormal 
signals are treated as an indication for latent errors to unfold into failures. 
        
C7 In our organisation, interpersonal communications are formalised in a precise, unambiguous, 
impersonal and efficient structure, which denies individuals to communicate in their idiosyncratic 
communication style. 
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Ref. Description 1) Observable in my 
organisation 
2) Cost – benefit to 
implement and 
maintain 
 1) Can you observe the following aspects in your organisation?   
2) Can you evaluate the cost benefit for water safety to implement and maintain 
the described characteristic? 
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Adaptable decision making dynamics and flexible organisational structures         
D1 Our organisation can only prevent outbreaks with a high level of centralisation, because low-
level decision makers have insufficient understanding of the inter-relationship between their 
action and consequences on other elements of the water supply system.  During an 
emergency, control has to be maintained highly centralised in order to maintain overview of 
the entire system response to action on all sub-units. 
        
D2 In our organisation, decentralisation is required to respond rapidly to unfolding failures.  An 
emergency can be confined to one sub-unit, which is subsequently isolated from the entire 
system. The control over an emergency is decentralised to this subunit until the emergency is 
cleared. 
        
D1/2a In our organisation, centralisation at collective level coexists with decentralisation at 
individual level. The organisation exhibits an adaptive, flexible or organic nature. 
        
D3 Our organisation enforces the stringent adherence to standard operating procedures aiming 
for repeatability of action and routines. 
        
D4 Our standard operating procedures are constantly updated and incorporate lessons learnt. 
Formal rules and procedures are effective elements to identify and control risk. 
        
D5 In our organisation, activities, which are not defined in standard operating procedures, are 
based on decisions a most senior individual makes, as they should have the best knowledge 
of the system. 
        
D6 Our organisation has a hierarchical structure for decision making which reflects expertise, 
know-how and seniority. Each level has controls and regulating mechanisms.  
        
D7 Our organisation requires staff to conform to organisational norms and avoids innovative, 
autonomous or creative behaviours. 
        
D8 Our decision-making processes have slack in-built in order to assess and challenge decisions 
to avoid faulty decisions to escalate into failure.  
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Ref Description 1) Observable in my 
organisation 
2) Cost – benefit to 
implement and maintain 
 1) Can you observe the following aspects in your organisation?   
2) Can you evaluate the cost benefit for water safety to implement and maintain 
the described characteristic? 
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System and human redundancy         
E1 Our organisation maintains reserve capacity in the system. This includes back-up functions, 
overlapping tasks and responsibilities. 
        
E2 In our organisation, we are aware that redundancy can be counterproductive. Back-up 
functions can increase technical complexity, conceal errors and can lead individuals into not 
performing their required tasks under the assumptions that someone else takes care of his 
task. 
        
          
Precise procedures in managing technology         
F1 Our organisation does not use state of the art equipment to ensure that our technology does 
not add unnecessary complexity to the organisation. 
        
F2 In water supply systems design, our organisation aims to simplify complex technical 
systems and avoid unnecessary automation. 
        
F3 New technology acquisition is only justified if existing equipment does not perform to 
required specification. 
        
F4 In our organisation, existing technology is maintained to exceptionally high standards, as we 
do not tolerate defective, substandard or malfunctioning equipment. 
        
F5 In our organisation, maintenance activity and protocols as well as performance data are used 
to monitor the healthy operation of the system. 
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Ref. Description 1) Observable in my 
organisation 
2) Cost – benefit to 
implement and maintain 
 1) Can you observe the following aspects in your organisation?   
2) Can you evaluate the cost benefit for water safety to implement and maintain 
the described characteristic? 
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Human resource management practices that support reliability         
G1 In recruitment and selection, our organisation acquires suitable and skilled candidates for 
the jobs aiming to match the complexity of the environment with an equally complex set of 
people to understand the system. Diverging backgrounds for staff offer different ways of 
looking at systems.  
        
G2 Since most people do what is rewarded, our organisation remunerates reliability with 
incentives, recognition and career opportunities.  
        
G3 In our organisation, job rotation increases networking between teams and helps the 
organisation to transfer and diffuse knowledge and lessons learnt. 
        
G4 Our organisation has systems in place to monitor the behaviour of staff.         
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4.3.2 HRO framework for incident reviews 
Table 85 HRO framework for incident reviews 
Ref Description  Observable in the organisation from 
evidence found in the  incident 
documentation  
Based on the incident documentation, could the following aspects be observed prior to, during and /or after the 
incident? 
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Organisational culture of reliability     
A1 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved had a strong sense for the company 
objectives of the organisation and shared a common system of beliefs and perceptions. 
    
A2 During the incident, the water supply system was continuously monitored so that failure events were foreseen and 
understood.  
    
A3 During the incident, our staff in operations had a highly developed understanding of their contribution to water safety and 
their role in the system.  
    
A4 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved acted in a collaborative and collegiate 
manner.  
    
A5 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved were sensitive towards all events where 
water supply reliability is concerned. Staff knew that a very small initial moment of inattention or misperception could have 
lead to an escalation of failure, which could have resulted in a major water quality incident.  
    
A6 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved took responsibility where problems 
were identified and immediate corrective action programmes were required. 
    
A7 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved were obliged to report their mistakes 
without fear of punishment. 
    
A8 In our organisation, individual behaviours, which jeopardise the company objectives, are recognised as unacceptable.      
A8a During the incident, our senior management was (and still is) committed to the reliability of the organisation. This was 
communicated to all levels in the organisation and demonstrated with investments in technology, processes and 
personnel. 
    
A9 During the incident, individuals “monitor, advise, criticize and support” each other, in particular in situations where 
mistakes were more likely to occur. 
    
A10 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved were attentive, alert and acted with 
care. 
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Table 86 HRO framework for incident reviews (continued) 
Ref. Description Observable in the organisation from evidence 
found in the  incident documentation 
 
Based on the incident documentation, could the following aspects be observed prior to, during and /or after 
the incident? 
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Continuous learning and intensive training     
B1 After the incident, continuous learning and training were facilitated in a review of processes and ways of operating.      
B2 Prior to the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved received training on the 
requirements of maintaining a safe system. These are embedded in formal rules, general guidelines and 
standardised frameworks. 
    
B3 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved adhered to standard operating 
procedures but also pro-actively identified potential sources of failure and actions to stop faults from escalating.  
    
X1 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved would have questioned 
procedures if they were inappropriate. 
    
X2 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved didn’t follow rules blindly, but 
negotiated the course of action in a collegial manner (teamwork) with more experienced staff and supervisors.  
    
X3 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved established an emergency 
response team for joint decision making in order to avoid overlooking complex circumstances.  
    
B4 Staff in the incident management team and operators maintain a commitment to continuous learning and seek the 
acquisition and improvement of skills.  
    
B5 We learn from failures, near misses and mistakes by other utilities and use these as a means to study the failure 
susceptibility of the own organisation. 
    
B6 Even minor errors and incidents provide us with a source for learning.       
 After the incident, we carried out a root cause analysis.     
B7 Our organisation develops a collective memory for failures, incidents and root causes for failure, which helps the 
organisation to anticipate future problems. 
    
B8 We share a sense that learning from trial and error is not feasible to understand our water supply system. For staff 
training, we use offline methods of learning which consist of realistic drills, simulations and exercises to replicate 
potential failure scenarios. 
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Table 87 HRO framework for incident reviews (continued) 
 
Ref.  Observable in the organisation from 
evidence found in the  incident 
documentation 
 Based on the incident documentation, could the following aspects be observed prior to, during and /or after the 
incident? 
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Effective and varied patterns of communication     
C1 During the incident, our communication systems make our water supply system better understandable, predictable and 
controllable.  
    
C2 During the incident, our organisation operated in an information rich environment. Processes were measured and understood. 
Data is transparent and made available to all.   
    
C3 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved are encouraged to share their experiences 
relating to the reliability of the system. Communication is designed as bottom up and top down to ensure rapid flow of 
information through the hierarchy of the system. Rapid dissemination of information helps the organisation to respond to 
water quality incidents with corrective action aiming to prevent the escalation of failure. 
    
X1 During the incident, staff in the incident management team and operators involved maintained “closed loop” communication 
with all stakeholders within the organisation. (Closed loop means that actions are issued, acknowledged, implemented and 
the implementation confirmed, etc) 
    
X2 During the incident, the organisation maintained “closed loop” communication with the public, regulators and government 
authorities 
    
C4 During the incident, communicating information shaped the ‘big picture’ of our organisational vision, objective and 
responsibility of individuals towards reliability. 
    
C5 During the incident, our organisation used various channels to transmit different types of data and information relating to 
monitoring and control of our assets (and ultimately water safety).  
Direct and complementary information enhanced information reliability. 
    
C6 During the incident, multiple monitoring and control data from a variety of sources provided information density, which allowed 
individual signals to be verified.  
    
C7 During the incident, staff communications was formalised in a precise, unambiguous, impersonal and efficient structure.     
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Table 88 HRO framework for incident reviews (continued) 
 
Ref. Description Observable in the organisation from 
evidence found in the  incident 
documentation 
 Based on the incident documentation, could the following aspects be observed prior to, during and /or after 
the incident? 
S
t
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e
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e
e
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e
e
 
S
t
r
o
n
g
l
y
 
d
i
s
a
g
r
e
e
 
Dynamic decision making and flexible organisational structures     
      
D1 During an incident, our organisation maintains centralised control to provide an overview of the entire system     
D2 During the incident, decentralisation was required to respond rapidly to the unfolding failure.  The incident could be 
confined to one sub-unit, which was subsequently isolated from the entire system. The control over the incident was 
decentralised to this subunit until the emergency was cleared. 
    
D1/2a During the incident, centralisation at collective level coexists with decentralisation at individual level. The organisation 
exhibits an adaptive, flexible or organic nature. 
    
D3 During the incident, the organisation enforced the stringent adherence to standard operating procedures aiming for 
repeatability of action and routines. 
    
D4 After the incident, the standard operating procedures were updated and incorporated lessons learnt. These formal 
rules and procedures are effective elements to identify and control risk. 
    
D5 During the incident, activities, which were not defined in standard operating procedures, were based on decisions a 
most senior individual made, as they should have the best knowledge of the system. 
    
D6 During the incident, our organisation had a hierarchical structure for decision making which reflected expertise, know-
how and seniority. Each level had controls and regulating mechanisms.  
    
D7 During the incident, our organisation required staff to conform to organisational norms and avoids innovative, 
autonomous or creative behaviours. 
    
D8 During the incident, our decision-making processes had slack in-built in order to assess and challenge decisions to 
avoid faulty decisions that may escalate further into failure.  
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Table 89 HRO framework for incident reviews (continued) 
 
Ref Description Observable in the organisation from 
evidence found in the incident 
documentation 
 Based on the incident documentation, could the following aspects be observed prior to, during and /or after 
the incident? 
S
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System flexibility and redundancy     
E1 Our organisation maintains reserve capacity in the system. This included back-up functions, overlapping tasks and 
responsibilities. 
    
E2 Our organisation is aware that redundancy can also be counterproductive. Back-up functions can increase technical 
complexity, conceal errors and can lead individuals into not performing their required tasks under the assumptions that 
someone else takes care of his task. 
    
 During the incident, was the system redundancy effectively exploited to mitigate the customer impact?     
      
Precise procedures in managing technology     
F1 The technology employed to deliver service on this site/ within this system was not unnecessarily complex to operate 
and had no detrimental effect on the incident. 
    
F3 Prior to or after the incident, new technology acquisition was only justified if existing equipment did not perform to 
required specification. 
    
F4 Prior to or during the incident, the existing technology was maintained to exceptionally high standards, as we do not 
tolerate defective, substandard or malfunctioning equipment. 
    
F5 Prior to or during the incident, maintenance activity and protocols as well as performance data were used to monitor 
the healthy operation of the system. 
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Table 90 HRO framework for incident reviews (continued) 
Ref. Description Observable in the organisation from evidence 
found in the incident documentation 
 Based on the incident documentation, could the following aspects be observed prior to, during and /or 
after the incident? 
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Human resource management practices that support reliability     
G1 Prior to the incident, the recruitment and selection process acquired suitable and skilled candidates for the jobs 
aiming to match the complexity of the environment with an equally complex set of people who would understand 
the system.  
    
G2 During the incident, most people did what was rewarded. Our organisation remunerates reliability with incentives, 
recognition and career opportunities.  
    
G3 After the incident, job rotation increased networking between teams and helped the organisation to transfer and 
diffuse knowledge and lessons learnt. 
    
G4 During the incident, our organisation had systems in place to monitor the behaviour of staff.     
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4.3.3 Interview template – International interviewees 
Risk management culture in operations, incident management and asset management 
 
 
A Introduction  
 
Name: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Organisation: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Responsibilities and experience in the organisation: 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
B Organisational objectives 
 
1) What are the primary objectives of your organisation? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
C Public Health 
1) What are the principle means of your organisation to ensure that drinking water is safe and reliable?  
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2) How would you define a public health risk and which parameters would you monitor in water 
supply operations?* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
* E.g., considering the probability of a water quality events or incidents to occur, the hazards, 
its duration and the affected population 
 
2a) Can you outline the process your organisation has in place to monitor public health risks? Do you 
use public health risk assessments and/or asset management decision processes for planning and 
operating physical assets? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3) Drinking water quality in your country is of high standard and drinking water legislation is 
primarily based on the control of hazards (e.g. water quality parameters). In your opinion, could the 
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regulation of drinking water quality be more risk based, i.e. taking into consideration the probability of 
a water quality event or incident to occur, its duration and the affected population? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4) How would you determine an acceptable level of public health risk? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
D Asset management 
1) Could you please outline your asset management decision process or procedure?*  
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Please state the objectives, assessment procedure, acceptability criteria and the integration of 
the process in your organisation (e.g. Policy, Organisation, Planning & Implementation, 
Monitoring, Audit and Review)? 
 
 
 
2) What are the outcomes of the asset management decision process and how are the costs for 
investments or operational changes incorporated in the decision? 
  
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
E Incident management and organisational learning 
1) Can you briefly outline your water quality incident procedure?* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*
 Please state the objectives for incident management, any guidelines you have to contain 
hazards, decision support for the incident manager, training in incident management, and 
communication infrastructure to support the emergency response team! 
 
2) Do you have guidelines to reduce the impact of an incident on the affected population and the 
duration of the incident? Does your organisation have guidelines for an acceptable duration for 
different hazard types (chemical, biological, and aesthetics) during an incident? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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4.3.4 Interview template – Regional Water Utility 
Technical & organisational reliability in Regional Water Utility 
 
The learning organisation 
 
 
 
 
A) For the Operations Engineer & Manager / Duty Manager 
 
1) What was the main learning outcome from the incident for your job role? 
 
2) What was the main learning outcome from the incident for the organisation? 
 
Did the Decision Making Process work effectively? 
 
Did communication during the incident work effectively? 
 
3) Will you / did you carry out an incident review?  
 
Are there criteria to decide if a review is necessary to be carried out? 
 
4) In an incident review,  
 a) Do you review what happened, when, why and where it happened and  
who was involved? 
 b) Do you involve a representative from asset management in the incident review? 
 
5) Following the incident, were the company procedures (e.g. for incident, operations and /or 
asset management) reviewed and, if necessary, amended? 
 
6) After the incident, was a review carried out whether the same failure (risk) could occur on 
other, similar assets? 
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7) Can you describe the co-operation between the asset management department and 
operations? 
 
8) Can you describe the interaction of staff in operations with the business risk model?  
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5 Appendix Asset management 
5.1 Risk assessment inconsistency experiment 
The finding of the risk assessment experiment are presented. Six risk assessors were tasked to 
assess a water main for its potential to have an adverse impact on customers.  
Assessment 1 
For this asset, the risk assessor identified three failure scenarios describing the same problem, 
i.e. water mains failure resulting in “loss of supply”, “leakage” and “security of supply”. A 
risk assessment for “low pressure” and “discolouration” have been omitted.  
In the description of the failure scenario it is highlighted that further investigatory work needs 
to be done which should to determine the actual risk. It seems that the risk assessor 
approximated the probability and severity score rather than assessing the problem prior to the 
risk assessment. The level of risk is assumed but actually reflects uncertainty in probability 
and impact.  
Based on the proposed engineered solution, the post risk score is reduced in terms of 
probability and severity. According to my assessment of the engineering solution, the severity 
should remain unchanged.  
For one risk assessment, the probability score is erroneous and suggest continuous asset 
failure once a year for 365 days. This is obviously wrong unless the water main has failed and 
has not been repaired. In this case, the other two probability scores would be erroneous.  
 
 
Assessment 2 
The risk assessor for this asset uses one Failure scenario for a water mains burst to result in 
water quality issues. However, in the description of the failure scenario the risk assessor 
identifies a few more potential effects on customer objectives. These are discolouration, loss 
of supply and low pressure.  The post solution scenario reduces risk in terms of probability 
and severity. Considering the engineering solution, this is erroneous and the severity 
assessment should be left unchanged. 
 
 
Assessment 3 
This asset has two identified failure scenarios for the same problem of water mains burst. Two 
risk assessments identify loss of supply and low pressure. From our review of incidents, it 
was identified that water main bursts commonly result in the loss of supply for some 
properties whereas others experience temporary low pressures. It is also common for a mains 
burst to experience discolouration due to transient pressure and changes in flow which 
resuspends deposited sediments in the water mains.  
It is also problematic to use a duration as an indicator for “loss of supply” in the severity 
scale. The severity scale should emphasis a hazard exposure, the affected population and the 
duration of an incident.  
Although “loss of supply” is related to the reliability of drinking water supply, there are also 
hazardous implications from de-pressurising a water main. For such an incident, low-pressure 
zones can cause the ingress of ground- or contaminated water into the distribution network. 
This hazardous effect also applies to the severity assessment for “low pressure”.  
 
An Application of High Reliability Theory in the Water Utility Sector 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
R A Bradshaw Page A320 Appendices 
 
 
Assessment 4 
This asset has four identified and assessed failure scenarios to describe the effect of a 
perceived incident due to a burst main. According to the risk assessments, a water mains 
failure results in “discolouration”, “loss of supply”, “leakage” as well as “compliance with 
legal obligation”. The latter risk assessment has been primarily designed for the assessment of 
impounding reservoirs to comply with statutory obligations detailed in the Reservoirs Act.  
A risk assessment for “low pressure” has been omitted although this effect would be highly 
likely for certain properties in the distribution management area.  
 
Assessment 5 
Two failure scenarios describe one root cause. A water mains failure is assessed for “loss of 
supply” and “leakage”. It appears that the asset engineer does not know the difference 
between “loss of supply” and “leakage”. According to current definitions, “loss of supply” is 
instantaneous whereas “leakage” is continuous. There is a flawed logic with respect to 
designing a risk assessment for leakage since it reflects a continuous problem. Therefore, the 
probability for leakage always requires to be 100% to reflect its continuous nature. The 
assessment of leakage due to water mains burst has been noted also for previous asset 
assessments. 
Risk assessments for “low pressure” and “discolouration” have been omitted.  
 
 
Assessment 6 
The assessment for this water mains failure uses three failure scenarios and risk assessments. 
Again, there is confusion as to whether mains failure should be assessed as "loss of supply" or 
"leakage". The third risk assessment uses “discolouration” as severity type.  
Here, the probability assessment refers to probability of water mains failure rather than 
referring to the probability that discolouration may be experienced by customers.  
 
 
In this study, six identical assets that have been assessed by risk assessors are investigated. 
The asset under investigation was a water main and risk assessors were tasked to assess all 
perceivable risks for this asset using the risk assessment model of the Regional Water Utility. 
In addition, the author surveyed a further 30 risk assessments for a variety of assets. Across 
the 36 risk assessments under review, evidence for inconsistency in risk assessments and 
scope for the enhancement for the risk assessment process was found.  
The risk assessment process allows for multiple risk assessments for a common asset failure 
type. In the case studies described above, we investigated “water mains failure” as a failure 
type. In all six asset assessments, a varying range of risk assessments had been constructed to 
assess the probable consequences of this asset failure type.  
The ability to assess more than one risk for a failure scenario reflects the reality of incidents. 
Incidents and consequences of failure can be multicausal with multiple effects with varying 
interdependency. This reflects my investigation into incidents experienced in the organisation. 
Often, one cause can have multiple effects. A mains burst can result in reduced pressure, loss 
of supply and/or discolouration. These scenarios would be assessed in three failure scenarios. 
In a risk assessment, it is in the remit of the risk assessor to identify the appropriate 
consequences of failure and the number of risk assessments he/she will conduct.  
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In some cases, it was found that the choice of a severity category for consequences of failure 
is inappropriately selected. In one example, the risk assessor used "compliance with legal 
obligations" to assess the risk of a mains failure. Although a creative choice for a severity 
assessment, this indicator has been designed for compliance with statutory obligations 
expressed in the Reservoir Act. In this instance, the use of this indicator artificially boosts the 
overall risk of the asset, increases the chance of attracting cash for main refurbishment or 
rehabilitation and therefore distorts the cost benefit analysis.  
In some cases, some confusion was identifed about the definitions of the severity descriptions. 
A good example is leakage and loss of supply. Both indicators have been used to assess the 
impact of a water mains burst. The definition for leakage anticipates continuous leakage 
rather than being instantaneous due to a water main burst. Leakage is a continuous process 
and occurs at a probability of 100%. It could be argued that a risk assessment for leakage is 
no severity indicator to reflect customer exposure. The effect of leakage may result in loss of 
supply and low pressure due to the reduced availability of drinking water at customer tap.  
 
In the investigation into the derivation of probabilities for risks arising due to water mains 
failure it was also observed that, in one instance, the risk assessors only derived the 
probability of the asset to fail but not the probability of this asset failure to have an impact as 
described in the severity assessment. This would assume that the impact of asset failure is 
evaluated at 100% probability to have an impact on the customer and discards any system 
redundancy.  
In general, the asset assessments do not explicitly state that two probability assessments are 
required to determine the overall probability of impact. It would be advantageous to split the 
probability assessments into a) the probability of main failure and b) the probability of having 
an impact on customers described by the severity indicator.  
 
The structure of the probability tree was also investigated. It was noticed that a failure may 
occur more than once a year, yet, the probability factor does not exceed 100%. The design of 
the probability tree asks whether the asset may fail within this year. It does not ask how often 
it may fail and as a result, repeated annual failure is always assessed as 100 %. Basically, it 
doesn't matter if a main burst occurs once or 10 times a year.  
 
In conclusion, of this case study, a number of improvements may enhance the risk assessment 
process.  
Firstly, the severity scale may require revising in order to provide better and unbundled 
definitions for severity. The current definition use a number of different approaches to 
severity assessment which may not enable the risk assessor to make an accurate assessment. 
During my placement in the Regional Water Utility, the author designed enhanced severity 
indicators to distinguish between hazard exposure, affected population and the duration of an 
incident.  
A higher definition may be required for the risk assessor to make better choices from the list 
of severity indicators. It may be recommendable to provide a structured decision tree to enter 
failure scenarios and their respective impact severities. This could be structured similar to the 
decision tree for assessing probabilities. This would also help in reducing the confusion that 
seems to arise in selecting the appropriate severity indicators.  
In a structured decision tree, the appropriate use of indicators could be customised to the asset 
type.   
Currently, the process of risk identification and assessment allows for much flexibility on 
behalf of the risk assessor. In the 36 case studies, the consistency in risk assessment varies 
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greatly. In turn, the organisation relies on the competency of the risk assessor. For a 
decentralised data acquisition system and process, it is recommendable to enhance the process 
towards high process definition to achieve data consistency.  
 
 
 
 
.  
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5.2 Enhanced risk assessment template 
This is a copy of the semi-automated MS Excel risk assessment model 
 
 
Enhanced risk assessment template for assets      
  Data Input fields    
  Assessment Example  Probability of failure List 
At which installation type would the failure occur?  WTW   1 
Asset reference      
At which process group would the failure occur?  Secondary Treatment   23 
Asset reference      
At which process would the failure occur?  Secondary filtration   2 
Asset reference      
At which element would the failure occur?  Process   22 
Asset reference      
At which component would the failure occur?  WTW - Chemical dosing pumps   3 
Asset reference      
At which type of IT/IS asset would the failure occur?  N/A   4 
What would happen (Symptom or effect)?  Treatment process failure   5 
Why would it happen (cause of failure)?  Pollution   5 
The failure scenario can be attributed to ….  Corrosion   7 
It can also be attributed to….  Corrosion   7 
It can also be attributed to….  Corrosion   7 
It can also be attributed to….  Corrosion   7 
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It can also be attributed to….  Corrosion   7 
Would Human factor play a role in causing the failure?  N/A   8 
Would any aspects of organisational culture contribute?  N/A   9 
What type of probability assessment for the equipment is used?  Weibull   10 
Probability/frequency of equipment to trip or failure per year?  0.7  70.00%  
How long does it take to reset/repair/replace asset? Max repair time in days is the lower of the 
following : 365 or  521 30.00  30.00  
Equipment non-availability in days    21.00  
Equipment non-availability in percent    5.75%  
Does the asset have redundancy (e.g. duty standby)?  Duty/Standby 1  11 
Probability/frequency of redundancy to trip or failure per year?  0.6  60.00%  
How long does it take to reset/repair/replace redundant asset? Max repair time in days is the lower of 
the following : 365 or 608 20.00  20.00  
Element non-availability in days    0.7  
Element non-availability in percent    0.19%  
What is the probability that other, alternative or parallel elements will compensate for the loss of one 
element?  VH  10.00% 13 
Process non-availability in days    0.1  
Process non-availability in percent    0.000189154  
What is the probability that other, alternative or parallel processes will compensate for the loss of one 
process?  L  70.00% 13 
Process group  non-availability in days    0.0  
Process group non-availability in percent    0.01%  
What is the probability that other, alternative or parallel process groups will compensate for the loss 
of one process group? 
 M  50.00% 13 
Installation non-availability in days    0.02  
Probability that installation non-availability    0.01%  
Installation availability in days per year    364.98  
Are there any installations between the failed installation and the customer which may reduce the 
impact?  
 SRE  0 15 
What is the probability that these installations avoid an impact on customers?  L  70.00% 16 
Customer impact in days    0.0  
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Customer impact probability in percent    0.00%  
Can you characterise the impact on customers?  
Biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged, Boil 
order as risk of illness through 
drinking water 1 64 17 
How many people would be affected?  0 - 7500  2 24 
Can you characterise other impact on customers?  N/A 0 0 17 
How many people would be affected?  0 - 7500  2  
Can you characterise other impact on customers?  N/A 0 0 17 
How many people would be affected?  0 - 7500  2  
How would the failure of the component be noticed?  customer contact   18 
Are other installations available in the region to compensate for the loss of this installation?  BH   19 
What other redundancy is available should the asset fail (e.g. alternative plant, system)?  Bottled water   20 
How long would it take to identify the source of failure (up to X hrs)?  1   21 
How long would it take to re-instate a safe system (up to X hrs)?  3   21 
Time exposure to incident   4 2  
Incident impact    22.6644  
Incident impact    1.3332  
Incident impact    1.3332  
Total incident impact    22.6644  
Risk score    0.001050328  
What type of management intervention might effectively reduce the risk?  Capital maintenance    
Figure 28 Risk assessment template 
 
The following tables represent the drop-down menu on the risk assessment template referred to in the right-hand column of the model in Figure 
28. 
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5 24  6 1 23 2 22 4 
3 
18 21  7 8 
                  
  
          
What 
happened 
first? 0 - 7500 2 
 
Which physical 
asset type is the 
source of the 
incident? 
Primary 
Treatment 
Process 
group Building 
Was an 
IT/IS asset 
the source 
of the 
incident? 
Can the 
incident be 
attributed to a 
specific 
component? 
How was it 
notified? 
How 
long did 
it take 
to 
identify 
the 
source 
of 
failure? 
The failure 
scenario can be 
attributed to …. 
Did 
Human 
factor play 
a role in 
causing 
the 
incident? 
Asset failure 
7500 - 
15000 4 
 
Asset type 
Secondar
y 
Treatment Intake Civil 
Information 
assets 
Component 
type 
customer 
contact 0  Material fatigue N/A 
Component 
failure 
15000 - 
30000 8 
 
Aquifer 
Tertiary 
Treatment 
Sedimentatio
n 
Mechanica
l  
Monitoring 
equipment N/A 3rd party 1  Corrosion 
Operator 
error 
Civil failure 30000 - 
60000 
16 
 
BH N/A coagulation Electrical 
Control 
equipment 
(e.g. MCC) Dam 
Member of 
public 2  Wear&Tear 
lack of 
experience 
Water main 
failure 
60000 - 
125000 
32 
 
Catchment  Flocculation Process SCADA 
Reservoir 
intake Operator 3  
operating 
environment 
(climate, soil 
condition) 
Lack of 
knowledge 
Mechanical 
failure 
125000 
- 
250000 64 
 
IRE  DAF  PLC 
Reservoir 
embankment Manager 4  3 rd part impact 
Lack of 
informatio
n 
Electrical 
failure 
250000 
- 
500000 
12
5 
 
River abstraction   
Primary 
filtration 
 Telemetry 
BH/River - 
Structure 
(Well/Bore) 
Emergenc
y services 5  Unfit for purpose 
Lack of 
training 
Treatment 
process failure 
500000 
- 
100000
0 
25
0 
 
Raw water 
pumping station  
Secondary 
filtration  
IT 
architectur
e 
BH/River - 
Pump & 
motor PLC 6  
Lack of 
maintenance 
Lack of 
instruction
s 
ICA failure > 
100000
0 
50
0 
 
Raw water 
main/Aqueduct  
Chemical 
treatment 
equipment 
 N/A 
BH/River - 
water main SCADA 7  Lack of standby 
Lack of 
supervisio
n 
Power failure N/A 
 
 
WTW  N/A   
BH/River - 
valve  8  Poor design  
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Pollution  
 
 
SRE     
BH/River - 
Flowmeter  9  
Poor operational 
use  
Raw water 
quality 
 
 
 
Water tower     
BH/River - 
monitoring 
equipment 
 10  Poor access  
Adverse 
weather 
 
 
 Drinking water 
trunk main 
(>300mm)     
BH/river - 
control 
equipment  11  
Poor lifting 
facilities  
Pollution  
 
 Water main 
(distribution) 
    
Catchment - 
Structures 
 12  
Poor 
maintainability 
 
3rd party  
 
 Power 
generation/powe
r supply 
    
WTW - 
Structure  13  Poor SOP  
Ingress of 
contamination 
 
 
 customer 
installation     WTW - Inlet  14  Poor condition  
security failure   
 
WPS     
WTW - 
Screening  15  Age  
Asset does not 
meet 
requirement to 
meet demand   
 
     
WTW - 
Coagulation  16  Inappropriate use  
Asset does not 
meet water 
quality 
objectives   
 
     
WTW - 
Flocculation  17  Adverse weather  
Asset failed to 
deliver 
service/produc
t   
 
     
WTW - 
Sedimentatio
n  18  
Water 
hammer/Transien
t pressure  
Hydraulic 
effect   
 
     
WTW - 
Filtration  19  
Differential 
settlement  
Insufficient 
capacity 
  
 
     
WTW - 
Contact tank 
 20  
Quality of 
chemicals 
 
Change in 
demand   
 
     
WTW - 
Chemical 
storage  21  Draught  
No water   
 
     
WTW - 
Chemical 
dosing 
equipment  22  flooding  
Too much 
water   
 
     
WTW - 
Chemical 
dosing pumps  23  N/A  
   
 
     
WTW - Pump 
& motor 
 24    
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     WTW - Valve  25    
   
 
     
WTW - 
Flowmeter 
 26    
   
 
     
WTW - 
Monitoring 
equipment  27    
   
 
     
WTW - 
control 
equipment 
 28    
   
 
     
SRE/WT - 
Structure 
 29    
   
 
     
SRE/WT - 
Pump & 
motor  30    
   
 
     
SRE/WT - 
Valve 
 31    
   
 
     
SRE/WT - 
Flowmeter  32    
   
 
     
SRE/WT - 
water main 
 33    
   
 
     
SRE/WT - 
monitoring 
equipment  34    
   
 
     
SRE/WT - 
control 
equipment  35    
   
 
     
Distribution - 
Structure 
 36    
   
 
     
Distribution - 
water main  37    
   
 
     
distribution - 
pump & 
motor  38    
   
 
     
Distribution - 
Valve  39    
   
 
     
Distribution - 
flowmeter 
 40    
   
 
     
distribution - 
monitoring 
equipment  41    
   
 
     
distribution - 
control 
equipment  42    
   
 
     
WPS - 
Structure 
 43    
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WPS - Pump 
& motor  44    
   
 
     WPS - Valve  45    
   
 
     
WPS - water 
main  46    
   
 
     
WPS - 
monitoring 
equipment 
 47    
   
 
     
WPS - control 
equipment  48    
   
 
       49    
Figure 29 Drop-down menu for risk assessment template 
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9  10 11 12 15 19 20 17 22 14 13 16 25 
Culture 
Was this type of 
incident previously 
assessed for this type 
of risk? 
Type of 
prob 
assessment D/D/S Redundancy 
Other 
installations 
Other 
installations 
Other 
redundancy 
Can you characterise the impact on 
customers? 
What type of 
management 
intervention might 
effectively reduce 
the risk? 
Installation 
failure 
Alternative 
processes 
Customer 
impact Duration 
N/A Unpredicted failure 
Manual 
decision 
tree 
Duty 
only 
No 
redundancy 
No other 
installations 
available 
No other 
installations 
available 
Water 
tankering 
Biological pathogens present, Public 
health effect. Illness through drinking 
water Capital investment 
It will not 
fail 
No other 
element/process/pro
cess group available 
A customer 
impact 
cannot be 
avoided 0 
Poor 
attitude Predicted failure Weibull 
Duty/Sta
ndby 
Common 
cause failure WTW Aquifer 
Bottled 
water 
Biological pathogens present, health 
effects envisaged, Boil order as risk of 
illness through drinking water Capital maintenance VL 
The cause of failure 
affects other units 
too VL 1 
Poor 
behaviou
r 
Predicted failure, but 
unanticipated impact  
Duty/Dut
y/ 
Standby VH SRE BH  
Biological pathogens present, PCV failure 
leading to an undertaking Asset replacement L VL L 2 
Careless
ness Operate to fail policy  
No 
redunda
ncy H Water tower Catchment  
Biological pathogens present, Trivial 
sample failure Asset refurbishment M L M 3 
Poor 
work 
processe
s Low risk   M WPS IRE  
Potential biological pathogens present, 
health effects envisaged Operator training H M H 4 
Poor 
training Medium risk   L  
River 
abstraction   Potential biological pathogens present operator information VH H VH 5 
Poor 
decision 
making High risk   VL  
Raw water 
pumping 
station 
 
Chemicals present above guidelines, 
health effects envisaged, PCV failure 
leading to an undertaking Operator instruction 
It will 
certainly 
fail VH 
customer 
impact can 
be avoided 6 
Poor 
communi
cation 
Asset failure 
predicted but not 
impact on customer 
  Failsafe  
Raw water 
main/Aqued
uct 
 
Chemicals present above guidelines, 
Trivial sample failure Operator supervision  
Yes, other 
elements/processes
/process groups can 
fully compensate N/A 7 
      WTW  
Aesthetics above guidelines, >200ug/l 
Iron or DWI reportable incident. Highly 
discoloured, resembles beer or Guinness 
    8 
      SRE  
Aesthetics, >150 ug/l or notable events. 
Opaque and discoloured resembles weak 
milky tea. 
    9 
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      Water tower  
Aesthetics, 100-150ug/l Iron or minor 
events. Translucent and discoloured 
resembles orange juice or lager.     10 
      
Drinking 
water trunk 
main 
(>300mm)  
Aesthetics, 50-100 ug/l Iron and no events. 
Particulate material visible in clear water     11 
      
Water main 
(distribution
) 
 
Aesthetics, < 50ug/l Iron and no events - 
Slight discolouration noticed in customer 
bath, Compliance but customer complaint 
    12 
      
Power 
generation/
power 
supply 
 Loss of supply     13 
      WPS  Potential contaminant ingress     14 
        Pressure <15m pressure     15 
        
Pressure - No flow upstairs at peak 
demand period (<10m pressure)     16 
        
Pressure  - No flow at peak demand 
period (<5m pressure)     17 
        Accident (Staff)     18 
        Accident (3rd party)     19 
        Injury (Staff)     20 
        Injury (3rd party)     21 
        N/A     22 
Figure 30 Drop-down menu for risk assessment template 
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5.3 Research tools 
5.3.1 Interview template – Regional Water Utility 
Technical & organisational reliability in Regional Water Utility 
 
The learning organisation 
 
In your job role as Asset Engineer, how do you get involved in the daily operations of water 
production and distribution? 
 
Can you briefly describe the process of identifying asset needs towards capital and 
operational solutions!  
 
How would you evaluate the Business Risk Model (BRM) and what improvements would you 
suggest? 
 
How do you -as an Asset Engineer- get involved in incidents? 
 
From your experience or knowledge, is the emphasis of incident review meetings more on 
technical issues or on human error and operating procedures? 
 
After an incident, is the risk of re-occurrence of an incident logged on BRM?  
 
After an incident happened at one site/asset, is a review carried out whether the same 
technical failure could occur on other, similar assets? 
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6 List of participants 
Participant 
No. 
Name Job title Organisation Country 
1  Process Engineer RWU UK 
2  Asset Engineer RWU  
3  Process Engineer RWU  
4  Specialist Engineer 
(Distribution systems) 
RWU  
5  Senior Ops Manager RWU  
6  Ops Manager RWU  
7  Incident/Ops. Manager RWU  
8  Ops Manager RWU  
9  Asset Engineer  RWU  
10  Ops Manager RWU  
11  Asset Engineer RWU  
12  Asset Engineer RWU  
13  Asset Manager 
(Rationalisation) 
RWU  
14  Asset Engineer (Distribution) RWU  
15  Process Engineer RWU  
16  Senior Manager (Risk)  UK 
17  Senior Manager (Risk)  UK 
18  General Manager  UK 
19  Asset Manager  Canada 
20  Asset Manager  Canada 
21  Asset Manager  Canada 
22  Ops Incident Manager RWU  
23  Ops Manager RWU  
24  Asset Engineer RWU  
25  Asset Planning Manager RWU  
26  Senior Asset Manager RWU  
27  Asset Engineer RWU  
28  Senior Asset Manager RWU  
29  Asset Manager RWU  
30  IT Manager RWU  
31  Asset Manager RWU  
32  Process Manager RWU  
33  Asset Engineer RWU  
34  Asset Manager RWU  
35     
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